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VOL. CCCXXXV.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

V.

PRINTED BY CRAPELET, 9, RUE DE VAUGIRARD.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"Bellum maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—Tit. Liv. *lib.* 21.

VOL. V.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME V.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

OCTOBER, 1801.—MAY, 1803.

Universal joy at the Peace of Amiens in France and England—Napoléon projects an Expedition against St.-Domingo—Sketch of the Revolution of that island since 1789—Arrival of the French Expedition: its early successes and deplorable fate—Contemporaneous Massacres and Disturbances in Martinique and Guadaloupe—Partition of the German Indemnities, and violent jealousies which it produced—Continental Affairs—Violent interference with Switzerland by the First Consul—State of Parties, and objects in dispute in that confederacy—Continued occupation of Holland by the French troops—Commercial and Financial situation of France and England during the Peace—Increasing jealousy of these two powers at each other—Negotiations on the subject—Their Rupture and Renewal of the War.—P. 1—65.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

MAY 1803—DECEMBER 1804.

Conquest of Hanover, and occupation of Italy by the French—Preparations in Great Britain and France upon the Renewal of the War—The Volunteers in England, and the Flotilla and vast forces collected by Napoléon—Their new organization and admirable arrangement—Negotiations between France and Russia—Increasing coldness of these two powers—Seizure of Sir George Rumbold, and proceedings of Napoléon against the English envoys, Drake and Spencer Smith, at the Lesser Courts of Germany—Naval and Colonial Operations of the year—Treaties between France and Spain and Portugal for the payment of large subsidies by the latter powers—Capture of the Spanish Treasure Frigates, and consequent War with the Court of Madrid—Debates on that subject in Parliament.—P. 66—117.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF 1805.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR TO THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

Formation of a Confederacy between Russia, Austria, and England, against France—Its secret conditions and fixed objects, which were never afterwards departed from during the war—Financial details of France and England at this period—Increasing intimacy between France and Prussia under the influence of the lure held out by the promised cession of Hanover to the latter power—Indecision and dishonourable conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin—Increased preparation for the invasion of England—Sailing of the combined fleet from Europe to the West Indies, whither they are followed by Nelson—Their return, and defeat by Sir R. Calder—which destroys all Napoléon's projects—March of the army from Boulogne for the Rhine—Battle of Trafalgar—Death and character of Nelson.—P. 118—183.

35698

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

OCTOBER—DECEMBER, 1805.

Forces on both sides in Germany and Italy—Rapidity and skill of the march of the French army across Germany—Violation of the territory of Anspach, and profound impression which it produces at Berlin—Actions round Ulm—Investment and capitulation of Mack—Campaign in Italy—Bloody but indecisive actions between the Archduke Charles and Masséna—Advance of Napoléon to Vienna—Alliance of Prussia and Russia against France—Campaign in Moravia—Battle of Austerlitz—Peace of Preshurg and return of Napoléon to Paris—Death and character of Mr. Pitt.—P. 184—253.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR. PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

1786 - 1816.

Astonishing Magnitude of the English Financial resources during the war—Origin and growth of the Sinking Fund—Mr. Pitt's principle on that subject—Its prodigious effects—Progressive maturing of the system—And ease with which it would have liquidated the whole debt before 1840—Causes which led to its abandonment, and disastrous consequences of that policy—General policy of Mr. Pitt regarding Taxation—Errors of his system—The undue extent of the Funding system—Niggardly use of the British military strength—Borrowing in 3 per cents—Hopeless present state of the British Finances.—P. 254—269.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

Accession of the Whig Ministry in England—Invasion of Naples by the French—Siege of Gaeta—Battle of Maida, and subjugation of the country by these forces—Occupation of Hanover by Prussia, and war of that power with England—Maritime Operations and total destruction of the French Navy—Reflections on that occurrence—Differences between America and Great Britain, which are adjusted—Capture of the Cape of Good Hope, and Expedition to Buenos Ayres—Its disastrous issue—Increasing jealousy between France and Prussia—Its causes—Violent excitement at Berlin—Where war is resolved on—Negotiations between France and Russia, which are broken off after peace had been signed at Paris—And between France and England, which are also abandoned—Death and character of Mr. Fox.—P. 297—346.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA.

OCTOBER—DECEMBER—1806.

Forces on both sides—Preparatory Movements of the Prussians—Advance of the French to the Saale—Indecision of the Duke of Brunswick—Who is turned and thrown back on the Saale—Battle of Jena, and total defeat of the Prussians—Battle of Auerstadt—Unparalleled disasters of the retreat—Actions at Halle, Prentzlow, Lubeck—Surrender of Hohenlohe, Blucher, and other corps—Fall of Stettin, Custrin, Magdebourg, and Hameln—Advance to Berlin by Napoléon—And of the French army to the Oder—Civil and Military organization of the conquered territories to the Vistula.—P. 347—394.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

PEACE OF AMIENS.

FROM THE CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

OCTOBER, 1801.—MAY, 1803.

ARGUMENT.

Universal joy in the British Islands at the Conclusion of the War—Napoléon meditates an expedition to St.-Domingo—Disastrous effects of the Revolt in that Island to the French Navy—Description of St.-Domingo—Its Statistical Details—Origin of the Revolution in that Island—Rash Measures of the French Constituent Assembly—Freedom is conferred on all persons of colour—The Insurrection breaks out—Its progress and horrors—The Constituent Assembly endeavour without success to retrace their steps—French Delegates in vain strive to settle the differences—The Insurrection becomes universal—The Girondists resolve upon unlimited concession—The arrival of their Commissioners augments the discord—Storming and Massacre of Cape Town—The universal freedom of the Blacks is proclaimed—The English obtain a footing on the Island—Furious civil wars which ensued between the negroes and mulattoes—Napoléon confirms Toussaint in his command—Vigorous measures of the Negro Chief in the Administration—His agricultural policy—and is appointed President for life of the Island—Napoléon instantly resolves to subdue it—Increasing prosperity of the inhabitants under Toussaint's Administration—Preparations of Napoléon for its subjugation—Immense Naval and Military forces assembled—British Government make no opposition—Expedition sails and arrives off St.-Domingo—First irresolution, but final firmness of Toussaint—The French land and Cape Town is burnt by the Blacks—But the French generally prevail in the field—Description of the mountainous interior to which the Negroes retire—Fruitless endeavour to induce Toussaint to submit—General and successful attack on his position—Desperate defence of a Fort in the mountains—The war assumes a Guerilla character—Negotiations for the termination of hostilities—Dignified conduct of Toussaint—General Pacification—Treacherous views of Napoléon—Perfidious arrest of Toussaint by the French authorities—Dreadful atrocities on both sides in Guadaloupe—Perfidious conduct of the French towards that Island—General revolt in St.-Domingo in consequence—Death of Leclerc, and ruin of the French army—continued successes of the Negroes—The Rupture of the Peace of Amiens completely destroys the French army—Reflections on this Expedition—And on the measure which it affords of the capacity of the Negroes—Degraded state of St.-Domingo ever since that time—Ambitious designs of Napoléon in Europe—Holland is again Revolutionized—And the Cisalpine Republic again remodelled—Entry of Napoléon into Lyon—Senatus Consultum there settling the Cisalpine Government—Nature of the New Constitution—Annexation of Piedmont to France—Construction of the Roads over Mont Cenis and the Simplon—Parma and Placentia are occupied by the French, with Elba—Progress of the Negotiations for the German

indemnities—Cordial Union of France and Prussia in this matter—In return for which Prussia guarantees the French acquisitions in Italy—Policy of Austria in this Negotiation—And of Russia—Secret views of the latter Power—Courageous act of Austria in occupying Passau—Angry Correspondence in consequence between France and Austria—Conference at Ratisbon—The principle of Secularization is admitted—Compensation respectively received—Proportion in which the several Powers gained acquisitions—Disastrous moral effect of this Spoliation of the Ecclesiastical Princes—Projects of Napoléon against Switzerland—Advantages of the Federal System in that country—Its adaptation to the varieties of their physical condition—Different characters of the races which composed its inhabitants—Discontent which the Central Democratic Government produced—Violent internal dissentions of the Swiss Cantons—Arguments adduced by the Partisans of France—Answers made by the Partisans of the old Institutions—Revolution effected by the aid of the French troops—But it does not answer the views of Napoléon—The new Government is again deposed—And a fresh Constitution framed by Napoléon—French Troops are withdrawn, and the Independence of the Valais proclaimed—Upon which the Government of Berne is overturned—The Mountaineers prepare for War—Heroic Proclamation of the Forest Cantons—Hostilities commence—Great early success of the Mountaineers—Diet assembled at Schwitz—Total subversion of the Central Government—Forcible interference of the First Consul—The Swiss in vain invoke the aid of Austria—Ney overruns the country with twenty thousand men—England remonstrates in vain—Dignified address of the Deputies of the Zurich Cantons on resigning the Government—The Swiss in despair submit—Aloys Reding and the leaders of the Confederates are arrested—Speech of the First Consul to the Swiss Deputies at Paris—Discontent which his principles excite on both sides—His final act of mediation for the settlement of Helvetia—Equitable measures for the Government of the country—Admirable principles of Napoléon's measures in this respect—Extreme dissatisfaction excited by this event over Europe—Honourable opinions of Mr. Fox on the subject, and on the treatment of Holland—Tranquillity and happiness of England during this period—Rapid improvement of the Finances and Trade of the country—And of British Shipping—Financial Details—Comparison of the Income and Expenditure in 1802 and 1803—Causes of irritation which gradually arose between England and France—Complaints of the First Consul at the English Newspapers—M. Otto's Note on this subject—Indignation at this proceeding even in France itself—Answer made to M. Otto by the British Government—Trial of Peltier for a Libel on the First Consul—War of the public Journals on both sides—Expedition of Sebastiani to Egypt—English resolve to retain Malta as a security—Violent explosion of Napoléon in conversation with Lord Whitworth—Hostile preparations on both sides—Second violent ebullition of Napoléon on Lord Whitworth—Diplomatic and Military preparations of France—Note in reply from Lord Hawkesbury—Ultimatum of both parties—War is at length declared—Arrest of all the British travellers in France—General indignation which it excites even in that country—Debates on the War in Parliament—Arguments in favour of it by the Ministry—And on the other side by the Opposition—Reflections on the altered tone of the Opposition—England was obviously resolved on war—But it was unavoidable on Napoléon's acknowledged intentions—His designs for the naval subjugation of this country—Incessant conquest was indispensable to his existence on the throne—Greatest stretches of power by France under his reign were always made during peace—And he was uniformly most rigorous to those who had submitted the most and been most faithful in their alliance with France—He meditated therefore in the end a resistless attack on Great Britain after a long peace.

Universal joy in the British Islands at the termination of the war.

UNBOUNDED was the joy, unlimited the hopes, conceived in Europe upon the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. Ten years of ceaseless effusion of blood had tamed the fiercest spirits, and hushed the strongest passions; the finances of all the parties in the strife had become grievously embarrassed; and the people of every country, yielding to the joyful illusion, fondly imagined that the years of discord had terminated, and a long season of peace and prosperity was to obliterate the traces of human suffering. They did not reflect on the unstable basis on which this temporary respite was rested; they did not consider that it was not from the causes of hostility having ceased, but the means of carrying it on having been exhausted, that a truce had been obtained; that the elements of a yet greater conflagration lay smouldering in the ashes of that which was past, that discordant passions had been silenced, not extinguished; irreconcilable interests severed, not adjusted. Little anticipating the dreadful calamities which yet awaited them, the population of Paris forgot, in the glitter of reviews, and the splendour of

military pageantry, all the calamities of the Revolution; the inhabitants of Vienna enjoyed with unwonted zest the respite from anxiety and exertion which the suspension of hostilities afforded them; and the youth of Britain hastened in crowds to the French metropolis, to gratify their curiosity by the sight of the scenes which had so long been the theatre of such tragic events, and the heroes who had gained immortality in such glorious achievements.

Napoléon meditates an expedition to St.-Domingo.

But not one instant's respite did the First Consul allow to his own active and indefatigable mind. Deeming nothing done while aught remained to do, he had no sooner arrived at the highest point of military glory, than he turned his attention to the restoration of naval power, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity which the suspension of maritime hostilities afforded to revive that decayed but indispensable part of public strength. Wisely deeming the recovery of the French colonies the only means that could be relied on for the permanent support of his marine forces, he projected, on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, an expedition for the recovery of St.-Domingo, the once great and splendid possession of France in the Gulf of Mexico, long nursed by the care and attention of the monarchy, at once lost by the reckless innovations of the Constituent Assembly.

Disastrous effects of the St.-Domingo revolt to the French navy.

It would seem as if the laws of Providence, in nations not less than individuals, have provided for the certain ultimate punishment of inordinate passions, in the consequences flowing from their own indulgence. Long before the war commenced, or the fleets of France had felt the weight of British strength; before one shot had been fired on the ocean, or one harbour blockaded by a hostile squadron, the basis on which the French maritime power rested had been destroyed. Not the conquest of the Nile, or the conflagration of Toulon; not the catastrophe of Camperdown, or the thunderbolt of Trafalgar, ruined the navy of France. Severe as these blows were, they were not irremediable; while her colonies remained, the means of repairing them existed. It was the rashness of ignorant legislation which inflicted the fatal wound, the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm which produced consequences that could never be repaired.

Description of St.-Domingo

St.-Domingo, the greatest, with the exception of Cuba, and, beyond all question, before the Revolution, the most flourishing of the West India islands, is about an hundred marine leagues, or three hundred English miles in length, and its mean breadth is about thirty leagues, or ninety miles. It contains three thousand square leagues, of which two-thirds were, in 1789, in the hands of the Spaniards, and one-third in those of the French. Although the French portion was the smallest, yet it was incomparably the most productive, both from the nature of the soil, and the cultivation bestowed on the surface. The Spanish consisted for the most part of steril mountains, clothed with forests, or rising into naked cliffs, in the centre of the island; whereas the French lay in the plains and valleys at their feet, and had the advantage both of the numerous streams which, in that humid climate, descended from their wooded sides, and the frequent bays and gulfs which the ocean had formed in its deeply indented shore (1).

The French possession of their portion of the island commenced in 1664, and notwithstanding the frequent interruption of their colonial trade during the wars with England, its prosperity increased in a most extraordinary degree, and in a ratio far beyond that of any other of the West India islands. As usual in all the colonies of that part of the world, the inhabitants consisted

(1) Dum. viii. 457, 458.

of whites, mulattoes, and negro slaves; the former were about 40,000, the latter 60,000; but the slave population exceeded 500,000. Such a disproportion was in itself a most perilous element in social prosperity; but it was much increased by the habits and prejudices of the European race, who were exposed to so many dangers. A large portion of the property of the island was in the hands of an inconsiderable number of great and old families, whose fortunes were immense, prejudices strong, and luxury extreme; while a far more numerous but less opulent body, under the name of *Petits Blancs*, were gradually rising into importance, and, like the Tiers-État in the mother country, felt far more jealousy of the great proprietors than apprehensions of the consequences of political innovation. Not a few also of the great proprietors were overwhelmed with debt, the natural consequence of long continued extravagance; and experience soon proved, that not less in the new than the old world, it was in that class that the most ardent and dangerous partisans of revolutionary change were to be found (1).

Its statistical details.

The produce of the island, and the commerce which it maintained with the mother country before the commencement of the troubles, was immense. The French part alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British islands taken together. Its exports amounted to the enormous value of 168,000,000 francs, or L.6,720,000; and the gross produce, including the Spanish portion, amounted to 460,000,000 francs, or L.18,400,000, while its imports, in manufactures of the parent state, were no less than 250,000,000 or L.10,000,000 sterling. More than half of this immense produce was re-exported from France to other states, and the commerce thence arising was the chief support of its maritime power. Sixteen hundred vessels, and twenty-seven thousand sailors, were employed in conducting all the branches of this vast colonial traffic. With so magnificent a possession, France had no occasion to envy the dependencies of all other states put together (2). It was this splendid and unequalled colonial possession which the French nation threw away and destroyed at the commencement of the Revolution, with a recklessness and improvidence of which the previous history of the world had afforded no example.

Origin of the Revolution in that island.

Hardly had the cry of liberty and equality been raised in France when it responded warmly and vehemently from the shores of St.-Domingo. Independently of the natural passion for liberty, which must ever exist among those who are subjected to the restraints of servitude, the slave population of this colony were rapidly assailed by revolutionary agents and emissaries, and the workshops and fields of the planters overrun by heated missionaries, who poured into an ignorant and ardent multitude the new-born ideas of European freedom. The planters were far from appreciating the danger with which they were menaced. On the contrary, a large proportion of the smaller class took part, as usual in revolutionary convulsions, with the popular party, and aided in the propagation of principles destined soon to exterminate themselves with slaughter and conflagration. All united in regarding the crisis in the mother country as a favourable opportunity for asserting their independence, and emancipating themselves from those restraints which the jealousy of her policy had imposed on their commerce (3).

(1) Dum. viii. 460, 464.

(2) Dum. viii. 112, 113. Jom. xiv. 445. Bing. ii. 407.

The produce of the whole British West India islands exported is now L.8.448,839; the British manufactures they consume, is L.3,988,286; the shipping employed in their trade 249,079 tons; the seamen, 13,691 in the outward, 14,900 in the homeward voyages. The total gross agricultural produce of the islands is about L.22,000,000.—See *Parl. Return, 4th June*, 1833; *and Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 64.

(3) Dum. viii. 112, 119.

March 8. 1790. Rash measures of the French Constituent Assembly.

By a decree on March 8, 1790, the Constituent Assembly had empowered each colony belonging to the Republic to make known its wishes on the subject of a constitution, and that these wishes should be expressed by colonial assemblies, freely elected and recognized by their citizens. This privilege excited the most ruinous divisions among the inhabitants of European descent, already sufficiently menaced by the ideas fermenting in the negro population. The whites claimed the exclusive right of voting for the election of the members of this important assembly; while the mulattoes strenuously asserted their title to an equal share in the representation; and the blacks, intoxicated with the novel doctrines so keenly discussed by all classes of society, secretly formed the project of ridding themselves of both. This decree of the National Assembly was brought out to the island by Lieutenant-Colonel Ogé, a mulatto officer in the service of France, who openly proclaimed the opinion of the parent legislature, that the half-caste and free negroes were entitled to their full share in the election of the representatives. The jealousy of the planters was immediately excited. They refused to acknowledge the decree of the Assembly, constituted themselves into a separate legislature (1), and having seized Ogé in the Spanish territory, put him to death by the torture of the wheel, under circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

Freedom is conferred on all persons of colour.

This unpardonable proceeding, as is usually the case with such acts of barbarity, aggravated instead of stifling the prevailing discontents, and the heats of the colony soon became so vehement, that the Constituent Assembly felt the necessity of taking some steps to allay the ferment. The moderate and violent parties in that body took different sides, and all Europe looked on with anxiety upon a debate so novel in its kind, and fraught with such momentous consequences to a large portion of the human race. Barnave, Malouet, Alexandre Lameth, and Clermont-Tonnerre strongly argued, that men long accustomed to servitude could not receive the perilous gift of liberty with safety either to themselves or others, but by slow degrees, and that the effect of suddenly admitting that bright light upon a benighted population would be to throw them into inevitable and fatal convulsions. But Mirabeau, the master-spirit of the Assembly, and the only one of its leaders who combined popular principles with a just appreciation of the danger of pushing them to excess, was no more, and the declamations of Brissot and the Girondists prevailed over these statesmanlike ideas. By a decree on 15th May, 1791, the privileges of equality were conferred indiscriminately on all persons of colour born of a free father and mother (2).

May 15th, 1791.

The insurrection breaks out.

Far from appreciating the hourly increasing dangers of their situation, and endeavouring to form with the new citizens an organized body to check the farther progress of levelling principles, the planters openly endeavoured to resist this rash decree. Civil war was preparing in this once peaceful and beautiful colony; arms were collecting; the soldiers, caressed and seduced by both parties, were wavering between their old feelings of regal allegiance and the modern influence of intoxicating principles, when a new and terrible enemy arose, who speedily extinguished in blood the discord of his oppressors. On the night of the 22d August, the negro revolt, long and secretly organized, at once broke forth, and wrapt the whole northern part of the colony in flames. Jean-François, a slave of vast penetration, firm character, and violent passions, not unmingled

Aug. 22, 1791.

(1) Ibid. vii. 120, 123.

(2) Dum. viii. 123, 125.

with generosity; was the leader of the conspiracy; his lieutenants were Biasson and TOUSSAINT. The former, of gigantic stature, Herculean strength, and indomitable ferocity, was well fitted to assert that superiority which such qualities seldom fail to command in savage times; the latter, gifted with rare intelligence, profound dissimulation, boundless ambition, and heroic firmness, was fitted to become at once the Numa and the Romulus of the sable republic in the southern hemisphere (1).

This vast conspiracy, productive in the end of calamities unparalleled even in the long catalogue of European atrocity, had for its objects the total extirpation of the whites, and the establishment of an independent black government over the whole island. So inviolable was the secrecy, so general the dissimulation of the slaves, that this awful catastrophe was noways apprehended by the European proprietors; and a conspiracy, which embraced nearly the whole negro population of the island, was revealed only by the obscure hints of a few faithful domestics, who, without betraying their comrades, warned their masters of their danger. The explosion was sudden and terrible. In a moment, the beautiful plains in the north of the island were covered with fires—the labour of a century was devoured in a night; while the negroes, like unchained tigers, precipitated themselves on their masters, seized their arms, massacred them without pity, or threw them into the flames. From all quarters the terrified planters fled to Cape Town, already menaced by ten thousand discontented slaves in its own bosom; while fifteen thousand insurgents surrounded the city, threatening instant destruction to the trembling fugitives within its walls (2).

Its progress and horrors

The cruelties exercised on the unhappy captives on both sides, in this disastrous contest, exceeded any thing recorded in history. The negroes marched with spiked infants on their spears instead of colours; they sawed asunder the male prisoners, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands. Nor were the whites slow in taking vengeance for these atrocities. In several sallies from Cape Town, the discipline and courage of the Europeans prevailed. Numerous prisoners were made, who were instantly put to death, and the indiscriminate rage of the victors extended to the old men, women, and children of the insurgent race, who had taken no part in the revolt (3).

While these disasters were overwhelming the northern part of the island, the southern was a prey to the fierce and increasing discord of the planters and people of colour. At length the opposite parties came into open collision. The mulattoes, aided by a body of negroes, blockaded Port-au-Prince; while the whites of that town and its vicinity, supported by the national guard and troops of the line, assembled their forces to raise the siege. The black army was commanded by a chief named Hyacinthe, who displayed in the action an uncommon degree of skill and intrepidity. The shock was terrible; but at length the planters were overthrown, and their broken remains forced back to the town. In other quarters similar actions took place, with various success, but the same result; the whites were finally forced into the cities, and the plains irrevocably overrun by the insurgent forces (4).

Overwhelmed with consternation at these disastrous events, the Constituent Assembly endeavoured, when it was too late, to retrace their steps. Barnave, who had so ably resisted the precipitate emancipation of the mu-

(1) Dum. viii 125, 127. Big. ii. 395.
(2) Dum. viii. 127, 129.
(3) Ibid. viii. 129, 130. Rap. à l'Assemblée Const. 23, 27.
(4) Dum. viii. 130, 138.

The Constituent Assembly in vain try to retrace their steps. Sept. 24. 1791.

latto race, and clearly predicted the consequences to which it would lead, prevailed upon them, in those brief days of returning moderation which signalized the close of their career, to pass a decree, which declared in substance that the external relations and commerce of the colonies should alone be subject to the direct legislation of the National Assembly in the parent state, and that the Colonial Assemblies should have the exclusive right of legislating, with the approbation of the king, for the internal condition and rights of the different classes of inhabitants. But it was too late. This wise principle, which, if embraced earlier in the discussion, might have averted all the disasters, only added fuel to the flames which were consuming the unhappy colony. The planters, irritated by injury and hardened by misfortune, positively refused to make any dispositions for the gradual extinction of slavery (1), and insisted upon the immediate and unqualified submission of the whole insurgents, mulatto and negro; while the slaves, imboldened by unlooked-for success, openly asserted their determination to come to no accommodation but on terms of absolute freedom.

French delegates in vain endeavour to settle differences.

Three delegates of the Convention, with a reinforcement of three thousand men, were despatched in November, 1791, to endeavour to re-establish the affairs of the colony, and reconcile its discordant inhabitants; but they soon found, that the passions excited on both sides were so vehement as to be incapable of adjustment. They arrived at Cape Town, where they found the remnant of the white population blockaded by the negro forces. They were received by the members of the Colonial Legislature covered with black, and those of the municipality arrayed in red crape; while instruments of punishment, gibbets and scaffolds erected in the market place, too surely told the bloody scenes which the island had recently witnessed. Their first step was to proclaim a general amnesty which was received with apparent thankfulness in the insurgent camps, and cold distrust by the Colonial Legislature. Toussaint repaired to the town, where he professed the desire of the negroes to return to their duty, if their rights, as proclaimed by the mother country, were recognized; but his language was not that of rebels negotiating an amnesty for their offences, but an independent power, actuated by a desire to stop the effusion of blood. As such, it excited the indignation of the planters, who insisted on the unqualified submission of the slaves, and the punishment of the authors of the revolt; demands which so enraged the negroes (2), that it was with difficulty Toussaint could prevent them from giving it vent by the indiscriminate massacre of all the prisoners in their hands.

The insurrection becomes universal.

The Constituent Assembly had flattered itself that its last decree, which put the fate of the mulatto and negro population into the hands of the Colonial Legislature, would have had the effect of inducing the latter to concede emancipation to the half-caste race, and of conciliating the former, through gratitude for so great a benefit conferred on them by their former masters; but in forming that hope, they proved their ignorance of the effect of concessions dictated by alarm, of which their own institutions were soon to afford so memorable an example. The Colonial Legislature, aware, from dear bought experience, that the prospect of such acquisitions in that moment of excitement would only inflame with tenfold fury all who had a drop of negro blood in their veins, resolutely refused to make any concessions even to the mulatto population. The commissioners of

(1) Ibid. viii. 138, 142. (2) Dum. viii. 143, 145.

the National Assembly openly took part with that unhappy body of men, thus deprived of the benefit conferred on them by the mother country, in consequence of which, the war, which had subsided during the progress of the negotiation, broke out again with redoubled fury, and the mulattoes every where joined their skill and intelligence to the numbers and ferocity of the negroes. A large body of whites were massacred in the church of Ouanaminthe by the Africans, whom the mulattoes had the cruelty to introduce; and Cape Town itself was nearly surprised by Biassou and Toussaint, at the head of a chosen body of their followers. The contest had no longer a semblance of equality. The insurrection broke out on every side, extended into every quarter; fire and sword devoured the remains of this once splendid colony; the wretched planters all took shelter in Cape Town; and the slaves, deprived of the means of subsistence by their own excesses, dispersed through the woods, reverting to the chase or plunder for a precarious existence (1).

The Girondists resolve upon unlimited concession.

Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly, which had succeeded the Constituent, a step farther advanced in revolutionary violence, were preparing ulterior measures of the most frantic character. Irritated at the Colonial Legislature for not having followed up their intentions, and instigated by the populace, whom the efforts of Brissot and the Society at Paris *des Amis des Noirs* had roused to a perfect frenzy on the subject, they revoked the decree of the 24th September preceding, which had conferred such ample powers on the Colonial Legislatures, dissolved the Assembly at Cape Town, and despatched three new commissioners, Arthaux, Sonthonax, and Polverel, with unlimited powers to settle the affairs of the colony. In vain Barnave and the remnant of the constitutional party in the Assembly strove to moderate these extravagant proceedings: the violence of the Jacobins bore down all opposition. "Don't talk to us of danger," said Brissot, "let the colonies perish, rather than one principle be abandoned (2)."

May 1793.

The proceedings of the new commissioners speedily brought matters to a crisis. They arrived first at Port-au-Prince, and in conformity with the secret instructions of the Government, which were to dislodge the whites from that stronghold, they sent off to France the soldiers of the regiment of Artois, established a Jacobin club, transported to France or America thirty of the leading planters, and issued a proclamation, in which they exhorted the colonists "to lay aside at last the prejudices of colour." Having thus laid the revolutionary train at Port-au-Prince, they embarked for Cape Town, where

June 10th, 1793.

they arrived in the middle of June. Matters had by this time reached such a height there as indicated the immediate approach of a crisis. The intelligence of the execution of the king, and proclamation of a Republic, had roused to the very highest pitch the democratic passions of all the inferior

The arrival of these commissioners augments the discord.

classes. The planters, with too good reason, apprehended that the Convention which had succeeded the Legislative Assembly would soon outstrip them in violence, and put the finishing stroke to their manifold calamities, by at once proclaiming the liberty of the slaves, and so destroying the remnant of property which they still possessed. But their destruction was nearer at hand than they supposed. On the 20th June, a

June 20th, 1793.

quarrel accidentally arose between a French naval captain and a mulatto officer in the service of the Colonial Government; the commissioners ordered them both into their presence, without regard to the distinction of colour, and this excited the highest indignation in the officers of the marine, who landed with their crews to take vengeance for the in-

(1) Dum. viii. 145, 151.

(2) Ibid. viii. 151, 152. Toul. iv. 172.

dignity done to one of their members. The colonists loudly applauded their conduct, and invoked their aid as the saviours of St.-Domingo: the exiles brought from Port-au-Prince fomented the discord as the only means of effecting their liberation: a civil war speedily ensued in the blockaded capital, and for two days blood flowed in torrents in these insane contests between the sailors of the fleet and the mulatto population (1).

Storming and massacre of Cape Town.

The negro chiefs, secretly informed of all these disorders, resolved to profit by the opportunity of finally destroying the whites thus afforded to them. Three thousand insurgents penetrated through the works, stript of their defenders during the general tumult, and, making straight for the prisons, delivered a large body of slaves who were there in chains. Instantly the liberated captives spread themselves over the town, set it on fire in every quarter, and massacred the unhappy whites when seeking to escape from the conflagration. A scene of matchless horror ensued: twenty thousand negroes broke into the city, and with the torch in one hand and the sword in the other, spread slaughter and devastation around. Hardly had the strife of the Europeans with each other subsided, when they found themselves overwhelmed by the vengeance which had been accumulating for centuries in the African breast. Neither age nor sex were spared; the young were cut down in striving to defend their houses, the aged in the churches where they had fled to implore protection; virgins were immolated on the altar; weeping infants hurled into the fires. Amidst the shrieks of the sufferers and the shouts of the victors, the finest city in the West Indies was reduced to ashes: its splendid churches, its stately palaces, were wrapt in flames; thirty thousand human beings perished in the massacre, and the wretched fugitives who had escaped from this scene of horror on board the ships were guided in their passage over the deep by the prodigious light which arose from their burning habitations. They almost all took refuge in the United States, where they were received with the most generous hospitality (2); but the frigate la Fine foundered on the passage, and five hundred of the survivors from the flames perished in the waves.

The universal freedom of the blacks is proclaimed, June 3, 1793.

Thus fell the queen of the Antilles, the most stately monument of European opulence that had yet arisen in the New World. Nothing deterred, however, by this unparalleled calamity, the Commissioners of the Republic pursued their frantic career; and, amidst the smoking ruins of the capital, published a decree which proclaimed the freedom of all the blacks who should enrol themselves under the standards of the Republic; a measure which was equivalent to the instant abolition of slavery over the whole island. Farther resistance was now hopeless; the Republican authorities became the most ardent persecutors of the planters; pursued alike by Jacobin frenzy and African vengeance, they fled in despair. Polverel proclaimed the liberty of the blacks in the west, and Montbrun gave free vent to his hatred of the colonists, by compelling them to leave Port-au-Prince, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the negroes. Every where the triumph of the slaves was complete, and the authority of the planters for ever destroyed (3).

But although the liberation of the negroes was effected, the independence of the island was not yet established. The English regarded with the utmost jealousy this violent explosion in their vicinity; and the leaders of the insurgents soon perceived that they could maintain their freedom only by an alli-

(1) Dum. viii. 152, 159.
(2) Toul. iv. 257, 260. Dum. viii. 157, 160.
(3) Dum. viii. 160, 164.

ance with the French Government. Toussaint, influenced by these views, passed into the service of France, with the rank of colonel, and the blacks began to be organized into regiments under the standards of the republic (1).

The English obtain a footing on the island.

The English before long appeared as actors on this theatre of devastation. They were naturally apprehensive of the utmost danger to their West Indian possessions, from the establishment of so great a revolutionary outpost in the centre of the Gulf of Mexico; and entertained a hope that, by allying themselves with the remnant of the planters, they might not only extinguish that frightful volcano, but possibly wrest the island with all its commerce from the French Republic. A British squadron appeared off Port-au-Prince early in 1794, and took possession of that town in the June following. They afterwards obtained the mole of St.-Nicolas, the principal harbour of the island; and the negro chief Hyacinthe passed into their service with 12,000 blacks. Encouraged by this great reinforcement, they commenced a systematic warfare for the reduction of the island; but Toussaint, at the head of the French forces and the great majority of the negroes, still maintained the standard of independence: the blacks soon deserted the British standard, the deadly climate mowed down the European troops, they were gradually pressed backward to the sea-coast, and at length the mole of St.-Nicholas, their principal stronghold, capitulated to the victorious negro chief (2).

June 5, 1794.

Furious civil wars between the negroes and mulattoes.

No sooner were they delivered from external enemies, than the parties in the island broke out into furious hostility with each other. The mulattoes beheld with undisguised apprehension the preponderance which the negroes had acquired in the late contests, and arrayed themselves under General Rigaud, and Hédouville, the Commissioner of the French Government, to resist Toussaint, who was at the head of the African population. A frightful civil war ensued, which was long carried on with various success: but at length the mulattoes were overcome, and Rigaud forced to take refuge in the walls of Cayes, the sole fortress on the island which still acknowledged his authority. Toussaint, who still professed himself a lieutenant of the French Republic, now undisputed master of the field, immediately turned his forces against the Spanish part of the colony, which had been ceded to France by the treaty of Basle. He marched at the same time against Port-au-Prince and Cape Town; his progress was one continued triumph; the Spanish territory received him without resistance, and in December, 1800, his authority was obeyed from one end of the territory to the other (3).

Napoléon confirms Toussaint in his command.

Matters were in this situation when Napoléon, who had now succeeded to the helm of government, began to turn his attention to the affairs of this long neglected and now ruined colony. Entirely directed by military ideas, he immediately conceived the design of regaining the French dominion over the island by means of Toussaint, who had now concentrated in his own hands all its forces, and for this purpose lent a willing ear to the representations of Colonel Vincent, whom the negro chief had sent to Paris to lay the state of its affairs before the First Consul. Influenced by these views, he sent back Colonel Vincent with a decree, confirming Toussaint in his command as general-in-chief, establishing the constitution there, which in France followed the 18th Brumaire, and a proclamation, in which he called on the "brave blacks to remember that France alone had recog-

(1) Ibid. viii. 164, 166.
(2) Dum. viii, 167, 171. Big. ii. 396, 397.
(3) Jom. xiv. 430, 434.

nized their freedom." This proclamation cut off all hopes from Rigaud and the remnant of the mulatto population, who immediately, in despair, embarked from Cayes, and dispersed themselves over the West India Islands, abandoning for ever their country to the insurgent population for whom they had made so many sacrifices; the usual fate of those in the middling ranks who stir up the passions of the lowest (1).

Vigorous measures of the Negro chief in the administration.

Toussaint, now undisputed governor of the whole island, adopted the most vigorous measures to put an end to the public discord. While he himself published a general amnesty, and paraded in triumph through the island, attended by all the pomp of European splendour, he committed to his ferocious lieutenant, Dessalines, the task of extinguishing the remains of the hostile party. That chief executed the duty with scrupulous exactness; the method of destroying provinces by means of noyades, imported from France by the revolutionary agents, was practised with fatal success, and African vengeance availed itself of the means of destruction which revolutionary cruelty had invented. While Toussaint was received with discharges of cannon and every demonstration of public joy in the principal cities of the island, ten thousand unhappy captives perished by the orders of the ferocious Dessalines, and the remains of the ardent race of mulattoes, whose ambition had first disturbed the peace of the island, perished by the hands of the servile crowd whom they had themselves elevated into irresistible power (2).

His agricultural policy; and is appointed President for life of the island.

Delivered by this bloody execution from almost all his enemies. Toussaint applied himself, with his wonted vigour, to restore the cultivation of the island, which, amidst the public calamities, had been almost totally abandoned. Imitating the feudal policy, he distributed the unoccupied buildings and lands among his military followers, and their authority having compelled the common men to work, the level parts of the country soon assumed a comparatively flourishing appearance. 1st July, 1801. At the same time an assembly of the leading chiefs of the country was convoked at Cape Town, who drew up a constitution for the inhabitants, and conferred on Toussaint unlimited authority, under the title of President and Governor for life, with the right of nominating his successor. Colonel Vincent was immediately despatched to Paris with the new constitution, and a letter from Toussaint to the First Consul, beginning with the words, "the first of blacks to the first of whites (3)."

Napoléon instantly resolves to subdue the island.

This unexpected intelligence was a severe blow to the First Consul. He at once perceived that Toussaint had no intention of remaining his lieutenant; that the feeling of independence had taken root; and that, unless a blow was immediately struck, the colony was for ever lost to the French empire. Colonel Vincent arrived with this despatch on the 14th October, 1801, just thirteen days after the signature of the preliminaries of peace with England, and when the now pacified ocean afforded him the means of at once reasserting the French dominion over the island. He immediately resolved to subdue the colony by force of arms, and restore to France those inestimable maritime advantages which its possession had so long secured to the monarchy. The idea of regaining a commerce which with the addition of the Spanish part of the island, might be expected to amount to sixteen millions sterling, employ two thousand ships, and thirty thousand seamen, was irresistible to a sovereign who felt his deficiency in these particulars to be the only impediment to universal dominion (4).

(1) Jom. xiv. 435, 440. Big. ii. 398, 399.
(2) Big. ii. 399, 400.
(3) Jom. xiv. 444, 445. Big. ii. 401, 402. Dum. viii. 176, 177.
(4) Big. ii. 402. Jom. xiv. 445.

Increasing prosperity of the island under Toussaint's administration.

Meanwhile, under the stern and severe government of the African chief, the fields of St.-Domingo began to regain part of their once smiling aspect. The military discipline which, during the long previous wars, he had been enabled to diffuse among his followers, afforded him the means of establishing that forced cultivation, without which experience has never found the negro race capable of pursuing the labour of civilized life. The mulattoes, compelled to engage in the most degrading occupations bitterly lamented the insupportable black yoke they had imposed upon themselves; the negroes, forced to re-enter their fields and workshops, found that their dreams of liberty had vanished into air, and they had only made, for the worse, an exchange of masters. Their comfortable dwellings, their neat gardens, their substantial fare, had disappeared, and there remained only the bitterness of servitude without either its protection or its compensations. But, amidst the most acute individual suffering, the rigid government of Toussaint succeeded in restoring, in part, the cultivation of the colony. The negroes were detained, by the terrors of military execution, in the most complete subordination. The chiefs to whom the lands were allotted submitted to the rule of a master whom they at once feared and admired. Commerce with the adjoining islands and the United States began to revive from its ashes; and out of the surplus produce and customs of the island, the Government obtained the means of maintaining a respectable military establishment. Eighteen thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred mounted gendarmes preserved order in the colony. Toussaint, amidst other great projects, had conceived the design of purchasing slaves from the adjoining states. His authority was absolute and universal; and the convulsions of St.-Domingo added another to the numerous proofs furnished by history, that revolutionary movements, under whatever circumstances commenced, can terminate only in establishing the unlimited despotism of a single individual (1).

But it was no part of the designs of the First Consul to allow this magnificent colony to slip out of the grasp of France, or its reviving commerce nourish only the navy of Britain. Hardly was the ink of his signature to the preliminaries of a maritime peace dry, when he turned all his attention to the conquest of the island. Independently of the maritime and political advantages to be derived from such a measure, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of the accession of influence which he would obtain from the disposal of the immense possessions, belonging chiefly to the emigrant noblesse, which would be recovered in the southern hemisphere. Having taken his resolution, he proceeded, with his wonted vigour and ability, in preparing the means of its execution. An extraordinary degree of activity immediately was manifested in the dockyards of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Toulon, Havre, Flushing, and Cadiz. Land forces began to diverge towards these different points of embarkation, and the destination of the armament was announced in the following proclamation issued by Govern-

Preparations of Napoléon for its subjugation.

22d Nov. 1801. ment:—"At St.-Domingo, systematic acts have disturbed the political horizon. Under *equivocal appearances*, the Government has wished to see only the ignorance which confounds names and things, which usurps when it seeks to obey; but a fleet and an army, which are preparing in the harbours of Europe, will soon dissipate these clouds, and St.-Domingo will be

(1) Dum. viii. 177, 178.
The American war of independence is no exception. It was not a revolutionary movement, but a regular war between one distant power and another; and, but for the boundless issue of the back settlements, it is more than doubtful whether even there the same results would not have taken place.

reduced, in whole, to the government of the Republic. In the proclamation addressed to the blacks, it was announced by the same authority :—"Whatever may be your origin or your colour, you are Frenchmen, and all alike free and equal before God and the Republic. At St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe slavery no longer exists—all are free—all shall remain free. At Martinique different principles must be observed (1)."

Immense naval and military forces assembled.

The forces collected in the different harbours of the Republic for this purpose were the greatest that Europe had ever yet sent forth to the New World. Thirty-five ships of the line, twenty-one frigates, and above eighty smaller vessels, having on board twenty-one thousand land troops, were soon assembled. They resembled rather the preparations for the subjugation of a rival power, than the forces destined for the reduction of a distant colonial settlement. The fleet was commanded by Villaret-Joyeuse; the army by Le Clerc, the brother-in-law of Napoléon and husband of the Princess Pauline, whose exquisite figure has since been immortalized by the chisel of Canova. The land forces were almost all composed of the conquerors of Hohenlinden. The First Consul gladly availed himself of this opportunity to rid himself of a large portion of the veterans most adverse to his authority. The most distinguished generals of Moreau's army, Richepanse, Rochambeau, Lapoype, and their redoubtable comrades, were employed in the same destination. In the selection of the general-in-chief, the First Consul was not less influenced by private considerations. He was desirous of giving the means of enriching themselves to two relations, whose passion for dress and extravagant habits had already occasioned repeated and disagreeable pecuniary demands to the public treasury (2).

British Government make no opposition.

The British Government naturally conceived no small disquietude at the preparation of so great an armament, at the very time when the signature of the preliminaries rendered it difficult to imagine what could be its destination. They demanded, accordingly, explanations on the subject, and the Cabinet of the Tuileries at once unfolded the object of the expedition. Not deeming themselves entitled to interfere between France and her colonies, and perhaps not secretly disinclined to the subjugation of so formidable a neighbour as an independent negro state in the close vicinity of her slave colonies, Great Britain abstained from any farther opposition, and merely took the precautionary measures of assembling a powerful fleet of observation in Bantry Bay (3), and greatly strengthening the naval force in the West Indies.

Expedition sails, and arrives off St.-Domingo.

The fleets from Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, all set sail on the 14th December, 1801. The land forces they had on board, under the immediate command of Le Clerc, amounted only to 10,000, but they were followed by reinforcements from Cadiz, Brest, Havre, and Holland, which swelled the troops ultimately to 35,000 men. The first division of this formidable force appeared off the island in the beginning of February. So completely was the government of St.-Domingo at fault as to the object of the expedition, that had it not been for fifteen days which were lost in the Bay of Biscay in assembling the different divisions of the fleet, Toussaint would have been surprised without any preparations whatever for his defence. No sooner, however, did he receive intelligence from an American vessel of the appearance of the fleet in the southern latitudes, than he instantly took his line, despatched messengers in all directions to

(1) Dum. viii. 193, 194. Big. 408, 409.
(2) Duchess d'Abr. vi. 93, 99. Norv. ii. 194. Bign. ii. 411.
(3) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 335. Ann. Reg. 1801, 99. Dum. viii. 202, 203.

assemble his forces, and announced his heroic resolution in these memorable words :—"A dutiful son, without doubt, owes submission and obedience to his mother; but if that parent should become so unnatural as to aim at the destruction of its own offspring, nothing remains but to intrust vengeance to the hands of God. If I must die, I will die as a brave soldier and a man of honour. I fear no one (1)."

First irresolution, but final firmness of Toussaint

But events quickly succeeded each other, which warned the negro chief of the desperate nature of the contest to which he was committed. He had recently before concluded a convention for mutual assistance with General Nugent, the governor of Jamaica, and, with reason, placed great reliance on the efficacious support of the English naval power to protect his dominions from the threatened invasion, when the intelligence of the peace of Amiens, followed by accounts of the arrival of the French fleet in the neighbourhood of the island, at once dissipated these expectations. He hastened to Cape Samana to obtain with his own eyes a view of the formidable armament of which report had so magnified the terrors; and was struck with astonishment at the sight, covering, as it did, the ocean with its sails, and so much beyond any thing yet seen in these latitudes. For a moment he hesitated on the part he should adopt. "We must die," said he; "France in a body has come to St.-Domingo. We have been deceived; they are determined to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." Recovering, however, soon after, his wonted resolution, he mournfully cast his eyes over the interminable fleet, whose sails, as far as the eye could reach, covered the ocean, and despatched couriers in all directions to rouse the most determined resistance. His forces, however, even with all the advantages of climate and local knowledge, were scarce equal to the magnanimous resolution. They hardly exceeded twenty thousand men, dispersed over the whole island; and whatever their courage may have been, they could not be expected to stand the shock of the troops with whom the Austrian monarchy had contended in vain (2).

The French land, and Cape Town is burnt by the blacks.

Le Clerc gave orders to commence the disembarkation at Cape Town on the 1st February, where Christophe commanded, but difficulties arose in consequence of the impossibility of finding a pilot who would guide the vessels into the harbour. At length the admiral seized upon the harbour-admiral, a mulatto, named Sangos, put a rope about his neck, and threatened him with instant death if he did not shew the way, and a bribe of 50,000 francs (L.2000) if he would; but nothing could induce him to betray his country. The precious time thus gained was turned to a good account by Christophe. He rapidly organized every thing for burning what yet remained of the town, which had been in part rebuilt since the sack ten years before; removed all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and all the stores which could be of service to the enemy, and only waited the signal of disembarkation to apply the torch in every direction. On the 4th the division of Hardy effected a landing on the one side of the capital, and Rochambeau on the other, under cover of a brisk cannonade from the fleet; on the same night the town was set on fire, and burnt with the utmost fury; out of eight hundred houses scarce sixty were standing on the following morning, and the first struggles of African independence were signalized by an act of devotion, of which European patriotism has exhibited few examples. The generous sacrifice was

4th Feb. 1802.

(1) Jom. xv. 41, 42. Dum. viii. 205, 206. Le Clerc, i. 117, 132.

(2) Dum. viii. 206, 207. Jom. xv. 42, 43, 48. Le Clerc, i. 19, 35.

not made in vain; both stores and provisions, which might have furnished invaluable supplies to the army, were destroyed, and out of the ruins of the city arose those pestilential vapours which afterwards proved more fatal to the troops than all the forces which Toussaint could assemble for their destruction (1).

But the French generally prevail in the field.

This sinister commencement, so ominous of the desperate nature of the resistance which they might expect, was not, however, immediately followed by the disasters which were apprehended. European skill and discipline soon asserted their wonted superiority over the military efforts of the other quarters of the globe; and how could the blacks, but recently emancipated from the lash of slavery, be expected to withstand, in regular combat, the conquerors of Hohenlinden? General Kerviseau without difficulty made himself master of the Spanish part of the island, which had unwillingly submitted to the negro government. Boudet and Latouche landed at Port-au-Prince in the harbour, in the face of the enemy, and pursued them so rapidly into the town, as to save it from the conflagration with which it was menaced by the savage Dessalines, while the whole southern part of the island submitted at once to the authority of the invaders, and was thus saved from impending destruction. The important harbour of the mole of St.-Nicholas was occupied without opposition; but Dessalines, who had failed in accomplishing that object at Port-au-Prince, did not abandon Saint-Marc till he had reduced it to ashes. On all sides the plains and sea-coast fell into the hands of the Europeans, and the black forces were driven back into the impracticable and wooded mountain ridges in the central parts of the island (2).

Description of the mountainous interior to which the negroes retire.

But this apparent triumph was the result chiefly of the profound and resolute system of defence adopted by the black government, which consisted in destroying the cities on the coast, ruining the cultivated plains which might afford supplies to the enemy, and retiring into the woody fastnesses in the interior, called, in the emphatic language of the country, "the Grand Chaos," where the system of bush fighting might render unavailing the discipline and experience of the European soldiers. There is nothing in the temperate zone comparable to the difficulty and intricacy of these primeval forests, where enormous trees shoot up to the height of two hundred feet from the ground, and their stems are enveloped in an impenetrable thicket of creepers and underwood, which flourish under the rays of a vertical sun. No roads, few paths, traverse this savage district; almost the only mode of penetrating through it is by following the beds of the torrents, which in that humid climate frequently furrow the sides of the mountains, where a column of regular soldiers is exposed to a murderous fire from the unseen bands stationed in the overhanging woods. It was Toussaint's design to maintain himself in these impenetrable fastnesses, sending forth merely light parties to harass the flanks and rear of the enemy, until the pestilential season of autumn arrived, and the heavy rains had generated those noxious vapours, which in that deadly climate so rapidly prove

(1) Dum. viii. 208, 218. Jom. xv. 46, 47, 48. Norv. ii. 207.

The parallel conflagrations of Numantium, Cape Town, and Moscow, prove, that whatever may be their deficiency in industry, or the habits of persevering exertion, the negro race is as capable as the European of the sacrifices required by patriotic spirit. When we recollect that it was in a comparatively rude state of society that all these heroic deeds were done, and that the history of civilization has afforded no similar examples, we are led to the conclusion, that the progress of refinement, by extending the influence of artificial wants, and strengthening the bonds by which men are bound to their individual possessions, gradually weakens the chords of public feelings, and that a foundation is thus laid for the decay of empires in the very consequences of their extension and greatness.

(2) Jom. xv. 50, 53. Norv. ii. 207, 209. Bign. ii. 415, 416. Dum. viii. 220, 230.

fatal to European constitutions. He had only twelve thousand regular troops remaining, but they were aided by the desultory efforts of the negroes in the plains, who were ever ready, like the peasants of la Vendée, to answer his summons, though apparently engaged only in agricultural pursuits; and with such auxiliaries, and the prospect of approaching pestilence, his resources were by no means to be despised, even by the best appointed European army. All the blacks were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit, for the intentions of the invader were no longer doubtful, and the tenor of the last instructions to Le Clerc had transpired, which were to re-establish slavery throughout the whole island (1).

Fruitless attempt to induce Toussaint to submit.

Penetrated with the difficulty of the novel species of warfare on which he was about to enter, Le Clerc tried to prevail on the negro chief, by conciliatory measures and the force of his paternal affections, to lay down his arms. For this purpose, he sent to him his two sons, whom he had brought with him from Paris, along with their crafty preceptor M. Coisnon, and a letter from the First Consul, in which he acknowledged his great services to France, and offered him the command of the colony, if he would submit to the laws of the Republic. With no small difficulty the children made their way to the habitation of Toussaint at Ennery, thirty leagues from Cape Town, in the mountains. Their mother wept for joy on beholding her long-lost offspring; and the chief himself, who was absent on their arrival, fell on their necks on his return, and for a moment was shaken in his resolution to maintain the independence of his country, by the flood of parental affection. He soon, however, recovered the wonted firmness of his character. In vain his sons embraced his knees, and implored him to accede to the proposition of the First Consul; in vain his wife and family added their tears. He saw through the artifice of his enemies, and clearly perceived that his submission would be the signal for the re-establishment of slavery throughout the colony. In the generous contention, patriotic duty prevailed over parental love. He sent back his sons to Le Clerc, with an evasive letter proposing an armistice; the French General granted him four days to determine, and again restored them to their father. Toussaint, upon this, retained his sons, and returned no answer to Le Clerc, who forthwith declared him a rebel, and prepared to carry on the war to the last extremity (2).

Feb. 12, 1802.

Feb. 17. General and successful attack on his position.

A few days afterwards the Toulon squadron arrived, bringing a reinforcement of six thousand men; and the French General, finding himself at the head of fifteen thousand effective men, prepared for a concentric attack from all quarters on the wooded fastnesses still in the hands of the negro chief. It took place on the 17th, with the greatest success. Toussaint himself, intrenched with 2500 of his best troops, supported by 2000 armed negroes, in a strong position at the ravine of Couleuvre, at the entrance of the thickets, was attacked and defeated by Rochambeau, with the loss of 700 men. His Lieutenant, Maurepas, who had gained an important success at Grosse Morne, was by this advantage placed between two fires, and forced to surrender; and soon after entered, with all his followers, into the service of the Republic. Dessalines, defeated by Boudet in the neighbourhood of St.-Marc, with his own hands set fire to his dwelling. All his officers followed his example, and the retreat of the blacks towards the mountains in the south was preceded by the massacre of twelve hundred

Feb. 28.

(1) Norv. ii. 207. Jom. xv. 53, 55. Dum. viii. 230, 232. Le Clerc, 171, 180.

(2) Dum. viii. 232, 235. Jom. xv. 55, 59. Norv. ii. 209, 210. Franklin's Hayti, 143.

whites, and clouds of smoke which announced the destruction of all the plantations in that part of the island (1).

Desperate defence of a fort in the mountains.

Nothing daunted by these calamities, Dessalines had no sooner reached a place of security in the hills, than he meditated an expedition against Port-au-Prince, from which the French troops had been in a great measure withdrawn; but it was defeated by the skill and valour of Latouche-Tréville, and he was compelled to fall back to the mountains. The beaten remains of the blacks now assembled at the fort of Crête à Pierrot, an inconsiderable stronghold erected by the English at the confluence of two streams, in a position deemed inaccessible. Here, however, they were assaulted by two brigades of the French army, under Debelle; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the blacks with grape and musketry, that March 3. the attempt to carry it by a *coup de main* failed, and the assailants were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred of their bravest troops. Le Clerc, upon this, concentrated all his disposable forces for the attack of this important point. The divisions both of Hardy and Rochambeau were brought up to support that of Debelle, and an escalade was again tried with the victorious troops of Rochambeau, who were a second time repulsed with severe loss. Le Clerc now despaired of reducing it but by regular approaches; and heavy artillery having, with infinite difficulty, been at length planted against it, the defences of the fort were battered in breach, and every thing disposed March 23. for an assault. Conceiving themselves unable to resist the attack of so considerable a body, the negroes, during the night, fell furiously upon the blockading forces, cut their way through, and got clear off, highly elated at having arrested the whole French army above three weeks, and inflicted on them a loss of fifteen hundred men, in the attack of a fort so inconsiderable, that fifteen pieces of cannon only were found mounted on the ramparts (2).

The war assumes a guerilla character.

Meanwhile Toussaint was again rallying his broken divisions in the rear of the besieging force, and had spread terror in every direction through the conquered territory. His Lieutenant, Christophe, carried his nocturnal incursions as far as Cape Town, and kept in constant alarm the feeble garrison which was left amidst its ruins. The division Hardy in consequence fell back to their assistance, and, reinforced by two thousand five hundred fresh troops, which had just disembarked from the Dutch fleet, its brave commander issued forth, and took the field against Christophe; but the blacks, taught by experience, nowhere appeared in large bodies, and kept up such a murderous guerilla warfare upon the invaders, that without making any sensible progress, they sustained a very serious diminution. Christophe at length retired to his old and formidable positions of Dondon and La Grande Rivière, at the entrance of the woody defiles. He was there attacked by Hardy, but the French were defeated, with heavy loss (3).

Negotiations for the termination of hostilities.

Both parties were now exhausted with this deadly strife. The negroes, driven from the rich and cultivated part of the island into the steril and intricate woody fastnesses, saw no resources for successfully prolonging the contest. Their means of subsistence must soon be expected to fail in these savage thickets; they had beheld with astonishment the agility and courage with which the French soldiers pursued them into their most inaccessible retreats, and began to despair of successfully

(1) Jom. xv. 60, 62. Dum. viii. 236, 245. Norv. ii. 211, 212.

(2) Dum. viii. 244, 249. Jom. xv. 64, 70. Norv. ii. 212.

(3) Dum. viii. 249, 255. Jom. xv. 70, 72. Norv. ii. 214.

maintaining the contest with an enemy who was continually receiving reinforcements from apparently interminable squadrons. On the other hand, Le Clerc was not less desirous to come to an accommodation. Although, in a campaign of six weeks, he had, by great exertions, surmounted incredible difficulties, yet it could not be dissembled, that these advantages had been gained by enormous sacrifices; the reinforcements received from France were far from compensating the losses which had been sustained; the soldiers, worn out with fatigue, and disgusted with an inglorious warfare, passionately longed for repose; their republican principles revolted at shedding their blood so profusely for the re-establishment of slavery; the military chest was exhausted, and the unhealthy season was fast approaching, which would mow down the troops yet faster than the deadly aim of the negroes. These feelings at length led to an accommodation. The French General secretly entered into a separate negotiation with the leaders of the enemy; Christophe and Dessalines followed the example of Maurepas, and went over with their forces to the French service, where they received their former rank and appointments; and the heroic Toussaint was left, with a few thousand devoted followers, to make head not only against the European invaders, but the faithless Africans who had ranged themselves on their side. Borne down by necessity, the negro chief was at length forced to submit; but, in doing so, he maintained the dignity of his character, and, instead of accepting the rank and emoluments which had seduced the fidelity of his followers, returned to his mountain farm of Ennery, and resumed, like Cincinnatus, the occupations of rural life (1).

Dignified conduct of Toussaint. May 5, 1802.

General Pacification.

This pacification was complete; and every thing promised a successful issue to this hazardous expedition. The negro chiefs rivalled each other in deeds testifying the reality of their submission. Christophe, Dessalines, Maurepas, zealously performed all the duties imposed on them by the French general. Thirty thousand muskets were surrendered in the department of the north alone, and stored up in the magazines of Cape Town. The French even found themselves compelled to restrain the ferocious zeal of their new allies, who put to death, without mercy, all the negroes who evaded the general disarming. Every where the blacks returned to their usual occupations. The workshops, the fields, were filled with labourers; foreign ships began to frequent the harbours, and commerce to give an air of returning prosperity to the scene of desolation. The regulations chalked out by Toussaint were for the most part adopted; the officers he had selected confirmed in their respective commands; and the foundations of a judicious system of colonial administration laid, by an assembly convoked at Cape Town. As the public treasury was exhausted, General Le Clerc pledged his private credit for these beneficent undertakings (2): a generous confidence, which was returned by the French Government by a base disavowal, which involved his family in total ruin (3).

(1) Bign. ii. 423, 424. Dum. viii. 254, 257. Jom. xv. 72. 75.

(2) Norv. ii. 218. Dum. viii. 257, 261. Jom. xv. 73, 75.

(3) The regulations of Toussaint had converted personal into rural servitude. The negroes were compelled to work in common by their overseers and officers, and received in return a fourth of the produce, which fourth was divided among them, according to the skill and strength of each individual. The inspectors exercised a summary jurisdiction over the labourers. All delinquencies were brought before them by the proprietors, and they forthwith investigated and punished the offence with rigid severity. Free labour was unknown, and continues so, generally speaking, to this day. It was the reality of slavery without its name. These regulations were so judicious, among a people invincibly averse to voluntary exertion that they were immediately adopted by the French General.—See DUMAS, viii. 263, 269.

The secret instructions of the First Consul directed the Commander-in-chief to engage all the negro chiefs to accept situations in the French service, and to send them over to receive employment, according to their rank, in the French continental armies (1). It was not very likely that the soldiers of Marengo and Hohenlinden would have submitted to be commanded by negro officers, or that the place of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Richepanse could have been supplied by the sable generals of division from Toussaint's army. Napoléon's real design was to deprive the blacks of their efficient leaders, and so pave the way for the re-establishment of slavery and the ancient proprietors. This was soon made manifest by what occurred at Guadaloupe. The proclamation of the First Consul had announced to the blacks the same treatment in St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe; and the re-establishment of servitude in the latter island revealed to the African race the fate which awaited them under the French Government (2).

Treacherous views of Napoléon.

Perfidious arrest of Toussaint by the French authorities.

During the two months which followed the pacification, Toussaint lived in profound retirement in his country residence at Ennery. Meanwhile, however, the yellow fever broke out at Cape Town, and the hospitals were speedily crowded with French soldiers, several hundred of whom died every day. The sight of this catastrophe excited the hopes of the negroes, and some insurrectionary movements manifested themselves among them in the mountains, not far from Toussaint's dwelling. Le Clerc immediately called upon Toussaint to disarm these assemblages, and he formed a detachment for that purpose; but the French, being suspicious of its destination, surrounded and disarmed it; and soon after, the General-in-chief, conceiving apprehensions of the fidelity of the negro leader, had him arrested and brought to Cape Town. The grounds on which this perfidious act was justified were so flimsy as to be incapable of deceiving any one (3); but it can hardly be made a subject of reproach against Le Clerc, for his instructions were positive, in one way or another to transport to France all the leaders of the blacks. Its infamy rests on the government of Napoléon, on whom the subsequent fate of this great man has affixed a lasting stain, which the consequent destruction of the expedition has inadequately expiated (4).

July 5, 1802.

Dreadful atrocities on both sides in Guadaloupe.

While these events were in progress in St.-Domingo, changes which ultimately were productive of the most important consequences took place in Guadaloupe. This island had revolted and fallen under the dominion of the blacks by a process extremely analogous to, though less bloody than, that which had obtained in its larger neighbour. The mulattoes, under a renowned leader named Pélage, had risen in insur-

(1) Nap. in Month.

(2) Dum. viii, 262, 263. Norv. ii. 219. Jom. xv. 75, 76.

(3) The ground set forth by the French Government was, that in one of his letters which they intercepted, addressed to one of his old aides-de-camp, he had congratulated him "that at length *Providence* had come to their succour." La Providence was the name of the great hospital at Cape Town; and from this ambiguous expression the French authorities concluded that he viewed with satisfaction the progress of the malady which was consuming them; a supposition probably not far from the truth, but which could never justify the arrest of the sable hero, while living quietly on his estate on the faith of a treaty solemnly concluded with the French Government. The mode of Toussaint's arrest added to the atrocity of the deed. Instead of sending a detachment to Ennery to seize him, he was called to Gonaives by General Brunck. The unsuspecting African fell into the snare, trusted to French honour, and was betrayed. He was forthwith sent to France, and confined in the castle of Joux, in the Jura, where he died soon after, whether by natural or violent means is unknown. This castle is situated on a rocky eminence, in a defile of those romantic mountains on the road from Besançon to Lausanne. Among the numerous spots illustrated by these memorable wars, not the least interesting is the scene of the imprisonment and death of the greatest of African heroes; and it were well for the memory of Napoléon, if it could be cleared of the obloquy arising from the sudden death, about the same time, of so many eminent men in the state prisons of France.—See Norvins, ii. 21; Jomini, xv. 77; Dumas, 271, 272.

(4) Dum. viii. 270, 271. Jom. xv. 77, 78.

rection in October 1801, against the European Governor, and speedily made themselves masters of the island; but hardly had they got possession of the reins of power, when they found themselves threatened by a formidable conspiracy of the slaves, and narrowly escaped being butchered a few days after in the seats of their newly acquired power. The island was in a state of anarchy, divided between rival authorities, when Admiral Bouvet arrived with the division Richepanse, 3500 strong, which had mainly contributed to the great victory of Hohenlinden. Pélage, whose terrors were fully awakened by the fervour of the insurgent slave population, immediately ranged himself under his command, and manifested in the short campaign which followed the most distinguished bravery: but the slaves resisted, and Basseterre, the capital, was only taken after a bloody conflict. Though driven to the mountains, however, the negroes maintained a desperate conflict; an inconsiderable fort in the woods held out long, and was only reduced by a regular siege: Ignatius, a determined chief, was at length destroyed at Petit Bourg after a frightful slaughter: and another leader, named Delgrasse, blew himself up, with three hundred of his followers, rather than surrender to the enemy. These bloody catastrophes, however, extinguished the revolt in the island: but they were followed by measures of unpardonable and ruinous severity. Twelve hundred prisoners were drowned in cold blood by Lacrosse, who took the command of the island; and soon after, by a proclamation issued in the name of the First Consul, slavery and the whole ancient régime was solemnly re-established. A few days afterwards, Richepanse was cut off by the yellow fever: a lamentable fate for so distinguished an European officer, to perish by an inglorious death in the midst of colonial atrocity (1).

May 5, 1802.

Aug. 5, 1802.

Perfidious conduct of the French towards that island.

The intelligence of these alarming events produced the utmost agitation in St.-Domingo. The re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe, to which liberty had been promised equally as to St.-Domingo in the proclamation of the First Consul (2), naturally excited the utmost apprehensions in the blacks as to the fate which was reserved for themselves, in the event of the French authority being firmly re-established in the larger island. A stifled insurrection soon broke out, which speedily spread over the whole colony; although Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines vied with each other in acts of severity against the insurgents. Dessalines even went so far as to arrest Charles Belais, Toussaint's nephew, who was conducted to the Cape, and sentenced to death by a military commission composed of mulatto officers. But the enthusiasm soon became universal, as the mask of profound dissimulation which they had so long worn fell from the faces of the negro chiefs. On the night of the 14th October, Clervaux, Christophe, and Paul Louverture, joined the insurgents in the north, and their example was shortly afterwards followed by Dessalines with all the forces in the west (3).

General revolt in St.-Domingo in consequence.

Death of Le Clerc, and ruin of the army.

The situation of the French army was now critical in the extreme. By the losses of the campaign their troops had been reduced to thirteen thousand men, and of these five thousand were in the hospitals; so that there remained only eight thousand capable of bearing arms; a force totally inadequate to maintain the whole country against an exasperated black population of several hundred thousand souls. Le Clerc therefore directed a concentration of all the disposable troops at Cape Town

(1) Dum. viii. 288, 301. Jom. xv. 80, 85.

(2) "At St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe, slavery no longer exists: all are free, and shall remain so. At Martinique, different principles must prevail: slavery continues there, and must continue."—*Proclam. Nov.* 1801.—DUMAS, viii. 283.

(3) Dum. viii. 273, 277. Jom. xv. 85, 87. Norv. ii. 223, 224.

and Port-au-Prince; but in doing this, they were severely pressed by the insurgents, who increased immensely when their retreat had become manifest; and in the midst of this hazardous operation he was seized with the yellow fever, which had already proved fatal to Hardy, Debelle, and his best officers. The violence of the malady, and the anxiety consequent on so responsible a situation, triumphed over the natural strength of his constitution, and he died on the 2d of November, leaving the remains of the army in the deepest state of dejection (1).

Nov. 2.

Continued successes of the negroes.

Rochambeau succeeded to the command; but though by no means destitute of military talents, he hastened the approaching dissolution of the French authority in the island, by the violence and injustice of his civil administration. Instead of cultivating the mulatto population, who had rendered such important services to his predecessor, he for ever alienated the affections of this numerous body, by the arrest and execution of Bardet, one of the half caste chiefs who had rendered the most efficient aid to the French. Such was the exasperation occasioned by this atrocious proceeding, that it instantly threw the mulattoes into the arms of the negroes, and the flames of insurrection shortly spread through the southern and eastern parts of the island, where that mixed race chiefly prevailed. Encouraged by these successes, Christophe and Dessalines made a nocturnal attack on Cape Town in the middle of February; they surprised Fort Belair, and put the garrison to the sword; and their assault on the body of the place was only defeated by an uncommon exertion of vigour and courage on the part of the French general. Exasperated at these disasters, Rochambeau renewed his severities on the mulatto race; two of their chiefs, Prosper and Brachas, were seized and drowned; and this so enraged their countrymen, that they all left the colours of France, to which they had hitherto rendered essential service, and joined the negro standards. Informed of these disasters, Rochambeau embarked in person for Port-au-Prince, with twelve hundred fresh troops recently arrived from France: but no sooner had he advanced into the open country around that town, than his troops fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with great loss into its walls (2).

Feb. 17, 1803.

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The rupture of the peace of Amiens totally destroys the French.

Matters were in this disastrous state when the finishing blow was put to the affairs of the colony, by the rupture of the peace of Amiens and renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The insurgents, supplied with arms and ammunition by the English cruisers, speedily became irresistible: all the fortified ports in the south and west fell into their hands. Lavalette, at Port-au-Prince, capitulated to Dessalines, and was fortunate enough to reach the Havanna with the greater part of his troops. Rochambeau, blockaded in Cape Town by the blacks on the land side, and the English at sea, was obliged, after a gallant resistance, to surrender at discretion, and was conducted to Jamaica; while the Viscount de Noailles, who last maintained the French standard on the island, escaped under false colours, dexterously eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers, and surprised one of their corvettes, but was wrecked on the Coast of Cuba, as if it had been ordained that no part of that ill-fated expedition should escape destruction (3).

Oct. 5. 1803.

Reflections on the expedition.

Thus terminated this melancholy expedition, in which one of the finest armies that France ever sent forth perished, the victims of fatigue, disease, and the perfidy of its Government. The loss sustained was

(1) Dum. viii. 277, 279. Jom. xv. 87, 92.
(2) Dum. 303, 315. Jom. xv. 92, 95. Bign. ii. 433, 435.
(3) Jom. xv. 98, 99. Norv. ii. 230, 231. Dum. viii. 336, 339.

immense. Out of thirty-five thousand land troops embarked, scarce seven thousand ever regained the shores of France. The history of Europe can hardly afford a parallel instance of so complete a destruction of so vast an armament. Nevertheless the First Consul is not chargeable with any want of skill or foresight in the conduct of the expedition, or any Machiavelian design to get quit of the soldiers of a rival chief, in its original conception. The object of regaining possession of so great a colony was well worth the incurring even of considerable risk; the forces employed apparently adequate to the end; the period of the year selected the best adapted for the conduct of warlike operations. In ability of design and wisdom of execution, Napoléon never was deficient. It was the insensibility to any moral government of mankind, springing out of the irreligious habits of a revolution, that occasioned all his misfortunes. St.-Domingo, in fact, was conquered, when it wast lost by his deceit and perfidy; by the iniquitous seizure of Toussaint when relying on the faith of a solemn treaty, and the re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe in violation of the promises of the French Government, contained in a proclamation signed by the First Consul (1).

Degraded state of St.-Domingo ever since that time.

Since the expulsion of the French from the island, St.-Domingo has been nominally independent; but slavery has been far indeed from being abolished, and the condition of the people any thing but ameliorated by the change. Nominally free, the blacks have remained really enslaved. Compelled to labour, by the terrors of military discipline, for a small part of the produce of the soil, they have retained the severity, without the advantages of servitude; the industrious habits, the flourishing aspect of the island, have disappeared; the surplus wealth, the agricultural opulence of the fields, have ceased; from being the greatest exporting island in the West Indies, it has ceased to raise any sugar (2); and the inhabitants, reduced to half their former amount, and bitterly galled by their republican task-masters, have relapsed into the indolence and inactivity of savage life (2).

(1) Bign. ii. 445.

Napoléon admitted subsequently that he was wrong in his conduct to St-Domingo. "I have to reproach myself," said he, "for that expedition in the time of the Consulate. It was a great fault to try to subject it by force. I should have been contented with the intermediate government of Toussaint. Peace was not then sufficiently established with England: the territorial wealth to which I looked in trying to subject it, would have only enriched our enemies. It was undertaken against my opinion, in conformity to the wishes of the Council of State, who were carried away by the cries of the colonists." —LAS CASES, ii. 179.

(2) Mackenzie's St.-Domingo, i. *passim*.

And of the measure which it affords of the capacity of the negroes.

(3) The revolution of St.-Domingo has demonstrated that the negroes can occasionally exert all the vigour and heroism which distinguish the European character; but there is as yet no reason to suppose that they are capable of the continued efforts, the sustained and persevering toil, requisite to erect the fabric of civilized freedom. An observation of Gibbon seems decisive on this subject. "The inaction of the negroes does not seem to be the effect either of their virtue or of their pusillanimity. They indulge, like the rest of mankind, their passions and appetites, and the adjacent tribes are engaged in frequent acts of hostility. But this rude ignorance has never invented any effectual weapons of defence or destruction; they appear incapable of forming any extensive plans of government or conquest, and the obvious inferiority of their mental faculties has been discovered and abused by the nations of the temperate zone. Sixty thousand blacks are annually embarked from the coast of Guinea, but they embark in chains, never to return to their native country; and this constant emigration, which, in the space of two centuries, might have furnished armies to overrun the globe, accuses the guilt of Europe and the weakness of Africa." [Gibbon, c. 25, vol. iv. 311.] If the negroes are not inferior, either in vigour, courage, or intelligence, to the Europeans, how has it happened that, for six thousand years, they have remained in the savage state? What has prevented mighty empires arising on the banks of the Niger, the Quarra, or the Coogo, in the same way as on those of the Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Nile? Heat of climate, intricacy of forests, extent of desert, will not solve the difficulty, for they exist to as great an extent in the plains of Mesopotamia or Hindostan as in Central Africa. It is in vain to say the Europeans have retained the Africans in that degraded condition, by their violence, injustice, and the slave trade. How has it happened that the inhabitants of that vast and fruitful region have not risen to the government of the globe, and inflicted on the savages of Europe the evils now set forth as the cause of their depression? Did not all nations start alike in the career of infant improvement? and was not Egypt, the cradle of civilization, nearer to Central Africa than the shores of Britain? In the earliest representations of nations in existence, the paintings on the walls of the tombs of the kings of Egypt, the distinct races of the Asiatics, the Jews, the Hottentots, and the

Ambitious designs of Napoléon in Europe.

But it was not only in the southern hemisphere that the vast designs of the First Consul were manifested. Europe also was the theatre of his ambition; and the preliminaries of Amiens were hardly signed, when his conduct gave unequivocal proof that he was resolved to be fettered by no treaties, and that to those who did not choose to submit to his authority, no alternative remained but the sword.

By the 11th article of the treaty of Lunéville, it had been provided, that "the contracting parties shall mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right to the people who inhabit them to adopt whatever form of government they think fit." The allies, of course, understood by this clause real independence; in other words, a liberation of these republics from the influence of France; but it soon appeared that Napoléon affixed a very different meaning to it, and that what he intended was the establishment of constitutions in them all, which should absolutely subject them to his power.

Holland is again revolutionized.

Holland was the first of the affiliated republics which underwent the change consequent on the establishment of the consular power in France. For this purpose, the French ambassador, Schimmelpennick, repaired to the Hague, to prepare a revolution which should assimilate the government of the Batavian to that of the French republic. So devoted was the Directory at the Hague to his will, that they voluntarily became the instrument of their own destruction. On the 17th September, the French ambassador sent the constitution, ready made, to the legislative body, with the intimation, that they had nothing to do but affix to it the seal of their approbation, as it had already received the sanction of the people. In fact, on the same day, it was published to the nation, and the Directory took for granted that it would be approved. The Dutch legislature, however, were not prepared for this degradation; and the last act of their existence did honour to their memory: they decreed the suppression of the illegal acts of the Directory. Forthwith a *coup d'état* was put in force. The Directory, by Sept. 18, 1801. a violent act, dissolved the Chambers; their doors were closed by French bayonets, the guards absolved from their oaths, and all the persons in the employment of the Government dismissed. Shortly after the new constitution was published by the Directory, alike without the knowledge or concurrence of the people—but it was a nearer approximation to the habits and wishes of the respectable classes than the democratic institutions which had preceded it—a legislative body, composed of five and thirty members, in a slight degree recalled the recollection of the old States-General. The division

Europeans, are clearly marked; but the blue-eyed and white-haired sons of Japhet are represented in cow-skins, with the hair turned outwards, in the pristine state of pastoral life, while the Hottentots are already clothed in the garb of civilized existence. What since has given so mighty an impulse to European civilization, and retained in a stationary or declining state the immediate neighbours of Egyptian and Carthaginian greatness? It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion, but that in the qualities requisite to create and perpetuate civilization, the African is decidedly inferior to the European race; and if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by the subsequent history and present state of the Haytian republic.—See *Mackenzie's St.-Domingo*, vol. ii. 260, 321.

The following table contains the comparative wealth, produce, and trade of St.-Domingo, before 1789, and in 1832, after forty years of nominal freedom.

St.-Domingo.

	1789.	1832.
Population,	600,000	280,000
Sugar exported,	672,000,000 lbs.	None.
Coffee,	86,789,000 lbs.	32,000,000 lbs.
Ships employed in trade,	1680	1
Sailors,	27,000	167
Exports to France,	L.6,720,000	None.
Imports from ditto.	9,890,000	None.

—*Ibid.* i. 321, and Dumas, viii. 112.

of provinces was the same as in the United States; but the Council of State, of twelve members, with a president changing every three months, was possessed of much more absolute power than ever belonged to the Stadtholder, while the frequent change of the president prevented any one from acquiring such a preponderance as might render him formidable to the authority of the First Consul. The form of submitting the constitution to the people was gone through. Out of 416,419 citizens having a right to vote, 52,219 rejected it. The immense majority who declined to vote was assumed to be favourable to the change, and the new government was solemnly proclaimed. The conduct of the Dutch on this occasion affords a striking proof of the impossibility of eradicating, by external violence, the institutions which have grown with the growth and strengthened with the strength of a free people. In vain they were subdued by the armies of France, and democratic institutions forced upon them, with the loud applause of the indigent rabble in power. The great mass of the inhabitants, and almost the whole proprietors, withdrew altogether from public situations, and took no share whatever in the changes which were imposed upon their country. In the seclusion of private life, they retained the habits, the affections, and the religious observances of their forefathers; their children were nursed in these patriotic feelings, untainted by the revolutionary passions which agitated the surrounding states; and when the power of Napoléon was overthrown, the ancient government was re-established, with as much facility, and as universal satisfaction, as the English constitution on the restoration of Charles II (1).

And the Cisalpine Republic again remodelled.

Having thus established a government in Holland, entirely subservient to his will, and in harmony with the recent institutions in France, the next care of the First Consul was to remodel the Cisalpine republic in such a way as to render it, too, analogous to the parent state, and equally submissive to his authority. For this purpose, early in November, 1801, the French authorities began to prepare the inhabitants of the infant Republic for the speedy fixing of their destinies, and the formation of a new constitution better adapted to their more matured state of existence; and, on the 14th of the same month, a proclamation of the Extraordinary Commission of Government announced the formation of an Assembly of 450 deputies at Lyon, in the end of December, to deliberate on the approaching constitution. The place assigned for their meeting sufficiently indicated the influence intended to be exercised over their deliberations; and it was openly avowed in the proclamation, which "invited the First Consul to suspend the immense labours of his magistracy, to share with the members of the Assembly the important duties which awaited them." To render the members more docile to his will, and prepare the scenes in the drama which was to be performed before the audience of Europe, two of the ablest statesmen of France, M. Talleyrand and M. Chaptal, preceded the First Consul at Lyon, and arranged every thing before his arrival in a way perfectly conformable to his will (2).

The Convocation was opened on the 31st December, at Lyon, with extraordinary pomp. The unwonted concourse of strangers, both from France and Italy; the extraordinary number of the most illustrious characters of both countries who were assembled, gave that city the air of the capital of southern Europe; the splendour of the processions with which the proceedings were opened, excited the utmost enthusiasm among the inhabitants. On the 11th

(1) Dum. viii. 39, 42. Norv. ii. 174, 175.

(2) Bot. iii. 416. Bign. ii, 152, 153. Norv. ii. 175, 176.

Entry of Napoléon into Lyon. Senatus-Consultum there settling the Cisalpine government.

January the First Consul made his triumphal entry into the city, escorted by a brilliant troop of one hundred and fifty young men of the first consideration, and was every where received with the most enthusiastic acclamations. Fêtes, spectacles, and theatrical representations succeeded each other without interruption, and universal transports attended the opening of a council fraught with the fate of the Italian peninsula. The few deputies attached to republican principles soon perceived that their visions of democracy were vanishing into air; but unable to stem the torrent, they were constrained to devour their vexation in secret, and join in the external acts of homage to the First Consul. But amidst the fumes of incense and the voice of adulation, Napoléon never for one instant lost sight of the important object of establishing his authority in Italy; and the report of the committee to whom the formation of a constitution had been referred, soon unfolded the extent of his views. They reported that reasons of policy and state necessity forbade the evacuation of the Cisalpine territory by the French troops; that the infant Republic "had need of a support which should cause it to be respected by the powers who have not yet recognized its existence; that it absolutely required a man, who, by the ascendant of his name and power, might give it the rank and consideration which it could no otherwise attain; and therefore that General Bonaparte should be invited to honour the Cisalpine Republic by continuing to govern it, and by blending with the direction of the Government in France the charge of its affairs, as long as he might deem necessary for uniting all the parts of its territory under the same political institutions, and causing it to be recognized by all the powers of Europe." Napoléon accepted without hesitation the duty thus imposed upon him. He replied—"The choice which I have hitherto made of persons to fill your principal offices has been independent of every feeling of party or local interests; but as to the office of President of the Republic, I can discover no one among you who has sufficient claims on the public gratitude, or is sufficiently emancipated from party feelings, to deserve that trust. I yield, therefore, to your wishes, and I shall preserve, as long as circumstances shall require it, the lead in your affairs." Loud applauses followed every part of this well-conceived pageant; and, at the conclusion of the address, the whole Assembly rose and demanded that the name of "Cisalpine" should be changed into that of "Italian Republic," an important alteration, which revealed the secret design, already formed by the ruler of France, of converting the whole peninsula into one state in close alliance with the great nation (1).

Jan. 25, 1802.

Nature of the new constitution.

The new constitution of the Italian Republic, "prepared in the cabinet of the First Consul, and to which the representatives of that state were not permitted to offer any opposition," was founded upon different principles from any yet promulgated in Europe. Three electoral colleges were formed; one composed of proprietors, one of persons of the learned professions, one of the commercial interest, whose numbers were invariably to remain the same. The legislative body consisted of seventy-five persons, elected by these colleges; while the vice-president, secretary of state, and all the members of the executive, were appointed by the First Consul. This constitution, so different from the democratic institutions which had preceded it, in some respects merits the eloge of the Italian historian, as being "the best which Napoléon had ever conceived (2);" and unquestion-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1802, 78. Bot. iii. 416, 417. Norv. ii. 176, 177. Bign. ii. 154, 157.

(2) Bot. iii. 416.

ably, in the restriction of the elective franchise to the most respectable members of these different classes, an important step was made towards that establishment of political power, on the basis of property and intelligence, which is the only foundation on which that admirable part of a limited government can be securely rested. Melzi, a great proprietor in Lombardy, was appointed vice-president of the republic, with every demonstration of regard from the First Consul; a judicious choice, well deserved by the character and patriotism of that illustrious nobleman; and in that appointment, not less than the general character of the constitution, the democratic party perceived a death-blow to all the hopes they had formed (1).

Sept. 11. 1802. Annexation of Piedmont to France.

The success of this measure for the thorough subjection of the Italian Republic to his will, led, shortly after, to another still more audacious, and which at any other period would have instantly lighted in Europe the flames of a general war. On the 11th September, Piedmont was, by a formal decree, annexed to the French Republic, the First Consul alleging, that the absence of any stipulation in his favour, in the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, was equivalent to a permission for him to absorb it in the growing dominion of France. The principle was thus openly acted upon, that the republic was at liberty to incorporate with its dominions any lesser state, whose integrity was not expressly guaranteed by the greater powers. By this bold measure, all the north of Italy, from the summit of the Maritime Alps to the shores of the Mincio, was directly subjected to French influence; and Austria beheld at Milan a second French capital, almost within sight of the frontier of its Italian possessions. Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states which had submitted to the power of Napoléon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune (2), remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed without opposition in the hands of the French republic.

Construction of the roads over Mont-Cenis and the Simplon.

Formidable as these acquisitions to France were, they were rendered doubly so from the measures taken at the same time by the enterprising spirit and vast conceptions of the First Consul to secure these important Transalpine acquisitions to his dominions. Louis XIV had said, after the family compact was concluded, "There are no longer any Pyrenees;" but with greater reason Napoléon might say, after the roads over the Simplon and Mont-Cenis were formed, "There are no longer any Alps." The Valais, an integral part of Switzerland, but of great importance in a military point of view, as commanding the direct route from France to Italy, both by the Great St.-Bernard and the Simplon, was erected into a separate republic, entirely under French influence, under the denomination of the "Republic of the Valais." The object of detaching this inconsiderable state from the Helvetic confederacy was soon apparent. French engineers began to work on the northern side of the Simplon; Italian, to surmount the difficulties of the long ravine on the south; and soon that magnificent road was formed which leads from the rugged banks of the Rhône to the smiling shores of the Lago Maggiore, and has revealed to the eyes of an admiring world the stupendous grandeur of the defile of Gondo. Similar works were undertaken at the same time up the valley of the Isère and over Mont-Cenis, as well as from the Rhône over Mont-Genevre to Turin.

July 2, 1802.

(1) Dum. viii. 56, 57. Bign. ii. 157, 158. Norv. ii. 177, 178.

(2) Dum. ix. 80, 81. Jom. xv.

The Alps, traversed by three splendid roads, ceased to present any obstacle to an invading army (1); and works, greater than the Roman Emperors achieved in three centuries of their dominion in Italy, were completed by Napoléon in the three first years of his consular government.

The command of Savoy, Piedmont, the Pays de Vaud, and the Valais, gave France a ready entrance through these new roads into Italy; but not content with this, the First Consul rapidly extended his dominions through the centre of the peninsula. A new constitution was given to the Ligurian Republic, which brought Genoa more immediately under French influence.

Parma and Placentia are occupied, with Elba.

The secret treaty of March 12, 1801, with Spain, by which Parma and Placentia were ceded to the Italian Republic, was made public, and the French troops took possession of that state, as well as the island of Elba, on the shores of Tuscany; while the King of Etruria, at Florence, a creature of his creation, preserved entire the ascendency of the First Consul in the centre of Italy. Thus not only was the authority of Napoléon obeyed, but almost his dominion extended from the North Sea to the Roman states; while the Pope and the King of Naples, trembling for their remaining possessions, had no alternative but entire submission to the irresistible power in the north of the peninsula (2).

These rapid and unparalleled encroachments would, notwithstanding the bad success of their former efforts, have led to a fresh coalition of the continental powers against France, if they had not been intent at that moment upon the important subject of indemnities to be provided for the German princes, and divided by the fatal apple of discord which French diplomacy had thus contrived to throw between the rival powers of Prussia and Austria.

Progress of the negotiations for the German indemnities.

When the conquests of France were extended to the Rhine, and all the territories on the left bank were permanently annexed to the Republic, not only a host of small German princes were dispossessed of their estates, but several of the greater powers lost valuable appendages of their dominions, situated on the same side of the river. To soften the effects of this deprivation, it was provided by the treaty of Lunéville, that indemnities should be obtained by the sovereigns who had suffered on the occasion, and for this purpose a Congress be opened in some convenient part of the German empire. But how were the sufferers to be indemnified, when the whole territories on the right bank were already appropriated by lay or ecclesiastical princes; and no one could receive an indemnity without some party being spoliated to give him admission? To solve the difficulty, it was agreed by the greater powers to *secularize,* as it was called, a large proportion of the ecclesiastical sovereignties of the empire. In other words, to confiscate a considerable part of the church property, and out of the spoils thus acquired provide equivalents for the conquests gained by the French Republic. Thus the dangerous precedent was established, of indemnifying the stronger power at the expense of the weaker, a species of iniquity of which France and Austria had set the first example, in their atrocious convention for the partition of the Venetian territories, and which, by shewing the German princes that they could place no reliance on the support of the great powers in a moment of danger, gave an irremediable wound to the constitution of the empire.

As it was early foreseen that the partition of these indemnities would form a most important subject of discussion, and that by dexterous negotiation on that subject more might be gained than by a successful campaign, the great

(1) Dum. ix. 81. Ann. Reg. 1802, 90.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1802, 88, 89. Dum. ix. 81, 82.

powers soon began to strengthen themselves by secret alliances. Preparatory to the approaching contention, and before entering that great field of diplomacy, France and Russia inserted, with this view, in the secret treaty, Oct. 8, 1801. 8th October, 1801, already mentioned, between the two powers, a stipulation, by which it was provided that the two Cabinets "should pursue a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to the adoption of their plans in the partition of the indemnities, which have for an invariable object the maintenance of a just equilibrium between the houses of Prussia and Au- Aug. 24, 1801. stria (1)." Shortly before, a treaty had been concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the First Consul guaranteed all the possessions of the latter, and engaged to support his claim for indemnities with all the influence in his power. Prussia might already calculate with certainty upon the support of France, not only from general principles of policy and common jealousy of the Emperor, but from the express stipulations in the treaty of Basle, in 1795, and the secret convention of 1796, in virtue of which she had maintained an ambiguous neutrality, of essential service to the Republic in the subsequent desperate struggles with the Imperial forces. The Prussian Cabinet accordingly received the warmest assurances of support from the First Consul in the approaching negotiations; and the idea of a triple alliance between the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and St.-Petersburg was even talked of and seriously entertained at all these capitals; insomuch, that the French envoy, General Hédouville, and the Prussian at Paris, the Marquis Lucchesini, received orders from their respective Courts to make every exertion to bring about this object. At length, on May 23, 1802. the 23d May, 1802, a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Prussia, without the privity of the Russian Ambassador, which settled the amount of the Prussian indemnity and that of the Prince of Orange; and such was the address of the First Consul and his Ambassador at St.-Petersburg, that the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander to its provisions was obtained without difficulty, notwithstanding the slight thus offered to his influence. By this convention it was stipulated that Prussia should obtain the bishoprics of Paderborn and Heldisheim, L'Eschefeld, the town and territory of Erfurth, the city of Munster, with the greater part of its territory, and other cities and abbacies, to the amount of more than four times what she had lost on the left bank of the Rhine. In return for these large acquisitions at the expense of neutral states, Prussia "guaranteed to the French Republic the arrangements made in Italy, viz.—the existence of the kingdom of Etruria, that of the Italian Republic, and the annexation of the 27th military division (Piedmont) to the French June 4, 1802. territory." By a treaty, signed on 4th June, 1802, between France and Austria, it was stipulated that these two powers should act together in regulating the matter of the indemnities; and the Emperor Alexander, when he ratified the treaty, provided for a compensation to the King of Sardinia for his continental possessions, and to the Duke of Holstein Oldenburg for his losses under the new arrangement. Thus was Prussia rewarded for her impolitic desertion of the European alliance and seven years of discreditable neutrality, by the acquisition of extensive territorial possessions adjoining her own dominions; thus did Napoléon, who had first bribed Austria to wink at his Italian conquests by the confiscation of the whole continental possessions of Venice, now reward the defection of Prussia by the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The parties to this general system of

Cordial union of France and Prussia in this matter.

In return for which Prussia guarantees the French acquisitions in Italy.

(1) Bign. ii. 89.

spoliation, linked as they were together, seemed to be beyond the reach of punishment; but Providence was preparing for them all, in consequence of their iniquity, the means of ultimate retribution—for Austria the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz; for Prussia the catastrophe of Jena and treaty of Tilsit; for Napoléon the retreat from Moscow and rock of St.-Helena (1).

Policy of Austria in this negotiation;

The views of Austria in this negotiation were widely different. Intent upon gaining a large indemnity for herself, and desirous even of extending her frontier from the Inn to the Iser at the expense of Bavaria, in exchange for her possessions in Swabia, she was yet opposed to the system of secularization, and desirous that the compensations should break up as little as possible the old and venerable constitution of the Germanic empire. This policy, which duty equally with interest prescribed to the head of that great confederation, was directly opposite to that which France and Prussia pursued. The former of these powers was anxious to augment her own strength by the acquisition of as many of the ecclesiastical possessions as possible, and increase her influence by the enrichment, at the expense of the church, of the princes who were included in the line of neutrality protected by her power; the latter looked only to breaking up the German confederation, and creating a circle of little sovereigns round the frontiers of the Republic dependent on its support for the maintenance of its recent acquisitions. Russia took under its especial protection, after the share of Prussia was secured by the treaty of May, 1802, the interests of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden; and France cordially united in their support; foreseeing already, in the extension of these powers through revolutionary influence, the formation of an outpost which might at all times open an entrance for its armies into the heart of Germany, and counterbalance all the influence of the Emperor in its defence. Thus was Austria, the power best entitled, both from the dignity of the Imperial crown and the magnitude of its possessions in the empire, to a preponderating voice in the negotiation, thrown into the shade in the deliberations, and thus did Russia and Prussia unite with the First Consul in laying the foundation of that CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, from which, as a hostile outwork, he was afterwards enabled to lead his armies to Jena, Friedland, and the Kremlin (2).

and of Russia.

Secret views of the latter power.

It was not without ulterior views to her own advantage that Russia supported in this extraordinary manner the pretensions of France in the affairs of Germany. The French ambassador at St.-Petersburg, M. Hédouville, received instructions from the First Consul to assure the Emperor of his "sincere desire to obtain for Russia the entire and free navigation of the Black Sea;" while, at the same time, Colonel Caulaincourt was commissioned at Paris to communicate to Napoléon the desire of the Czar to favour the extension of French commerce in the Black Sea; M. Hédouville was also enjoined to open a negotiation for "the triumph of liberal principles in the navigation and commerce of neutral vessels." Thus Napoléon shook for a moment the firm purpose of the Emperor Alexander, by artfully presenting to his youthful imagination the objects of ambition long cherished by his predecessors, Catherine and Paul—afterwards, in part, attained by his successor, Nicholas (3).

Convinced at length, from the intelligence communicated by his ambassadors at St.-Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, of the perfect accord between these powers, the Emperor of Austria deemed it high time to take some step

(1) Bign. ii. 304, 325. Jom. xv. 23, 27. Dum. vii. 10, 23.

(2) Dum. vii. 23, 40. Bign. ii. 325, 332. Jom. xv. 26, 29.

(3) Bign. ii. 320, 321.

which should vindicate his authority as the head of the empire, and shew the coalesced powers that they would not succeed in maintaining all their proposed acquisitions but by force of arms. By an imperial decree he directed that the deputation of the interested powers should meet at Ratisbon on the 3d August. This deputation consisted of four electors, viz. Mayence, Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, and four members of the College of Princes, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, and Hesse Cassel. It was universally known that a decided majority of this assembly was in the interests of France; and in effect so little did the coalesced powers attempt to disguise their designs, that the parties whom they supported had taken possession of the provinces allotted to them in the secret treaties before the Congress at Ratisbon assembled. The King of Prussia, on July 3d, took possession of the territories assigned to him, in conformity with a proclamation issued on the 6th June, and the Elector of Bavaria, following the example, seized on the territories he was to receive on the 17th July, and was proceeding to occupy Passau, when the emperor, who regarded that important city with reason as one of the bulwarks of his hereditary states, anticipated him by marching the Austrian forces into it, as well as into the archbishopric and city of Saltzburg (1).

July 23, 1801. Courageous act of Austria in occupying Passau.

July 3.

July 17, 1802.

This courageous act, which seemed at first sight to set at defiance the whole power of Russia, Prussia, and France, was in reality levelled at the First Consul, who had, by secret instructions not communicated to the other powers, enjoined this extravagant prejudication of the deliberations of the Congress. Desirous, however, if possible, to avoid coming to an open rupture with France, the Emperor instructed his ambassador at Paris to soften as much as possible the hostile act, by representing that the town in dispute was only taken possession of in a provisional manner, till its destiny was finally determined by the Congress. An angry interchange of notes ensued between the French and Imperial ambassadors, during which, the first Consul deemed the opportunity favourable to draw still closer his relations with the Prussian Cabinet. In consequence, a treaty was concluded, on the 5th September, between France, Prussia, and Bavaria, by which it was stipulated, that if "within sixty days the Emperor should not evacuate the town of Passau and its dependencies, the French and Prussian Governments should unite their forces to compel him to do so, as well as to maintain the ancient possessions of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn." To this convention the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg acceded, stipulating only as the condition of its concurrence, an adequate compensation to the Grand Duke of Tuscany (2).

Angry correspondence in consequence between France and Austria.

Sept. 5, 1802.

Meanwhile the conferences at Ratisbon were opened, and the fruit of the secret negotiations which had so long been depending became manifest. Immediately after it met, the ministers of France and Russia laid on the table a joint plan for the partition of the indemnities, and insisted that the matters submitted to their deliberations should be finally adjusted within the space of sixty days. This haughty interference on the part of stranger powers was in the highest degree grating to the feelings of the Austrian Cabinet, but, with the usual prudence of their administration, they resolved to dissemble their resentment. Having recourse again to negotiation, they assailed the Cabinet of the Tuileries by the same artifices with which the First

Aug. 18. Conferences at Ratisbon.

(1) Dum. vii. 42, 45. Jom. xv. 28, 29. Bign. ii. 333, 335.

(2) Bign. ii. 335, 338. Dum. viii. 44, 51.

The principle of secularization is admitted.

Consul had succeeded so well at St.-Petersburg and Berlin, and offered, on condition of obtaining some advantages in Germany, to recognize his recent strides in Italy. This proposal had the desired effect. Two conventions were concluded at Paris, in the end of December, between Austria and France, which settled the affairs both of Italy and Germany. By the first, the compensations in which the Imperial family was interested were fixed. The Bisgraw and Ortenaw were conferred upon the Duke of Modena, in lieu of the states he had lost in Italy, and the Emperor received in exchange the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which were severed from the church for that purpose, while Passau was ceded to Bavaria, and in exchange, the bishopric of Aichstedt conferred upon Austria. By the second, the Emperor recognized the King of Etruria, and all the changes which had taken place in Italy since the treaty of Lunéville (1).

Dec. 26, 1802.

Compensations respectively received.

The shares of the greater powers being settled, the claims of the minor states were easily disposed of, and the indemnities finally adjusted by a recess of 25th February, 1803. By this arrangement, the most important which had taken place since the treaty of Westphalia, the old Germanic constitution was entirely overturned, and a new division made which for ever destroyed the fundamental principles of the empire. It was easy to perceive, on comparing the compensations dealt out to the different states, the influence which had preponderated in the deliberations, and the gross injustice with which those states who had inclined, in the preceding contests, to the interests of France, were enriched at the expense of those who had stood by the Imperial fortunes. The Grand Duke of Tuscany received hardly a fourth—the Duke of Modena little more than a third of what they had respectively lost; while Prussia acquired four times, and Bavaria nearly twice, the amount of their ceded provinces on the left bank of the Rhine (2).

Feb. 25, 1803.

(1) Bign. ii. 343, 345. Jom. xv. 31, 32.

(2) Dum. vii. 48, 49. Jom. xv. 32, 33. Bign. i. 344, 349.

By this treaty, the equivalents settled upon the principal powers, out of the ecclesiastical spoils of the empire, were thus adjusted.

Proportion in which the several powers gained acquisition.

I. Prussia, by the treaty of Basle, had ceded to the Republic her provinces on the left of the Rhine, including the duchy of Gueldres, the principality of Mocurs, and part of the duchy of Cleves, containing in all

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	137.000	1,400,000 florins.
Gained,	526,000	3,800,000
So gained,	389,000	2,400,000

Her acquisitions, which made up this great addition, consisted of the free towns of Malhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar. The bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and part of Munster, and many other abbacies and church lands.

II. Bavaria had lost, beyond the Rhine, the duchy of Deux Ponts, that of Juliers, and the palatinate of the Rhine. She received in stead the important free towns of Ulm, Memmingen, Nordlingen, the bishoprics of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Augsbourg, and Passau, and a vast many rich abbacies and monasteries. Her losses and gains stood thus—

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	580,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	854,500	6,607,000
Gained,	274,500	2,801,000

III. Wirtemberg, for its possessions in Alsace and Franche-Comté, obtained nine Imperial cities and eight abbeys.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	14,000	240,000 florins.
Gained,	120,000	612,000
Gained,	106,000	372,000

While such were the portions allotted to the states under the protection of France or Russia, who were to be rewarded for preceding neutrality, and form the basis of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, the indemnities allotted to the connections of that power were of the most meagre description. For example, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had lost in Italy the beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and he

Disastrous moral effects of this general spoliation of the ecclesiastical Princes.

But it was not merely by the augmentation of some and diminution of other states, and the formation of a body of sovereigns in the empire, dependent on France for the maintenance of their acquisitions, that this partition of the indemnities was fatal to the best interests of Europe. Moral effects far more disastrous resulted from this great act of diplomatic spoliation. In all ages, indeed, the maxim *vae victis* has been the rule of war; and injury or subjugation formed the lot of the conquered. But in all such cases, not even excepting the recent and flagrant partition of Poland, it was on the belligerent states only that these consequences fell; and the adjoining nations were exempt from the effects of the tempest which had overthrown their less fortunate neighbour. It was reserved for an age in which the principles of justice, freedom, and civil right were loudly invoked on both sides, to behold the adoption of a different principle, and see belligerent states indemnify themselves for their losses in war, at the expense not of the vanquished, but of neutral and weaker powers which had taken no part in the contest. This monstrous injustice, of which Napoléon gave the first example, in the cession of Venice, precipitated into hostile measures by his intrigues, to Austria, was immediately adapted and acted upon by all the great powers; and at the Congress of Ratisbon their frontiers were rounded, and strength augmented, by the spoils of almost all the ecclesiastical princes, and a great number of the free cities of the empire. This, too, was done, not by conquerors with arms in their hands, not in the heat of victory, or triumph of conquest, but by calculating diplomatists, in the bosom of peace, without any inquiry into the interest or wishes of the transferred people, and guided only by an arithmetical estimate in cold blood of the comparative acquisitions by each power in revenue, subjects, and territory. All ideas of public right, of a system of international law, or the support of the weaker against the greater powers, were overturned by this deliberate act of spoliation. Woful experience diffused an universal conviction of the lamentable truth, that the lesser states had never so much cause for alarm as when the greater were coming to an accommodation. Neutrality, it was seen, was the most perilous course which could be adopted, because it interested no one in the preservation of the weaker states; and all Europe prepared to follow the banners of one or other of the rival chiefs, who, it was foreseen, must soon contend for the empire of the world in the centre of Germany. It is the glory of England that she alone has never acceded to this system of international spoliation; but on the contrary resisted it, on every occasion, to the utmost of her power: that her acquisitions and losses have been all at the expense of her enemies or herself: that no friendly or neutral power has had cause to rue the day that she signed her treaties; and that so far from gaining at the expense of lesser states, she has repeatedly made sacrifices of enormous magnitude, to soften the consequences of their adverse fortune—a memorable instance of the effects of real freedom and a constitutional government in subduing the desire of gain and elevating the standard of public virtue, and of the difference of

received the archbishopric of Saltzbourg, the bishopric of Aichstedt, part of that of Passau, and the valley of Berctolsgaden.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
He lost,	1,150,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	286,000	2,150,000
Lost,	864,000	1,650,000

—See BIGNON, ii. 349, 351; and JOMINI, xv. 32, 37.

its effects from all that the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm or the ambition of despotic power are capable of producing!

Projects of Napoléon against Switzerland.

While the continental powers were intent on the acquisition of ill-gotten gains in the centre of Germany, Napoléon had leisure to pursue his projects of ambition in the mountains of Switzerland. His conduct towards the inhabitants of that country led to important consequences, as it first unfolded, even to his warmest admirers, the insatiable spirit of aggrandizement by which he was actuated, and was one of the immediate causes of the renewal of the war.

Advantages of the federal system in that country.

When republican institutions are established in a country of considerable extent and varied productions, it is by the *federal system*—in other words, a congregation of independent states, having each the power of internal legislation—that the national integrity can alone for any length of time be preserved. The reason is, that separate interests are there brought to bear directly on the conduct of public affairs; and if those interests are adverse, which must frequently be the case, the despotism of the stronger over the weaker power speedily becomes insupportable. A monarch equally removed from both, and equally dependent upon either for his support, may dispense equal justice between the contending interests of separate provinces or classes of society; but it is in vain to expect any thing like equity in the judgment formed by one of these provinces or classes upon the rival pretensions of the other. To do so is to expect that men will judge equally and impartially in their own cause; a pitch of perfection to which human nature never has, and never will arrive. The Autocrat of Russia, or the Emperors of Rome, may deal out impartial justice in determining on the rival and conflicting interests of the different provinces of their vast dominions; but it is quite extravagant to look for a just decision by one of these provinces or its representatives upon the other. Power, superiority of votes or influence, will ever form the basis of their decision; the majority, as Tocqueville tells us it now is in America, will become despotic; and that power will never be yielded up but to the sword. The unchangeable division in Great Britain between the manufacturing and agricultural classes on the subject of the corn laws, and the threatened dissolution of the American confederacy by the collision of the Southern and Northern Provinces on the subject of the tariff on English goods, are so many instances of the operation of the simple principle, that no man can judge impartially in his own cause; and which, when applied to nations, forbids the extension of democratic institutions for any great length of time beyond the limits of a single city or particular class of society (1).

Interest, accordingly, universally leads the holders of considerable property, in all countries where democratic institutions prevail, to support the system of federal union, in preference to that of a central and universally diffused authority; because they find that it is in small states where the interests of the inhabitants are nearly the same, and in such states only, that their influence can be felt, or their wants receive due consideration. On the other hand, the democratic party in such communities are generally at first desirous of the concentration of power in a central government, and the con-

(1) Sparta, Athens, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, are instances of the government of a subject-territory by the citizens of a single town: Holland, of the ascendency of one commercial class in society: Great Britain, from 1688 to 1832, of a government substantially vested in the representatives of the great properties and *interests* of the state. It is not difficult to foresee what must be the result of the subsequent transference of political power from the proprietors to the multitude in an empire composed of such widely separated and discordant materials.

currence of all the representatives in its formation: these being the circumstances in which the influence of the leaders of the multitude is most effectually exercised, and the ascendency of towns, where their partisans are chiefly to be found, most thoroughly established.

Its adaptation to the varieties of their physical condition.

Though not extensive in point of superficial surface, Switzerland embraced such an extraordinary variety of climate, soil, and occupation, as rendered the rule of a single central democratic government in an especial manner vexatious. The habits and interests of the vine-growers in the Pays de Vaud are as much at variance with those of the shepherds of Glarus, as those of the intellectual city of Geneva or the aristocratic society of Berne are with the manufacturers of Soleure, or the chestnut-fed inhabitants of the Italian bailiwicks. Nor were the habits and ideas of the people less at variance than the physical features of the districts in which they dwelt. Their lineage, their language, their religion, their affinities were different. Perched on the summit of the Alps, they partook of the varied character of the races of mankind who met at their feet and ran up the valleys to their highest summits. The inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud, speaking the French tongue, shared in the feelings and excitement which the Revolution had produced to the north of the Jura. Those who dwelt on the Ticino and the Misocco betrayed, in their harmonious language, enthusiastic feelings, and indolent habits, the influence of Italian descent; while the brave Switzers to the north of the St.-Gothard evinced, in their independent spirit, rough manners, cleanly habits, and persevering character, the distinguishing features which in every age have distinguished the nations of German or Gothic descent. To establish one uniform democratic government for a country so situated, is as great an absurdity as it would be to propose the same political institutions for the English, trained to habits of order by centuries of freedom; the French, impetuous by nature, and unrestrained by custom; and the Russians, but recently emerged, under the rule of despotism, from savage life.

Different characters of the races which composed its inhabitants.

Discontent which the central democratic government produced.

The natural and unavoidable consequence of the establishment of a central democratical government, in a country composed of such various and discordant materials, was the entire subjugation of the rural districts by the inhabitants of the great towns. The peasants of Underwalden, the shepherds of Glarus, in vain attempted a contest with the citizens of Berne, Lausanne, or Zurich, speaking a different language, trained to habits of business, and closely congregated round the seat of government. In the unequal struggle they were speedily cast down; and thus the unity of the republic was but another expression to them for the practical loss of all their political franchises. The circumstances, too, under which this constitution had been forced upon them—the cruel devastation of their country, by which it had been preceded—the odious foreign yoke which it had brought upon their necks—the unheard-of contributions and spoliation by which it had been followed—had produced indelible feelings of aversion among the mountaineers,—a race of men resolute in their ideas, tenacious of their habits, and more jealous of their independence than any other people in Europe. Hence the singular fact, that the most ardent opponents of the new central government were to be found among the partisans of the most opposite former constitutions; and that, beside the oligarchy of Berne and Zurich, where political power was confined to a limited number of families, were to be found the peasants of the Forest Cantons, who exercised indiscriminately, under the canopy of heaven, all the functions of government (1).

(1) Jom. xiv. 409, 410. Dum. viii. 35, 36. Bign. ii. 368.

After the forcible proclamation of the new constitution imposed by the Directory upon Switzerland in 1798, the country remained for four years the theatre of interminable contests and intrigues. The success of the allies in 1799 having brought their forces into the mountains, and the Archduke Charles having, by proclamation, invited the people to re-establish their ancient form of government, an insurrection broke out simultaneously in every part of the country; but the allies being unable to render them any assistance, or advance any distance into their territory, it was speedily suppressed, without difficulty, by the armed force organized in the towns in the French interest. Overwhelmed with astonishment at the immense bodies of men who contended for the empire of Europe amid their mountains, sensible of th ir own insignificance amidst such prodigious masses, and equally pillaged by friend and foe, the Swiss took hardly any farther share in the contest, and resigned themselves, in hopeless despair, to a yoke which, in the circumstances of the world, appeared inevitable. But the passions, restrained from breaking out into open hostilities with foreign powers, burned only the more fiercely in the internal dissentions which tore every part of the republic. So furious did the spirit of party become, and so vehement the reproaches addressed by the adverse factions to each other, that the historian would be at a loss to recognize the features of the Swiss character, were it not in the lenity of them all, when victorious, to their fallen adversaries,—a moderation so remarkable, and so analogous to what took place in Holland during all the convulsions subsequent to the Revolution, and in England throughout the Great Rebellion, that it encourages the pleasing hope, that such tempering of savage inclination is either the blessed result of long-established freedom and religious habits, or is an inherent quality in the nations of Gothic descent (1).

Violent internal dissentions of the Swiss Cantons.

Without pursuing the complicated thread of Helvetic revolution during the four disastrous years that followed the French invasion, it will be more serviceable to give a summary of the arguments urged respectively by the partisans of the new constitution and the ancient government. On the part of the French supporters it was urged, "that nothing could be so extravagant as to hear the federal party invoke the popular welfare, when they were in reality advancing the interests only of oligarchy and fanaticism. How dare they make use of the sacred name of freedom, when, under the name of a popular government, two or three families have been for above a century in possession of all the offices of administration? It is in vain that they impose so far upon the public credulity as to style the central government a thousand times more burdensome than the ancient régime, when the slightest observation must be sufficient to shew that the burdens which have pressed so severely upon all classes have been owing solely to the evils inseparable from foreign warfare. And are the expenses of a few additional regiments, and of a central administration, composed at most of eighty or a hundred individuals, to be put in comparison with at least twenty separate governments, embracing, with their subordinate agents, several thousand persons? Disguise it as you will, it is not the feelings of patriotism or the public interest which occasion all the outcry, but selfish

Arguments adduced by the partisans of France.

(1) Jom. xiv. 410, 411. Bign. ii. 361. Dum. viii. 35, 37.

The usual course with the victorious party was to banish their fallen antagonists to Basle or Lausanne; and, after a few months, even this severity was relaxed, and the prescribed families returned to their homes and usual avocations. What a contrast to the proscriptions of the Convention, and transportations of the Directory, in the capital styling itself the centre of European civilization!—See Bignon, ii. 361.

consideration and private advantage. Thinking, like Cæsar, that it is better to be the first at Praeneste than the second at Rome, these popular despots would rather reign unmolested in their little valleys than be blended in the general administration of Switzerland, where they would speedily be reduced to their proper level, and where their voices, drowned in the minority, would cease to give them the consideration to which they aspire, under the mask of disinterested patriotism (1).

Answers made by the partisans of the old institutions.

It was impossible to deny that there was some truth in these insinuations; but the opposite party, at the head of which Aloys Reding, chief of the Canton of Schwytz—a chief of an energetic and noble character—did not fail to retort upon their adversaries arguments of an opposite kind, to which the recent calamities gave additional weight. They urged, "that if the misfortunes of Switzerland, since it had been exposed to revolutionary agitation, would not convince the partisans of a central government of their errors, neither would they be convinced though one rose from the dead. Since the disastrous period when the French troops entered Switzerland and proclaimed that form of administration amidst the blood of thousands, and by the light of burning villages, what had been witnessed in their once happy and united territory but rancour, hatred, and dissention? It is idle to ascribe that continued exasperation to the clamour of interested individuals; it has extended infinitely beyond the persons dispossessed by the recent changes, and embraces, in fact, the whole population, with the exception of that limited class in the towns to whom the central system has given the entire government of the country. Every one knows that Helvetia has paid more in taxes and contributions since the French invaded it than in a century before; and, in fact, it could hardly have been credited that such vast sums existed in the country as the republican agents have contrived to extract from its industrious inhabitants. It is in vain to allege that these calamities have been the result of war. The worst of them have arrived, not in war, but in peace; and have been, not contributions levied by soldiers, with arms in their hands, but exactions made by the cupidity of revolutionary agents, armed with the powers of the Central Government. It is utterly impracticable that such a system of administration can answer in a country so peculiarly situated as our Cantons are; the universal reprobation in which it is held is a sufficient proof of its total failure. In fact, the interested motives, so liberally insinuated on the other side, truly govern those who, for the sake of a constitution in which they have contrived to obtain lucrative situations, oppose themselves to the unanimous wish of their fellow-citizens (2).

Matters were brought to a crisis by a solemn recognition of the central authority by the Assembly, which met at Berne on the 1st August, 1801. The representatives of the lesser Cantons, and of the aristocratic party, protested against that resolution, and also against the power of redeeming tithes, inserted in the new constitution. Deeming opposition fruitless in an assembly ruled by a revolutionary majority, the deputies of nine Cantons separated from the remainder of the body, and finding that their absence only rendered the opposite party more precipitate in their measures, they had recourse to a *coup d'état* to accomplish their subversion. On the night of the 28th of October, a part of the legislative body met, and gave full power to Dolder and Savary, two leading members of the ancient executive council, to accomplish the revolution. They immediately had recourse to the French troops, who had secret orders from the First

Oct. 28, 1801. Revolution effected by the aid of the French troops.

(1) Jom. xiv. 411, 412.

(2) Jom. xiv. 412, 414. Dum. ix. 16.

Consul to support the movement; the posts of Government were all forced, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, and a Provisional Government, with Reding at its head, proclaimed (1).

The object of Napoléon in supporting this counter-revolution at Berne, was to establish a government in that country more in harmony with the monarchical institutions, now in the course of reconstruction at Paris, than the Democratic Assembly convened during the first fervour of the Helvetic Revolution; but he soon experienced some difficulty in steering between the opposite extremes into which the country was divided. Reding, the head of the Provincial Government, repaired to Paris, where the First Consul immediately impressed upon him the necessity of proceeding upon the principle of fusing together the different parties, on which he himself had proceeded in the formation of the Consular Government; and therefore required, as the condition of his farther support, the admission of six of the most moderate of the opposite party into the Government. Reding was coldly received at the Tuileries. His energetic and ardent character was little suited to the First Consul, who had no intention of reinstating the aristocratic party, who necessarily inclined to Austria, on that defenceless part of the French territory. He returned therefore to Berne, disappointed in his hopes, and applied without success to Austria and Prussia to obtain that support which he despaired of receiving from the French Government (2).

Nov. 29, 1801.

But it does not answer the views of Napoléon.

On his return, Reding found the new Government destitute both of power and consideration, and discord breaking out more fiercely than ever between the adverse factions. The Senate appointed by the Revolution of 28th October promulgated a new constitution, professed to be based on the principles laid down by the First Consul; but it neither satisfied either of the parties in Switzerland, nor accorded with the views on which his administration was founded. Deeming the time now arrived, therefore, when his interference was loudly called for, Napoléon instigated Dolder and the six persons admitted into the Government at his suggestion, to accomplish another revolution. They took advantage of the moment when Reding and the deputies of the Forest Cantons had returned, with patriarchal simplicity to their valleys, to celebrate the festival of Easter, and effected the object without difficulty. The Government were deposed, the constitution of 17th February was abolished, and an Assembly of forty Notables, specified in a list furnished by the French ambassador, appointed to meet at Berne on the 28th April, to put a final stop to the dissentions of the country. The new constitution, framed by Napoléon upon principles infinitely superior to any which had yet been extracted out of the revolutionary crucible, was proclaimed at Berne on the 19th May. It consisted of an Executive, composed of a Landamman and two Lieutenants, appointed for nine years; a Senate of fifty-six members, who proposed all changes in the laws; and a National Diet which sanctioned them. The sense of the citizens was forthwith taken upon this constitution. It appeared that out of 330,000 persons entitled to vote, 92,000 rejected it, 72,000 supported it, and 170,000 abstained from voting. A majority of votes, therefore, were for rejection: but the Government, proceeding on the principle that those who withdrew were favourable to the change, proclaimed its adoption by a large majority. The lesser Cantons

Feb. 17, 1802.

The new government is again deposed.

April 17, 1802.

And a new constitution framed by Napoléon.

May 19.

(1) Dum. viii. 37, 39. Bign. ii. 368, 369. Jom. xiv. 418, 419.

(2) Dum. ix. 19, 20. Bign. ii. 370, 371. Jom. xiv. 420, 421.

loudly announced their determination of seceding from the confederacy, if it was forced upon them; but the aristocratic Cantons, influenced by the promise that if agreed to the French troops would be withdrawn, at length agreed to its adoption (1).

Deeming the result of the last revolution sufficiently favourable to his views, Napoléon thought it no longer advisable to continue the French troops in Switzerland, where they had remained in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, for two years, to the evident dissatisfaction both of England and Austria. On the 20th July, accordingly, the retreat of the Republicans was proclaimed by the First Consul, and at the same time, the erection of the Valais into a separate Republic announced. This measure, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, and evidently in connection with the formation of the great military road over the Simplon, announced but too clearly to the Swiss the state of dependence under which they were to be placed to France by the new government they had obtained, and contributed not a little to the explosion which immediately followed the removal of the French forces (2).

July 20, 1802. French troops are withdrawn, and the independence of the Valais proclaimed.

The Government at Berne, aware of the slight hold which they had of the affections of the great majority of the inhabitants, were thunderstruck by the intelligence that the French troops were to be withdrawn, and loudly remonstrated against the adoption of a measure so fatal to their interests; but the First Consul, tired of the incessant changes of rulers in the Swiss states, and desirous of a pretext for interfering with decisive effect in a country so important to his military operations, persevered in his resolution, and the evacuation in good earnest commenced. The Government, despairing of any support from the national troops, eagerly solicited the aid of the Helvetic brigades, which was granted them by the First Consul: but before they had time to arrive, the insurrection had broken out in the small Cantons, and the constitution approached its dissolution. In a letter addressed to the French ambassador, on the 13th July, they openly announced their resolution to withdraw from the Helvetic confederacy, and renew the ancient league of the Waldstatten, under which they had in early times maintained their independence (3).

Upon which the Government at Berne is overturned.

July 13, 1802.

In this important and touching manifesto, the shepherds of the Alps asserted, by unanswerable arguments, their right to that freedom in the choice of their government for which the French had so long and justly contended, and which had been expressly guaranteed to them by the treaty of Lunéville. But the Administration of Berne ans-

The mountaineers prepare for war. Aug. 17, 1802.

(1) Jom. xiv. 424, 425. Dum. viii. 19, 20. Bign. ii. 371, 372.

(2) Jom. xv. 109. Dum. ix. 20, 21.

Heroic proclamation of the Forest Cantons

(3) "We have in vain endeavoured," said they, "for four successive years, to extricate ourselves from a constitution which, from its origin, and still more from the violence with which it was established, could not fail to be insupportable. It is in vain that we have constantly hoped that the Helvetic Government, instructed by the calamitous events of the last four years, would at length find that our separation from the Republic was that which was most wise and suitable for both parties; and that the wish which we have so often and so strongly expressed for our ancient liberty, would have induced them to abandon the hope that these three Cantons would ever voluntarily accept any other constitution than that which has always been considered as the only one suited to these states, and for that reason so highly prized by ourselves and our ancestors. Our reunion with Helvetia, which has been stained with so much blood, is perhaps the most cruel example of constraint that history can offer.

"In the conviction, therefore, that for a forced and unfortunate marriage divorce is the only reasonable remedy, and that Helvetia and ourselves cannot recover repose and contentment except by the dissolution of this forced tie, we are firmly resolved to labour at that separation with all possible activity; and we think it best to address that authority which for four years past has united us, in spite of ourselves, to the Helvetic Republic. As to any thing farther, we only wish to preserve uninterrupted harmony and good understanding with all our neighbours. In listening to our just demands, the Helvetian Republic will find the only means of preserving with us the relation of brotherhood and kindly neighbours."—See *Ann. Reg.* 1802, p. 227.

wered them by a proclamation, in which they announced their resolution to maintain by force the unity of the Republic. Upon this the Forest Cantons convoked a diet at Schwytz, which abolished all privileges, and re-established the ancient democratic constitution; in which they were immediately joined by the neighbouring Cantons of Zug, Glarus, Appenzel, and the Rheinthal. "The treaty of Lunéville," said they, "allows us the free choice of our institutions: we are at liberty therefore to overturn those which have been forced upon us." The opposite parties now openly prepared for war; magazines were formed, arms collected on both sides; and while the mountaineers on the Lake of Lucerne were rousing themselves, under their former magistrates, for the assertion of their ancient demoeratic rights, the peasants of the Oberland were secretly conspiring with the patricians of Berne for the re-establishment of the former aristocratic privileges of that oligarchy; an union at which the French writers are never weary of expressing their astonishment, not perceiving that it was formed on true conservative principles, and for the re-establishment of a government in both situations recommended by experience, and suited to the interests and habits of the people.

Aug. 17, 1802.

Aug. 28. Hostilities commence. Great early success of the mountaineers.

Hostilities were commenced in the Forest Cantons, by an attaek on the advanced guard of the troops of the Helvetic Republic, near the foot of Mount Pilatus, who were repulsed in an attempt to penetrate from the north into the Canton of Underwalden. Zurich soon after revolted against the constituted authorities, and the indignation of the inhabitants was strongly excited by an ineffectual bombardment which General Andermatt, at the head of the forces of the Republic, kept up, with the view of terrifying the inhabitants into submission. But the flame now broke out on all sides: the peasants of the Oberland and Argovia assembled under their old leaders, Watteville and D'Erlach, and the approach of their united forces towards Berne compelled the Government to summon Andermatt from the siege of Zurich to defend its own ramparts. Dolder, who, by making himself useful to all parties, had contrived to place himself at the helm of the Government, now lost all hope, and seeing no means of making head against the storm, concluded a convention, by which he was allowed to retire with his troops unmolested to the Pays de Vaud. Thither he proceeded accordingly, followed by the French ambassador, who fabricated a story of a bullet having fallen in the court of his hotel, to give his Government a pretence for immediate hostilities with the insurgents. The confederates immediately published a proclamation, in which they declared, "after four years of incessant calamity, we have at length attained the object of our desires. Guided by duty, and called by fortune, we have at length re-entered into the city of Berne, our common mother, which your courage and fidelity has placed in our hands. We are penetrated with gratitude and admiration when we behold the generous and sublime burst of patriotism which has led you to brave so many dangers to recover your laws and your government. The supreme authorities have resolved to remain on terms of friendship with those who, during the preceding days of calamity, have deviated from their duty: it tenders them the hand of reconciliation. It expects not less confidently from its own and now victorious supporters, that they will forget their former injuries, and not stain the triumph of their country by acts of individual vengeance (1)."

Meanwhile Reding convoked a General Diet to be held at Schwytz; and

(1) Dum, ix. 24, 30 Jom. xv. 110, 125. Bigo. ii, 373, 375.

announced to the assembled Cantons "the necessity of renouncing for ever all political privileges, and conceding to the people subjected to their government, as to lawful brothers, the same liberties and privileges which are enjoyed by the inhabitants of towns." A resolution wise and just in itself, and which sufficiently indicated the intention not to re-establish those vexatious distinctions in political power, by which the Swiss Confederacy had been so long deformed. The Diet met on the 27th of September, and immediately adopted the resolution to raise an armed force of twenty thousand men. At the same time, the truce agreed upon with Dolder having expired, hostilities were renewed on the side of the Pays de Vaud; and Fribourg, after a sharp cannonade, fell into the hands of the confederates. The approaching dissolution of the Central Government was now apparent: the national guards of the Pays de Vaud, who had taken up arms in its defence, were driven back in disorder from Mora to Moudon; Payerne opened its gates; and the discomfited authorities could hardly assemble 2000 men at Lausanne for their defence. Already the Swiss troops in great force, were approaching, and the fugitive Government was preparing to retire into the neighbouring territory of France, when a new actor appeared on the stage, and the wishes of Switzerland were crushed for a long course of years, by the armed interference of the First Consul (1).

Sept. 27. Diet assembled at Schwytz.

Total subversion of the Central Government.

Forcible interference of the First Consul.

On the 4th October, General Rapp, aide-de-camp to Napoléon, arrived at Lausanne with the following proclamation by the French Government:—"Inhabitants of Helvetia! Swiss blood has flowed from the hands of the Swiss. For two years you have exhibited the most deplorable spectacle. Contending factions have alternately possessed themselves of power. They have signalized their ephemeral authority by a system of partiality which accused at once their weakness and incapacity. You have disputed for three years without coming to an understanding. If you are abandoned to yourselves, you will massacre each other for three years longer without interruption. Your history proves that you can never settle your intestine divisions but by the interposition of France. It is true I had intended not to intermeddle in your affairs. I had seen all your different administrations seek my advice without following it, and not unfrequently abuse my name to the purposes of their interests and their passions; but I can no longer remain an unconcerned spectator of the misfortunes which are devouring you. I revoke my resolution. I will become the mediator in your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, and such as suits the dignity of the great nation which I represent. Five days after the publication of the present proclamation the Senate shall assemble at Berne. The Government established at that place since the capitulation is dissolved. All authorities, wherever constituted by it, are at an end. The troops who have been in arms for six months shall alone be retained. All the others are hereby disbanded, and required to lay down their arms (2)."

The Swiss in vain invoke the aid of Austria.

This haughty proclamation was a severe blow to the confederate chiefs at the moment of triumph; for nearly the whole country had now arranged themselves under their banners, and, with the exception of the Pays de Vaud, Switzerland had unanimously overturned the constitution forced upon them by France. The dignity of their conduct was equal to its wisdom under this cruel reverse. Disdaining to submit to the yoke of the conqueror, and yet sensible of their inability to contend with so formidable a state without the aid of more efficient allies, they in-

(1) Jom. xv. 125, 129. Dum. ix. 30, 38. (2) Dum. x. 38, 39.

voked the support of Austria and the other powers, to assert for them the independence stipulated by the treaty of Lunéville; and finding the Imperial Cabinet deaf to their entreaties, still refused to separate, protested against the violence by which they were menaced, and declared that "they yielded only to force." They despatched a confidential agent to Paris, who addressed himself to the ambassadors of all the other states, imploring their assistance. "Scarcely," said he to the English Government, "did Switzerland find herself independent than she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes. Almost the whole of the country, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, threw off the yoke. The aristocratic Cantons renounced their exclusive privileges. The new Cantons were left at liberty to form their own constitutions. Who could have imagined that Bonaparte, in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, would have issued such a decree as has just appeared? Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should he persist in this determination, and the other powers not interfere, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, though without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe. Will the government of England, ever so generous, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked among free people? We have only men left us. The Revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means. We are without arms, ammunition stores, or money to purchase them." But though all the continental powers warmly participated in these feelings, none ventured to give expression to them. England alone interfered, and, by an energetic note, protested against this subjugation of a neutral power, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville; and despatched a confidential agent to the borders of Helvetia to ascertain the real state of the country; but finding it impossible to rouse the continental powers to any interference in its behalf, they justly deemed it inexpedient to proceed farther at that moment in support of so remote and inland a state (1). All was soon accomplished. Ney entered Switzerland with twenty thousand men, and occupied, without resistance, Soleure, Zurich, and Berne; and the scene of violence commenced by the imposition of a contribution of 600,000 francs on the cities which had fallen under the power of the invaders (2).

England remonstrates in vain.

Oct. 10, 1802.

Ney overruns the country with twenty thousand men.

The Swiss in despair submit.

The subjugation of Switzerland being resolved on, the tyrannical process was, however, carried into effect with as much clemency and moderation as the circumstances would admit. Ney, to whom the painful task of completing the conquest of these gallant mountaineers was committed, executed his duty with humanity and discretion. He sent a peremptory order to the Diet to dissolve and disband its forces; and supported the mandate by the advance of masses, evidently overwhelming, to St.-Gall, Glarus, and Schwytz. Yielding to necessity, they ordered their troops to disband, and closed their sittings by a touching appeal to posterity, in which they protested against the violence by which they had been oppressed; and bequeathed to happier times the duty of restoring the liberties of their country (3). At the same time they notified to Ney, "that the Diet of Schwytz,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1282.

(2) Jom. xv, 130, 135. Dum. ix. 34, 40. Bign. ii. 377, 378.

Dignified address of the Deputies of the Forest Cantons on resigning the Government.

(3) This memorable address, worthy of the country of Tell, was conceived in the following terms:—"The Deputies of the Cantons have come to the resolution of surrendering the powers with which they were invested into the hands of their constituents, inas-

yielding to force, had come to the resolution of separating, inserting, however, in the name of all Switzerland, the same reservation for the future which it had already made known in its public proclamation (1)."

Aloys Reding, after the disbanding of the troops, disdained either to fly or to make submission, but remained at Schwytz, ready to undertake, in his own person, all the responsibility consequent on his patriotic devotion. He was soon after arrested, along with his brother the Landamman of Baden, and some other leaders of the confederates, and sent under a strong guard to Zurich, from whence, in a short time, he was transferred to the castle of Chillon, on the lake of Geneva, a fortress rendered more interesting in the eyes of freedom by his captivity than by the sufferings of the feudal prisoner, over whose fate modern genius has thrown an imperishable lustre (2).

Speech of the First Consul to the Swiss Deputies at Paris.

Resistance being thus rendered hopeless in Switzerland, a Diet of fifty-six Deputies of the Cantons was appointed to meet at Paris, in the December following, to deliberate on the formation of a constitution, and receive the law from the First Consul. His conduct and language on this occasion were distinguished by his usual penetration and ability, and a most unusual degree of lenity and forbearance; and if any thing could have reconciled the Swiss to the loss of their independence, it must have been the wisdom and equity on which his mediation was founded.

Dec. 10, 1802.

"The situation of your country," said he to the assembled Deputies, "is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of passion are necessary to save it. I have undertaken, in the face of Europe, the engagement to render my mediation efficacious. I will faithfully discharge all the duties which that sacred function imposes on me; but that which might be difficult without your concurrence, becomes easy by your influence and assistance. Switzerland does not resemble any other country; its geographical and topographical situation, the difference of religion, and extreme variety of manners which prevail in its various parts, render it an exception to all other states. Nature has made your country federative; to attempt to conquer it is not the part of wisdom. Circumstances, the spirit of past ages, have established among you sovereign and subject people. New circumstances, and the spirit of a different age, have introduced equality of right between all the parts of your territory. Many of your states have been governed for centuries by the most absolute democracy; others have fallen under the dominion of particular families, and subjects have grown into sovereigns. The influence of public opinion in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace, which surround you, have powerfully contributed to the formation of these institutions. The disposition of these countries is now changed, and yours must undergo a similar modification. The renunciation of all exclusive privileges is at once the wish and the interest of your people.

"What your interests require is, 1. Equality of rights among the whole eighteen Cantons.—2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation of all exclusive privileges on the part of the patrician families.—3. A federative organization,

much as the force of foreign armies opposes an irresistible bar to the accomplishment of their duties. But while they recognize the necessity of submission, the Deputies conjure their constituents not for one moment to believe that it can impair their right to choose their own form of Government; a right which they inherit from the virtues and courage of their ancestors, and is expressly guaranteed by the treaty of Lunéville. With this view, while they yield to force, they are resolved to do nothing which may impair that precious bequest to future generations, or sanction in any degree that which other inhabitants of Switzerland accepting such an alleviation, may have the appearance of approving."—See JOMINI, xv. 133; and DUMAS, ix. 57.

(1) Jom. xv. 137. Dum. ix. 56. Ney's Mem. ii. 247, 260.

(2) Dum. ix. 58, 59.

where every Canton finds itself arranged according to its language, its religion, its manners, its interest and opinion. The Central Government remains to be provided for; but it is of much less consequence than the cantonal organization. It is impossible to establish uniformity, either in finances, army, or civil administration, amongst you. You have never maintained regular armies, nor had established accredited agents at the courts of the different governments. Situated on the summit of the mountains which separate France, Italy, and Germany, you participate in the disposition of all these different countries. Strict neutrality, a prosperous commerce, and family administration, can alone secure your interests, or be suited to your wishes. Every organization that could be established amongst you hostile to the wishes or interests of France, would injure you in the most essential particulars.

"After having addressed you as becomes one of your own citizens, I must now use the language befitting the Chief Magistrate of two of your most powerful neighbours; and I must at once declare, that neither France nor the Italian Republic will ever suffer a system to be established amongst you calculated to promote the interest of their enemies. The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men, your immediate neighbours, without whom you can neither exist as a state nor subsist as individuals, are also of no small weight in the balance of public justice. Let nothing, as concerns them, be hostile amongst you; let every thing, on the contrary, be conducive to their interests, and let it continue, as in times past, your first interest, your first policy, your first inclination, your first duty, to permit nothing, to leave nothing on your territory which, directly or indirectly, can prejudice the interests, the honour, or the cause of the French people. It is indispensable, not merely that there should exist no sort of disquietude for that portion of our territory which is open and which you cover, but that we should farther feel the assurance, that if your neutrality were ever to be violated, your interest, not less than your inclination, would lead you to range yourselves under the banner of France, rather than in opposition to it (1)."

Discontent which his principles excite on both sides.

Abstracting from the determination here openly announced of subjecting Switzerland to the influence, and even government of France, which, however alarming to all the neighbouring powers, as chief magistrate of that country, the First Consul was naturally led to desire, there can be no doubt that the principles which he here set forth were those which the most profound wisdom would have suggested to terminate the dissentions of which it had so long been the prey. They gave, accordingly, almost as great umbrage to the vehement Republican as the ultra-conservative party; the former deploring the re-establishment of a federal union, and the separate constitution of different Cantons; the latter the formation of a Central Government, under the influence, and subject to the control of France. Both parties conducted the debate with much warmth, and the greatest abilities of France and Switzerland were employed in the conference, which took place in the Council of State at Paris, in presence of the First Consul (2). At length the discussion was terminated by the act of mediation pronounced by Napoléon on the 19th February, 1803, which, for the remainder of his reign, settled the condition of the Helvetic confederacy.

His final act of mediation for the settlement of Helvetia.

By this act Switzerland was divided into nineteen Cantons; the lesser ones were revived, and their limits, re-established as formerly. The Oberland was restored to Berne; but the estates of Vaud, Ar-

(1) Thib. 356, 359.

(2) Dum. ix. 65, 72. Jom. xv. 138, 40.

govia, Thurgovia, St.-Gall, and the Tessino, which formerly had been subjected to the other Cantons, were elevated to the rank of constituent members of the confederacy. Six of the principal Cantons, namely, Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, and Lucerne, were styled directing Cantons, and the Diet sat, year about, at their chief towns; and for that year the chief magistrate of that Canton was Landamman of Switzerland. The federal contingent was fixed at 15,203 men, and 490,507 francs, (L.20,000). All exclusive privileges were abolished, so that the citizen of any one Canton was a denizen of any part of the confederacy. All alliances of one Canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. Each Canton sent a deputy to the Diet; but Berne, Zurich, Vaud, Argovia, St.-Gall, and the Grisons, sent two. The functions of the Supreme Council were declared to be; 1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the Diet; 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign services, and the recruiting of soldiers; 3. To levy the contingent, and appoint commanders of the armed force, and the foreign ambassadors; 4. To adopt measures of external utility, and settle disputes between one Canton and another. The act concluded in these terms:—"The present act, the result of long conferences with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution, the French troops shall withdraw. We recognize Helvetia, as organized by this act, as an independent power, and guarantee the federal constitution, and that of each Canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state (1)."

The subsequent dispositions of the First Consul were all dictated by a desire to render the foreign yoke then imposed upon the Swiss as light as possible, and win the affections of a people whose situation rendered their neutrality of more value to France than their alliance. Satisfied with the erection of the Valais into a separate republic, which gave him the entire command of the Simplon road, Napoléon allowed the Swiss to retain their neutrality, rejected all idea of an alliance offensive and defensive, and modified the existing stipulated contingent of 25,000 men into a levy of sixteen regiments, who were taken into the pay of the French Republic. These lenient conditions gave universal satisfaction in Switzerland. The Deputies of the Cantons met at Fribourg in the beginning of July, under the auspices of Louis d'Affry, designated by Napoléon as the first Landamman of the confederacy, while the presence of Aloys Reding, as Deputy for Schwytz, gave testimony to the commencement of the system of fusion which it was so much his object to establish in all the countries subjected to his dominion, and proved, that if the Swiss were not reconciled to the foreign yoke, at least they had abandoned all hope of farther resisting it (2).

Equitable measures for the government of the country.

(1) Jom. xv. 139, 141. Dum. ix. 70, 73. App. 253, 279. Pièces Just.

(2) Jom. xv. 240, 241. Dum. ix. 73, 75.

Admirable principle of Napoléon's measure in this respect.

The sagacity with which the First Consul discriminated the most important features in the condition of the Swiss Cantons, may be appreciated by the following extracts from the speech he delivered on the formation of the internal constitution of the confederacy:—"The re-establishment of the ancient order of things in the democratic Cantons is the best course which can be adopted both for you and me. They are the states whose peculiar form of government render them so interesting in the eyes of all Europe; but for this pure democracy, you would exhibit nothing which is not to be found elsewhere. Beware of extinguishing so remarkable a distinction. I know well that this democratic system of administration has many inconveniences; but it is established. it has subsisted for centuries, it springs from the circumstances, situation, and primitive habits of the people, from the genius of the place, and cannot with safety be abandoned. When usage and systematic opinion find themselves in opposition, the latter must give way. You must never take away from a democratic society the practical exercise of its privileges. To give such exercise a direction consistent with the tranquillity of the state, is the part of true political wisdom. In ancient Rome the votes were counted by classes, and they threw into the last classes the whole body of indigent citizens, while the first contained

Extreme dissatisfaction excited by this event over Europe.

The dignified conduct of the Swiss patriots, in the last extremity of their independence, and the necessity to which they reduced the First Consul of openly employing force to subdue them, was in the highest degree contrary to his wishes, and proved more prejudicial to his interests in Europe than any other event which had occurred under his government. He had hoped that all necessity for a visible conquest would be prevented by one of the factions openly invoking his assistance; and that thus Switzerland would be subjugated as other countries had been, by dividing without appearing to do violence to the people. The unanimous expression of public detestation which attended the proclamation of the French Constitution, and the instant overthrow of the Government which followed the removal of the French troops, entirely frustrated this insidious design, and compelled Napoléon to throw off the mask, and, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, openly accomplish the subjugation of the country. This violent proceeding was not less painful to the feelings of the people than it was alarming to the governments of all the neighbouring states. To see the great central fortress of Switzerland, commanding all the passes from France into Italy, placed in the hands of so ambitious a ruler, at the very time when he was rapidly extending his dominions over the whole peninsula, excited the strongest jealousy in all the European Cabinets, while the subjugation of the country of William Tell, and the overthrow of Swiss independence by republican bayonets, awakened deep feelings of commiseration among all to whom the name of liberty was dear, and did more to dispel the general fascination which had attended the government of the First Consul than any circumstance which had occurred since his elevation to power. At the same time, the indignation of the Dutch was strongly excited by the continued residence of the French troops in their territory, and the heavy load which the finding clothing, and paying so large a body of men, imposed on their almost ruined finances, in direct opposition to the treaty signed, and promises held out on occasion of the late change in their government; and the conviction became as general as it was painful, that the ambition of France was insatiable, and that the establishment of revolutionary governments in the adjoining states, only led to a prolongation of the onerous yoke of the Great Parent Republic (1).

only a few hundred of the most opulent individuals; but the populace were content, and, amused with the solicitation of their votes, did not perceive the immense difference in their relative value, and that, all put together, they did not equal the influence of a few of the great patrician families.

"Since the revolution, you have never ceased to seek your safety independent of France. Your position, your history, in fine, common sense, forbid it. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value in the eyes of other powers. The first is permanent and constant; the second depends on fortune and political combination, and can only be transient in its operation. Switzerland can never defend its plains but with the aid of France, France is open to attack on the Swiss frontier; Austria is not, for she is covered by the bulwark of the Tyrol. I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed an hundred thousand men, rather than allow it to remain in the hands of the party who were at the head of the last insurrection, so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France." —Thibaudeau, 363, 367.

(1) Sir R. Liston's Despatch, Dec, 29, 1802. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1285.

Honourable opinion of Mr. Fox on the subject.

As a specimen of the effect which these events produced on the liberal party in Europe, it is sufficient to refer to the speeches of the leaders of the Opposition in the British Parliament—"The French Government," said Mr. Fox, "was bound by treaty, as well as by every principle of justice, to withdraw their troops from Switzerland, and to leave that country to itself, even with the miserable government which they had established in it, and to respect its independence. During their dominion in that country, they had formed a government so utterly odious to the people, that the moment their troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants, by an insurrection founded on the truest principles of justice, rose and overturned it. The French Government interfered to restore it, and bad as the system was, the manner of their interfering to restore it was, if possible, still worse. This violent act of injustice, no man can contemplate with more indignation than myself.

And on the treatment of Holland.

"The conduct of France, with respect to Holland, affords a still more intolerable instance of injustice. Were I master of the use of colours, and could paint with skill, I would take the darkest to delineate the conduct of France towards that Republic. It certainly has

Tranquillity and happiness of England during this period.

While the continent of Europe was agitated by these important events, and presaged, in the rapid strides of the First Consul towards universal dominion, the approaching renewal of the war, England was tasting, with unalloyed satisfaction, the blessings and the tranquillity of peace. She had given the most unequivocal proof of the sincerity of her confidence in the honour of France in permitting the vast armament of Le Clerc to proceed unmolested to the West Indies; and had beheld, with pain, indeed, but without opposition, the successive new-modelling of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Valaisan Republics, under the authority of the First Consul, and the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia to his dominions or those of his subject states. On occasion only of the overthrow of Helvetic independence her ministers presented an energetic note to the French Government, complaining of that breach of the European liberties; but finding their remonstrances not supported by the other powers, they prudently desisted from any more efficacious interference in their behalf (1). Secure in her insular position and maritime strength, she beheld with uneasiness, but without apprehension for her own independence, the successive additions to the power of France; and deemed herself not called upon to interfere actively in continental affairs till the powers more immediately interested were prepared to second her efforts by efficacious aid.

Rapid improvement of the finances and trade of the country.

During this brief period of national repose, the industry and finances of the country prospered in a most extraordinary degree; and Great Britain literally reaped at the same time the excitement of war with the commerce and tranquillity of peace. As her statesmen did not deem it safe to make any considerable reduction in the national establishments while the power of France was so formidable, the lassitude arising from a diminished government expenditure was hardly experienced: an extensive paper currency maintained the prices and activity of war, while the opening of the continental ports brought into her harbours the extended commerce of peace, and rendered her commercial cities the emporium of the civilized world. Her exports and imports rapidly increased; the cessation of the income tax conferred comparative affluence on the middling classes; agriculture, sustained by continued high prices, shared in the general prosperity; the sinking fund, relieved in some degree from the counteracting influence of annual loans, attracted universal attention; while the revenue, under the influence of so many favourable circumstances, steadily augmented, and the national exigencies were easily provided for, without any addition

been worse treated by her than any other country whatever. Holland has not only suffered all the unavoidable evils of war, but when peace came, to turn that country, in defiance of a positive treaty with France, into a depôt for French troops, for the mere purpose of putting the Dutch to the expense of maintaining them, was an act no less despicable for its meanness than hateful for its atrocity."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1446, 1450.

(1) "His Majesty has received with deep regret the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, published by authority in the Moniteur of October 1. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

"The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as any other power, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has, in the present instance, been expressly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the treaty of Luneville, by the French Government, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret he may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights."—LORD HAWKESBURY'S *Note to* M. OTTO, Oct. 10, 1802—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1281.

to the burdens of the people. So wide spread was the enthusiasm occasioned by this bright gleam of prosperity, that even sagacious practical men were carried away by the delusion; and the only apprehension expressed by the moneyed classes was, that the sinking fund would extinguish the debt too rapidly, and capital, left without any secure investment, be exposed to the risk and uncertainty of foreign adventure (1).

Financial details.

Under the influence of such favourable circumstances, the permanent revenue of Great Britain steadily increased, while the public expenditure was rapidly diminished. In the year 1802, indeed, the effect of the great war expenses, which the unsettled state of the negotiation prior to the signing of the definitive treaty made it impossible to reduce, rendered a considerable national expenditure necessary; but in the succeeding year the full benefit of pacific reduction was experienced. In the former year the current annual expenditure was, independent of the interest of the debt, L.29,693,000, and the receipt L.36,368,000. In the latter, the receipt had risen to L.30,609,000, and the expenditure, without the interest of debt, fallen to L.28,298,000 (2). The financial operations of both years were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, from the extent of the floating debt which was funded, and loans contracted to meet the winding up of the war, which produced a receipt and expenditure in each of nearly eighty millions from the public treasury; but, excepting these extraneous sums, the aspect of the national resources was in the highest degree satisfactory. The sinking fund was rapidly and steadily absorbing the debt, and afforded the prospect of extinguishing the whole national encumbrances, great as they were, at no distant period (3).

And of shipping.

(1) It was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place in Parliament, that the real value of British produce and manufactures exported in the year 1802 was little short of L.50,000,000. being an increase of L.8,000,000 above the year preceding; and the shipping entering the port of London in the years 1801 and 1802 were as follows:

	British.			Foreign.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1801,	1762	418,631	23,096	3385	452,667	20,388
1802,	2459	574,700	33,743	1549	217,117	10,555

Thus indicating that the return of peace had reduced to a half the Foreign shipping in the port of London, and added a half to the British.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1127.

Comparison of the income and expenditure in 1802 and 1803.

(2) Porter's Parl. Tables, i. p. 1,

(3) The ways and means and expenditure for these two years stood as follows:

Expenditure. 1802.

Ordinary,	L.29,693,000
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded,	19,855,588
Exchequer Bills,	23,892,815
Sinking Fund,	6,114,033
	L.79,555,436

The interest of the debt, funded and unfunded, was L.19,855,588; and the produce of the sinking fund L.6,114,033. [Porter's Parl. Tables, i. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 446. and Ann. Reg. 1802, 588. App. to Chron.

Ways and Means.

Ordinary Income,	L.36,368,149
Loan,	27,550,449
Exchequer Bills,	17,094,653
	L.81,013,251

The unfunded debt funded this year amounted to L.23,892,815, which explains the difference between the supply and expenditure.

Expenditure 1803.

Current,	L.28,298,366
Interest of funded and unfunded debt,	20,699,864
Sinking fund,	6,494,694
Paid Exchequer Bills,	17,194,198
	L.72,687,122

Ways and Means.

Revenue,	L.38,609,392
Loan,	11,960,523
Exchequer Bills,	20,481,130
	L.71,051,045

The rapid growth and steady application of the sinking fund was the subject of deserved congratulations to the country, both by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Pitt. They calculated that it would extinguish the whole existing debt in forty-five years; and the celerity of its increase, compared with that of the interest of the debt, might be judged of by the fact, that when it was first instituted, in 1784, its produce annually was one-tenth of the interest; whereas in 1803 it had risen to a

Causes of irritation which gradually got up with France.

But these flattering prospects were of short duration. Independent of the increasing jealousy with which the British Government beheld the continental encroachments of Napoléon, and which rapidly communicated itself to all classes of the English people, several causes of irritation grew up between the rival governments, which first weakened and at last destroyed their good understanding. The detail of these causes is fraught with the highest historical interest. The fate of the world has depended on the results to which they led.

Complaints of the First Consul at the English newspapers.

The first of these subjects of irritation was the asperity with which the Government and acts of the First Consul were canvassed in the English newspapers. Not only did several French journals, published in London, in particular that of Peltier and the "Courrier Français de Londres," comment with great severity on his proceedings, but almost all the English journals, following the bent of the public mind, discanted, in the most unmeasured terms, on his continual encroachments in Continental Europe. To Napoléon, who was accustomed only to the voice of adulation, and heard nothing in the enslaved journals of his own country but gracefully turned flattery, these diatribes were in the highest degree painful, and not the less so, probably, because the charges which they contained in regard to his foreign aggressions were more easily silenced by authority than answered by argument. He therefore caused his minister at the court of London to remonstrate warmly against these articles (1), and concluded by soliciting, "1. That the English Government should adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and writings printed in England are filled. 2. That the individuals specified in the undersigned list should be sent out of Jersey. 3. That Georges and his adherents should be transported to Canada. 4. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two Governments, it should be recommended to the princes of the House of Bourbon, at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw. 5. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient Government of France, be required to quit the territory of the British empire (2).

Of these extravagant demands, which proved that Napoléon understood as little the action of a free government as he did the relative situation of France and England treating on a footing of perfect equality, it is sufficient to observe, that it has excited the indignation even of the French historians who

third of the then existing debt. It will hereafter appear that when it was broken upon in 1813, it was producing more than half the interest of the debt; and that if it had been let alone, it would have extinguished the whole debt existing at the conclusion of the war before the year 1840.—See PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, i. 1, and *Parl. Deb.* xxxvi. 1127-1130.

M. Otto's note on this subject.

(1) "The greatest of all injuries," said M. Otto, "is that which tends to debase a foreign Government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even, to dissolve the first bands of society. This is not a question concerning some paragraphs which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print, but a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French Republic, but all its constituted authorities—against the whole nation—represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. These observations are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace. It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to induce the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the conclusion of the concordats, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities and provoke the just indignation of the French Government and people. Not a doubt can exist of these writings having been composed and circulated by Georges and the former bishops of France."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1270.

(2) M. Otto's note, Aug. 17, 1802. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1270. Norv. ii. 234, 236.

Indignation excited at this even in France itself.

are most friendly to his cause. "It was nearly the same thing," says his eloquent apologist, Norvins, "to propose to Great Britain the sacrifice of its constitution, as to insist upon its abandoning the two pillars of its freedom, the liberty of the press, and the privilege of habeas corpus. Such a demand was in the highest degree imprudent on the part of the First Consul, as it necessarily rendered him odious to the English people. Such language might have been used to the Cisalpine or Ligurian Republics, the creations of his hands: but it was wholly unsuitable to an independent power like England: and although that language was but the expression of disunion which already existed between the two Governments, yet it was extremely imprudent to make it known in a diplomatic communication to the whole of Europe (1)."

The British Government replied to this extraordinary requisition in dignified but courteous language (2). They answered specifically each of the charges advanced by the French Government, and concluded with observing, "His Majesty is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and the security of its laws and constitution. But the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and the character of its Government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded (3)."

No farther diplomatic correspondence took place on this subject, but soon after, to remove all grounds for complaint on the part of the First Consul, a prosecution was instituted by the Attorney-General against Peltier, for one of the most vehement of his articles against the French Government. This

(1) Norv. ii. 237, 238.

Answer made to M. Otto by the British Government.

(2) "It cannot be denied," they observed, "that some improper and indecent paragraphs against the Government of France have appeared, both in the English newspapers and the French journals published in London: but they have not been published under the authority of the British Government, nor are they any ways responsible for their contents His majesty neither can nor will, in consequence of any representation or menace from a foreign power, make any concession which may be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject; the constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description: but there exist judicatures wholly independent of the executive, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems criminal; and they may investigate and punish not only libels against the Government and magistracy of this kingdom, but those reflecting on the individuals in whose hands the administration of foreign Governments is placed. The British Government is perfectly willing to afford to the French Government all the means of punishing the authors of any writings which they may deem defamatory, which they themselves possess; but they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the French Government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, they may punish the venders or distributors of such writings as they deem defamatory in their own country, or increase, by additional penal regulations, the risk of their circulation within their own bounds.

"With respect to the removal of the persons considered obnoxious to the French Government from the British dominions, his Majesty has no desire that the princes of the House of Bourbon should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed or can be induced to quit it: but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and with his sense of justice to withdraw from them the right of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly, and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two Governments. The emigrants in Jersey, most of whom are there chiefly in consequence of the cheapness of provisions, had removed, or were removing, previous to M. Otto's note. If any of them can be shewn, by reasonable evidence, to have distributed papers on the coast of France with the view of disturbing the Government, and of inducing the people to resist the new Church Establishment, his Majesty will deem himself justified in taking measures to compel them to leave the country. Measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for removing Georges and his adherents from his Majesty's European dominions. There are few, if any, of the French emigrants who continue to wear the decorations of the ancient government: it might be more prudent if they all abstained from doing so; but the French Government cannot expect that his Majesty will commit so harsh an act as to send them out of the country on that account."—Lord Hawkesbury's *Note*, 17th August, 1802, *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1274, 1276.

(3) Lord Hawkesbury's Note, Aug. 17, 1802. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1277.

Trial of Peltier for a libel on the First Consul.

prosecution, which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of France, awakened the most intense interest, gave occasion to a splendid display of eloquence on the part of the accused from Sir James Mackintosh, who then first gave public proof of those great abilities which his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ* and lectures on constitutional law had long made known to a more limited circle. Peltier was found guilty; but the subsequent breaking out of war between the two countries prevented his being brought up to receive judgment (1).

War of the public journals on both sides.

The war of journals continued with redoubled vehemence on both sides of the Channel, as events succeeded calculated to call forth mutual complaints; and several articles in the *Moniteur*, of the most hostile character, bore evident marks of the First Consul's composition. The French incessantly urged the execution of "the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens;" loudly complained that the British Government had not evacuated Alexandria, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope, as stipulated in that instrument; and declared that the French people would ever remain in the attitude of Minerva, with a helmet on her head and a spear in her hand. The English answered, that the strides made by France over Continental Europe since the general pacification, and their menacing conduct towards the British possessions, were inconsistent with any intention of preserving peace, and rendered it indispensable that the securities held by them for their own independence should not be abandoned. This recriminatory warfare was continued with equal zeal and ability on the opposite sides of the Channel: loud and fierce defiances were uttered by both parties; and it soon became manifest, from the temper of the people, not less than the relations of their Governments, that the contest could be determined only by the sword (2).

In truth it was not merely from the continental acquisitions of France, great as they had been since the peace, that the British Government conceived apprehensions of the impossibility of long maintaining friendly terms with that power. Other circumstances nearer home indicated a determination in the First Consul to resume the contest at no distant period, and render the places evacuated by the treaty of Amiens, the outposts from which hostilities were to be directed against their vital interests. The continued stay of a large French force in Holland, in defiance of express treaty; the gradual accumulation of troops on the shores of the Channel and on the frontiers of Hanover, indicated any thing rather than a pacific disposition, and menaced

Expedition of Sebastiani to Egypt.

England in the quarters where she was most easily assailable. At the same time, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, in October, 1802, for purposes evidently of a warlike character, and the minute and elaborate military report which he laid before the First Consul on his return, proved that so far from having abandoned the idea of conquest on the banks of the Nile, he was prepared to resume it on the first convenient opportunity (3). Influenced by these circumstances, and the evi-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 240.

(2) Dum ix. 98, 106. Norv. ii, 238, 241. Ann. Reg. 1803, 246.

(3) It appears from Colonel Sebastiani's Report that he embarked on the 16th September at Toulon, and after visiting Tripoli, arrived at Alexandria on the 16th October. "I communicated," says he, "to the English Commander there the order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart told me that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected; and when I insisted for a more specific answer, he declared that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he believed he should winter there." He minutely examined the fortifications of Alexandria, and all the neighbouring forts; afterwards visited Cairo, under an escort of five hundred men; traversed Upper Egypt as far as the Cataracts, and returned by St.-Jean d'Acre and the Ionian Islands to France, with specific information as to the military and political state of the countries he had visited, and their respective dispositions towards France and England. The First Con.

dent demonstration of an insatiable ambition which the conduct of France to Italy and Switzerland afforded, the English Government sent orders to delay the evacuation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope, which they had not only resolved on, but in part commenced (1), and openly declared their resolution to retain these important stations till some satisfactory explanation was obtained of the French movement (2).

This resolution of the Cabinet of St.-James's immediately gave rise to an angry diplomatic correspondence between the two Governments; but instead of quoting these official documents, it is more important to give the substance of the famous interview which the First Consul had with Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, on the 21st February, 1803, which is so descriptive of the character of that extraordinary man as to be one of the most valuable documents of history. "He placed," says that nobleman in his account of the interview transmitted the day following to his own Government, "in the very first rank our not evacuating Egypt and Malta, as we were bound by the treaty to have done. In this," said he, "no consideration on earth shall make me acquiesce. Of the two, I would rather see you in possession of the faubourg St.-Antoine than Malta. The abuse thrown out against me in the English public prints is vexatious, but not of so much consequence, not so mischievous as what appears in the French papers published in London. My irritation against England is daily increasing; because every wind which blows from England brings nothing but enmity and hatred against me. If I had felt the smallest inclination to take Egypt by force, I might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. Instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it only furnishes me with a pretence for invading it. I shall not do so, however I may wish to possess it as a colony, because I do not think it worth the chance of a war, in which I might possibly be considered as the aggressor, and by which I should lose more than I should gain; since, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.

Violent explosion of Napoléon in conversation with Lord Whitworth.

"What have I to gain by going to war? A descent upon your coast is the only means of offence I possess; and that I am determined to attempt, and

sul thought it so little necessary to disguise his designs, that he published the Report, which is very long and elaborate, in the Moniteur; and it was particularly observable that Sebastiani assured all the Christians from whom he received deputations in Egypt and Syria "of the friendship and protection of the First Consul." The Report concluded with a detailed statement of all the British troops in Egypt, and the respective forces of the Turks and native chiefs.—See the whole Report in *Parl. Hist.* xxxvii. 1350, 1359.

(1) British declaration. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1332, 1333.

As decisive evidence that in autumn 1802, and anterior to the manifestation of the First Consul's ambitious designs in Europe, the British Government was sincere in its intention to execute the treaty of Amiens, it is sufficient to refer to the testimony of the French historians. "England," says General Matthieu Dumas, "notwithstanding its regret at seeing the key of the Levant and the East Indies slip from its grasp, was making preparations for receiving in the fortresses of Malta the Neapolitan troops, who, by the treaty of Amiens, were to form its garrison for a year. Such, indeed, was their sincerity, that the foreign troops were actually disembarked and well received. From the 15th to the 20th September, at the periods fixed by the treaty, orders were in like manner transmitted for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British troops, and the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch forces." General Dundas and Sir Roger Curtis had received positive orders for the surrender of the Cape, with all its dependencies, to the Dutch forces. The best understanding prevailed between the troops of the two nations. The 1st January, 1803, was fixed for the final evacuation; and the English troops had actually commenced their embarkation, and were half on board, when, on the evening of the 31st of December, a vessel arrived, which had left Plymouth on the 31st October, with orders to stop the cession of the colony. The British had only fifty-nine men at that time in the town; the Dutch garrison was fifteen hundred strong; and the British troops were eight miles distant when this unexpected intelligence arrived.—Dumas, ix. 91, 120, 121.

(2) See the documents in Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1257, 1297.

put myself at its head. But can you suppose that, after having gained the height on which I stand, I would risk my life and reputation in so hazardous an undertaking, unless compelled to it by absolute necessity. I know that the probability is that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are an hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt; and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise.

"France, with an army of 480,000 men, to which amount it is to be immediately completed and ready for the most desperate enterprise, and England with a fleet which has rendered her the mistress of the seas, and which I shall not be able to rival for ten years, might, by a good understanding, govern the world, and by their strife overturn it. If I had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the peace of Amiens, there is nothing I would not have done to prove my desire to conciliate. Participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that would have testified confidence. Nothing, however, has been able to overcome the hostility of the British Government; and thence we are now come to the point—Shall we have peace or war? To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled, the abuse in the public prints suppressed or kept within due bounds, and the protection openly given to my bitterest enemies. If you desire war, it is only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. I have not chastised the Algerines, from my unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but I hope that the time will come when England, Russia, and France will feel that it is for their interest to destroy such a nest of robbers, and force them to live by cultivating their lands rather than plunder.

"Peace or war depends on Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was merely commercial. It was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the treaty of Amiens (1)."

March. 8, 1803 Hostile preparation on both sides.

This energetic and highly characteristic conversation was not of a nature calculated to diminish the alarm of the British Government, or allay the hourly increasing irritation in the two countries. The result was, that the English Cabinet openly gave orders for the assembling of forces; and on the 8th March, a message from the King to both Houses of Parliament announced, that "as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, his Majesty has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government, this communication has been deemed necessary." This message was received with the most animated feelings of patriotism by both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Fox, whose eloquence had so often been exerted in palliating the conduct of France, concurred in the address in answer, which passed both Houses without a single dissenting voice; and every thing announced a degree of unanimity in the farther prosecution of the war unknown in its earlier stages. A few days afterwards the militia was called out. Ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy; and

The press loudly and universally supported the Government.

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1297, 1299.

March 10. preparations were made in the principal harbours of the kingdom for the most vigorous hostilities. These measures were immediately met by corresponding menaces on the part of France; and every thing breathed hostility and defiance in the two countries (1). Lord Nelson was intrusted with the command of the Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir Sidney Smith received orders to put to sea with a squadron of observation. A hot press took place in the Thames. Sixteen ships of the line were instantly put in commission; the public ardour rose to the highest pitch; and England resumed her arms with a degree of enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had laid them aside (2).

March 14. These hostile preparations speedily led to a second and still more violent ebullition on the part of the First Consul. In a public court at the Tuileries, held a few days after the King's message had been communicated to him, he publicly addressed Lord Whitworth in the following terms:—

Second violent ebullition of Napoléon on Lord Whitworth.

"So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years. I suppose you want to fight for fifteen years more. The English wish for war; but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm, I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us, you must respect treaties. Wo to those who violate them; they will answer for the consequences to all Europe." This violent harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the impassioned gestures with which it was accompanied, induced the English ambassador to suppose that the First Consul would so far forget his dignity as to strike him; and he was deliberating with himself as to what he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to the nation which he represented, when Napoléon retired, and delivered the assembled ambassadors of Europe from the pain they experienced at witnessing so extraordinary a scene (3).

Diplomatic and military preparations of France.

This vehement exposure of hostile disposition produced an extraordinary sensation both in England and Europe. In the former, by the indignation it excited, and the ardent desire to revenge the slight thus publicly put upon the national honour, in the person of its ambassador: in the latter, by the clear evidence which it afforded of the impossibility of amicable terms being any longer preserved between the rival powers. Couriers, despatched the same night to every court in Europe, immediately made known generally the conflict that was approaching; and diplomacy was

(1) M. Talleyrand, in answer to the message of the English King, drew up the following note, which was delivered to the British Ambassador:—

1. If his Britannic Majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it is destined for America, and was on the point of sailing; but in consequence of that message its orders are countermanded.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanations respecting these armaments in England; and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20 000 men into Holland, when that country is named in the King's message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that they should form an encampment on the borders of Hanover; and that additional bodies of troops should join them.

4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

6. It is also the natural consequence of all this that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1309.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1170, 1180. Dum. ix. 138, 144. Ann. Reg. 1803.

(3) Lord Whitworth's Despatch, March 14, 1803. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1310. Norv. ii. 249. Dum. ix. 163, 164.

soon as active in endeavouring to contract alliances as military energy in forwarding warlike preparations. General Duroc was forthwith despatched by the First Consul to Berlin, and Colonel Colbert to St.-Petersburg, to endeavour to rouse the Northern Powers to re-assert the principles of the armed neutrality, and join in the league against Great Britain; but these potentates had already concerted measures, on occasion of the meeting they had at Memel in the preceding year, to settle the matter of German indemnities, and refused to interfere in the contest. At the same time he put the army on the war footing; ordered the immediate levy of an hundred and twenty thousand men; reinforced the troops both in Holland and Italy; declared Flushing and Antwerp in a state of siege; commenced the formation of the great arsenals which were afterwards constructed in the Scheldt; hastened his naval preparations with the most incredible activity; and already directed those numerous corps to the shores of the Channel, which, under the name of the Army of England, were so seriously to menace the independence of Great Britain. The flame spread to every heart; patriotic feeling was roused to the highest pitch in France as well as in England; and never was war commenced with more cordial approbation on the part of the people of both countries (1).

Note in reply from Lord Hawkesbury, March 15, 1803.

To these intemperate sallies on the part of the First Consul the British Government contented itself with replying, through the medium of the Minister for Foreign Affairs: "His Majesty has the most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens should be executed in as complete a manner as possible; but it is impossible for him to consider that treaty as founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession or engagement was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; and that if ever there was a case in which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in a note by the French Government, namely, that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests, for the acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent. The subsequent acquisitions made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy, have extended the power and increased the territory of France; and therefore England would have been justified, consistently with the spirit of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions, for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and would have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta, when his attention was arrested by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt, which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of Amiens (2)."

(1) Dum. ix. 146. Norv. ii. 250.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1311, 1312.

Ultimatum of both parties.

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of these declarations, the negotiation was kept open for two months longer, and had very nearly terminated by the English being permitted to retain Malta, on an indemnity being provided for France on the Continent. The British Government proposed that Malta should be retained by England, and the Knights indemnified: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops: Elba confirmed to France: the Italian and Ligurian Republics recognized by England, with the Kingdom of Etruria, upon a satisfactory indemnity being provided to the King of Sardinia. To this the French Cabinet would not agree; and it was next proposed by the English ministers, that "Great Britain should possesses Malta for ten years; that the island of Lampedosa should be ceded in perpetuity to that power: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops, and the new Italian states recognized by England, on provisions in favour of Sardinia and Switzerland being contained in the treaty (1)." If these terms were not acceded to in seven days, the British Ambassador was enjoined to demand his passports. Napoléon would only consent, on the other hand, that Malta should be placed in the power of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, upon their agreeing to it and becoming parties to the treaty of Amiens; but this the British Cabinet declined, alleging that Russia, the only power deemed independent of France, had positively refused to be a party to any such arrangement (2). As a last resource, and finding the British Ambassador resolute,

War is at length declared.

Talleyrand suggested an arrangement by which Malta should be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain, in return for a proper equivalent to France; but Lord Whitworth had no authority to enter into such an arrangement, which was one of exchange, instead of being indemnity and security; and Talleyrand positively refused to explain himself farther on the subject, or specify what equivalent France required. Lord Whitworth in consequence demanded and received his passports on May 12th; letters of marque were issued by the British Government on the 16th; General Andreosi, the French Ambassador, embarked at Dover on the 18th May; and the flames of a war were again lighted up, destined ere long to involve the whole world in conflagration (3).

May 20. Arrest of all the British travellers in France.

This declaration of war was immediately followed by an act as unnecessary as it was barbarous, and which contributed more perhaps than any other circumstance to produce that strong feeling of animosity against Napoléon which pervaded all classes of the English during the remainder of the contest. Two French vessels had been captured, under the English letters of marque, in the bay of Audierne; and the First Consul made it a pretence for ordering the arrest of all the English then travelling in

Decree, May 22, 1803.

France between the ages of eighteen and sixty years. Under this savage decree, unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare, above ten thousand innocent individuals, who had repaired to France in pursuit of business, science, or amusement, on the faith of the law of nations, which never extended hostilities to persons in such circumstances, were at

(1) April 23, 1803. Lord Hawkesbury's Despatch.

(2) When this was first proposed to the Emperor Alexander, he answered that it would be ineffectual, as so inconsiderable an island could not be the real object of contest between the parties; but he afterwards signified his readiness to accept the treaty, though it was then too late, as war was declared. The communication from the Russian Ambassador, signifying the Emperor's readiness to act as mediator, was dated 24th May, and was not communicated to the English Government till all diplomatic relations with France had ceased, by the declaration of war on the 16th May preceding.—See Bignon, iii. 73, 107, 108.

(3) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1339, 1349. Lord Whitworth's Despatch, May 12, 1803. Bign. iii. 65, 75. Norv. ii. 250, 253. Dum. ix. 160, 177.

once thrown into prison, from whence great numbers of them were never liberated till the invasion of the allies in 1814. This severity was the more unpardonable, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs had, a few days before, given the English at Paris assurances that they should be permitted to leave the kingdom without molestation; and numbers had, in consequence, declined to avail themselves of the means of evasion when in their power. No other authority than that of Napoléon itself is required to characterize this transaction. "Upon reading," says he, "the ironical and insolent answer made by the English Government to my complaints, I despatched, in the middle of the night, an order to arrest over all France, and in all the territories occupied by our armies, the whole English, of whatever description, and retain them as hostages for our vessels, so unjustly seized. The greater part of these English were wealthy or noble persons, who were travelling for their amusement. The more novel the act was, the more flagrant its injustice, the more it answered my purpose. The clamour it raised was universal, and all the English addressed themselves to me; I referred them to their own Government, telling them their fate depended on it alone (1)." In committing this unpardonable act, Napoléon hoped to bring under his power such a number of Englishmen of distinction as should compel the British Government to yield to his terms; but he mistook the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and contributed only to the formation of that inveterate spirit of hostility which mainly occasioned his overthrow (2).

Debates on the war in Parliament.

The renewal of the war was soon after the subject of important and animated debates in both Houses of Parliament; but in the tone

(1) Nap. in Las Cas. vi. 32, 33.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 289. Dum. ix. 178. Bign. iii. 127, 128.

General indignation which it excites even in France.

Of the feelings with which this unjustifiable proceeding on the part of the First Consul was received, even by those of his generals who were most attached to his person and government, no better proof can be required than is furnished in the Duchess d'Abrantes' Memoirs, to whose husband's lot, as Governor of Paris, it fell to carry the painful decree into execution in that city. He was sent for by the First Consul in the middle of the night, who put letters into his hands explaining the cruel measure which was in contemplation. His eyes flashed fire, his whole figure was trembling with agitation. "Junot," said he, "you must, before an hour elapses, take measures, so that *all* the English, without one single exception, should be arrested. The Temple, the Force, the Abbaye, will hold them—they must be seized;" and with these words struck the table violently with his fist. "This measure," said Napoléon, "must be executed at seven in the evening—I am resolved that, in the obscurest theatre, or lowest restaurateur in Paris, not an Englishman shall this night be seen."—"My General," replied Junot, who though at first stunned, soon recovered from his stupor, "you know not only my attachment to your person, but my absolute devotion to every thing which concerns you It is that devotion which induces me to hesitate at obeying your orders before imploring you to take a few hours to reflect on the measure which you have now commanded." Napoléon frowned: "Again," said he, "are we to have the scene of the other day over gain? Even Duroc, with his quiet air, will soon come here to preach to me. By God, gentlemen, I will shew you that I can make myself obeyed, Lannes has already experienced that; he will not find much to amuse himself with while eating oranges at Lisbon. Do not trust too far, Junot, to my friendship; from the moment that I conceive doubts as to yours, mine is gone."—"My General," replied Junot, still undaunted, "it is not at the moment that I am giving you the strongest proof of my devotion, that you should thus address me. Demand my blood—demand my life—I will surrender them without hesitation; but to ask a thing which must cover us with"——"Go on," cried Napoleon: "what is likely to happen to me, because I fling back on a faithless Government the insults which it offered to me?"—"It is not my part," said Junot, "to decide on the conduct which you should pursue. I am sure that when you come to yourself, and are no longer fascinated by those around you who impel you to violent measures, you will be of my opinion."—"Of whom do you speak?" Junot made no answer; he knew what he would say, but his noble heart disdained to descend to the accusation of others. [D'Abr. vi, 398, 403]

The pretence put forth by the French writers, that this unparalleled measure was justified by the capture of two French vessels in the bay of Andierne before war was formally declared, is totally groundless. These vessels were seized on the 20th May, eight days after the English Ambassador had left Paris, and two after the French had sailed from Dover; that is, after hostilities had been openly announced between the two countries, and four after the issuing of letters of marque by the British Government. To set up this, the first capture of the war, as an excuse for the severe and cruel measure adopted towards the private travellers—a class of men who universally have been allowed, in modern Europe, to retire unmolested upon hostilities breaking out—was a pretext as flimsy as the measure itself was unjustifiable and impolitic; and it was, in an especial manner, unseemly in a power which made such loud complaints of the enforcing of the ordinary rules of war in maritime affairs by the English cruisers.

which pervaded the speeches of the Opposition, it was manifest how materially the light in which the war was viewed by the Whig party had changed in the course of the contest, and how much the constant aggressions of Napoléon had alienated the minds of those who had hitherto shewn themselves the stanchest enemies of the conduct of Government in resisting the progress of the Revolution.

Arguments in favour of it by the Ministers.

It was argued by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, "that the first great point on which the negotiation turned was, whether there was such clear evidence of an intention, on the part of France, to resume its designs against Egypt as justified us in retaining Malta for our security? Now, on this point, the proof furnished by the conduct of the First Consul was decisive. The mission of Sebastiani to the Levant, which he himself admitted to Lord Whitworth was of a military character; the emphatic declaration which he made to that nobleman, that, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France; and the information of the same intention, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, evidently proved that he had only suspended his designs against that country, and was resolved to renew them on the first favourable opportunity. This was a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens, which expressly provided for the integrity of the Turkish empire; and the time when he set out (Sept. 16) was important, as it entirely destroyed the pretence that he was sent to refute the statements in Sir Robert Wilson's work, which it is notorious was not published at that time. It is in vain to oppose to the inference clearly deduced from these circumstances the improbability that, if such had really been the designs of the French Government, they would have so openly avowed them; for that has been uniformly the system of all the rulers of that state since the Revolution, and seems to be now a fixed principle of their policy, instead of carefully concealing any project likely to shock the feelings of mankind till the moment of its execution, to announce it publicly for a long period before, in order that the minds of men may be familiarized to its contemplation, and have come to regard it with indifference.

"If, then, the design against Egypt is apparent, can there be the smallest doubt that we are entitled, from the moment it is discovered, to take such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we are thus exposed? And if this be admitted, the justice of our retaining Malta, the outwork both of Egypt and India, is apparent. All military authorities are agreed upon the vast importance of that island; and among them we must place, in the very first rank, the First Consul himself, who has not only declared that he would rather see us in possession of the faubourg St.-Antoine, but has evinced the sincerity of that declaration by preferring all the hazards of a war, which he was obviously anxious to avoid, to its relinquishment. England's interest in Malta is apparent, because it is a step on the road to India; whence the extraordinary anxiety of France for its acquisition, if not as a stage on the same journey for themselves? Consider, then, what would be our feelings if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or twelve months afterwards?

"The conduct of France on the continent of Europe has been equally inconsistent with the maintenance of pacific relations. What shall we say to her arrogant interference in the matter of German indemnities, and arrangement of the share of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes, without the concurrence either of the Emperor or the States interested in the maintenance of the equilibrium of the empire? What of the unprovoked and tyrannical

attack on Switzerland? What of the continued stay of French troops in Holland, in direct violation both of the treaty of Amiens and the subsequent conventions with the Batavian republic? The annexation of Piedmont, the severing of the Valais from Switzerland, the acquisition of Parma and Placentia, the new government imposed on the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, are so many steps towards supreme dominion over Italy, which may be already said to be in the hands of the French Government. And are we, with such instances of disregard of treaties and insatiable ambition before our eyes, to permit him to make the same unresisted strides towards maritime which he has already made towards continental supremacy?

"Add to this a still more glaring attack on our national independence, the clandestine sending of agents in the train of the French ambassador, with instructions to take soundings in our ports, and obtain information as to the military situation of all the provinces of the kingdom; and when the Government of England applied to the French ambassador to have them removed, the First Consul manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorized emissaries, under the name of commercial agents, to prepare, in the midst of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. He has at the same time summoned us, in the most arrogant manner, to restrain the liberty of the press with reference to his government; in other words, to make an exception in favour of France of that general right to free discussion, which is the birthright of Englishmen, and daily exercised against their own Government and all the world besides. What are these acts but to require us to surrender at once our liberties and the means of national defence? And, not content with this, he requires us to banish the Bourbon princes, and transport the French emigrants to Canada,—addressing thus the King of England as if he were the President of one of his newly-created republics, and requiring him to submit to the last indignity of the conquered, the necessity of betraying the unfortunate.

"We have tried the system of connection with Europe for a century, and that of leaving the continent to shift for itself for eighteen months, and we see what has been the result. Compare the rank and station to which we raised ourselves by our former policy, with that to which we have been fast descending by the prevalence of the latter. Weigh the insults which we have borne, the aggressions to which we have been exposed during this short period against all the causes and provocations of war scattered over the face of the preceding century, and see if the former do not preponderate. We have found, then, and this, if nothing else, the experiment of the peace of Amiens has clearly proved, that a country, circumstanced as this is, cannot safely abjure a dignified policy, and abdicate its rank among nations; that with such a country to be lowly is not to be sheltered, to be unpresuming is not necessarily to be safe. We may now see, by dear-bought experience, that our safety is necessarily linked with that of Continental Europe, and that a recurrence to our ancient and established policy is not only the most honourable, but the most prudent course which can be pursued.

"In these circumstances, nothing remains but to be prepared, collectively and individually, to meet with courage and resignation whatever difficulties it may be the will of Providence we should encounter; to make such vigorous naval and military preparations as may not only be adequate to repel any attempt at invasion, but diffuse the most complete sense of security throughout the whole nation; and enter at once upon such a resolute and prospective

system of finance, as may enable the people to contemplate, without apprehension, the maintenance of the war for as long a period as it has already lasted, and prevent its expenses in the end from being unnecessarily, perhaps intolerably, augmented (1)."

And on the other side by the Opposition.

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox and Mr. Wilberforce, "that, however manifest it might be that the First Consul cast a longing eye to Egypt, and coveted Malta as a stepping-stone to that country, still the question of peace or war did not depend on that circumstance. Was it not evident that from the very first he had fixed his affections on that fortress? and nothing has recently occurred to strengthen the conviction of every thinking man on that subject. But still seeing that, knowing that, we made peace, and stipulated for the surrender of Malta to a neutral power; and this was all that the security of our Eastern possessions required. This is what, by the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim; this is what we should have remained contented with. Malta, indeed, is a valuable possession; but the most valuable of all possessions is good faith. By claiming the sovereignty of Malta, instead of its independence, you take a ground which is barely tenable, and give your inveterate enemy an opportunity of misstating your real views, both to France and Europe, and charging this country with those projects of rapacity and monopoly by which it has been his incessant object to represent its councils as actuated.

"The language of Bonaparte, in the latter stages of the negotiation, affords reason to believe that he would have acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not our retention of it for ten years; and this affords a reply to the argument that the surrender of Malta, on a declaration of war, was the only alternative left us. No; there was another alternative, the independence of Malta—that independence which, under the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim, and which would have secured Egypt and our Eastern possessions. Why were we so dilatory in availing ourselves of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Russia? Whence the extraordinary haste, at the very close, to break off the negotiation, when it had taken a turn favourable beyond our most sanguine hopes—when the First Consul apparently was willing, rather than risk a war, to have ceded it to us in perpetuity, upon obtaining an equivalent, and the appearances of coercion being avoided?

"Undoubtedly you may interfere to prevent the aggrandizement of any continental state upon the general principles of policy, which include prudence, and upon the first principle which governs nations as well as individuals, the principle of self defence. Nay, you are authorized by the rank you hold, and I trust will ever hold in the scale of nations, to interfere and prevent injustice and oppression by a greater to a smaller power. But has the conduct of France since the peace been such as to call for the application of this principle? The system of German indemnities, indeed, was robbery, spoliation of the weaker by the stronger power; but France has had no greater share in the general iniquity than other powers against whom we have made no complaint. To say that the Emperor was injured by the arrangements made, is nothing to the purpose. Undoubtedly he was; but what else could be expected after the disasters of the war? Piedmont, at the time of the treaty of Amiens, was substantially a province of France; it was the twenty-seventh military division, and belonged to that power as effectually as Gibraltar to us. Whether it is expedient that it should belong to France, instead of being restored to the King of Sardinia, is a different question, which should have

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1387, 1398, 1430.

been settled, if it was meant to have been seriously agitated, at the treaty of Amiens. The violent interference with Switzerland no one can contemplate with more indignation than myself; but it was an act not particularly directed against this country, and which, how culpable soever, we were not called on to resist, if the powers more immediately interested looked on with indifference. The disgraceful treatment of Holland, in defiance alike of treaty and former services, is, indeed, one of the most atrocious acts on record; but we have allowed the proper season for complaining to go past, and by acquiescing in their injustice at the time have precluded ourselves from making it the subject of recrimination afterwards. The mutual abuse of the press is not to be classed with these serious subjects of complaint. Great and permanent as was the evil thereby occasioned, from the irritation which it perpetuated in the minds of the people of both countries, still it is not a fit subject for war; and both nations might properly be addressed in the advice which Homer put into the mouth of the Goddess of Wisdom—'Put up your swords, and then abuse each other as long as you please.'

"The demand to send away the French refugees, however, can never be too strongly reprobated. To deny to any man, whatever be his condition or rank, the rights of hospitality for political principles would be cowardly, cruel, and unworthy of the British character. The demand that we should send out of the country persons obnoxious to the Government of France, is made upon the most false and dangerous principles. The acquiescence of two such nations as England and France in such a system of international law would exterminate every asylum, not only to crime but misfortune, on the face of the globe. To yield to such demands would be the height of baseness. No man has, politically speaking, less respect for the house of Bourbon, nor a greater desire for peace, than I have; but yet for that family, or the very worst prince it contains, if among them there should be a bad one, I should be willing to draw my sword and go to war rather than comply with a demand to withdraw a hospitality to which he had trusted. I say this with respect to persons against whom no crime is alleged; with respect to those who are accused, whether justly or unjustly, of a crime, I think some inquiry should be made into the grounds of the accusation, and the result, whatever it is, be publicly made known. This is a duty we owe not only to France but ourselves; for the hostility of a great and generous nation gives no countenance to crimes even against its worst enemies.

"As to the commercial commissioners, as it is apparent that they were in truth military men, and in effect no better than spies, it was a shameful attempt to impose upon us for a most mischievous purpose; and therefore there was but one course to have pursued, namely, to have sent them immediately out of the country, and instantly applied to France for explanation and satisfaction for having sent them here under such colours and for such objects. But without doing either the one or the other, the question is, was it a ground for going to war?

"Is Malta essential to Egypt? Is Egypt essential to India? Both propositions are more than doubtful. Great stress is laid upon the possession of the banks of the Nile as indispensable to our Eastern possessions; but is there any rational foundation for this opinion? Is it not rather the result of an overweening interest in that country, from the glorious triumphs to our arms of which it has recently been the theatre?—feelings natural and praiseworthy if kept within due bounds, but not fit to be made the ground for determination in so momentous a question as that of peace and war. And let us beware, lest, while crying out against the aggrandizement of France

in Europe, we do not give them too good cause to recriminate upon us for our conduct in Asia (1); and consider well, whether, since the treaty of Amiens, we have not added more to our territories in the Mysore, than France has done in the whole Continent put together."

The House divided, when 398 supported the Address, approving of the war, and 67 voted against it. In the House of Lords the majority was still greater; 142 voting for the amendment and 10 against it (2).

Reflections on the altered tone of the Opposition.

The altered tone of the Opposition upon the war was very remarkable, and eminently characteristic of the change which, in the estimation even of its warmest opponents, the contest had undergone. There were no longer the fierce recriminations, the vehement condemnation of Government, the loud accusations of leaguing with sovereigns in a crusade against the liberties of mankind, with which the chapel of St.-Stephen had so long resounded when the subject was brought forward. France now had little of popular sympathy in any other country. She had lost the support of the democratic party throughout Europe, and stood forth merely as a threatening and conquering military power. This change, though at the time little attended to, as all alterations which are gradual in their progress, was of the utmost moment, and deprived the contest, in its future stages, of the principal dangers with which it had at first been fraught. It was no longer a war of opinion on either side of the Channel. Democratic ambition did not now hail, in the triumphs of the French, the means of individual elevation. Aristocratic passion ceased to hope for this overthrow as paving the way to a restoration of the ancient order of things. The contest had changed its character: from being social it had become national. Not the maintenance of the constitution, the coercion of the disaffected, the overthrow of the Jacobins was the object for which we fought: the preservation of the national independence, the vindication of the national honour was felt to be at stake. The painful schism which had so long divided the country was at an end. National success was looked upon with triumph and exultation by an immense majority of the people, with the exception of a few party leaders who to the last regarded it with aversion. The war called forth the sympathies of almost all classes of citizens. The young, who had entered into life under its excitement, were unanimous in its support; and a contest which had commenced under more divided feelings than any recorded in the history of England, terminated with a degree of unanimity unprecedented in its long and glorious career.

England was obviously resolved on war.

Upon coolly reviewing the circumstances under which the contest was renewed, it is impossible to deny that the British Government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that, so far as the transactions between the two countries are concerned, they were the aggressors. The great stress laid on Sebastiani's mission to Egypt; the evasion of Russian mediation; the peremptory refusal to abandon Malta, even to a neutral power; the repeated demands by the English ambassador for his passports; the resolution at last not to treat, even on the footing of Malta being abandoned to England, are so many indications of a determined spirit of hostility, and a resolution, on one pretence or another, to put an end to amicable relations between the two countries.

But it was unavoidable on his acknowledged intention.

On the other hand, the same impartiality requires it to be stated that the conduct of France to other states, and the language which the First Consul had begun to hold towards Great Britain herself,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi, 1405, 1438, 1466,

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1491, 1514.

indicated a settled resolution of disregarding the stipulations of treaties, and the commencement of a system of intimidation inconsistent with the existence of any independent power. The stretches made by France over Europe during a period of profound peace, in defiance alike of express agreement and the regard due by the common law of nations to the independence of weaker powers, were such as to render any long continued pacification out of the question. Pointing as the First Consul evidently did towards universal dominion, actuated as he plainly was by the principle that every thing was allowable which was conducive to the interests or the grandeur of France, it was in vain to expect that he would long continue at peace with this country, the only obstacle that stood in his way in the prosecution of these intoxicating objects. If he had not hitherto engaged in open acts of hostility against us, it was only because he was not prepared for them, because peace was requisite to restore his marine and put his naval resources on a more respectable footing; but his language already shewed his secret designs, and in his anxiety for supreme authority he spoke as if he had already acquired it. In these circumstances it is of little consequence what was the ostensible cause of the rupture; the real ground of it was a well-founded distrust of the pacific intentions of the First Consul, or his ability to remain at peace even if he had been so inclined; a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that he was preparing, at some future period, a desperate attack upon our independence, and that all which he now acquired would ere long be returned with consummate talent against it.

He himself has told us what he meant to have done, and unfolded the matured designs he had formed for our subjugation. It was no part of his plan to have gone to war in 1803, or exposed his infant navy to the risk of being swept from the ocean or blockaded in its harbours, before his sailors had acquired the experience requisite for success in naval warfare. He intended to have remained at peace with England for six or eight years; to have built annually twenty or twenty-five ships of the line; immensely enlarged his ports and fortifications in Holland, the Scheldt, and the Channel; extended, in the interim, his dominion over all the lesser states in the Continent, and not unfurled the flag of defiance till he had from eighty to an hundred ships of the line at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, manned by experienced seamen, to cover the embarkation of the invading army at Boulogne (1). The immense docks which he excavated out of the granite

His designs for the subjugation of this country.

(1) "I was resolved," said Napoléon, "to renew at Cherbourg the wonders of Egypt. I had already raised in the sea my pyramid I would also have had my lake Mareotis. My great object was to concentrate, at Cherbourg, all our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to be able to deal out a grand stroke at the enemy. I was establishing my ground so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."

"The Emperor had resolved upon a strictly defensive plan till the affairs of the Continent were finally settled, and his naval resources had accumulated to such a degree as to enable him to strike a decisive stroke. He ordered canals in Brittany, by the aid of which, in spite of the enemy, he could maintain an internal communication between Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, Holland, Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest. He proposed to have at Flushing or its neighbourhood, docks which were to be capable of receiving the whole fleet of Antwerp, fully armed, from whence it could put to sea in twenty-four hours. He projected near Boulogne a dike similar to that at Cherbourg; and between Cherbourg and Brest, a roadstead like that of l'Ile du Bois. Sailors were to be formed by exercising young conscripts in the roads, and performing gun practice and other operations in the harbours. He intended to construct twenty or twenty-five ships of the line every year. At the end of six years he would have had 200 ships of the line, at the end of ten as many as 300. The affairs of the Continent being finished, he would have entered heart and soul into that project; he would have assembled the greater part of his forces on the coast from Corunna to the mouth of the Elbe, having the hulk on the shores of the Channel. All the resources of the two nations would thus have been called forth, and then he would either, he conceived, have subjected England by his moral ascendency, or crushed it by his physical force. The English, alarmed, would have assembled for the defence of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames. Our three corps off Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp, would have fallen on their central masses,

of Cherbourg and the slime of the Scheldt, the vast arsenal of Antwerp, the capacious basin of Boulogne, were all preparations for the great design which he had in contemplation, and which no moderation or pacific disposition on the part of Great Britain, short of absolute submission, could possibly have averted. "When by these means," said he, "England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and the advantage which she derived from her insular situation was at an and, she must necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seventeen millions must in the end sink before one which commands the resources of forty (1)."

In forming a judgment on the propriety of the course adopted by England on this occasion, there arc two considerations not generally attended to, which require to be steadily kept in view, arising as they do out of the whole conduct of the French Government throughout the revolutionary war.

The first is, that all the great stretches of power during the whole contest were made by France in a period of peace; and that great as were her military conquests, they were yet inferior to the strides which she made, in defiance of treaty, in the middle of the forced pacifications which followed her triumphs. During the peace of Campo Formio she conquered Switzerland, revolutionized Rome, and subjugated Naples. By the treaty of Lunéville she was bound to allow the Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics to choose their own constitutions; but hardly was the ink of his signature dry when she established a government in these independent states, all entirely composed of her creatures, and incorporated Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia with her dominions. The peace of Presburg and Tilsit were immediately followed by the overthrow of her own allies, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, and the seating of brothers of Napoléon on the thrones of the two first of these kingdoms. The peace of Vienna, in 1809, was but a prelude to the incorporation of the Roman States, Holland, and Hamburgh, with the French dominions; and the treaty of Vienna, in 1805, was the immediate forerunner of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the conquest of Naples for his brother Joseph; in other words, the organization of half of Germany and the whole of Italy under the direction of the Emperor.

Greatest stretches of power by France during his reign were always made in time of peace.

Nor did the military strength of France, under the able direction of Napoléon, grow in a less formidable manner during every cessation of hostilities. Like blood in a plethoric patient, it accumulated fearfully during each interval of bleeding; and resistance to the malady became the more difficult the longer it was delayed. Down to 1800, Austria had maintained a protracted and doubtful contest with the Republic; but during the peace which followed, the military resources of France were so immensely increased that in the next war which ensued, in 1805, she was struck to the earth in a single campaign. The long repose of Germany which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was marked by such an extraordinary growth of the military strength of France as enabled it at the same time, in 1812, to maintain three hundred thousand men in Spain, and precipitate five hundred thousand on the Russian dominions. Continued hostility, however, in the end weakened this colossal power—the military resources of France rapidly declined during the fierce campaigns of 1812 and 1813; and at length the Conqueror of Europe saw

while our wings turned them in Scotland and Ireland. Every thing then would have depended on a decisive affair, and this was what Napoléon called his battle of Actium. 'We must have conquered,' said he repeatedly, 'when the two nations were opposed to each other, body to body, for we were forty millions, and they only fifteen.'"—See Las Cases, v. 15.

(1) Nap. in Las Cas. v, 8, 14.

himself reduced, in the plains of Champagne, to the command of fifty thousand men. This effect of peace to France, so different from what is generally observed in conquering states, was the result of the complete overthrow of all pacific habits and pursuits during the Revolution; the rise of a generation, educated in no other principles but the burning desire for individual and national elevation, and the organization of these immense warlike resources by a man of unexampled civil and military talent. Napoléon felt this strongly. He had no alternative but continued advance or abandonment of the throne. "My conquests," said he, "were in no respect the result of ambition or the mania of dominion; they originated in a great design, *or rather in necessity* (1)."

The second is, that Napoléon uniformly treated with the greatest severity the powers which had been most friendly and submissive to his will; and that acquiescence in his demands, and support of his interests, so far from being a ground to expect lenient, was the surest passport to vindictive measures; while he reserved all his favours for the rivals from whom he had experienced only the most determined hostility. Reversing the Roman maxim, his principle was,

"Parcere *superbis*, et debellare *subjectos*."

The object of this policy was, that he might strengthen himself by the forces of the weaker before he hazarded an encounter with the greater powers. Its steady prosecution was an important element in his unexampled success; its ultimate consequences the principal cause of his rapid decline.

And he was uniformly most rigorous to those who had submitted the most, and been most faithful in their alliance.

Holland was the first power which submitted to the republican arms. The inhabitants of its great towns hailed the soldiers of Pichegru as deliverers. Its government was rapidly revolutionized, and throughout the whole war stood faithfully by the fortunes of France; and it received in return a treatment so oppressive as to call forth the passionate censure of Mr. Fox in the British Parliament (2), and induce a brother of Napoléon to abdicate the throne of that country, that he might not be implicated in such oppressive proceedings. Piedmont next submitted to the rising fortunes of Napoléon. After a campaign of fifteen days it opened its gates to the conqueror, and placed in his hand the keys of Italy; and in a few years after the King of Sardinia was stript of all his continental dominions, and the territories he had so early surrendered to France were annexed to the engrossing Republic. Spain was among the first of the allied powers which made a separate treaty with France; and for thirteen years afterwards its treasures, its fleets, and its armies, were at the disposal of Napoléon; and he rewarded it by the dethronement of its king, and a six years' war fraught with unexampled horrors. Portugal at the first summons drew off from the alliance with England, and admitted the French eagles within the walls of Lisbon; and it received in return an announcement in the Moniteur that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. The Pope submitted without a struggle to all the rapacious demands of the French Government: the treasures, the monuments of art, one-third of the dominions of the church, were successively yielded up: the Head of the Faithful condescended to travel to Fontainbleau to crown the modern Charlemagne; and he was rewarded by a total confiscation of his dominions, and imprisonment for the remainder of his life. Venice maintained a neutrality of the utmost moment to France during the desperate struggle with Austria

(1) Las Cas. ii. 273.

(2) Ante, v. p. 93.

in 1796, when ten thousand even of Italian troops would have cast the balance against the rising fortunes of Napoléon; and he, in return for such inestimable services, instigated a revolt in its continental dominions, which afforded him a pretence for destroying its independence and handing over its burning democrats to the hated dominion of Austria. A majority of the Swiss fraternized with the Republicans, and called in the French forces in 1798; and in 1802, Switzerland was deprived of its liberties, its government, and its independence. Prussia, by a selfish and unhappy policy, early withdrew from the alliance against France; and for ten years afterwards maintained a neutrality which enabled that enterprising power to break down the bulwark of central Europe, the Austrian monarchy; and on the very first rupture he treated it with a degree of severity almost unparalleled in the annals of European conquest.

He meditated, in the end, a resistless attack on England.

While such was the conduct of Napoléon to the states which had earliest submitted and most faithfully adhered to his fortunes, his lenity towards the powers which had boldly resisted and steadily defied his ambition was not less remarkable. Austria, after a desperate warfare of five years, received as the price of its pacification the Venetian territories, more than an equivalent for all it had lost in the Low Countries; and on occasion of every subsequent rupture, obtained terms so favourable as to excite the astonishment even of its own inhabitants; until at length a Princess of the House of Hapsburg was elevated to the Revolutionary throne, and the continued hostility of twenty years rewarded by a large share of the conqueror's favour. Russia had twice engaged in fierce hostility against France; but the resentment of Napoléon did not make him forget his policy. He made the most flattering advances to Paul in 1800; and after the next struggle, the treaty of Tilsit actually gave an accession of territory to that formidable rival. With England, his most inveterate and persevering enemy, he was ever ready to treat on terms of comparative equality. He surrendered valuable colonies of his allies at the peace of Amiens; and was inclined, in the last extremity, to have abandoned Malta rather than provoke a war with so dreaded a naval power when his own maritime preparations were only in their infancy. The inference to be drawn from these circumstances is, not that Napoléon towards the greater powers was actuated by a spirit of moderation, the reverse of what he evinced towards the lesser, for such a conclusion is at variance with the whole tenor of his life; but that his ambition in every instance was subordinate to his judgment, and that he studiously offered favourable terms to the states with whom he anticipated a doubtful encounter, till his preparations had rendered him master of their destinies. His long continued favour to Prussia was but a prelude to the conquest of Jena and partition of Tilsit: his indulgence to Russia only a veil for his designs till the assembled forces of half of Europe were ready in 1812 to inundate its frontiers: his proffered amity to Great Britain, the lure which was to deceive the vigilance of its Government till the Channel was studded with hostile fleets, and a coalition of all the maritime states had prepared a Leipsic of the deep for the naval power of England. Such being the evident design of the First Consul, as it has now been developed by time, and admitted by himself, there can be but one opinion among all impartial persons as to the absolute necessity of resuming hostilities, if not in 1803, at least at no distant period, and preventing that formidable increase of his resources during the interval of peace, which with him was ever but the prelude to a more formidable future attack, and might have deprived Great Britain of all the security which she enjoyed from her insular situation and long established maritime superiority.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

MAY 1803—DECEMBER 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Great Preparations on both sides for the Renewal of the War—Conquest of Hanover by the French—A Convention is entered into by the Hanoverian Generals—Violation of Neutral Rights by the French Generals—They extend themselves through Southern Italy—Declarations against English Commerce—Immense Preparations in the Channel for the Invasion of Britain—Works and Flotilla at Boulogne—Description of the Small Craft assembled—Napoléon visits Antwerp, and orders Immense Works there—His Designs for the Invasion—And Measures to enforce Discipline in the Army on the Coast—Humiliating Treaties agreed to by Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal—Louisiana sold by France to America—Vast Forces collected on the Channel by the Money thus gained—Military Force and Finances of France—Preparations of England to repel the danger—Number and Warlike Spirit of the Volunteers—Naval Preparations—Finances and New Taxes of the year—Proposal to Fortify London—Argument in favour of it by Mr. Pitt—Napoléon's opinion on the subject—Fresh Rebellion in Ireland—Murder of the Lord Chief Justice in Dublin—Execution of the Ringleaders—Naval Events of the year—Defeat of Linois by the China Fleet—Supplies and Finances for the year 1804—General Despondency which ensued in Britain—Which is increased by the alarming illness of the King—All eyes are in consequence turned to Mr. Pitt—Coalition against the Ministry—Which falls, and Mr. Pitt becomes Prime Minister—Vigorous Measures of Lord Melville for the Restoration of the Navy—And his admirable Civil Regulations for that Service—Situation of Austria—Statistical details regarding that Monarchy—Its Government and State Policy—And Jealousy of Prussia and Reliance on England—Leading Statesmen at Vienna at this Period—Rapid Growth of Prussia in Wealth and Numbers—Court and Manners of Berlin—Its State Policy and Diplomacy—Foreign Policy—Russia—Its Rapid Growth and Steady System—Statistics of the Empire, and State of the Army—Character and Manners of the Emperor Alexander—His differences with France—Which lead to a Recall of the Russian Ambassador from Paris—Napoléon gains over Prussia by hinting at its obtaining Hanover—Immense sensation excited by the Death of the Duke D'Enghien—The French Government endeavours to effect a set-off, by falsifying Mr. Drake's proceedings at Stutgard—Opinions of the Diplomatic Body at Paris on the Subject—Warlike Note presented by d'Oubril, on the part of Russia, to Napoléon—Talleyrand's Answer—Farther Memorial of Russia—Pacific System of Austria—Its Conduct at the Death of the Duke d'Enghien—Recognizes Napoléon's Imperial Title—Temporizing Policy of Prussia—Accession of Hardenberg to power produces no External Change—They remonstrate against the seizure of Sir George Rumbold—Hostile Dispositions of Sweden, which are taken advantage of by Great Britain—Extension of the French Power in Italy—Internal Measures of Napoléon—Splendid Fête at Boulogne—His Vexation at the Defeat of his Flotilla in the midst of it—General Rejoicing sover France on this occasion—Disgraceful Adulation with which he was surrounded—Vast Designs of the Emperor at Mayence for the Confederation of the Rhine—His Coronation at Paris—Ceremony at Notre-Dame—Result of the Appeal to the People on the Subject—Distribution of Eagles to the Army—Protest of Louis XVIII against his Assumption of the Imperial Crown—Splendour of the Imperial Court—Napoléon refuses any Accession of Territory to the Holy See—Origin of the Differences between England and Spain—Secret Measures of Hostility by the Latter Power—Catastrophe which precipitated hostilities—And at once brings on a War—Spanish Manifesto—Reply by England—Argument against the Conduct of Government in Parliament—Defence of it by Mr. Pitt—Who is supported by Parliament—Reflections on the Subject—And particulars in which England appears to have been wrong.

Great preparations on both sides for the renewal of the war.

THE recommencement of the war was followed by hostile preparations of unparalleled magnitude on both sides of the Channel. Never did the ancient rivalry of France and England break forth with more vehemence, and never was the animosity of their respective Govern-

ments more warmly supported by the patriotism and passions of the people. The French, accustomed to a long career of conquest, and considering themselves, on land at least, as invincible, burned with anxiety to join in mortal combat with their ancient and inveterate enemies; and anticipated, in the conquest of England, the removal of the last obstacle which stood between them and universal dominion. The English hurled back with indignation the defiance they had received, warmly resented the assertion of the First Consul that Great Britain could not contend single-handed with France, and invited the descendants of the conquerors of Hastings to measure their strength with those in whose veins the blood of the victors of Cressy and Azincour was yet fresh. Ancient glories, hereditary rivalry were mingled with the recollection of recent wrongs and newly-won triumphs. The Republicans derided the military preparations of those who had fled before their arms in Holland and Flanders—anticipated in the conflagration of Portsmouth a glorious revenge for the fires of Toulon—and pointed to the career of William the Conqueror as that which was to be speedily followed by the First Consul. The English reverted to the glories of the Plantagenet reigns, and fired at the recital of ancient achievement; and referred with exultation to the sands of Egypt, as affording an earnest of the victories they were yet to obtain over the veteran arms of France. Both parties entered, heart and soul, into the contest—both anticipated a desperate and decisive struggle; but little did either foresee the disasters which were to be encountered, or the triumphs that were to be won.

Conquest of Hanover by the French, May 26, 1803

The first military operation of the French ruler was attended with rapid and easy success. Ten days after the hostile message of the King of England to the House of Commons, the French army on the frontiers of Hanover received orders to put itself in motion, and accomplish the reduction of that electorate. The force intrusted to Mortier on this occasion was twenty thousand men; and the Hanoverian troops, whose valour was well known, amounted to nearly sixteen thousand; but the preponderating multitudes with which it was well known the First Consul could follow up, if necessary, this advanced guard, rendered all attempts at resistance hopeless. Some measures of defence were, however, adopted; and the Duke of Cambridge, in an energetic proclamation, enjoined the immediate assembly of the *levy en masse,* but the rapid advance of the French troops rendered all these efforts abortive. Count Walmoden made a gallant resistance at Borstell, on the shores of the Weser; but as there was no time for succours to arrive from England, and it was desirable not to involve that inconsiderable state in the horrors of a protracted and hopeless struggle, a convention was wisely entered into two days afterwards at Suhlingen, by which it was stipulated, that the Hanoverian army should retire with the honours of war, taking with them their field-artillery behind the Elbe, and not bear arms against France till exchanged during the remainder of the contest. The public stores in the arsenals, amounting to nearly 400 pieces of cannon and 30,000 muskets, fell into the hands of the French; but what they valued more, were nineteen colours and sixteen standards, the trophies of the army of Prince Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War (1).

Jun. 2, 1803.

A Convention is agreed to by the Hanoverian Generals.

The British Government, upon being informed of these transactions, refused to ratify the capitulation, and loudly complained of the invasion of the German Confederation by this irruption, in defiance alike of the privileges of the Elector of Hanover as a Prince of

(1) Bign. iii. 129, 133. Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 326. Dum. ix. 204, 205.

the Empire, and the neutrality of his German states, which had been observed throughout all the late war, and was expressly provided for in the treaty of Lunéville. The consequence was, that Walmoden was summoned by Mortier to resume hostilities or lay down his arms. The brave Germans declared they would rather perish than submit to such a degradation, and, on the 27th, hostilities recommenced along the whole line; but the contest was too obviously unequal to permit either party to come to extremities. The French abated somewhat from the rigour of their first terms. The Hanoverian army was dissolved; the soldiers disbanded and sent home for a year; the officers retained their side arms; those of the common men were given up to the civil authorities. The troops thus let loose afterwards proved of essential service to the common cause. They were almost all received into the English service, and, under the name of the King's German Legion, were to be seen in every subsequent field of fame from Vimeira to Waterloo (1).

Violation of neutral rights by the French Generals.

In the course of this incursion the French armies set at nought the neutrality, not only of Hanover, but of all the lesser states in its vicinity. Mortier traversed without hesitation all the principalities, not merely which lay in his way on the road to Hanover, but many beyond that limit. Hamburgh and Bremen were occupied, and the mouth of the Elbe and Weser closed against British merchandise. This uncalled-for aggression is not only of importance, as demonstrating the determination of the First Consul to admit of no neutrality in the contest which was commenced, but as unfolding the first germ of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which he mainly trusted afterwards in his hostilities against Great Britain. Unaccustomed, however, as the European powers hitherto were to such instances of lordly usurpation, this violation of neutral rights excited a very great sensation. In the north especially the advance of the French standards to the Elbe, and the permanent occupation of the free cities of Hamburgh and Bremen by the troops of that nation, awakened a most extraordinary jealousy. Russia openly expressed her discontent, and Austria and Prussia made representations on the subject to the Cabinet of the Tuileries; while Denmark, more courageous, actually assembled an army of thirty thousand men in Holstein, to prevent the violation of the Danish territory. But the Emperor was too much depressed by his long continued disasters—Prussia too deeply implicated in her infatuated alliance with France, to resent openly this violation of the German confederation—and Russia too far removed to take any active steps, when the powers more immediately interested did not feel themselves called on to come forward. Thus the jealousies of the North evaporated in a mere interchange of angry notes and diplomatic remonstrances; the troops of Denmark alone appeared in the field to assert the cause of European independence; too weak to contend with the Republican legions, they were compelled to retire into their cantonments, after being treated with insulting irony in the French journals (2); and the north of Germany permanently fell under the dominion of France, from which it was only delivered, ten years after, by the disasters of the Russian campaign (3).

They extend themselves through Southern Italy.

Simultaneous with the conquest of Hanover by the French was the march of an army into the south of Italy, and occupation of the port of Tarentum by the Republican forces. St.-Cyr received the command of the troops destined to this service, which were fourteen thou-

(1) Dum. ix. 217, 220. Ann. Reg. 1803, 326.

(2) "The military mania," said the Moniteur, "is a strange passion to seize little princes."—BIGNON, iii. 139.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1803, 326, 327. Bign. iii. 138, 139. Dum. ix. 207, 208.

sand strong; and on the 14th May he addressed a proclamation to the soldiers, which was soon after followed by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. They advanced forthwith to Tarentum, which, with its extensive fortifications and noble roadstead, again formed the outwork of France against the Eastern possessions of Great Britain. At the same time Tuscany was invaded, Leghorn was declared in a state of siege, and all the English merchandise found in that great seaport confiscated; the First Consul thus evincing that he was resolved to admit of no neutrality in a lesser state in the great contest which was approaching, and that, by a continued violation of the usages of war at least, he was resolved to compel a change in the code of naval hostility. As usual, all these troops were to be maintained and paid by the countries where they were quartered. The formal protest by the ephemeral King of Etruria against the military occupation of his dominions was hardly even noticed by the First Consul. In vain it was represented to him that the commerce and revenue of Tuscany were ruined by the measures of severity adopted towards the English merchandise; these considerations were as nothing in his estimation, compared to the grand design which he had in contemplation of overturning the power of Great Britain. At the same time the island of Elba, intrusted to General Rucca, was put in the best state of defence; Corsica fortified at every accessible point, and ten thousand men laboured on the fortifications of Alexandria, the key, in Napoléon's estimation, to the whole peninsula. "I consider that fortress," said he, "as the possession of the whole of Italy: the rest is a matter of arms, that of political combination (1)."

Declarations against English commerce, June 23, 1803.

By an *arrêt* on 23d June, the First Consul formally commenced that virulent strife which he so long maintained against the English commerce. It declared, "that no colonial produce and no merchandise coming directly from England, should be received into the ports of France; and that every such produce or merchandise should be confiscated." Neutral vessels arriving in France were subjected to new and vexatious regulations, for the purpose of discovering from whence they had come (2); and any vessel coming from, or which "had touched at a harbour of Great Britain," was declared liable to seizure.

Immense preparations in the Channel for the invasion of Britain.

But all these combinations, extensive as they were, sunk into insignificance, compared to the gigantic preparation made on the shores of the Channel for the invasion of Great Britain. Every thing here conspired to rouse the First Consul to unheard-of exertion. By accumulating the principal part of his troops on the shores of the Channel, he fixed the attention and excited the alarm of Great Britain, furnished a brilliant object of expectation to his own subjects, and obtained a pretext for maintaining an immense army on foot, without exciting the jealousy of the other European powers; while, if they conceived the design of attacking France, he had always at hand a vast force ready organized, capable of crushing them. Impelled by these different motives, he made the most extraordinary efforts to hasten the preparations for a descent on Great Britain. The official journals publicly announced his intention of putting himself at the head of the expedition, and called on all the departments to second the attempt. The public spirit of France, and the hereditary rivalry with which its inhabitants were animated against England, produced the most strenuous efforts to aid the Government. A circular from the War Office to

(1) Dum. x. 16, 27. Bign, iii. 140, 143. Bot. iv. 125, 139.

(2) Dum. x. 51, 52. Bign. iii. 142, 143.

the different towns and departments called on them to furnish voluntary aids to the great undertaking. "Every vessel," said the War Minister, "shall bear the name of the town or district which has contributed the funds for its formation: the Government will accept with gratitude every thing, from a ship of the line to the smallest praam. If by a movement as rapid as it is general, every department, every great town covers its dock-yards with vessels, soon will the French army proceed to dictate laws to Great Britain, and establish the repose of Europe, the liberty and prosperity of commerce, on the only basis which can ensure their duration." Every where the people answered the appeal with acclamations, and soon every workshop on the coast was in activity from the Texel to Bayonne. Forts and batteries, constructed on every headland and accessible point of the shore, both secured the territory of the Republic from insult, and afforded protection to the small craft proceeding from the places of their construction to the general points of rendezvous: the departments vied with each other in patriotic gifts and offerings; that of the Upper Rhine contributed 300,000 francs (L.12,000) for the construction of a vessel to bear its name; that of the Côte d'Or threw off at their own expense a hundred pieces of cannon to arm the flotilla; and Bourdeaux, albeit the first to suffer by the resumption of hostilities, manifested in an energetic address, their cordial concurrence in the war. Such was the public spirit, even of those parts of the country which had been most convulsed during the Revolution, that Napoléon ventured upon the noble design of forming a Vendéen legion, "all composed," to use his own words, "officers and soldiers, of those who have carried on war against us;" and its ranks were speedily filled by the remains of that unconquerable band (1).

The object to be gained by all these preparations was to assemble, at a single point, a flotilla capable of transporting an army of 150,000 men, with its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, and horses; and at the same time to provide so formidable a covering naval force as might ensure its safe disembarkation, notwithstanding any resistance that could be opposed by the enemy. Such a project, the most gigantic to be attempted at sea of which history makes mention, required the assembling of very great means and no small share of fortune for its success; but it was within the range of possibility, and the combinations made for its accomplishment were among the most striking monuments of the extensive views and penetrating genius of the First Consul.

Works and flotilla at Boulogne.

The harbour of Boulogne was taken as the central point for the assembling of the vessels destined for the conveyance of the troops. Its capacious basin, enlarged and deepened by the labour of the soldiers, was protected by an enormous tower, constructed on a coral reef, amidst incredible difficulties, from the action of the waves, and armed with heavy cannon, capable of carrying to the distance of 2,000 toises, while similar excavations extended the neighbouring ports of Etaples, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. Every harbour, from Brest to the Texel, was rapidly filled with gunboats of different dimensions; the dockyards, the shipwrights were universally put into activity; and as fast as the vessels were finished, they were sent round, under protection of the numerous batteries with which the coast abounded, to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The number and intrepidity of the British cruisers in the Channel rendered this a service both of difficulty and danger; but the First Consul was indefatigable, and by communicating his own incredible activity to all the persons in subordinate situations, at length

(1) Bign. iii. 144. Norv. ii, 264. Dum. x. 33, 37.

made great progress in the assembling of naval forces within sight of the shores of Britain. No sooner were the English cruisers blown off their stations by contrary winds, than the telegraph announced the favourable opportunity to the different harbours; numerous vessels were speedily seen rounding the headlands and cautiously cruising along the shore, while the artillerymen, with lighted matches in their hands, stood at the frequent batteries with which it bristled, to open upon any ships of the enemy which might come within range in attempting to impede their passage. The small draught of water which the gunboats required enabled the greater part of them to escape untouched, and concentrate in the roads of Boulogne: but a considerable number were intercepted and destroyed by the British cruisers, and innumerable deeds of daring courage were performed, in too many of which valuable blood was shed in the attainment of a comparatively trifling object (1).

Description of the small craft assembled.

The small craft assembled was of four different kinds, according to the weight and species of the troops which they were intended to convey. The praams, or largest sort, carried each six four-and-twenty pounders, and were intended rather to protect the smaller vessels which conveyed the troops than to be employed in the transport themselves. The next class bore four twenty-four pounders and one howitzer; they were calculated to receive each from 150 to 200 men, and made flat-bottomed, in order to land them as near as possible to the shore. The third were armed each with two twenty-four pounders, and were capable of conveying eighty men each; while the smallest had a four-pounder at the poop and a bomb at the stern, and bore from forty to fifty men each. The artillery were intended to be embarked in the larger vessels, the cavalry in those of a medium size, the infantry in the smallest; and such was the discipline and organization of the troops destined for the expedition, that each man knew the vessel on board of which he was to embark; and experience proved that a hundred thousand men could find their places in less than half-an-hour (2).

Napoléon visits Antwerp, and orders immense works there.

Upwards of thirteen hundred vessels of this description were, in the course of the year 1803, collected at Boulogne and the adjoining harbours; but immense as these preparations were, it was not on them alone that the First Consul relied for the execution of his project. Innumerable transports were at the same time assembled, which, without being armed, were destined for the reception of the stores and ammunition of the army; and Napoléon himself proceeded to the coast, to hasten by his presence the preparations which were going forward, and judge with his own eyes of the measures which should be adopted. He visited all the material points in the maritime districts; inspected at Flushing the new docks and fortifications which had been commenced; and rapidly discerned in Antwerp the central point where the chief arsenal for the naval subjugation of
July 21, 1803. England should be established. An *arrêt* of the 21st July directed that a dock should be there constructed, capable of containing twenty-five ships of the line and a proportional number of frigates and smaller vessels; and those immense works were immediately commenced, which in a few years rendered this the greatest naval station on the continent (3). Not content with

(1) Dum. x. 38, 48. Bign. iii. 144, 145. Norv. ii. 261, 262.

In this partisan warfare, Captain Owen, in the Immortalité, and Sir Sidney Smith, in the Antelope, particularly distinguished themselves.—*See* James's *Naval Hist.* iii. 294, 346.

(2) Dum. x. 40, 45. Bign. iii. 145, 147.

(3) The opinion of Napoléon was repeatedly and strongly expressed as to the great importance of Antwerp as a naval station to France. "He often declared," says Las Cases, "that all he had done for Antwerp, great as it was, was nothing compared to what he intended to have done. By sea, he meant to have made it the point from whence a mortal stroke was to be launched against the enemy; by land, to have rendered it a certain place of refuge in case of disaster, a pivot of the national safety; he intended to have rendered it capable of re-

the realities of that marvellous period, the minds of men, as usual in times of highly-wrought excitement, were inflamed by fictitious prodigies; and the announcement that, in excavating the harbour of Boulogne, a hatchet of the Roman legions and a medal of the Norman princes had been discovered, conveyed to the vivid imaginations of the French soldiers the happy omen that they were about to tread in the footsteps of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror (1).

His design for the invasion.

But these naval forces, great as they were, constituted but a part of those which were destined to be employed in the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of France and Holland, and, soon after of Spain, were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of Napoléon, which he himself has pronounced to have been the most profoundly conceived and nicely calculated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean in the West Indies; to have brought this combined fleet rapidly back to the Channel while the British blockading squadron were traversing the Atlantic in search of their enemies, raised the blockade of Rochefort and Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole armament, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was under cover of this irresistible force that Napoléon calculated upon crossing over to England, at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom he thought he would reach London in five days, and where he intended instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the downfall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the English republicans had at heart. Numerous as were the chances against the successful issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel how near it was succeeding, how little the English were aware of the danger which really threatened them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated the gallant officer whose important combat defeated the most profound combination that the genius of Napoléon ever formed for their destruction (2).

And measures to enforce discipline in the army on the coast.

But towards the success of this attempt a very great military as well as naval force was necessary; and the attention of the First Consul was early turned to the means of restoring the strength of that arm, which the expedition to St.-Domingo and detachments into Italy and Hanover had very much diminished. The soldiers, long habituated to the excitement and plunder of war, had become weary of the monotony of a garrison or pacific life; discipline was sensibly relaxed, and desertion, especially among the old soldiers, had increased to an alarming extent. The most energetic measures were immediately taken to arrest this evil; new regula-

ceiving an army in case of defeat, and sustaining a whole year of open trenches. Already all the world admired the splendid works erected at Antwerp in so short a time, its numerous dockyards, magazines, and basins; 'but all that,' said the Emperor, 'was nothing: it was only the commercial town; the military town was to be on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, where the ground was already purchased for its construction. There three-deckers were to have reposed, with all their guns on board, during the winter months; vast sheds were to have been constructed to shelter their huge bulk from the weather in peace; every thing was determined on on the most gigantic scale. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St.-Helena; for the cession of that fortress was one of the principal reasons which induced me not to agree to peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France, without the frontiers of the Rhine and Antwerp, is nothing.' All the difficulties attendant on the situation were nothing in the eyes of Napoléon: in his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the Scheldt, which they had themselves often signalized as so formidable, he was indefatigable; and in less than eight years Antwerp had become a maritime arsenal of first-rate importance, and contained a considerable fleet." [Las Cas vii. 43, 44, 56, 57.] When Napoléon made these energetic remarks at St.-Helena, he was far from anticipating that, in twelve years, a British squadron was to aid a French army to wrest this magnificent fortress from the ally of England, and restore it to the son-in-law of France and the sway of the Tricolor flag!

(1) Bign. iii. 147, 149. Norv. ii. 263, 264. Dam. x. 77, 78.

(2) Nap. in Month. ii. 227. Jom. Vie de Nap. ii. 20, 21. Las Cas, ii. 277, 280.

tions introduced to ensure a rigid enforcement of the conscription, and the height requisite for the service lowered to five feet two inches,—a decisive proof that the vast expenditure of human life in the preceding wars had already begun to exhaust the robust and vigorous part of the population. Such was the rigour with which the conscription laws were now enforced, that escape became hopeless; and the price of a substitute, which rose to the enormous sum of L.500, rendered it totally impossible for the middling classes to avoid personal service. Napoléon was indefatigable on the subject. "Keep your eyes," said he to the Minister of War, "incessantly fixed on the recruiting; let not a day pass without your attending to it; it is the greatest affair in the state." From necessity, then, not less than inclination, the military life became the sole object of ambition; and the proportion of the number drawn to that of the youth who were liable to serve each year was so great, that, for the remainder of his reign, it practically amounted to almost a total absorption of half, sometimes the whole, of the young men, as they rose to manhood, into the ranks of war (1).

Sept. 27, 1803. Humiliating treaties agreed to by Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal.

Nor was Napoléon less solicitous, by means of foreign negotiations, to increase the disposable force which he could bring to bear against the common enemy. Ney, who had commanded in Switzerland, concluded a capitulation, by which sixteen thousand troops of that Government were put at the disposal of France, and soon after placed in reserve of the army of England at Compiègne, while, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between the two states, which stipulated that the Helvetic Confederacy should in addition, if necessary, furnish eight thousand auxiliary troops to France; General Pino led an Italian division across the Alps, to form part of the same armament; while Augereau assembled a corps in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, to enforce the mandates of the Consular Government, if the Courts of Madrid and Lisbon refused to conclude treaties on the footing of the orders sent out from the Tuileries. But there was no need for the precaution; terror and French influence were already paramount at both those capitals, and the seal was put to the disgrace of the Peninsula by the treaties concluded with Spain on the 19th October, and with Portugal on the 25th December. By the first of these conventions, an annual payment of six millions of francs (L.240,000 a-month, or L.2,880,000 a-year) was stipulated in favour of France, to be either remitted to Paris or employed in repairing the French ships of war in the Spanish harbours; several officers, holding important situations in the Spanish army, were to be dismissed for alleged offences against the French Government; many stipulations in favour of the export of French manufactures, and their transit into Portugal, were agreed to; and the Spanish Government engaged to procure the payment of at least a million of francs (L.40,000) a-month by the Portuguese to the French Government, as long as the maritime war lasted. By the second, Portugal purchased an exemption from actual hostilities by an annual payment of 16,000,000 francs (L.640,000) to Napoléon. The conclusion of these treaties was a virtual declaration of war by both Spain and Portugal against great Britain, since it placed the pecuniary resources of both countries at the disposal of France during the continuance of the contest. Bitterly did the people of the Peninsula subsequently lament

Oct. 19, 1803.

Dec. 25, 1803.

(1) Dum. x. 60, 72.

It was calculated that 208, 233 young men in the French empire annually attained the age of 20, the period when liability to serve commenced. Thus the first conscription of 1798, which required 200,000 men who had that year attained that age, absorbed nearly the whole persons liable, and the drawing of lots became a vain formality. The conscription in 1803 was 120,000, and it was never less, generally much greater, during the remainder of the war.—Dumas, x. 65.

their degradation, and nobly did they then wipe off the stain on their honour (1).

Louisiana sold to America, April 30, 1803.

No sooner also did the maritime war appear inevitable, than Napoléon concluded an arrangement with the United States of America, by which, in consideration of eighty millions of francs (L.3,200,000,) he ceded to them his whole rights, acquired by the convention with Spain, to Louisiana; anticipating thus, for a valuable consideration, the probable fate of a naval contest, and extricating from the hands of the British a valuable colonial possession, which would assuredly soon have become their prey (2).

Vast force collected on the coast by the money thus gained.

By these different means, Napoléon was enabled to put on foot a very large army for the invasion of Great Britain. An order addressed to the Minister at War, on the 14th June, 1803, fixed the organization of the army which was divided into six corps, each of which was to occupy a separate camp, and be under a different commander. Ney, Soult, Davoust, and Victor, were to be found among the names of the generals. It extended along the whole coast, from the Texel to the Pyrenees. The first camp was in Holland, the second at Ghent, the third at St.-Omer, the fourth at Compiègne, the fifth at St.-Malo, the sixth at Bayonne. The whole troops assembled at these different points were intended to exceed 150,000 men, and their command was intrusted to the most distinguished generals of the army. Though all included under the name of the army of England, their wide dissemination renders it probable, that the First Consul had other objects in view besides the subjugation of Great Britain in their disposition; but the Continental Powers shut their eyes to the danger which awaited them from the concentration of such powerful forces, and secretly rejoiced that the vast army from which they had all suffered so much was quietly cantoned at a distance from them on the shores of the ocean, intent on a distant and hazardous enterprise (3).

Military force and finances of France.

Great as these preparations were, they were not beyond the resources at the disposal of the First Consul. The army of France alone, without counting the subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian states subject to its command, amounted to the enormous aggregate of above 420,000 men, independent of the national and coast guards, which were above 200,000 (4). The finances of the country were in an equally flourishing condition. The revenue exceeded that of 1802, and amounted to 570,968,000 francs, or L.23,000,000 sterling (5); while the im-

(1) Norv. ii. 265, 266. Bign. iii. 200, 201, and 238.
(2) Bign. iii. 169, 170.
(3) Jom. ii. 22. Dum. x. 89, 91,
(4) The army consisted of—

Infantry,	341,000
Artillery,	26,000
Cavalry,	46,350
Invalids,	14,560
	427,910

—*See Report of the Minister at War*, June, 1803.—DUMAS, ix, 117.

(5) The Budget for 1803 stood thus:—

	Francs.	
Direct contributions,	305,105,000 or	L.12,200,000
Registers, stamps, etc.	200,106,000 or	8,420,000
Customs,	36,924,000 or	1,800,000
Post Office,	11,200,000 or	600,000
Salt tax,	2,300,000 or	92,000
Lottery,	15,326,000 or	950,000
	570,961,000 or	L.24,062,000

—*See* DUKE DE GAETA, i. 304. The annual subsidy paid by the Italian Republic was 25,000,000 francs, or L.1,000,000 sterling.—DUMAS, xi. 134.

mense subsidies paid by Spain and Portugal as the price of their pretended neutrality—by the Italian Republic in return for the alliance of France—and the maintenance by Hanover, Holland, Naples, and Tuscany of all the troops cantoned in their respective territories, largely contributed to the increase of the resources of the Republic (1).

Preparations of England to repel the danger.

But nothing were the Government or people of England daunted by the formidable preparations which were directed against them. Relying on the patriotism and spirit of the people, the Administration made the most vigorous efforts for the national defence, in which they were nobly seconded both by Parliament and the people. Independent of the militia, eighty thousand strong, which were called out on the 25th March, and the regular army of 130,000 already voted, the House of Commons, on June 28th, agreed to the very unusual step of raising 50,000 men additional, by drafting, in the proportion of 34,000 for England, 10,000 for Ireland, and 6000 for Scotland; which it was calculated would raise the regular troops in Great Britain to 112,000 men, besides a large surplus force for offensive

July 18.

operations. In addition to this, a bill was brought in shortly afterwards, to enable the King to call on the levy *en masse* to repel the invasion of the enemy, and empowering the lord-lieutenants of the several counties to enrol all the men in the kingdom, between seventeen and fifty-five years of age, in different classes, who were to be divided into regiments according to their several ages and professions. But all persons were to be exempt from this conscription who were members of any volunteer corps approved of by his Majesty; and such was the general zeal and enthusiasm, that in a few weeks three hundred thousand men were enrolled, armed, and disciplined in the different parts of the kingdom, and the compulsory conscription fell to the ground. This immense force, which embraced all classes and professions of men, not only was of incalculable importance, by providing a powerful reserve of trained men to strengthen the ranks and supply the vacancies of the regular army, but contributed in a remarkable manner to produce a patriotic ardour and feeling of unanimity among the people, and lay the foundation of that military spirit which enabled Great Britain at length to appear as principal in the contest, and beat down the power of France, even on that element where hitherto she had obtained such unexampled success (2).

Numbers and warlike spirit of the volunteers.

The spectacle now presented by the British Islands was unparalleled in their previous history, and marked decisively the arrival of a new era in the war—that in which popular sympathy was enlisted against the Revolution, and the military usurpations of France had roused an unanimous resolution to resist its aggression. In the multitudes who now thronged to the standards of their country were to be seen men of all ranks and descriptions, from the Prince of the Blood to the labourer of the soil. The merchant left his counting-house, the lawyer his briefs; the farmer paused in the labours of husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or amusement, the country gentleman was to be seen at the head of his tenantry. Everywhere were to be seen uniforms, squadrons, battalions; the clang of artillery was heard in the streets, the trampling of cavalry resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant reposing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was to be seen hurrying, with his musket on his shoulder, to his rallying point. Instead of the nobleman wasting his youth in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to

(1) Bign. iii. 245, 246.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1604, 1627, 1630.

be found inhaling a nobler spirit amidst the ranks of his rural dependents. In the general tumult even the voice of faction was stilled; the heart-burnings and divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten; the Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the volunteers; from being a war of opinion, the contest had become one of nations, and, excepting in a few inveterate leaders of party in the Legislature, one feeling seemed to pervade the whole British Empire (1). Mr. Sheridan, with that independent and patriotic spirit which ever distinguished him, at the close of the Session made an eloquent speech on moving the thanks of Parliament to the volunteers and yeomanry for the zeal and alacrity with which they had come forward in defence of their country; and thunders of applause shook the House when he declared it to be the unalterable resolution, not less of the Legislature than the Government, that "no proposal for peace should be entertained while a single French soldier had footing on British ground (2)."

Aug. 10.

Naval preparations, Dec. 2, 1802.

Nor was it at land only that preparations to resist the enemy on the most gigantic scale were made: the navy also, the peculiar arm of British strength, received the early and vigilant attention of Government. Fifty thousand seamen, including twelve thousand marines, had been in the first instance voted for the service of the year; but ten thousand additional were granted when it became probable that war would ensue, and forty thousand more when it actually broke out. Great activity was exerted in fitting out adequate fleets for all the important naval stations the moment that hostilities were resumed, although the dilapidated state of the navy, in consequence of previous ill-judged economy, rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty. Seventy-five ships of the line, and two hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission. The harbours of France and Holland were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant in the Mediterranean; and, excepting when their small craft were stealing round the headlands to the general rendezvous at Boulogne, the flag of France, at least in large fleets, disappeared from the ocean (3).

March 14, 1803

June 11.

June 14. 1803. Finances and new taxes of the year.

No small efforts in finance were required to meet these extensive armaments by sea and land; but the resources of the country enabled Government to defray them without difficulty. A property-tax of 5 *per cent,* which it was calculated would produce L.4,500,000 yearly; additional customs to the amount of L.2,000,000 a-year; additional excise chiefly on malt spirits and wine, which were estimated at L.6,000,000; and a loan of L.12,000,000, were sufficient to enable Government to meet the heavy expenses attendant on the renewal of the war, even on the extended scale on which it was now undertaken. These burdens, especially the income and malt taxes, were severe, but they were universally felt to be necessary; and such was the general enthusiasm, that the imposition of war taxes in a single year to the amount of twelve millions and a half, did not excite a single dissentient voice in Parliament, or produce any dissatisfaction in the country (4).

(1) The King reviewed in Hyde Park, in October, sixty battalions of volunteers, amounting to 27,000 men, besides 1500 cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, and in a remarkable state of efficiency. The total volunteers of the metropolis were 46,000.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1694, 1697. Dum. x. 136.

(3) James, vol. iii. Table No. 12. Ann. Reg. 1803, 621. App. to Chronicle.

(4) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1595.

The new taxes imposed were,—

1. *Customs.*

Twenty per cent additional on sugar, etc. imported,	L.1,300,000	L.2,160,000
Duty of one per cent on exports,	460,000	
One penny a lb on cotton wool,	250,000	
Tonnage additional,	150,000	

Mr. Pitt's speech on fortifying London.

A long and interesting debate took place in Parliament, upon the question whether London should be fortified. Colonel Crawfurd urged strongly the great danger of the capital and the principal dépôt for our military and naval stores being wholly undefended; and maintained that, as matters then stood, the loss of a single battle might draw after it the surrender of the metropolis and chief arsenals of the kingdom, the effect of which, both in a political and military point of view, would be incalculable. Mr. Pitt added the great weight of his authority on the same side, and strongly enforced the propriety, not only of strengthening the metropolis, or at least the arsenals in its vicinity, but fortifying the principal headlands of the coast, in order to render landing by the enemy more difficult. "It is in vain to say," said he, "you should not fortify London, because our ancestors did not fortify it, unless you can shew that they were in the same situation that we are. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and lances, we ought to use them now, and consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery. If the fortification of the capital can add to the security of the country, I think it ought to be done. If by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety and destruction of the capital. It will not, I admit, make a difference between the conquest and independence of the country; for that will not depend upon one or upon ten battles: but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives, with misery, havoc, and desolation spread over the country on the one hand, or the confounding the efforts and chastising the insolence of the enemy on the other (1)." These arguments were little attended to at the time, and the proposed measure was not adopted: but there can be no doubt that they were well founded, and that England might have had bitter cause to regret their neglect, if Napoléon, with a hundred thousand men, had landed on the coast of Sussex. For this opinion we have now abundant grounds, in the result of the invasions

Brought over. . . .		L.2,160,000
2. *Excise.*		
Fifteen per cent on the lower, and forty-five per cent on higher teas, ...	L.1,300,000	L.6,000,000
Additional duty of ten pounds a pipe on wine, ...	500,000	
Fifty *per cent* on spirits.	1,500,000	
Two shillings additional on malt, ...	2,700,000	
3. *Property.*		
Five per cent on income and property, ...		4,500,000
In all.		L.12,660,000

The income and expenditure of the year stood as follows:—

EXPENDITURE.	
Navy.	L.10,211,378
Army, ...	8,935,753
Militia, etc.	2,889,976
Ordnance.	1,128,913
Miscellaneous.	5,440,441
Grant to National Debt, ...	200,000
Exchequer Bills, ...	10,150,456
	L.38,956,917
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded, ...	20,699,864
	L.59,656,781
Sinking fund, ...	6,494,000
	L.66,150,781

INCOME.	
Total income from Taxes, . . .	L.38,609,392
Loan, ...	12,000,000
Raised by Exchequer Bills, . . .	20,481,000
	L.71,090,392

—*See Ann. Reg.* 1803, 631, *et seq.*; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1598; and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1659, 1662.

of Austria, Russia, and France, at a subsequent period, when possessed of much greater military resources than were then at the command of the British Government, and the best of all authority in the recorded opinion of Napoléon himself. Central fortifications near or around the metropolis are of incalculable importance, in order to gain time for the distant strength of the kingdom to assemble when it is suddenly assailed: if they had existed on Montmartre and Belleville, the invasion of the allies in 1814, instead of terminating in the submission of France, would probably have led to a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine; and he is a bold man who on such a subject ventures to dissent from the concurring opinion of Mr. Pitt and Napoléon (1).

Fresh Rebellion in Ireland.

This year was again distinguished by one of those unhappy attempts at rebellion, which have so frequently of late years disgraced the history and blasted the prospects of Ireland. Though the country was disturbed by the usual amount of predial violence and outrage, no insurrection of a political nature was apprehended, when suddenly, on the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, unequivocal symptoms of a fermentation of a more general character were observed in the population of Dublin. It was soon discovered that a conspiracy was on foot, the object of which was to force the Castle and harbour stores of the capital, dissolve the connection with England, and establish a Republic in close alliance with France; but the means at the disposal of the conspirators were as deficient as the objects they had in view were visionary and extravagant. Eighty or a hundred persons, under the guidance of Emmett, a brother of the chief who was engaged in the former insurrection, a young man of an ardent and enthusiastic temperament, proposed, on the 23d July, to assemble in open rebellion the peasantry from the adjoining counties, who were for that purpose to flock into the metropolis, under pretence of seeking for work in hay-making, on the eve of the festival of St.-James; and with that motley array they were to march against a garrison consisting of above four thousand men. In effect, on the day appointed the country labourers did assemble in vast numbers in St.-James's street as soon as it was dark, and Emmett put himself at their head: but he soon discovered that the insurgents were rather disposed to gratify their appetite for assassination and murder, than engage in any systematic operations for the subversion of the Government. In vain he and a few other leaders, animated with sincere though deluded patriotic feeling, endeavoured to infuse some order into their ranks, and lead them against

Napoléon's opinion on the subject.

(1) "Napoléon says he frequently turned in his mind the propriety of fortifying Paris and Lyon; and this in an especial manner occurred to him, on occasion of his return from the campaign of Austerlitz. Fear of exciting alarm among the inhabitants, and the events which succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, prevented him from carrying his designs into execution. He thought that a great capital is the country of the flower of the nation, that it is the centre of opinion, the general depôt; and that it is the greatest of all contradictions, to leave a point of such importance without the means of immediate defence. At the season of great national disasters, empires frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never awanting for internal defence, if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand national guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of 300,000 men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers, commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge of a few thousand horse. Paris, ten times in its former history, owed its safety to its walls: if, in 1814, it had possessed a citadel capable of holding out only for eight days, the destinies of the world would have been changed. If, in 1805, Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war: if, in 1806, Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena might have rallied there till the Russian army advanced to its relief: if, in 1808, Madrid had been fortified, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somosierra, could never have ventured to march upon that capital, leaving the English army, in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, in its rear." Let not the English imagine, that their present naval superiority renders these observations inapplicable to their capital: it was after the victory of Austerlitz that the necessity of fortifying Paris occurred to the victor in that memorable fight. Who will guarantee the navy of England in all future times against a maritime crusade, and a rout of Leipsic at the mouth of the Thames?—See NAPOLÉON, in MONTHOLON, ii, 278, 280.

the Castle and other important points of the city: instead of doing so, they murdered Lord Kilwarden, the venerable Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, and Colonel Browne, a most worthy and meritorious officer, whom they met in the streets; and, equally incapable of resolute as humane conduct, were shortly after dispersed by two volleys from a subaltern and fifty men, who unexpectedly came on the rear of their savage and disorderly columns (1).

Murder of the Lord Chief Justice in Dublin.

The fate of the Lord Chief Justice was peculiarly deplorable. He arrived at the entrance of Thomas street in his carriage, accompanied by his daughter and nephew, when the chariot was stopped, the Chief Justice and his nephew dragged out and murdered by repeated stabs from the ruffians, who struggled with each other for the gratification of striking them with their pikes, while the young lady, whom they had the humanity to spare, fled in a state bordering on distraction through the streets, and arrived at the Castle in such agitation as to be hardly capable of recounting the tragic event which she had witnessed. A bystander, shocked at the savage ferocity of the murderers, exclaimed that the assassins should be executed next day; but the words recalled his recollection to the upright dying magistrate, and he raised his head for the last time to exclaim, "Murder must be punished; but let no man suffer for my death but on a fair trial, and by the laws of his country," and immediately expired. Memorable words to be uttered at such a moment by such a man, and eminently descriptive of that love of impartial justice which constitutes at once the first duty of a judge, and the noblest epitaph on his sepulchre (2).

Execution of the ring-leaders.

Emmett and Russel, the two leaders of the insurrection, were soon after seized, brought to trial and executed. The former made no sort of defence, but when called upon to receive sentence, stood up and avowed the treason with which he was charged, glorying in his patriotic intentions, and declaring himself a martyr to the independence and liberties of his country. At his execution he evinced uncommon intrepidity and composure, received the communion of the Church of England, and died the victim of sincere but deluded patriotism. The remaining conspirators were pardoned, upon making a full disclosure of their projects and preparations, July, 28, 1803. by the judicious lenity of Government, and a bill was shortly after brought in for the better suppression of insurrection and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, which passed both Houses without any opposition (3).

A frantic and unsuccessful attempt at the assassination of the King was made, in the same year, by Colonel Despard, a revolutionist of the most dangerous character, who was tried, condemned and executed.

Naval events of the year.

Notwithstanding the magnitude of the preparations on both sides, the naval operations of the first year of the war were inconsiderable. The French fleets were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to be able to leave their harbours in large masses; and the closeness of the British blockade prevented any considerable number of detached vessels from escaping. As usual, the effects of the English maritime superiority speedily appeared in the successive capture of the enemy's colonies. St-Lucia and July 17. Tobago fell into their hands in July, and Demerara, Berbice, and Sept. 12 and 23. Essequibo in September. The planters in these sugar islands willingly yielded to the British forces, anticipating from them protection from their own slaves, whom the events in St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe had

(1) Ann. Reg. 1803, 300, 312.
(2) Ann. Reg, 1803, 311, 312.
(3) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1671, 1675.

given them so much reason to dread, and a share in that lucrative commerce which, under the British flag, they could carry on with every part of the world, and which the almost total cessation of production in the French islands had thrown almost exclusively into their hands. Some angry disputes broke out in this year between the British Government and the Local Legislature in Jamaica, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to contribute the requisite supplies to the support of the large military garrison of the island (1); but they gradually gave way in the following years, in consequence of the advantageous market for their produce which the war afforded them, and the approach of real danger from the combined fleets of France and Spain.

Defeat of Linois by the China fleet.

The first gleam of success came from the Eastern ocean, and what was remarkable, from the merchant ships of England. Immediately after war was declared, Admiral Linois, with one sail of the line and three frigates, escaped from the roads of Pondicherry, in consequence of the British Admiral on that station being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities; and since that time he had cruised about in the Indian Archipelago, capturing detached ships, and doing considerable damage to British commerce. Emboldened by this success, he lay in wait for the homeward bound China fleet, which he expected would prove an easy prey. On the 14th February he descried the fleet leisurely approaching, in no expectation of encountering an enemy, and anticipated little opposition: but Commodore Dance, who commanded the British vessels, by a bold and gallant manœuvre defeated his efforts, and to his infinite honour saved the valuable property under his command from destruction. Dismissing the Feb. 15, 1804. heavily leaden and weaker vessels to the rear, he made the signal for the stronger and better equipped to bear down in succession upon the enemy; and so intimidated was the French Admiral by this gallant bearing and vigorous fire, that after a few broadsides he took to flight, and was pursued for above two hours by his commercial victors! This gallant action, which confounded the enemy, and saved British property to the amount of a million and a half sterling, excited the greatest satisfaction throughout the nation (2). Rewards were distributed with an unsparing hand by the East India Company to the various commanders and their brave crews; and the Commodore received the honour of knighthood from his Majesty's hands.

Various attacks were made in the course of the summer on the Boulogne flotilla and the squadrons of small craft proceeding to that destination; but although the utmost gallantry was uniformly displayed by the officers and men engaged, the success obtained was in general very trifling, and bore no proportion to the loss sustained by the assailants. The only conquest worthy of record made by the British, either at sea or land during the year 1804, was that of Surinam in the West Indies, which, in the beginning of May 3. May, yielded, to the great joy of the inhabitants, to a military and naval force, under the command of Sir Charles Green, and Commodore, afterwards Sir Samuel Hood; on which occasion also a frigate and brig fell into the hands of the victors (3).

Supplies and finances for 1804.

The supplies voted by Parliament for the service of the year 1804 were much greater than for the preceding year, and the military

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, p. 2. Bign. iii. 158.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 141. and Chron. 409. Dum. xi. 64, 66, 69,

(3) Ann. Reg. 1804, 138, 139.

and naval force kept on foot far more considerable (1). The expenditure swelled, independent of the charges of the debt, to no less than L.53,000,000, of which L.42,000,000 was for the current expenditure, and L.11,000,000 for retiring of Exchequer bills. The land troops of the year amounted, including 22,000 in India, to above 300,000 men, exclusive of 340,000 volunteers—an enormous force, capable, if properly directed, not only of repelling any attempt at invasion, but interposing with decisive effect in any strife which might take place between France and the great military powers of the Continent (2). The naval forces also were very considerably augmented, there being no less than 100,000 men, including 22,000 marines, voted for the service of the year, and 83 ships of the line and 390 frigates and smaller vessels in commission.

General despondency which ensued in Britain.

But the magnitude of their forces, compared with the inconsiderable amount of the services rendered by them to the country, ere long revealed the secret weakness of the Administration. It was in vain to disguise from the country that the public expenditure could not long continue at the enormous height which it had now reached, and that unless some advantages commensurate to the sacrifices made were gained, the nation must in the end sink under the weight of its fruitless exertions. To the animation, excitement, and hope which generally prevailed at the commencement of the war, had succeeded the listlessness, exhaustion, and discontent which invariably, after a certain interval, follow highly wrought and disappointed feeling. The trifling nature of the success which had been gained, notwithstanding such costly efforts, during the first year of the contest, produced a very general conviction that Ministers, whatever their individual respectability or talents might be, were unequal as a body to the task of steering the vessel of the state through the shoals and quicksands with which it was surrounded; and in particular, did not possess that weight and

(1) The receipt and expenditure of the year 1804 stood as follows :—

Expenditure.	
Navy,	L 12,350,574
Army,	12,993,000
Militia, etc.	6,159,000
Ordnance,	3,737,000
Miscellaneous,	4,217,000
Extra do,	2,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	11,000,000
Civil List,	591,000
Additional do,	60,000
	L.53,607,574
Interest of Debt, funded and unfunded,	20,726,772
Sinking Fund,	6,436,000
	L.80,770,346
Ways and Means.	
War Taxes,	L.15,440,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	5,000,000
Malt Duty additional,	750,000
Duty on Pensions, etc.	2,000,000
Lottery,	250,000
Surplus of 1803,	1,370,000
Loan, England,	10,000,000
Do. Ireland,	4,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	14,000,000
Annuities Loan,	1,150,000
Permanent Revenue, *minus* surplus of Consolidated Fund,	25,365,000
	L.79,825,000

—See *Parl. Deb.* ii. 351, 355, and *App.* 35, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 584, *App. to Chron.*

(2) James, iii. App. Table 13, Ann. Reg. 1804, 577. App. to Chron. Parl. Deb. ii. 351, 355.

This force was distributed as follows :—

In the British Isles,	129,039	
Colonies,	38,630	
India,	22,897	
Recruiting,	533	
Militia in Great Britain,	109,947	
Regulars and Militia,		301,046
Volunteers in Great Britain,		347,000
Total in Great Britain,		648,046
Irish Volunteers,		70,000
Grand Total,		718,046

—See *Parl. Deb.* i. 1678, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 19.

eminence in the estimation of foreign states, which was necessary to enable Great Britain to take up her appropriate station as the leader of the general confederacy, which it was now evident was alone capable of reducing the Continental power of France. This feeling was strongly increased by the complaints which generally broke out as to the reduced and inefficient state of the navy under the management of Earl St.-Vincent; and it soon became painfully evident, from a comparison of the vessels in commission at the close of the former and commencement of the present war, that this important arm of the public defence had declined to a very great degree during the interval of peace; and that, under the delusion of a wretched, and in the end most costly economy, the stores on which the public salvation depended had been sold and dissipated, to an extent in the highest degree alarming. The consequence was, that when war broke out the navy was in an unprecedented state of dilapidation; and from the absence of convoys for our merchant fleets, and the neglect to apprise Admiral Rainier and the fleets in the East of the breaking out of hostilities by an overland despatch, many severe losses, which might have been avoided, were sustained by the commercial interests (1).

Increased by the alarming illness of the King.

The public despondency, already strongly excited by these untoward events, was increased to the highest degree by the alarming intelligence which spread abroad as to the health of the King. On the 14th February, it was publicly announced by a bulletin at St.-James's Palace that his Majesty was indisposed; and a succession of similar notices soon left no doubt in the public mind that the disease was that mental malady which had plunged the nation fifteen years before in such general consternation. On this occasion the panic was still greater, from the alarming posture of public affairs, and the general distrust which prevailed as to the stability and capacity of the Administration. But after an interval of a few weeks it was announced that the most distressing symptoms had abated. On the 29th February the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared in Parliament "that there was no necessary suspension of the Royal functions." On the 14th March the Lord Chancellor stated in the House of Lords that "he had since conversed with his Majesty, and that his mental state warranted the Lords Commissioners in expressing the royal assent to several bills which had passed through Parliament;" and on the 9th and 18th May the King drove, to the infinite joy of the inhabitants, through the principal streets of the metropolis: though it was several months afterwards before he was restored to his domestic circle, or able to go through the whole functions of royalty (2).

All eyes are turned to Mr. Pitt.

But during this interval of doubt and alarm the minds of the great majority of men throughout the nation became convinced of the necessity of placing the helm of the state under firmer guidance, and all

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, 129, 131.

Mr. Addington boasted during the peace that if war broke out, fifty ships of the line could be equipped in a month, but when this declaration came to be put to the test, it was discovered that the royal arsenals were almost emptied, and every thing sold requisite for the naval defence of the country. Even the men of war on the stocks, at the close of the contest, had been left imperfect, and the hands employed upon them dismissed. In the general penury which prevailed, neither vessels could be procured for the King's squadrons, nor convoys provided for the merchant service. When the royal message was delivered to Parliament on 8th March, 1803, there was hardly a ship of war either ready or in a state of forwardness; and the greatest aversion to the public service pervaded every department of the navy. The consequence was, that notwithstanding the utmost efforts to repair the ruinous economy and dilapidations of the two preceding years, the ships in commission on the 5th January, 1804, were only 356, of which 75 were of the line; whereas in the commencement of 1801 the number was 472, of which 100 was of the line.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 130, 131, and JAMES's *Naval Hist.* iii. Tables No. 9 and 13.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 27, 29.

eyes were naturally turned to that illustrious statesman, who had retired only to make way for a pacific administration, and could now, in strict accordance with his uniform principles, resume the direction of the second war with revolutionary France. As usual in such cases the gradual approximation of parties in the House of Commons indicated the conversion of the public mind; and it soon became evident that the Administration was approaching its dissolution. On the 15th March matters came to a crisis. Mr. Pitt made a long and elaborate speech, in the course of which he commented with great severity on the maladministration of the royal navy under the present government, and concluded with moving for returns of all the ships in commission in 1793, 1801, and 1803. He was cordially supported by Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan; and it became evident that a coalition had taken place between the Whig and Tory branches of the Opposition. The motion was lost by a majority of 70; there being 130 for it, and 200 against it. But from the character and weight of the men who voted, it was evident that the Ministry were rapidly sinking, and that they only retained office till their successors could be appointed, which the unhappy condition of the King rendered a doubtful period (1). In effect, their majority went on continually declining; and on the 23th April, in a question on the army of reserve, it was only 37. It was now openly stated by Ministers that they only held office during the continuance of a delicate state of public affairs; and the Opposition, seeing their object gained, suspended all farther attacks till the King's health was restored; and on the 12th May, the day after he had appeared in public, it was formally announced in the House of Lords that Ministers had resigned, and their successors had been appointed (2).

Coalition against the Ministry.

May 12, 1804.

Mr. Pitt becomes Prime Minister.

It was at first expected that a coalition was to be formed as the basis of the new Administration; but it was soon discovered, both that there was an irreconcilable difference between the opinions of the leaders of the different parties on the chief subjects of policy, and also that there were scruples in the royal breast against the admission of Mr. Fox, which rendered his accession to the Cabinet nearly impracticable. The new ministry, therefore, was formed exclusively of Tories; and a majori ty ofit was composed of members of the late Cabinet. The material changes were, that Mr. Pitt was First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in room of Mr. Addington; Lord Melville First Lord of the Admiralty, in room of Earl St.-Vincent; and Lord Harrowby Foreign Secretary, in lieu of Lord Hawkesbury (3). Lord Grenville, the able and faithful supporter of Mr. Pitt during the former war, declined to take office, assigning as a reason that it was formed on too narrow a basis, at a time when the public dangers called for a coalition of all the leading men in the state, to give vigour and unanimity to the national councils; an opinion in which he was joined by a great proportion of the men of moderate principles throughout the country. Although Mr. Pitt probably judged rightly in constructing his Cabinet entirely of men of his own principles, as experience has proved that no individual talent, how great soever, can withstand the loss of character consequent on an abandonment of principle; and therefore that coalition administrations have seldom any long existence.

Lord Grenville's Letter to Mr. Pitt, Ann. Reg. 1804, 123, 125.

(1) Parl. Deb. i. 866, 927.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 80, 84. Parl. Deb. i. 319, 409.

(3) The new Cabinet stood thus:—
Mr. Pitt, Premier.
Duke of Portland, President of the Council.
Lord Eldon, Lord Chancellor.
Earl of Westmoreland, Privy Seal.
Earl of Chatham, Master General of the Ordnance.
Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.
Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Lord Harrowby, Foreign Affairs.
Earl of Camden, War and the Colonies,
Lord Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The vigour and decision of Mr. Pitt's councils speedily appeared in the confederacy which he formed of the Continental States, on the greatest scale, to stem the progress of French ambition. Nor was the ability and energy of Lord Melville less conspicuous in the rapid restoration of the navy from a state of unexampled decrepitude and decay to a degree of exaltation and lustre unprecedented even in its long and glorious annals. Every thing was to be done; for such was the mutilated and shattered state of the fleet, and to such an extent had the spirit of parsimonious reform been carried, that when stores and timber were offered at comparatively moderate terms, they were refused by the late Admiralty, and suffered to be sold to the agents of the country, rather than deviate from their pernicious economy, even in the purchase of those articles which were in daily consumption. The consequence was, that Lord Melville was compelled to accept the offers of timber, stores, and masts, at whatever price the contractors chose to demand; and the savings of one naval administration entailed a quadruple expenditure upon that which succeeded it. But by strenuous exertions, and at an enormous cost, the defects were at last made up; the deficiencies were supplied by the purchase of East India vessels, and by contracting for the repairs of others; and the old practice of building prospectively for the service of future years, which had been abandoned in the fervour of ill-judged economy, was again resumed with the very best effects to the public service. The results of the admirable vigour and efficiency which the new First Lord of the Admiralty introduced into every branch of the civil department of the navy were soon conspicuous. Instead of 556 vessels, including 75 of the line, which alone were in commission in the beginning of 1804, there were 475, including 85 of the line, ready for sea in the beginning of 1805; 80 vessels of war, including 26 of the line, were in a few months far advanced on the stocks; and the navy was already afloat which was destined to carry the thunder of the British arms to the shoals of Trafalgar (1).

Vigorous measures of Lord Melville for the restoration of the navy.

Nor was the conduct of Lord Melville less beneficial in the civil regulations introduced for the increase of the comfort and health of the sailors. Many admirable practical improvements were established; many experienced evils removed: the wives of absent seamen allowed to draw a certain proportion of their wages during their absence at the nearest harbour to their places of residence: many abuses in the food, clothing, and pay of the men corrected; and the foundation laid of that excellent system of management, which is ultimately, it is to be hoped, destined to wipe the stain of impressment, with all its concomitant evils, from the British Constitution. The merits of the new Admiralty on these subjects, however, were neither generally known to, nor appreciated by, the country. In hostile projects they were for the first year of their administration by no means fortunate. From unacquaintance with nautical subjects, they lent too credulous ears to the designs of visionary projectors: repeated unsuccessful attacks on the French flotilla tarnished the reputation of the navy; and the total failure of an attempt to blow it up by means of infernal machines called Catamarans exposed it to the ridicule of all Europe (2).

And admirable civil regulations for that service.

Before detailing the political combinations by which Mr. Pitt again resuscitated the torpid spirit of the coalition, and brought Russia, and Austria, and eventually Prussia, into the great contest of European independence, a slight

(1) James, iii, App. No. 12, 13. Ann. Reg. 1804, 137.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 141, 143. Dum. xi. 26, 51.

survey of the political situation and resources of these great military monarchies, henceforth principals in the strife, is indispensable.

Situation of Austria. Statistical details regarding that monarchy.

Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 of florins (L.8,000,000,) had risen by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere to 106,000,000, or L.9,800,000. During the war its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes; and it sustained no diminution by the peace of Campo Formio, the Venetian States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries. At the peace of Lunéville, the income of Government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or L.10,000,000 sterling; a sum equal to at least twenty-five millions sterling in Great Britain; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled during the difficulties of former years to have recourse to a paper currency; and the bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation, convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and Government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twenty-five florins, or two pounds sterling. During the course of the war, silver and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation, and paper billets for two and three shillings were in general circulation. A considerable portion of the smaller currency was in brass, which was issued at double its intrinsic value; and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts of the Government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states. The debt, in all, was 200,000,000 florins (L.10,000,000) in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it amounted to triple that sum. The treasury had been reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own subjects (1).

Its government and state policy.

The policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is neither required to uphold the influence of the crown, nor overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army and civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of Government irresistible, and enables the Archdukes and Imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of princes of the blood in other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of Government more gentle and paternal than in the Hereditary States; but in the recently acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint have long existed in the Italian and Hungarian dominions. The population of the empire, at the peace of Lunéville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable (2).

(1) Raymond and Roth, Stat. de l'Autrich. ii. 274, 285. Bign. ii. 270, 273.

(2) Bign. ii. 270, 274.

And jealousy of Prussia.

Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Lunéville, the leading principle of the Austrian Cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the Great Frederick, and had been much increased by the impolitic and ungenerous advantage which the Court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the north of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and short-sighted policy on the part of the Prussian Government, which, in their rivalry of the Emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, they never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the Cabinet of London on every occasion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the Imperial Cabinet was to lean for continental support on the Russian power; and although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg took with Prussia in arranging the matter of German indemnities, yet this temporary estrangement soon disappeared upon the arrival of more pressing dangers (1), and they were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.

And reliance on England.

Leading persons of its Cabinet at this period.

The leading persons in the Administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobentzell, Vice-Chancellor of State, and Count Colloredo, a Cabinet Minister, and intimate friend of the Emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him an European reputation, was at the head of the war department, but the powers of Government were really in the hands of Cobentzell and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterwards celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian Cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe, that in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part (2).

Rapid growth of Prussia in wealth and numbers.

Immense was the difference at this period between the system of government of Austria and Prussia. Though the latter monarchy in reality only dated from the reign of Frederick the Great, yet during the short period which had since elapsed it had made unexampled progress. The treasure, indeed, amassed by that great warrior and able prince, had been wholly dissipated during the succeeding reign, but both under his sway and that of his successor Frederick William, the monarchy had made important advances in territory, wealth, and population. By withdrawing from the alliance against France in 1794, the Cabinet of Berlin had succeeded in appropriating to itself a large portion of the spoils of Poland,

(1) Bign. ii. 275, 276.

(2) Bign. ii. 263, 267. Dum. xi. 23, 27.

while the open preference to French interests which they evinced for the ten years which followed the treaty of Basle was rewarded by a considerable share of the indemnities; in other words, of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire: and a most important increase of influence, by the place assigned to Prussia as the protector of the neutral leagues beyond a fixed line in the north of Germany. During this long period of pacification, the industry and population of the country had rapidly increased; a large portion of the commerce of Germany had fallen into its hands, and the whirl and expenditure of war, so desolating to other states, was felt only as increasing the demand for agricultural produce, or augmenting the profits of neutral navigation (1).

Statistical details.

At the death of the Great Frederick in 1786 the population of the monarchy was 7,000,000 of souls, and its revenue 31,000,000 thalers, or about L.4,500,000 sterling. By the shares obtained of Poland, on occasion of its successive dismemberments, and the acquisition of Anspach, Bayreuth, and other districts, its population was raised to 9,000,000; and although the treasure of 70,000,000 thalers, (L.10,000,000,) left by the Great Frederick, had disappeared, and been converted into a debt of 28,000,000 of thalers, or L.4,100,000, yet this was compensated by the increase of the revenue, which had risen to 36,000,000 thalers, or L.5,000,000. Various establishments had been set on foot at Berlin, eminently calculated to promote the interests both of commerce and agriculture. In particular, a bank and society of commerce were established in that capital, and institutions formed in the provinces to lend money to the landed proprietors, on reasonable terms. By the aid of these establishments, and the effect of long continued peace and prosperity, the finances of the state were in the most flourishing condition in 1804: all the branches of the public service provided for by the current revenue, and even a considerable progress made in the reduction of the debt. The large share of the German indemnities, obtained through French and Russian influence by this aspiring power, made a considerable addition to the public resources: the acquisition of 526,000 souls raised the population to 9,500,000 souls, and the increase of 2,375,000 thalers yearly revenue swelled the income of the public treasury to 38,375,000 thalers, or L.6,000,000 sterling; a sum equivalent, from the value of money, to at least ten millions sterling in Great Britain. This revenue, as in Austria, was the net receipt of the Exchequer, and independent, not merely of the expenses of collection, but of various local charges in the different provinces. The regular army was nearly 200,000 strong, brave, and highly disciplined, but not to be compared to the French, either in the experience and skill of the officers or in the moral energy which had been developed by the events of the Revolution (2).

Manners and court at Berlin.

The Prussian capital was one of the most agreeable and least expensive in Europe. No rigid etiquette, no impassable line of demarcation separated the Court from the people: the Royal Family lived on terms of friendly equality, not only with the nobility, but the leading inhabitants of Berlin. An easy demeanour, a total absence of aristocratic pride, an entire absence of extravagance or parade, distinguished all the parties given at Court, at which the King and Queen mingled on terms of perfect equality with their subjects. Many ladies of rank, both at Paris and London, spent larger sums annually on their dress than the Queen of Prussia; none

(1) Hard. v. and vi. 379, 247, 249. Bign. ii. 291, 292.

(2) Bign. ii. 293, 297.

equalled her in dignity and grace of manner and the elevated sentiments with which she was inspired. Admiration of her beauty and attachment to her person formed one of the strongest feelings of the Prussian monarchy; and nothing contributed more to produce that profound irritation at France, which in the latter years of the war pervaded all classes of its inhabitants, than the harshness and injustice with which Napoléon, to whom chivalrous feelings were unknown, treated, in the days of her misfortune, that captivating and high-spirited princess (1).

Its state policy, and diplomacy.

A spirit of economy, order, and wisdom, pervaded all the internal arrangements of the state. The Cabinet, led at that period by Haugwitz, but in which the great abilities of Hardenberg and Stein soon obtained an ascendency, was one of the ablest in Europe. Its diplomatists, inferior to none in information, penetration, and address, had long given to Prussia a degree of influence at foreign courts beyond what could have been expected from the resources and weight of the monarchy. The army, drawn from the robust rural population, and supported by the admirable system of limited service, was in effect a military school, in which the whole inhabitants were trained to the use of arms, and could be rendered available in periods of danger to the public defence. In no other of the great powers of Europe were the expenses of Government so moderate, or the state capable, in proportion to its numbers, of bringing so great a number of men into the field; and though no restraint recognised in theory existed upon the authority of the sovereign, the wisdom and justice of the Administration in every department left few just causes of complaint to the people (2).

Foreign policy.

The established principles of the Prussian Cabinet, under the direction of Haugwitz, ever since the peace of Basle in 1795, had been to keep aloof from the dangers of war, and take advantage, as far as possible, of the distresses of their neighbours to augment the territory and resources of the monarchy. From a mistaken idea of present interest, not less than the influence of former rivalry with Austria, they inclined to the alliance with France, and derived great temporary benefits from the union, both in the accessions of territory which they received out of the ecclesiastical estates of the empire, and the increase of importance which they acquired as the head of the defensive league of the north of Germany. Little did they imagine, however, in what a terrible catastrophe that policy was to terminate, or anticipate, as the reward of their long friendship, a severity of treatment to which Austria and England were strangers, even after years of inveterate and perilous hostility. The interview at Memel in 1802, and the open support given by Russia to the Prussian claims in the matter of the indemnities, had already laid the foundation of an intimate personal friendship between Frederick William and the Emperor Alexander; but it was as yet rather an alliance of policy than affection, and had not acquired the warmth which it afterwards received at the tomb of the Great Frederick, and on the field of Leipsic (3).

Russia, its rapid growth and steady policy.

Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before

(1) Bign. ii. 297, 299.
(2) Hard. vi. 407, 411. Bign. ii. 299, 301.
(3) Bign. ii. 300, 301. Hard. vi. 401, 407.

him, in the improvement, instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very commencement of his reign his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit: the punishment of the knout, the use of torture, had been abolished; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code; slavery banished from the royal domains; and the first germ of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe; the policy of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg was unchanged and unchangeable: domineering ascendency over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition, and in the contests and divisions of other powers too many opportunities occurred of carrying their designs into execution. For above a century past Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory; unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoléon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilization marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made; its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states; and its limits, to all human appearance, are not destined to recede till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St.-Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem (1).

Statistics of the Empire, June 18, 1834.

At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great in 1725, the population of the empire was about 20,000,000, and its revenue 13,000,000 silver rubles, or L.3,200,000 sterling: in 1787 its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000, and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or L.9,000,000: in 1804 its inhabitants were no less than 36,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or L.12,000,000; a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain (2). The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation tax; a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilization, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It amounted to five rubles for each freeman, and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors,—the object of universal desire in cold climates,—produced a large sum: the duties on the latter articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or L.3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that comparatively infant state, the expenses of Government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great that they were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory; and experience has demonstrated, that without large foreign subsidies Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe. The army raised by conscription, at the rate of so many in each

(1) Tooke's Russia, ii. 124, 147. Bign. ii. 278, 280.

(2) The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles; but from the great emission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half-a-crown English money.—Bignon. ii. 282.

And state of the army.

hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above 500,000 men; but from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above 70,000 men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper, and the actual force which it can bring into the field; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amidst loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched; the hospital service still miserably defective; but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents on the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by Government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half-a-guinea, that of the Cossacks eight and sixpence, a-year; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Benningsen retired towards Konigsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the Russian murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although 90,000 men thundered in close pursuit, that the general was compelled to soothe their dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased, and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amidst the icy lakes and drifted snow of Preussich Eylau (1).

Character and manners of the Emperor Alexander.

Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of decorum, and re-

(1) Wilson's Polish Campaign, i. 31. Bign. ii. 282, 285.

"Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment; "the enemy are already in possession."—"Prince Potemkin must look to that, for he gave us the order; come on, Russians!" was the reply, and the whole marched forward, and perished the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—SIR ROBERT WILSON's *Polish War*, p. 2,

mained throughout an attached friend to that Princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation, for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence his marked regard for the Polish nation through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there; and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzow, were his first advisers. But though attached from the outset to England, to whose influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his admiration for the First Consul, and, still directed by the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the French project of elevating Prussia at the expense of Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederick William, who had ascended the throne about the same age, and only shortly before himself; and this was soon ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a little to determine the subsequent course of events on the great theatre of Europe (1).

His difference with France.

Notwithstanding, however, the high admiration which Alexander felt for Napoléon, and the open support which he had given to his policy in the matter of the German indemnities, events soon occurred which produced first a coldness, and at length a rupture between them. The first of these arose out of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and especially Russia, Austria, and Prussia. No sooner was the war renewed, than England made the most strenuous exertions to induce the Czar to accept the office of mediator between the contending powers in regard to this matter; and Napoléon could not refuse to accede to the proposal. After a long negotiation, however, it came to nothing. While Talleyrand was prodigal of protestations in regard to the sincere desire of the First Consul to submit to the decision of so magnanimous and just a potentate, he took care to make no concessions whatever calculated to restore the peace of Europe. The Russian monarch, by his rescript of May 24, insisted that, as a basis of the arrangement, the neutrality of the north of Germany and the Neapolitan territory should, in the event of war, be maintained inviolate, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of 11th October, 1801 (2); but hardly was this basis laid down, when Hanover was invaded by the army of Mortier, and Naples, as far as Tarentum, overrun by that of St.-Cyr.

May 24, 1803.

Which lead to a recall of the Russian ambassador from Paris.

The consequences of this double rupture eventually were the revival of the coalition. Russia and France, indeed, easily came to an understanding on the subject of Switzerland, the Czar agreeing to leave the First Consul undisturbed in his usurpation over the Helvetic confederacy, provided he would not interfere in his arrangements concerning the Ionian Isles; but on other and more vital points it was soon discovered that their pretensions were irreconcilable. Napoléon proposed that Malta should be garrisoned by Russian troops for as many years as should be deemed necessary; Lampedosa be ceded to Britain; Switzerland and Holland evacuated by the French troops; and the acquisitions of France in Italy recognized by England. The British Government, on the other hand, offered to submit all their differences with France to the decision of Alexander, and insisted that the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Ger-

June 18, 1803.

(1) Bign. ii. 285, 290.

(2) Bign. iii. 108, 111. Dum. x. 5 and 6.

many should be a part of the arrangement; but to this he positively refused to accede. This matter was soon warmly taken up by the Russian Cabinet, especially after the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French troops, and the closing of the Elbe and the Weser to British vessels,—measures utterly subversive of the neutrality of Germany, and in which the Duke of Oldenberg, brother-in-law to the Emperor, whose territories were next threatened by Gallic invasion, was in an especial manner interested. The continued occupation of Tarentum by the French troops also irritated the Russian Cabinet, as well as the failure to provide an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for his continental dominions, as stipulated in the same treaties; and to such a height did the mutual exasperation arrive, that, before the end of 1803, M. Markoff, the Russian ambassador, was received with so much indignity, in a public audience, by the First Consul, that he was recalled, and M. D'Oubril, the chargé-d'affaires, alone left at the French capital (1).

Napoléon gains over Prussia by hinting at its getting Hanover.

Prussia at first warmly seconded Russia in its remonstrances against the occupation of the north of Germany, and especially the levying of heavy requisitions on Hamburgh and the Elector of Hesse Cassel by the French troops. But Napoléon threw out a lure to the Cabinet of Berlin, which speedily caused its efforts in that direction to slacken. He directed his diplomatic agents at that capital to drop hints, that possibly the electorate of Hanover might, in the event of Prussia withdrawing her opposition to France, be incorporated with her monarchy; and though the Prussian Ministers did not venture to close at once with so scandalous an aggression, yet, actuated partly by the desire of securing so glittering a prize, partly by a wish to be freed from the disagreeable vicinity of the French troops, they proposed to Napoléon that his troops should evacuate Hanover, which should be occupied till a general peace by those of the Prussian
July 30, 1803. monarchy. Napoléon declined to accede to such an arrangement, but offered, on condition of an alliance, offensive and defensive, being entered into with France, to cede in perpetuity Hanover to that power. Prussia
Nov. 1803. had the virtue or the prudence to resist this insidious offer, and reverted to the proposal that the French troops should retire from the north of Germany, and the First Consul should respect the neutrality of the empire; and that, in consideration of this, Prussia should engage that, during the continuance of the war, France should neither be attacked by Germany, nor *across* Germany. This proposition, however, by no means suited the great designs which Napoléon had already formed of forcing all the neutral powers into a general confederacy against England, and, in consequence, the negotiation fell to the ground, leaving only the Prussian Cabinet, unhappily for itself, a secret desire for the possession of the Hanoverian states, which long prevented them from joining in the general league against French usurpation (2).

Matters were in this state when the arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien excited an unanimous feeling of horror through Europe, and universally overwhelmed the French partisans by the indignation which it pro-

(1) Bign. iii. 205, 225. Dum. x. 6.

(2) Bign. iii. 230. 233.

The working of this feeling may be discerned in the secret instructions sent to the Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, on 17th December, 1803. He was directed, if possible, to conclude a Convention, containing a secret article, in these terms:—"Without entering into any formal stipulation as to the fate of the electorate of Hanover, which the events of the maritime war and the negotiations for a general peace will determine, the First Consul, considering that the geographical position of Prussia renders these arrangements of more importance to her than any other power, engages to keep chiefly in view the interests of his Prussian Majesty in all the discussions which the destination of that country may give rise to." Napoleon, however, declined to accede to any such half measures. —*See* BIGNON, iii. 232, 233.

Immense sensation excited by the death of the Duke d'Enghien. March 21, 1804.

duced in every virtuous mind. The impulse given by this deed, not less impolitic than criminal, to the fermenting elements of a coalition against France, was very great. The Court of St.-Petersburg went into deep mourning on the occasion, and sent orders to all its diplomatic ministers at foreign courts to do the same; that of Stockholm followed the example; and M. D'Oubril, on the part of his Imperial Majesty, presented an energetic remonstrance on the occasion, both to the Diet at Ratisbon and the Cabinet of the Tuileries. This produced a vigorous reply from the First Consul, written in his usual powerful manner, but with so little circumspection, that it was evidently calculated to widen instead of closing the breach already existing between the two powers. "The complaint of Russia on this matter," said he, "leads one to ask whether, when England meditated the assassination of Paul, and it was known that the proposed assassins were within a league of the frontier, the Russian Government could have had any hesitation in seizing them. A war, conducive, as any struggle between France and Russia ever must be, to no other interests but those of England, will never be voluntarily undertaken by the First Consul; but commence it who will, he would prefer it to a state of things derogatory in the slightest degree to the equality subsisting between the Great Powers. He claims no superiority over them, but he will submit to no degradation. He interferes with none of the measures of the Russian Cabinet, and he requires a corresponding forbearance on their part." Similar explosions took place between the diplomatic agents of the two powers at the Diet of Ratisbon; and resolved to have the lead in provoking a rupture, if it should arise, Napoléon sent instructions to his Ambassador, General Hédouville, to quit St.-Petersburg in forty-eight hours, and leave only a Chargé d'Affaires there. "Know," said he, "as your final instructions, that the First Consul has no desire for war, but he fears no human being (1)."

March 24, and April 11, 1804. The French Government endeavours a set off by falsifying Mr Drake's proceedings at Stutgard.

As a sort of counterpoise to the powerful feeling excited against them by the tragic fate of the Duke d'Enghien, the French Government, shortly after that catastrophe, published, by means of Régnier the head of the police, the particulars of some steps taken towards effecting a counter-revolution in France by the British Government, in which Mr. Drake, their accredited envoy at the Court of Bavaria, and Mr. Spencer Smith, the Chargé d'Affaires at the Electoral Court of Wirtemberg, were the chief agents. They made a very great handle of that transaction, and endeavoured, by a forced and unnatural construction of the expressions employed by these gentlemen in their instructions to the leaders of the malecontent party in France, to make it appear that their object was not merely a counter-revolution, but the assassination of the First Consul; but a simple quotation of the expressions used, as given in their own report, is sufficient to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that nothing was aimed at but the subversion of the existing Government; a project in which it was never supposed diplomatic characters were forbidden to enter towards powers in hostility with their country, and in which almost all the ambassadors of France, throughout the revolutionary war, were actively engaged (2). It clearly appeared, however, that though well

(1) State Papers, 644, Ann. Reg. 1804. Bign. iii. 439, 441.

(2) Mr. Drake's instructions to his agents are thus given in the official report by the French police: — "Art. 2. The principal object in view being the overthrow of the present Governmeot, one of the chief means of accomplishing this is by obtaining knowledge of the plans of the enemy. For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence to begin by establishing a correspondence with the different bureaus for obtaining information as to the plans going forward, both for the exterior and the interior. 7. To gain over those employed in the powder mills, so as to be able to blow them up as

qualified to meet the French forces in the field, England was no match for their police agents in a transaction of this description; for the publications of Régnier revealed the mortifying fact, that the whole correspondence both of Drake and Spencer Smith, had been regularly transmitted, as fast as it took place, to the police of Paris; and that their principal correspondent in that city, M. Méhu de la Touche, was himself an agent of the police, employed to tempt the British envoys into this perilous enterprise (1). But that neither the British Government nor their diplomatic agents ever entertained any projects of assassination against the First Consul, or any other means of annoyance but those of open hostility, is admitted by the person in the world who had the best opportunity of information on this subject, the private secretary of Napoléon himself (2); and it is difficult to see how the First Consul could object to diplomatic characters in other countries engaging in attempts to overturn revolutionary Governments in hostility with their own, when his own brother Joseph, during his embassy at Rome, was, with his knowledge and authority, actively engaged in the conspiracy which overturned the Papal Government in 1797; and the French Ambassador at Venice, in 1796, took so active a part in the democratic conspiracy which led to the destruction, by his means, of that ancient Republic (3).

Opinions of the diplomatic body at Paris on the subject.

The publication of the details of this abortive attempt at a counter revolution in France, which were officially communicated to the whole Foreign Ambassadors at Paris, led to answers from all the members of that body, which are curious, as evincing the different degrees of subjection in which the European potentates were then kept by the French ruler. The answer of the Russian Ambassador was evasive, amounting to nothing but a declaration in favour of the rights of nations; that of the Austrian equally ambiguous; but those of Prussia and all the lesser powers

occasion may require. 8. It is necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers that may be relied on, to print and execute every thing that the confederacy may stand in need of. 9. It is much to be wished that a perfect knowledge may be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly at Paris. 13. It is well understood, that every means must be taken to disorganize the armies both in and out of the Republic." The report adds, that in his intercepted correspondence Mr. Drake says, "If you see any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them," and again, "I earnestly request you to print and distribute a short address to the army. The main object is to gain partisans among the military; for I am thoroughly persuaded that it is through *the army alone* that we can reasonably hope to gain the object so much desired." In a subsequent report, mention is made of a project for getting possession of the fortresses of Huningen and Strasbourg; but no where is there the slightest allusion to the commission of assassination, or any illegal or disgraceful acts.—*See Report*, by RÉGNIER, 24th March and 11th April, 1804; *State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 620, 625.

(1) Report by Régnier, April, 14, 1804. State Papers, 624, 625. Ann. Reg. 1804.

(2) "I can affirm," says Bourrienne, "with perfect confidence, that the British Government have constantly rejected with indignation, not indeed the projects submitted to them for overturning the Consular or Imperial Government, but all designs of assassination or personal violence against the person of the First Consul and the Emperor. Positive proof of this will be found in the subsequent part of these memoirs."—BOURRIENNE, v. 12. Again, the same author adds, "All the correspondence, which scandalized every honest man, on this subject, was the work of the perfidious suggestions of the secret agents of police, of whom Mehu de la Touche was the chief, who acted in the perilous but lucrative line of double espionage. I can affirm as a positive fact, that during the six years that I spent at Hamburg, I was in a situation to *know every thing;* and I can with confidence affirm, that neither in my public character nor private relations have I ever discovered the smallest evidence to warrant the assertion that the English Government was ever engaged in any plots of a dishonourable character."—BOUR. vi. 207.

(3) Hard. Memoirs, v. 186, 192.

"Should the Pope die," said Napoléon to his brother Joseph, when ambassador at Rome in 1797, "you must exert yourself to the utmost to prevent another being appointed, and *to bring about a Revolution.*"—*Confidential Despatch of* NAPOLÉON *to* JOSEPH, dated Passeriano, 29th September, 1797. "What you have to do," said Talleyrand, in his confidential despatch of 10th October following, "is to take care that the *reign of the Popes shall cease;* and to encourage the disposition of the people for liberty, you must proclaim at Rome a representative Government, and deliver Europe from the Papal supremacy; taking care, at the same time, to secure for us Ancona, with a suitable extent of maritime territory."—*See* HARDENBERG'S *Memoirs*, v 186, 192. These were the instructions of Napoléon and the French Government to an ambassador at the court of a friendly power, for the purpose of revolutionizing that very power; whereas the acts complained of on the part of the English diplomatic agents were all directed against France, with whom their sovereign was in a state of declared hostility.

were more or less an echo of the sentiments of the French Government on the occasion, and clearly indicated the paramount ascendency exercised over their minds by the ruler of its military force (1). Lord Hawkesbury, as the official organ of the British Government, also published a manifesto on the subject, which was followed by an answer from Talleyrand on the part of the French Cabinet; but the interest of these manifestoes was soon obliterated in the whirl of more important events, arising out of the ceaseless advance of French ambition (2).

Warlike note presented by D'Oubril on the part of Russia to Napoléon. July 21, 1804.

This attempt on the part of the French Government to turn aside a portion of the odium which attached to them throughout Europe in consequence of the violation of the territory of Baden and murder of the Duke d'Enghien, was attended with very little success. The Russian Cabinet, now fully wakened to a sense of the imminent danger arising from the evident resolution of the First Consul to extend his power over the whole Continent, and feeling the personal slights put upon the Emperor Alexander in the correspondence of Napoléon, were resolute in demanding satisfaction; and on the 21st July a most important note was presented by M. D'Oubril, which at once announced the basis of a new coalition against France. In this able document it was stated that no Government could behold with indifference the dreadful blow given to the

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1804, 630, 638.

April, 30, 1804. (2) Lord Hawkesbury observed, in the British note, "That his Majesty's Government should disregard the feelings of such of the inhabitants of France as are justly discontented with the existing Government of that country: that he should refuse to listen to their designs for delivering that country from the degrading yoke of bondage under which it groans, or to give them aid and assistance, so far as those designs are fair and justifiable, would be to refuse fulfilling those duties which every wise and just Government owes to itself and to the world in general, under circumstances similar to the present. Belligerent powers have an acknowledged right to avail themselves of all discontents that may exist in countries with which they may be at war. The exercise of that right, even if in any degree doubtful, would be fully sanctioned in the present law, not only by the present state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the Government of that country, which, since the commencement of the present war, has constantly kept up communications with the disaffected in the territories of his Majesty, and has assembled at the present moment on the coast of France a corps of Irish rebels, destined to second them in their designs against that part of the United Kingdom. In the application of these principles, his Majesty has commanded me to declare, besides, that his Government have never authorized a single act which could not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and of usages recognized and practised in all ages. If any Minister, accredited at a foreign Court, has kept up correspondence with persons resident in France, with a view to obtain information as to the designs of the French Government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done nothing more than what Ministers, under similar circumstances, have always been considered as having a right to do, and much less than the ministers and commercial agents of France have towards the disaffected in his Majesty's territories."

Sept. 5, 1804. To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, "In every country, and in every age, the ministry of diplomatic agents has been held in veneration among men; ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an augury of wisdom, justice, and happiness. England, on the contrary, wishes that its diplomatic agents should be the promoters of plots, the agents of troubles, the correspondents of vile spies, and profligate emissaries; it charges them to foment seditions, to provoke and reward assassination, and pretends to cover these infamous proceedings with the respect and inviolability that belongs to the ministers of kings and the pacificators of nations. 'Diplomatic agents,' says Lord Hawkesbury, 'are not permitted to conspire in the country where they reside against the laws of that country, but they are subject to no such restriction, in regard to the states for which they are not accredited.' Admirable restriction! Europe will be covered with conspiracies, but the defenders of public right will have no cause of complaint: some distance will always intervene between the chief conspirator and his accomplices; Lord Hawkesbury's ministers will pay the crimes which they instigate; but they will have sufficient deference to appearances to avoid being at once their instigators and witnesses. Such maxims are the height of hypocrisy and audacity: never did government make so barefaced a sport of the opinion of cabinets, and the conscience of nations. The Emperor is resolved to put a stop to proceedings so fatal to humanity; and you are therefore invited to communicate to your Government, that the French Government will not recognize the English diplomacy in Europe, until the English Cabinet shall cease to charge its ministers with warlike commissions, and restrain them to their proper functions." It is curious to recollect that this tirade, which proceeds entirely upon the false assumption that the British envoys were implicated in plots for assassination, emanated from Napoléon and Talleyrand, who directed Joseph Bonaparte, in 1797, to revolutionize Rome, the very state at which he was the ambassador of the French Republic.—*See State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 602, and Dumas, x. 279-280. A similar attempt was made by the Prince of Peace to charge Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, with having let fall in conversation some expressions favourable to the assassination of Napoléon; but this immediately drew forth a positive and indignant denial from that gentleman, and, from the degraded character of the Spanish favourite, obtained no credit in Europe—*See Ann. Reg.* 1805, 124-125.

independence and security of nations by the recent arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien : that Russia, by the peace of Teschen, engaged to guarantee and mediate the German empire, and in that character was not only entitled, but bound to interfere in that matter : that, desirous to extinguish the flames of war, she had since proposed to act as mediator between France and England, but was not accepted : that since the renewal of the war the French Government had evinced a determination to disregard all the rights of neutral powers, by marching its troops to the coasts of the Adriatic, and levying contribution on, and taking military possession of the Hanse Towns, though these states had no connection whatever with the depending contest : that Portugal and Spain had been compelled to purchase their neutrality by enormous pecuniary sacrifices : that Switzerland, Holland, and great part of Italy were mere French provinces; one part of the German empire was occupied by the French troops, and in another arrests were committed by French detachments, in open violation of the law of nations : that Russia had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France, but neither, could she remain a passive spectator of the successive trampling under foot of all the weaker states of Europe by its armies; nor could she overlook the insult offered to his Imperial Majesty in alluding to the death of his father, and advancing a totally groundless charge, in relation to that matter, against Great Britain, whom France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it. The note concluded by declaring that M. D'Oubril had been ordered to state that he could not prolong his stay in Paris unless the following points were adjusted :—" I. That conformably to the fourth and fifth articles of the secret convention of 11th October, 1801, the French troops should be ordered to evacuate the kingdom of Naples; and having done so, its Government should engage to respect the neutrality of that power during the remainder of the war. II. That, in pursuance of the second article of the same treaty, the French Government should agree in future to act in close concert with his Imperial Majesty for the settlement of the affairs of the Italian peninsula. III. That he should engage, in conformity with the sixth article of the same convention, and the promises so often repeated to Russia, to provide without delay an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. IV. That in virtue of the obligation implied in a common mediation and guarantee, the French Government should engage to evacuate the North of Germany, and undertake to respect strictly in future the neutrality of Germanic confederacy (1)."

Talleyrand's answer.

How just and conformable to the letter as well as the spirit of preceding treaties these demands may have been, it was hardly to be expected that the First Consul would accede to them, or permit France openly to recede before Russia; and it is therefore probable that in making this demand in such peremptory terms the Russian Cabinet had it in view to establish a basis on which, at some future period, they might found the resumption of hostilities. M. Talleyrand answered the note on the 29th of the same month, and declared, " Whenever the Court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity. If the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg is of opinion that it has claims on that of Paris, in consequence of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the secret convention of 1801, France also claims the execution of the third article of the same treaty, which provides that the two contracting parties shall not suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspon-

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1801, 648.

dence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states; a wise provision, which has been totally neglected by the Imperial Ambassador, M. Markoff, the true author of the disunion and coldness between the two powers, and who, during his residence at Paris, has even gone so far as to lend the asylum to which he was entitled to the hired agents of England. Was the mourning assumed by the Russian Court for a man whom the French tribunals had condemned for having conspired against the safety of the First Consul, conformable to the letter or spirit of this article? The French Government demands the execution of the ninth article of the secret convention, in which the two contracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the Republic of the Seven Isles, and that no foreign troops shall remain; a stipulation evidently violated by Russia, since she has continued to retain her troops there; reinforced them in an ostentatious manner; and changed the government of the country without any concert. Finally, France claims the execution of the eleventh article of the same treaty, which evidently requires that, instead of evincing a spirit so unduly partial to England, and rendering itself perhaps the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should unite with France to consolidate a general peace, and re-establish a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, to secure the liberty of the seas (1)."

Farther memorial of Russia.

The same views were more fully unfolded in a subsequent memorial presented by M. D'Oubril to the French Cabinet on August 28th. The Russian minister there loudly complained that the King of Sardinia, stript of all his continental dominions by the union of Piedmont to France, still remains without the indemnity so often promised by France: that the King of Sardinia and the North of Germany are still oppressed by the burdensome presence of the French troops: that the whole of Italy has been changed by the innovation of the French Government, without any concert with his Imperial Majesty; and replied to the charge of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, founded on the ninth article of the secret convention, "That if the Russian troops have a second time occupied the Ionian islands, it is with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, at the request of the inhabitants, and in virtue of a previous concert with France. The Emperor only awaits the intelligence of his Chargé d'Affaires' departure from Paris to intimate to the French mission to quit his capital. He beholds with regret the necessity under which he is laid of suspending his relations with a Government which refuses to perform its engagement; but he will remain in that suspensive position, which it lies on the French Government to convert if it pleases into one of open hostility." This note remained without any answer; and on the day following, M. D'Oubril received his passports, with the intimation, however, that it was expected he would not cross the frontier till he received intelligence that the French Chargé d'Affaires had left the Russian territories, and he remained accordingly at Mayence. War was not yet openly proclaimed between the two empires, but it could hardly be said that peace existed; and its open declaration was evidently postponed only for a convenient opportunity (2). And when the accession of Napoléon to the imperial throne was notified to the Court of St.-Petersburg, the Emperor refused to recognize his new title, even after it had been acceded to by the sovereign whose dignity it appeared more immediately to affect, the Emperor of Austria.

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1804, 649, 650.

(2) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1804, 951, 953. Bign. iii. 452, 454. Dum. xi. 53.

The warlike intentions of Russia during this year were not confined to diplomatic manifestoes. Independent of several lesser squadrons which were cruising in the Baltic, a fleet of nine ships of the line and several frigates passed the Sound, and sailed round by the straits of Gibraltar towards the Adriatic sea; while several expeditions from Sebastopol proceeded through the Dardanelles in the same direction, and disembarked 7000 men in the Ionian islands. The army was every where put on the most efficient footing, vacancies filled up, new levies ordered, and every thing done which could enable Russia to interpose with a weight proportioned to its strength in the great conflict which was approaching in Western Europe (1).

Pacific system of Austria.

While the political horizon was thus overshadowed by clouds in the northern hemisphere, Austria continued faithful to her system of maintaining a strict neutrality, and repairing in silence the breaches in her army and finances which had been produced by the disasters of preceding years. An event occurred, however, in the course of the year, which proved that the spirit of the Imperial Cabinet was far from being extinguished, and that Austria might still be calculated upon to bear a prominent part in any coalition which might be formed for the independence of Europe. The Elector of Bavaria had become entangled in some very unpleasant disputes with the nobles of the equestrian order as they were called; that is, the nobles who held directly of the empire, and were subject to no other jurisdiction, wherever their territories might be locally situated, which had fallen to him on the partition of the indemnities. The Elector, considering them as to all intents and purposes his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg, to settle the point in dispute between them; but they had refused, and applied to the Emperor, who supported their pretensions to independence from his government. Upon this the Elector appealed to the First Consul; but however well inclined he might have been in general to support any sovereign who resisted the jurisdiction and weakened the authority of the Emperor, he had no desire to see Austria added to the number of his enemies in the present threatening aspect of affairs in the North of Europe. The Elector therefore received, to his no small astonishment, a notification that he must not oppose the rights of the Emperor in this particular, Jan. 24, 1804. and also give satisfaction to Austria for the seizure of the Oberhausen, a district situated on the frontiers, near the Inn, the year before, Jan. 28, 1804. and long the subject of contention between the two powers. By a solemn decree of the Aulic Council the nobles of the equestrian order throughout the empire were confirmed in all the privileges which belonged to them before the division of the indemnities, and the execution of this decree by force of arms was committed to the Archduke of Austria, and the Electors of Saxony and Baden; a result which contributed in no small degree to restore the influence of the Emperor throughout Germany, and revive the ancient respect for the majesty of his undefined authority which preceding events had so much impaired (2).

Its conduct on the death of the Duke d'Enghien.

Careful, however, not to hazard the advantage thus gained by any premature or unsupported measure of hostility towards France, the Cabinet of Vienna abstained from expressing any open indignation at the violation of the territory of the empire at Ettenheim, and gave an answer rather favourable than otherwise to the circular transmitted to the diplomatic body at Paris, relative to the affair of Drake and Spencer Smith. Nay, they at once ordered the French emigrants to quit their territories,

(1) Dum. xi. 55.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 190, 191. Bign. iv. 1, 9.

when the First Consul represented that their residence there gave umbrage to the Government of France. Notwithstanding these pacific steps, however, the armaments in the interior went on without intermission; magazines were formed in Styria, Carinthia, at Venice, and in the Tyrol: the army was gradually increasing in strength and reviving in spirit; and an attentive observer could discern, amidst a constant interchange of pacific assurances, appearances not a little indicative of an approaching rupture (1).

Recognizes Napoléon's imperial title.

Matters were in this state between the Cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries, when the elevation of Napoléon to the imperial dignity opened up apparently a fresh subject of discord between the two powers. But, instead of testifying any repugnance at this step, the Austrian Cabinet had the address to make it a ground for adopting a measure which had been long in their contemplation, but for which a favourable opportunity had not yet arrived, viz, the assumption of the title of Emperors of Austria by the House of Lorraine, and rendering it hereditary in their family. After a long correspondence between the two Cabinets, this matter was adjusted to their mutual satisfaction, and on the 11th August, immediately after the Emperor, in a full council, had recognized the title of the Emperor Napoléon, he assumed for himself and his successors in the Austrian dominions the title of "Emperor of Austria." The motive for this step was declared to be, "the preservation of that degree of equality which should subsist between the great powers and the just rank of the House and State of Austria among the nations of Europe." The step was justified on "the precedent formerly afforded by the assumption of the Imperial crown by the Czars of Russia, and more recently by the ruling sovereign of France;" and though it at first excited considerable jealousy among the lesser princes of Germany, yet they soon all recognized the new and hereditary title of the Emperor; and it was erelong acquiesced in by all the potentates of Europe, those under the influence of Napoléon, not less than those who were opposed to him; by the first, because it afforded some countenance to the recent assumption of the Imperial dignity by the French ruler; by the last, because it promised to consolidate in the Austrian dominions some counterpoise to his power (2).

Temporizing policy of Prussia.

Aware that the Cabinet of Vienna would endeavour, on the first favourable opportunity, to regain some of its lost possessions, and that its friendly dispositions could not with certainty be calculated upon for any length of time, Napoléon was urgent in his endeavours, during the whole of this year, to draw closer the cords which united France to Prussia. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien had awakened at Berlin, as elsewhere, the most profound feelings of indignation; and in the consternation with which it overwhelmed the friends of France might be seen, says the panegyrist of Napoléon, the clearest evidence that, "more than even a crime, that act was a fault (3)". But though the Anti-Gallican party was greatly strengthened, it was not placed in possession of power by that event. The policy of the Cabinet still continued to be guided by French influence; and accordingly the King of Prussia was among the first of the greater powers which formally recognized the French Emperor. When the menaces of Russia gave reason to apprehend an immediate rupture in the north, it became of the utmost moment for Napoléon to secure, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of Prussia, in order that a barrier might be opposed to the march of the Mus-

(1) Bign. iv. 12, 13, 19.
(2) State Papers, 695. Ann. Reg. 1804. Bign. iv. 22, 29.
(3) Bign. iv. 32.

covite troops across the north of Germany: and, on condition that the French troops in the electorate of Hanover should not be augmented, and that the burden of the war should not be laid upon the neutral states of that part of the empire, Prussia agreed to maintain a strict neutrality, and not to permit the march of Russian or any other foreign troops across her territories. In return for these concessions, which, though not so extensive as he desired, were yet of great moment to the French Emperor, Napoléon openly proclaimed, both in his diplomatic relations, and in the official columns of the Moniteur, his inclination to augment the strength of Prussia (1), and his intention not to let any pretensions of France upon Hanover stand in the way of the territorial aggrandizement of that power.

Accession of Hardenberg to power produces no external change.

A change which occurred at this period in the Prussian Ministry was looked to by the diplomatists of Europe as likely to lead to a material alteration in its foreign policy; but it was not attended at first with the effects which were anticipated. Count Haugwitz, who for ten years had been the chief director of its diplomatic relations, and whose leaning towards the French alliance had been conspicuous throughout the whole of his administration, retired to his estates in Silesia; and the chief direction of affairs fell upon Baron Hardenberg, a statesman of great ability, who was known to be decidedly hostile to the revolutionary principle, the devastating effects of which he had had ample opportunities of appreciating in the course of his diplomatic career, and whose inclination towards the English and Russian alliance, already warmly espoused by the Queen, was expected to produce important effects on the fate of northern Europe. The new minister, however, proceeded at first in the footsteps of his predecessor; the negotiation for the occupation of Hanover, if not by Prussian, at least by Saxon or Hessian troops, instead of French, was resumed, though without success, as Napoléon shewed an invincible repugnance to quitting his hold of that important part of the German territory; but the jealousy of Prussia was allayed by a renewed promise, that the French troops in that electorate should not exceed thirty thousand men; on condition of which the King engaged that they should not be disquieted from the side of his dominions (2).

They remonstrate against the seizure of Sir Geo. Rumboldt. Oct. 25, 1804.

An event, however, soon occurred, which put the independence of Prussia to the test, and afforded the measure of the extent to which its Cabinet was disposed to sacrifice its pretensions to the rank of an independent power to the ascendency of the French alliance. Sir George Rumboldt, the English Minister at Hamburgh, was seized at his country villa within the territory of that free city, on the night of the 25th October, in virtue of an order for arrest, signed by the French Minister of Police at Paris, and forwarded without delay to that capital, where he was lodged in the Temple, and all his papers submitted to the inspection of the French Government. This violent proceeding was not only a flagrant violation of the law of nations, in the person of the accredited Minister of England, in the circle of Lower Saxony, but a grave fault of policy; as it directly brought the Emperor of France into collision with the King of Prussia, the protector of that circle of the empire, and endangered all the amicable relations which with so much care had been nursed up for ten years between the two powers. It produced a very great sensation at Berlin. The party hostile to the French alliance represented it as a grievous slight upon the honour of Prussia, and such as if unredressed would for ever

(1) Bign. iv. 30, 41. Ann. Reg. 1804, 194, 195. (2) Bign. iv. 41, 43.

blast its influence in the north of Germany; and the opinion became universal, that the ambition of Napoléon knew no bounds, and that he was resolved to treat the independent states of Europe in the same manner as the provinces of his own empire. The conduct, both of the King and the Cabinet at this crisis, was worthy of the successors of the Great Frederick. The Prussian Ambassador at Paris received instructions to make the most energetic remonstrances on the subject to the Cabinet of the Tuileries, and the King wrote in person a confidential letter to the Emperor, expressing how deeply he had been hurt by the event. These representations had the desired effect: nothing was discovered in Sir George's papers tending to implicate either him or the British Government in any thing which could answer the purposes of Napoléon, and after a few days' confinement he was sent to Cherbourg, and delivered over with a flag of truce to the English cruisers, leaving to France the disgrace only of having violated the law of nations and the independence of Germany without any object, and receded before the remonstrances of a comparatively inferior power (1).

Hostile dispositions of Sweden.

The first decided symptom of hostility towards France came from Sweden; a country removed by its situation from the immediate dangers of French invasion, and under the government of a prince of an ardent and chivalrous character, whose animosity to the revolutionary system had been long and powerfully marked. As Duke of Pomerania, that sovereign had a voice in the Diet of the empire at Ratisbon; and his notes presented to that assembly on the subject of the Duke d'Enghien had breathed an uncommon degree of spirit and independence (2). This conduct, which was not more than might have been expected in an intrepid sovereign who was married to a princess of the House of Baden, the potentate immediately insulted on that occasion, drew forth the pointed animadversions of the French Emperor; and in a series of articles inserted in the official part of the Moniteur, the King of Sweden was assailed in a manner which could hardly be tolerated by any independent power (3). In one, in particular, a distinction was drawn between the Swedish nation, with whom the writer professed a desire to remain on a friendly title, and its sovereign, a rash and headstrong young man misled by extravagant ideas. "Your merchant vessels," it added, "shall ever be well received in the ports of France: your squadrons, whenever they stand in need of them, shall be victualled in her harbours. She will see on their mast-heads only the pavillons of the Gustavuses who have reigned before you." When language such as this prevails between sovereigns, the transition is easy to a state of actual hostility. On the 7th September, a note presented by the Swedish Ambassador, addressed *Monsieur* Napoléon Bonaparte, announced the termination of all confidential communication between the two Governments, and at the same time the importation of French journals and pamphlets into Sweden was prohibited. Mr. Pitt was too vigilant an observer not to perceive, in this state of mutual irritation, the foundation of a Convention favourable to the interests of Great Britain; and on the 3d December a treaty was concluded at London between England and Sweden, by which it was stipulated that a depôt should be established at Stralsund in Pomerania, or in the adjoining island of Rugen, for the formation of the legion which it was intended to form of Hanoverian troops, in the pay of Great Britain; and that an entrepôt should be established in that town, for the disposal of British colonial produce and

Sept. 7, 1804.

Which is taken advantage of by Great Britain, Dec. 3, 1804.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, 183, 184. Bign. iv. 43, 46.
(2) State Papers, 697. Ann. Reg. 1804.
(3) Moniteur, Aug. 14, 1804.

manufactures. In return for these concessions, and in order to enable the Swedish Government to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence, a subsidy of L.80,000 was promised by England. If these provisions did not amount to any act of open hostility against France, they at least demonstrated that Sweden was not disposed to enter into the projects of the Emperor Napoléon for the exclusion of British commerce from the Continent of Europe (1); a disposition which amounted in his estimation to a declaration of war against the French empire.

At the time that Sweden was thus giving the first example of a decided resistance to France, the Ottoman empire also adopted a peremptory tone on the same subject. Retaining still a lively recollection of the evils they had sustained in consequence of the unprovoked attack of Napoléon on Egypt, they refused to recognize him as Emperor; and Marshal Brune, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, after six months of vain attempts at negotiation, was compelled to quit that capital, which fell entirely into the views of the Russian party (2).

Extension of French power in Italy, Oct. 20, 1804.

While the northern and eastern powers were thus giving signs of approaching hostility to France, Napoléon was unceasingly extending his grasp over the Italian peninsula. By a treaty with the Ligurian Republic, of October 20, the whole resources of Genoa were placed at the disposal of France, and that magnificent harbour became a great French naval station in the Mediterranean. The Emperor engaged to procure admission on favourable terms for the Ligurian manufactures into the states of Piedmont and Parma, and to cause its pavillon to be respected by the Barbary powers; in return for which he obtained six thousand sailors, and the free use of the arsenals, fleets, and harbours of the Republic. Napoléon immediately took measures for the construction of ten ships of the line at Genoa. "This," says the French historian, "was in effect an appropriation of Genoa to France; the Act of Incorporation which soon after followed of this Republic with the French empire was but a public proclamation of what then took place (3).

Internal measures of Napoléon.

While negotiations of such moment were taking place in the diplomatic body throughout Europe, and every thing conspired to indicate an approaching rupture of the most terrible kind, Napoléon was actively engaged in measures calculated to rouse the spirit and heighten the enthusiasm of his own subjects. On the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, the inauguration of the Legion of Honour took place with all imaginable pomp in the splendid church of the Invalides at Paris, built by Louis XIV; and on the same day the crosses of honour of that body were distributed by the generals in all the camps and garrisons of the empire. The profound policy of Napoléon was here singularly conspicuous, in selecting the anniversary of the first victory of the Revolution for the establishment of an institution calculated to revive the distinctions which it was its chief object to abolish, and blending in the public mind the recollection of Republican triumph with the edifice and the associations which were most likely to recall the splendour of the monarchy.

July 14, 1804.

July 15.

At the same time that this apparent homage to Republican principles was paid at Paris, a measure of all others the most destructive to real freedom was carried into effect in the restoration of the Ministry of Police, with the crafty Fouché again at its head.

(1) Bign. iv. 57, 59. Ann. Reg. 1804, 195.
(2) Dum. xi. 56, 57.
(3) Bign. iv. 117, 119.

Shortly after the conclusion of this important ceremony in the capital, the Emperor repaired to the head-quarters of the grand army at Boulogne, and there, on the 16th August, the anniversary of the fête of his tutelar saint, a spectacle of the grandest and most imposing kind took place. Marshal Soult
April 16, 1804. received orders to assemble the whole troops in the camps at Boulogne and Montreuil, nearly 80,000 strong, on the slopes of a vast natural amphitheatre, situated on the western face of the hill on which the Tower of Cæsar is placed, lying immediately to the eastward of the harbour of the former of these towns. In the centre of this amphitheatre a throne was placed, elevated on a platform of turf, at the summit of a flight of steps. The immense body of soldiers were arranged in the form of the rays of a circle, emanating from the throne: the cavalry and artillery, stationed on the outer extremity, formed the exterior band of that magnificent array; beyond them, a countless multitude of spectators covered the slope to the very summit of the hill. The bands of all the regiments of the army, placed on the right and left of the throne, were ready to rend the air with the sounds of military music. At noon precisely, the Emperor ascended the throne amidst a general salute from all the batteries, and a flourish of trumpets unheard since the days of the Romans: immediately before him was the buckler of François I while the crosses and ribbons which were to be distributed were contained in the helmet of the Chevalier Bayard. His brothers, ministers, and chief functionaries, the marshals of the empire, counsellors of state and senators, the staff of the army, its whole generals and field officers, composed the splendid suite by which he was surrounded. Amidst their dazzling uniforms the standards of the regiments were to be seen; some new and waving with yet unsullied colours in the sun: many more torn by shot, stained with blood, and black with smoke; the objects of almost superstitious reverence to the warlike multitude by which they were surrounded. The Emperor took the oath first himself, and no sooner had the members of the Legion of Honour rejoined "We swear it," than raising his voice aloud, he said, "and you, soldiers, swear to defend, at the hazard of your life, the honour of the French name, your country, and your Emperor." Innumerable voices responded to the appeal, and immediately the distribution of the decorations commenced, and the ceremony was concluded by a general review of the vast army, who all defiled in the finest order before the throne, where they had just witnessed so imposing a spectacle (1).

Splendid fête at Boulogne.

His vexation at the defeat of his flotilla in the midst of it.

The chief of such a host might be excused for deeming himself the sovereign of the earth; but an event was approaching, destined to teach the French Emperor, like his great predecessor Canute the Dane, that there were bounds to his power, and that his commands were limited to the element on which his army stood. It was part of the pageant that a naval display should take place at the same time, and the eyes of Napoléon and his Minister of Marine, M. Decrès, were anxiously turned, towards the close of the ceremony, to the headlands round which it was expected the vanguard of the flotilla would appear. In effect, they did make their appearance at four o'clock; but at the same moment a violent tempest arose, the wind blew with terrific violence, and several of the vessels, in the hands of their inexperienced mariners, were stranded on the beach. This untoward accident, though, practically speaking, of little importance, was yet in the highest degree mortifying to Napoléon, arriving as it did on such an occasion, in presence not only of his own troops, but the English cruisers, and cha-

(1) Dum. xi. 40, 42. D'Abr. vii. 176, 178. Norv. ii. 336, 338.

racteristic as it was of the impassable limits which the laws of nature had placed to his power. He retired chagrined and out of humour for the rest of the day; all the magnificence of his military display could not console him for the rude manner in which he had been reminded, at the highest point of its splendour, of his weakness on the other element, which required to be subdued before his dreams of universal dominion could be realized (1).

General rejoicings over France.

The fête of Napoléon was celebrated in the other harbours of France by the completion of works of more durable utility, but every where with the same enthusiastic feeling. At Cherbourg it was signalized by discharges of artillery from the battery placed on the great sea dyke intended to break the fury of the waves which roll into that harbour,—a work begun by the unfortunate Louis XVI and now completed by his illustrious successor. At Antwerp the rejoicings were equally sincere: several smaller vessels were launched on the occasion; and already its basins in a great state of forwardness, three ships of the line and a frigate almost completed, and immense preparations in the arsenals and dockyards, attested the impulse which the genius of the Emperor, in a single year, had given to the naval resources of France. Two days after the fête the English cruisers stood into the harbour of Boulogne, and a heavy cannonade took place between them and the front line of the French flotilla. Napoléon, on board a gunboat with Admiral Brueys, was a spectator of the combat, and after an exchange of long shots for two hours, the English ships stood off, not having succeeded in inflicting any serious damage on the enemy, a circumstance which afforded the French, little accustomed to indecisive combats at sea, an opportunity for boundless exultation, and the happiest augury of success in the great maritime contest which was approaching (2).

Aug. 18, 1804.

Disgraceful adulation with which he was surrounded.

From Boulogne the Emperor traversed the coast of the Channel as far as Ostend, every where reviewing the troops, inspecting the harbours, stimulating the preparations, and communicating to all classes the energy of his own ardent and indefatigable mind. From thence he proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring by all means to revive the recollection of the empire of Charlemagne, an era of which, with Eastern servility, he was incessantly reminded in the adulatory addresses which flowed in from the mayors and constituted authorities in all the districts through which he passed. "God," said the prefect of Arras, "created Bonaparte, and rested from his labours,"—an excess of flattery which shortly drew forth

(1) D'Abr. vii. 185, 187. Norv. ii. 338.

(2) Dum. xi. 44, 47. Bign. iv. 124, 125.

No man knew better than Napoléon how to win the affections and excite the gratitude of his soldiers; and it was to his wonderful powers in this respect, almost as much as to his political and military capacity, that his long-continued success was owing. To increase this effect, and add to the naturally retentive powers of his memory in this respect, he inquired privately from the officers who were the veterans of Egypt or Italy in their regiments; and when he passed them in review, stopped the men designed to him, and said, "Ah! you are a veteran:—How is your old father?—I have seen you at Aboukir or the Pyramids:—You have not a cross; here is one for you,"—and threw the cordon round the astonished soldier's neck. It may easily be conceived what must have been the effect of such a demeanour, impressing as it did the soldiers with the belief that they were all known to the Emperor if they had distinguished themselves, and that any one might look, under such auspices, to becoming a marshal of the empire.

It was not only in his own soldiers, however, that this great man appreciated heroic or generous conduct. No one set a higher value upon it in his enemies. When at Boulogne, two English sailors were brought before him who had escaped from the depôt at Verdun, and attempted to cross the Channel in a frail bark a few feet long, just capable of floating them, which they had constructed of wood which they found on the sea beach. The daring nature of the attempt attracted the admiration of the Emperor who said to them, "Is it really true that you have endeavoured to cross the sea in that bark?"—"Ah! Sire!" they replied, "if you doubt it, give us leave, and you will see us set out instantly." "I indeed wish it," replied he: "you are bold enterprising men, but I will not let you expose your life. You are free. Farther, I will cause you to be conducted on board an English ship: you shall return to London, and tell the English what esteem I have for the brave, even among my enemies." He dismissed them with several pieces of gold each. This incident took such a hold of his imagination, that he recounted it to his companions in exile at St. Helena.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 201, 202.

from the faubourg St.-Germain the witty addition, that he had better have reposed a little sooner (1); and is valuable as a historical record, demonstrating how rapidly revolutionary violence leads to Eastern despotism, for in no part of France was democratic cruelty more vehement ten years before than in that very town of Arras, the scene of the unparalleled atrocities of Le Bon, and the place where the guillotine had become so familiar an object, that it was employed by the little children to decapitate cats, birds, and mice, which had fallen into their hands (2).

Vast designs of the Emperor at Mayence for the Confederation of the Rhine.

More important changes were destined to result from the next station at which the Emperor rested, Mayence, where he received at the same time the congratulatory addresses of all the eastern provinces of France and of all the lesser German potentates on the right bank of the Rhine, whom he was already preparing to mould into the frontier bulwark of his power. It was here that he first brought to maturity the design which he had already formed of a CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, under the protection of France, and which would practically amount to an extension of its power into the heart of Germany (3). Napoléon remained during the autumnal months at this great frontier fortress; and while to the public eye he seemed engaged only in matters of parade and magnificence, receiving the congratulations of the adjoining states on his accession to the Imperial throne, he was in reality incessantly occupied with those vast designs which in the succeeding year led to such memorable results both at land and sea. It was there that he first conceived the plan of that great combination to elude the British fleets, and concentrate an overwhelming force in the Channel, which so nearly proved successful in the following year, and placed the English monarchy in greater jeopardy than it had stood since the battle of Hastings (4); and it was there too that he matured the details of that astonishing march of his land forces from the shores of the Channel to the heart of Germany, which was so soon destined to lead to the triumphs of Ulm and Austerlitz. Nor were objects of internal utility and pacific improvement neglected during these warlike designs. Numerous decrees for the encouragement of industry, as well as the encouragement of science and the protection of the frontier, are dated from the places visited during this journey.

Sept. 11.

One from the camp at Boulogne established nine prizes of 10,000 francs, (L.400,) and thirteen of 5,000 each, for useful inventions in agriculture and manufactures, proceeding on the noble desire expressed in the preamble, that "not only should France maintain the superiority she had acquired in science and the arts, but that the age which was commencing should advance beyond that which was drawing to a close:" one from

Sept. 21.

Mayence, on 21st September, organised the institution of twelve colleges in the principal towns of the empire for the study of law: one from

Aug. 25.

Dunkirk gave a new and more effective organization to the body of

July 16.

engineers for roads and bridges through the state: while another put upon a new and much improved footing the important establishment of the Polytechnic School (5).

His coronation at Paris.

Immediately after his return to Paris, Napoléon commenced preparations for the important solemnity of the coronation. Although the spirit of the age was still essentially irreligious, and the forcing through

(1) Norv. ii. 347. Bour. vi. 194, 195, 205.

(2) See vol. ii. 169, and D'Abr. vii. 213, 214. Bour. vi. 221, 222.

(3) Marquis Lucchessini's Confed. Rhenana, i. 74. Bign. iv. 127, 128. Norv. ii. 344.

(4) Letter of Sept. 29, 1804. Dum. xi. 205. Pièces Just.

(5) Bign. iv. 130, 139. Norv. ii. 340, 341.

the concordat with the Pope had exposed his Government to a ruder shock than the abrogation of all the political privileges acquired by the people during the Revolution (1), still Napoléon was well aware that, with a large proportion at least of the rural population, the consecration of his authority by the ceremony of coronation was an essential particular, and that to all, of whatever latitude of opinion, it was of great political importance to prove that his influence was so unbounded as to compel the Head of the Church himself to officiate on the occasion. The Papal benediction appeared to be the link which would unite the Revolutionary to the Legitimate régime, and cause the faithful to forget, in the sacred authority with which he was now invested, the violence and bloodshed which had paved his way to the throne (2). Napoléon, for these reasons, had long resolved, not only that he should be crowned according to the forms of the French monarchy, but that the ceremony should be performed by the Head of Christendom; and for this purpose a negotiation had for some months been in dependence with the Holy See. There was no precedent, indeed, of such an honour being conferred on any crowned head excepting the Emperors of Germany, the successors of the Cæsars, since the days when Stephen III consecrated the usurpation of Pepin, and poured the holy oil on the head of the founder of a new dynasty, and his son Charlemagne; but this only rendered him the more desirous to secure for himself an honour of which there had been no example for ten centuries; and his achievements certainly would not suffer by a comparison with those of the illustrious founders of the Carlovingian dynasty. Early in June, accordingly, a negotiation had been opened with the Vatican for the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope in person; and although considerable difficulties were at first started by the Cardinals, in order to enhance the merit of compliance, and if possible obtain some concessions to the Church, from so great an act of condescension on the part of its Head, yet such was the ascendency of French influence and the terror of Napoléon's arms, that at length the consent of the Consistory was obtained; and in reply to a letter of Sept. 15, 1804. Napoléon, dated from Mayence on 15th September, the Pope agreed to officiate at the consecration, and announced the speedy commencement of his journey to France. On the day following a concordat was concluded for the Italian Republic, on terms precisely similar to those already agreed on with the French Government (3).

Ceremony at Notre-Dame.

The ceremony was fixed for the 2d December, in the cathedral church of Notre-Dame at Paris. The Pope arrived on the 25th November at Fontainebleau, where the Emperor went to congratulate him on his approach. They met at a cross in the forest on the road to Lyon, about a mile to the southward of the palace, which is still shewn to travellers. Napoléon was on horseback, but they both alighted at the same time, and immediately remounted the Pope's carriage—the Emperor entering first,

(1) "At that period (in 1804) there prevailed," says the French historian, "in the Republic a complete indifference on religious subjects; and the apathy of the nation in that respect was such that it would not leave to any legislator the power of choosing for it any species of Christian worship. This state of things is well worthy of consideration; and it existed in the great majority of the nation to such a degree, that the organization of the Catholic worship by the concordat appeared to the people a more daring innovation than the overthrow of the national representation on the 19th Brumaire. Religion had no hold at that period of the affections, I had almost said none of the necessities, of the people: the spirit of the age since the days of Louis XV had been entirely philosophical."—NORVINS, ii. 326—7.

(2) "I will allow the generals of the Republic," said Napoléon, "to exclaim as long as they please against the mass: I know what I am about; I am working for posterity." Though indifferent as to religion himself, he saw clearly that in the end it rules the great body of mankind, and that the irreligious fanaticism of the age was probably destined to be as short-lived as its democratic fervour.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 223.

(3) Bign. iv. 103, 113. Bot. iv. 136, 142. Dum. xi. 75.

and placing His Holiness on his right hand. They drove together to Fontainebleau, from whence Pius VII proceeded alone to Paris (1). He was every where received with extraordinary demonstrations of respect, and lodged at the Tuileries, in magnificent rooms, in the Pavilion of Flora, where, by a delicate attention, he found his sleeping apartment furnished exactly like that which he had recently left on the Monte Cavallo. His arrival at Paris created an extraordinary sensation; among the small remnant of the faithful, of joy at beholding the head of the church within a city so recently defiled by the orgies of infidelity; among the more numerous body of the irreligious or indifferent, of curiosity and astonishment at the extraordinary changes which had so rapidly converted the cathedral where, ten years before, the Goddess of Reason was enthroned amidst crowds of revolutionary admirers, into the scene where the august ceremony of coronation was to be performed by the head of the church on the founder of a new race of sovereigns. How sceptical or indifferent soever the great bulk of the people may have been, they were universally impressed with feelings of respect for the venerable pontiff who displayed, in the trying circumstances in which he was placed, so large a portion of Christian charity and forbearance; and on some occasions on which the brutality of democratic prejudice strove to expose him to insult, his demeanour was so mild and benevolent as to excite the unanimous admiration of all who witnessed it (2).

Result of the appeal to the people on the subject.

On the day before the coronation, the Senate and Tribunate presented, with great pomp, the result of the appeal made to the French people on the subject of the hereditary succession of his family. Sixty thousand registers had been opened. Out of 3,574,898 votes, only 2569 were in the negative. Such was the result, after sixteen year's experience, of the democratic fervour of 1789! In reply to a laboured harangue from François of Neufchateau, the orator of the Legislature on this occasion, Napoléon said, "I ascend the throne where I have been placed by the unanimous voice of the people, the senate, and the army, with a heart penetrated with the splendid destinies of a people whom, in the midst of camps, I first saluted with the title of the Great. From my youth upwards my thoughts have been entirely occupied with their glory; and I now feel no pleasure nor pain but in the happiness or misfortune of my people. *My descendants will long sit on this throne.* In the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives for the defence of their country. As its first magistrates, they will never forget that contempt for the laws and the overthrow of the social edifice are never occasioned but by the weakness and vacillation of princes. You, senators, whose counsels and aid have never been awanting in the most difficult circumstances, will transmit your spirit to your successors. Remain ever as you now are, the firmest bulwarks and the chief counsellors of the throne, so necessary to the happiness of this vast empire (3)."

(1) It is a remarkable coincidence, that Fontainebleau, where Napoléon, in the pride of apparently boundless power, met the Pope coming to his coronation, was also the witness, ten years after, of his abdication and fall. But the life of the Emperor is full of such extraordinary and apparently mysterious combinations. Immediately after his accession to the Consulship, he was intent on a negotiation to obtain for France the island of Elba, the scene of his first exile; and not a month before his coronation, he dictated orders to Villeneuve for the conquest of St.-Helena, the destined theatre of his sufferings and death.—See Bourrienne, vi. 233.

(2) Bour. vi. 225, 227. Bign. iv. 141, 143. D'Abr. vii. 216.

When visiting the Imperial printing office, one of the workmen was ill bred enough to keep on his hat in the presence of His Holiness. A murmur of disapprobation arose among the crowd, which the Pope observing, stept forward and said, with the most benevolent aspect, "Uncover yourself, young man, that I may give you my benediction; no one was ever the worse of the blessing of an old man." The spectators were profoundly affected by this incident.—Bourrienne, vi. 227.

(3) Bour. vi. 233.

Dec. 2, 1804. The ceremony of coronation took place on the day following, with the utmost possible magnificence in the Cathedral of Notre-Dame. The day was intensely cold, but clear and bright, the procession long and gorgeous, and the whole luxury and magnificence of the empire displayed under its venerable walls. Carriages glittering with gold and purple trappings; horses proudly caparisoned; liveries, resplendent with colour, dazzled the multitude in the streets through which the cortège passed, as much as a sea of ostrich feathers; rich embroidered court dresses; and a procession of stars, ribbons, and uniforms, added to the imposing aspect of the scene within the cathedral. The bewildered Republicans who witnessed the ceremony, beheld with pain the pages in attendance on the Empress's carriage, and the swords used as part of full dress, as under the ancient régime. The multitude, though dazzled by the spectacle, was far from testifying the enthusiasm which was evinced in the fêtes of the Revolution. After taking the oath prescribed by the Senatus Consultum of 18th May 1804 (1), and receiving the Papal benediction, the Emperor, with his own hands, took the crown and placed it on his head; after which he himself, with perfect grace, crowned the Empress, who knelt before him. The general aspect of this interesting moment may be still seen in the admirable picture of David, whose good fortune it has been to be the means of transmitting to posterity so many of the memorable scenes of this heart-stirring epoch (2).

Distribution of eagles to the army.

On the day following, a military spectacle of a still more animating kind took place in the Champ-de-Mars. Napoléon had there laid aside his imperial robes. He appeared in the uniform of a colonel of the guard, to distribute to the colonels of all the regiments in Paris, and deputations from all those absent, the EAGLES which were thenceforward to form the standards of the army. In the midst of the plain, in front of the École Militaire, a throne was placed, on which the Emperor and Empress were seated. The spot selected was nearly the same with that where, fifteen years before, the unfortunate Louis XVI had sat beside the President of the National Assembly. At a signal given, the troops closed their ranks, and grouped in dense masses round the throne; then the Emperor, rising from his seat, said in a loud voice, "Soldiers! there are your standards. These eagles will serve as your rallying point. They will ever be seen where your Emperor shall deem them necessary for the defence of his throne and of his people (3)."

(1) The oath was in these words: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect, and cause to be respected, the laws of the Concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect, and cause to be respected, equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the sale of the national domains; to impose no tax but by legal authority; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour; and to govern, with no other views but to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."—BIGNON, iv. 144.

(2) D'Abr. vii. 249, 259. Bour. vi. 235, 236. Bign. iv. 145, 146.

The Duchess of Abrantes, who, as wife of the governor of Paris, was very near the Emperor on this occasion, mentions, that immediately after crowning the Empress he cast a look of almost intolerable intelligence on her. He thought doubtless of her mother, Madame Permon, and the Rue des Filles de St.-Thomas, where she had refused his hand ten years before, in the humbler state of his fortunes. What must have been the Duchess's feelings on the fate which might have been her mother's at that moment?—D'ABRANTES, vii. 261, 263.

When Napoléon was paying his court to Joséphine shortly before their marriage, neither of them having a carriage, they walked together to the notary Raguideau, to whom the latter communicated her design of marrying the young General. "You are a great fool," replied the cautious formalist; "and you will live to repent it. You are about to marry a man who has nothing but his cloak and his sword." Napoléon, who was waiting in the antechamber unknown to Joséphine, overheard these words, but never mentioned them to her till the morning of the coronation, when he sent for Raguideau. The astonished old man was brought into the presence of the Emperor, who immediately said to him, with a good humoured smile, "What say you now, Raguideau; have I nothing but my cloak and my sword?"—BOURRIENNE, vi. 237, 238.

(3) Dum. xi. 77, 78. Bour. vi. 238, 239.

Protest of Louis XVIII against his assumption of the imperial crown.

While Napoléon was thus conferring upon his newly acquired power the sanction of Papal benediction, Louis XVIII from the shores of the Baltic, protested in the face of God and man, against this fresh invasion of his claims, in terms worthy of the illustrious house whose fortunes he bore. "On the shores of the Baltic, in the sight and under the protection of Heaven, strengthened by the presence of my brother, of the Duke d'Angoulême, and the concurrence of the other Princes of the Blood; calling to witness the royal victims, and those whom honour, fidelity, patriotism, and duty, have subjected to the Revolutionary axe, or the thirst and jealousy of tyrants; invoking the manes of the young hero whom impious hands have torn from his country and future glory; offering to our people, as a pledge of reconciliation, the virtues of the angel whom Providence has snatched from fetters and death to offer an example of every Christian virtue, we swear, that never will we abandon the heritage of our fathers, or break the sacred bond which unites our destinies to yours; and we invoke, as witness to our oath, the God of St.-Louis, the judge of the rulers of men (1)." Who could have foreseen, at the date of this coronation and this protest, that the bones of Louis XVIII would repose in the royal vaults of St.-Denis, while those of Napoléon were to rest under a solitary willow on the rock of St.-Helena.

Dec. 2, 1804.

Splendour of the imperial court.

The coronation of the Emperor was followed by a series of rejoicings, assemblies, and fêtes, which lasted for upwards of two months. The vast expenditure, both of the Court and the numerous civil and military functionaries of Government; the great concourse of strangers, and unwonted splendour of the dresses and decorations, caused an unusual degree of activity among the shopkeepers and manufacturers of Paris, and contributed not a little to reconcile that important and democratic body to the Imperial régime which had now succeeded the terrors of the Revolution. Without possessing the whole elegance or finished manners of the old régime, the Imperial Court was remarkable for the lustre and beauty of its assemblies, over which the grace and affability of Joséphine threw their principal charm. But not one moment did Napoléon withdraw from state affairs for such amusements. Through the midst of the whole, he laboured eight or ten hours a-day with his Ministers, and was already deeply engaged in those great designs which led to such decisive results in the succeeding years (2).

Napoléon refuses any accession of territory to the Holy See.

The Pope had been led to expect, in return for his condescension in travelling to Paris to crown the Emperor, some important benefits for the Holy See, and the Cabinet of the Vatican looked forward to the restoration of the three legations annexed to the Italian Republic by the treaty of Tolentino. But however much Napoléon might appreciate the importance of obtaining the Papal benediction to his throne, he was not a man to relinquish any of the substantial advantages of power and territory on that account, and he was little disposed to imitate the magnificent liberality of his predecessor Charlemagne to the Catholic Church. He accordingly replied to the petition of the Pope for the three legations—"France has dearly purchased the power which it enjoys. We cannot sever any thing from an empire which has been the fruit of ten years of bloody combats. Still less can we diminish the territory of a neighbouring potentate, which, in confiding to us the powers of government, had imposed upon us the duty of protection, and never conferred upon us the power of alienating any part of its territory (3)."

(1) Bign. iv. 150.
(2) Bign. iv. 153. D'Abr, vii. 240, 260.
(3) De Pradt, Quatre Concordats, 173. Bign. iv. 113, 114.

The close of the year was marked by a melancholy event, on which the British historian must dwell with pain, and which led to lighting up the flames of war between England and Spain.

Origin of the differences between England and Spain.

The treaty of St.-Ildefonso in 1796 has been already mentioned, by which Spain became bound to furnish France with an auxiliary force (1); and also the subsequent convention of 19th October, 1805, by which this auxiliary force was commuted into a subsidy to the amount of L.2,880,000 yearly by the Spanish to the French Government (2). The hostile character of this treaty, and great amount of this subsidy, had long been a matter of jealousy to the British Government, furnishing, as it evidently did, the sinews of war to France; and being, as it was, as directly applied to the fitting out of the armaments destined for the invasion of England, as if the gun-boats, instead of being constructed with this treasure at Boulogne, had been fitted out at Cadiz or Corunna. As it was known, however, that the Spanish Cabinet, in yielding to this tribute, was in truth constrained by necessity, the English Government, from whom its amount was studiously concealed, was not at first disposed to make it the subject of complaint; and it was intimated, soon after the convention was agreed to, that England would not consider a small and temporary advance of money as any ground for the commencement of hostilities. In the close of the year, however, when rumours as to the magnitude of the payment had got abroad, the
Dec. 13, 1803. English Ambassador stated, in a formal note to the Spanish Government, that if it amounted to any thing like such a sum as three millions, Great Britain would consider it as a war-subsidy, and as in itself equivalent to a hostile aggression against herself (3). In reply, the Spanish Cabinet insisted that the amount of the subsidy was perfectly consistent with the neutrality which their Court professed towards England, and not greater than would have been required to fit out the war contingent provided for in the former treaty. Thus the matter rested for six weeks, when the English
Feb. 18, 1804. Ambassador presented a fresh and energetic remonstrance, upon the ground of the evident partiality and preference shewn to French vessels over British, especially in the sale of prizes, and complaining of hostile preparations and armaments in the Spanish harbours (4). The Spanish Govern-

(1) This force was mutually stipulated at fifteen ships of the line and 24,000 men; and this aid is to be furnished on the simple demand of the requiring party, without any inquiry into the policy or justice of the hostilities in which they are to be engaged; and by Art. ii. of the same treaty, the contracting parties are to assist each other with their whole forces, in case the stipulated succours should not be sufficient.

(2) Ante, iii. 92, and v. 73.

(3) Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, stated in this note: "With respect to the subsidy, his Majesty is perfectly sensible of the difficulties of the situation in which Spain is placed, as well by reason of her ancient ties with France, as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power and of its chief. These considerations have induced him to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and have inclined him to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention from their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined to me to declare to your excellency, that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the recent convention with France, cannot be considered by the British Government but as a war subsidy; a succour the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of the British subjects, and the most dangerous to the British dominions; in fine, more than equivalent for every other species of aggression. Imperious necessity compels him now to declare these sentiments, and to add that the passage of French troops through the territories of Spain would be considered as a violation of her neutrality, and that his Majesty would feel himself compelled to take the most decisive measures in consequence of that event." The Spanish Minister replied: "Although the Spanish Cabinet is penetrated with the truth, that the idea of aiding France is compatible with that of neutrality towards Great Britain, yet he has thought that he could better combine these two objects by a method which, without being disagreeable to France, strips her neutrality towards Great Britain of that hostile exterior which military succours necessarily present."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 74, 91.

(4) On the 18th February, 1804, Mr. Frere stated, in his note to the Spanish Minister at Madrid: "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance on the part of England depends entirely on the cessation of every naval armament within the ports of this kingdom, and that I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected. It is also indispensable that the sale of prizes

ment, in reply, strongly professed their desire to give perfect satisfaction to the English Cabinet on every subject excepting the subsidy, as to which they would not draw back from existing engagements; upon which the British Ambassador stated, that his Government wished for an indefinite suspension of hostilities on the ground of the subsidy, provided no other causes of complaint weregiven, but that if such took place, they would forthwith commence war without any farther declaration of an intention to do so (1).

Secret measures of hostility by the latter power, Sept. 29, 1804.

Matters were in this state of jealous watching and suspended hostility, when, in the end September, intelligence was received by the British Government that several small detachments of French troops, amounting in all to 1500 men, had proceeded from Bayonne to Ferrol, where a French naval force of four ships of the line was already lying, and that the Spanish Government had transmitted orders for the arming, without loss of time, three ships of the line, two frigates, and several smaller vessels at that port; that similar instructions had been sent to Carthagena and Cadiz; that three first-rate line of battle ships had been directed to proceed from Cadiz to Ferrol, and that orders had been given to the packets to arm as in time of war (2). This was accompanied by the alarming addition that within a month eleven ships of the line would in this way be ready for sea at the latter harbour; that numbers of soldiers were daily arriving there from France; that the ships, though said to be bound for America, were victualled for three months only; that they merely waited the arrival of the treasure on board the frigates from America to throw off the mask; and that there did not appear a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain (3). In consequence of this intelligence, which was transmitted at the same time to Mr. Frere at Madrid, warm remonstrances were presented to the Spanish Government; and it was intimated by the British Ambassador, "that the total cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain having been the principal condition required by England, and agreed to by Spain, as the price of the forbearance of Great Britain, the present violation of this condition can be considered in no other light but as a hostile aggression on the part of Spain, and a defiance given to England. These preparations become still more menacing from a squadron of the enemy being in the port where they are carrying on. In no case can England be indifferent to the armament which is preparing, and I entreat you to consider the disastrous consequences which will ensue, if the misery which presses so heavily on this country be completed by plunging it unnecessarily into a ruinous war." To this note the Prince of Peace replied, on the part of the Spanish Government, "The King of Spain has never thought of being wanting to the agreement entered into with the British Government. The cessation of all naval armaments against Great Britain shall be observed as heretofore; and whatever information to the contrary may have been received, is wholly unfounded, and derogatory to the honour of the Spanish nation (4)."

Sept. 27, 1804. Mr. Frere's note.

Oct. 3, 1804.

D. P. Cevallo's answer.

Catastrophe which precipitated hostilities.

Every thing indicated that hostilities could not be averted many weeks, when they were unhappily precipitated by the measures of the British Cabinet. No sooner was Admiral Cochrane's despatch, announcing the serious naval preparations at Cadiz, Carthagena, and Ferrol,

brought into the ports of this kingdom should cease, otherwise I am to consider all negotiations as at an end, and I am to think only of returning to my superiors."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 89, 91.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1805, 124, 125. Parl. Deb. iii. 62, 92.

(2) Lord Cochrane's Despatch, Sept. 3, 1804. Parl. iii. 95, and 242.

(3) Admiral Cochrane's Despatches, Sept. 5 and 11, 1804. Parl. Deb. iii. 242, 243, and Sir R. Calder's Despatch, Ibid. 213.

(4) Parl. Deb. iii. 95, 98.

received by the English Government, than they transmitted orders to that officer to prevent the sailing of either the French or Spanish fleets from the harbour of Ferrol, and to intimate this intention to the French and Spanish admirals; and at the same time they sent instructions to Lord Nelson on the Mediterranean, Admiral Cochrane on the Ferrol, and Lord Cornwallis on the Brest station, to despatch two frigates each to cruize off Cadiz, in order to intercept the homeward-bound treasure frigates of Spain; and at the same time they directed these admirals to stop any Spanish vessels laden with naval or military stores, and keep them till the pleasure of the British Government was known, but without committing any farther act of hostility either on such vessels or the treasure frigates (1). These orders were too punctually executed. On the 5th October, a squadron of four British frigates off Cadiz, under the command of Captain Moore in the Indefatigable, fell in with the four Spanish frigates having the treasure on board, and the British officer immediately informed the Spanish commander that he had orders to detain his vessels, and earnestly entreated that this might be done without effusion of blood. The Spaniard, of course, declined to submit in this way to an equal force, and the consequence was, that an engagement took place, and in less than ten minutes one of the Spanish ships blew up with a terrific explosion. The three others were captured, with the valuable treasure, amounting to above L.2,000,000 sterling, on board; but England had to lament a loss on the part of Spain of 100 killed and wounded, besides 240 lost in the frigate which exploded, before any formal announcement of hostilities (2).

Which at once brings on a war.

It is needless to proceed farther with the details of this painful negotiation. The capture of the frigates produced the result which might have been anticipated, in an immediate declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain on the 12th December. Various attempts at explanation and apology were made by the English Government, but Spain was too completely in the arms of France to expect she should forego such an opportunity of joining in the war; nor, indeed, after such an act of violence, could it be expected that any independent state would abstain from hostilities (3).

(1) Orders, Sept. 18, 19, and 25, 1804. Parl. Deb. iii. 118, 121.

(2) Captain Moore's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1804, 557, and 141.

(3) Parl. Deb. iii. 99, 115.

Spanish manifesto.

The Spanish manifesto on this occasion stated: "It was very difficult for Spain and Holland, who had treated jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations are reciprocally connected, to avoid finally taking part in the grievances and offences offered to their ally. In these circumstances his Majesty, proceeding on the principle of a wise policy, preferred pecuniary subsidies to the contingent of troops and ships with which he was bound to assist France by the treaty of alliance in 1796; and expressed, by his Minister at the Court of London, his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. But the English Government, animated with a spirit of hostility against Spain, not only listened to the reclamations of individuals addressed to it, but exacted as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain as neutral the cessation of every armament in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes brought into them. Though these conditions were urged in the most haughty manner, they were complied with, and religiously observed by the Spanish nation; when the English Government manifested its secret and perverse aims by the abominable capture of four Spanish frigates, navigating in a state of profound peace, at the very moment when the English vessels were enjoying the full rights of hospitality in the harbours of Spain. Barbarous orders at the same time were given to detain and carry into its harbours as many Spanish ships as its fleets could meet with, to burn or destroy every Spanish ship below an hundred tons, and carry every one of larger dimensions into Malta."—*State Papers*, 700, 701. *Ann. Reg* 1804.

Reply by England.

To this it was replied in the British declaration of war: "The stipulations of military and naval succours to a great extent by the treaty of 1796, followed by an obligation to put at the disposal of France, if required, the whole resources of the Spanish Monarchy, gave to Great Britain an incontestable right to declare, that unless she decidedly renounced that treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform its conditions, she could not be considered as a neutral power: that the monthly sum which Spain was bound to pay by the present convention far exceeded the bounds of forbearance, as it might prove a greater injury than any other hostility: that in consequence it had been intimated to the Spanish Government, that England's abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that if either any French troops entered Spain, or authentic accounts were received of any naval armaments preparing in the harbours of Spain for the assistance of France, the British am-

Arguments against the conduct of Government in Parliament.

This unhappy catastrophe produced a great and painful division of opinion among the people of Great Britain. While the Ministerial party lamented the necessity under which Government lay of adopting the steps which had led to so deplorable an effusion of human blood, they yet vindicated the measure as justifiable in itself, and unavoidable in the circumstances in which they were placed; but a large and conscientious body of their usual supporters beheld with pain what they deemed an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of nations, and loudly condemned an act derogatory to the honour of the British name. The debates in Parliament on this subject condensed as usual every thing that was or could be urged on the opposite sides, clothed in all the force of language of which the great orators who then led the different parties were masters. On the one hand it was urged by Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, "that there appeared nothing but inattention, negligence, and mystery on the part of the British Government on this occasion. The Spanish Government had been most eager to cultivate a good understanding with this country, and had made repeated applications for this purpose to the British Cabinet; but the criminal negligence or supineness of Ministers had at length forced them into the arms of France, and compelled them to permit the march of fifteen hundred French troops to Ferrol. Spain no doubt had, in 1796, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, which might well have been made the ground of hostility, but it was not done so; and when afterwards she commuted the military succours there stipulated into a fixed annual payment, to this, too, there was no serious objection stated. They told the Spanish Government, indeed, that the continuance of a suspension of hostilities would mainly depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the harbours of Spain; but was this condition violated? Ships, indeed, were fitting out at Ferrol; but when remonstrated with on the subject, the Spanish Government at once declared that their sole object was to transport troops to the coast of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the Governor of Ferrol stated, that, to remove all uneasiness, the men should be put ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Not satisfied with these explanations, not waiting to see if they were well founded, we proceeded at once to the violence of assaulting their ships on the high seas. It is in vain to assimilate this

bassador had instructions forthwith to leave Madrid; that the constant report of naval armaments in the ports of Spain had induced the British Cabinet to give the Spanish Government explicit warning on the 18th February, 1804, that all farther forbearance on the part of England must depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain: that notwithstanding the strongest assurances of the Spanish Government that this should be the case, information was received from the British admirals that considerable bodies of French troops had arrived at Ferrol from France; and that orders had been given for fitting out four ships of the line and two frigates in that very harbour, in which four French line-of-battle ships were already assembled, so as to threaten to outmatch the British blockading force: that these circumstances compelled the British Government explicitly to declare, by its ambassador at Madrid, that the continuance of peace required a complete and unreserved disclosure of the Spanish relations and engagements with France, which had hitherto been withheld; and that at the same time it became necessary to issue orders to prevent the sailing of the French or Spanish squadrons from Ferrol, and to intercept and detain the treasure ships till its destination was divulged, and to send back any Spanish ship of war to the harbour from which she sailed, but on no account to detain any homeward bound ships of war not having treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever."—See *Parl. Deb.* iii. 126, 130.

The statement in the Spanish manifesto as to the orders given to Lord Nelson to destroy all vessels under 100 tons and send the others to Malta, is an exaggerated and mistaken allusion to these last instructions. No such orders were given by the British Government. On the contrary, the instructions were, "not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty sailing from a port of Spain; but you are to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence he came, and only in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain him and send him to Gibraltar or England. You are not to detain any homeward bound ship of war, unless she shall have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever" They are also directed "to detain any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores."—See *Orders*, 25th September, and 25th November, 1804, *Parl. Deb.* iii. 119, 121.

to an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchants' ships, which might be delivered back, and assaulting them on the high seas? Take a merchant's property, it might be restored to him; imprison seamen, they might be discharged; but burn, sink, and blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which has been spilt? The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for dollars. Better that all the dollars and ten times their quantity were paid, so as it could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms.

"In considering this question, we must carefully distinguish between the causes of a rupture which might have been set forth, and those which actually were made the ground of hostilities. The treaty of St.-Ildefonso was clearly an offensive treaty, and its existence was as clearly a ground on which war might have been declared. It was even more offensive than the family compact. But the grand objection to the conduct of Ministers was, that they did not instantly take a decided line on the resumption of hostilities with France. They should then have required Spain to renounce the offensive articles of that treaty, or used every effort to cultivate a good understanding with that power, while yet her disposition was amicable. They did neither. The subsequent commutation of the warlike succours into a money payment may possibly have been considered as an additional hostile act by Ministers, but unquestionably they did nothing to evince this feeling to the Court of Spain. Mr. Frere remained, and was directed to remain, at Madrid long after the commutation was known. Spain, in truth, was acting under the dread of French conquest; and therefore it was cruel to inquire rigidly into her conduct. The armament at Ferrol was quite inconsiderable, and had been admitted by Mr. Frere himself to be destined for the conveyance of troops to Biscay. The orders for sailing had been countermanded, and the vessels ordered, on the 16th September, to be laid up in ordinary; so that all ground of complaint had been removed before the English orders to stop the treasure frigates had been given. Even the refusal to communicate the terms of the commutation treaty was no justification of the violence which had been committed, because that refusal was subsequent to the order which produced the capture (1)."

Defence of the Government by Mr. Pitt.

On the other hand, it was answered by Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury: "The terms of the treaty of St.-Ildefonso, by which France and Spain mutually guarantee each other's territories, and engage to furnish reciprocally a force of fifteen ships of the line, and 24,000 men, to be given upon the mere demand of the requiring party, and the additional obligation upon each, in case of need, to assist the other with their whole forces, lie at the foundation of this question, because they constituted the ground of the whole proceedings which the British Government found themselves compelled to adopt. In whatever light this treaty be viewed, it could not be considered, on the part of Spain, but as a reluctant tribute to the overbearing dictates of its ambitious and tyrannic ally; and although conditions so plainly hostile would have justified the demand of an explicit and immediate renunciation from Spain, on pain of a declaration of war in case of refusal; yet a feeling of pity towards a gallant and high-spirited though unfortunate nation long dictated a delicate and temporizing policy. But at the same time, the interests of this country imperatively required that a pledge

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 354, 362, 448, 453.

should be given that this treaty should not be acted upon: and in reply to the representations of the English ambassador to that effect, the Prince of Peace evinced, in August last, a disposition if possible to elude the demands of France. The requisitions of the First Consul, however, were urgent, and nothing short of a subsidy of L.250,000 a-month, or L.3,000,000 a-year, would be accepted: although the Spaniards were so sensible of the enormity of complying with such a demand, that they strongly urged that even a subsidy of L.700,000 yearly would expose them on just grounds to a declaration of war from Great Britain. The particulars of this treaty Spain, down to the very last moment, refused to communicate: and when urged on this subject, they answered, 'You have no reason of complaint, because you do not know what we pay.' From what we have learned, however, of the commutation which was finally agreed to, it is evident that, so far from being an alleviation, it was the greatest aggravation of the original treaty. At the very highest, the rated equivalent for 15 ships of the line would be L.1,000,000 yearly: so that, as the Spanish Government has agreed to pay L.3,000,000 annually, there remains L.2,000,000 for the commutation of the land forces being at the rate of L.85 a-man; whereas the equivalent for service of this kind usually given, and that agreed to in the treaty between this country and Holland in 1788, was L.9 for each man: a fact which clearly demonstrates that the commutation is nearly ten times as injurious to Great Britain as the original treaty would have been.

"The forbearance of Ministers, under such aggravated circumstances of provocation, was not founded upon blindness to the danger which the hostility of Spain, under French direction, might hereafter produce, but upon motives of policy adopting due preparations against that event. Their forbearance was expressly said to be conditional, and to depend as a *sine qua non* on a total abstinence from naval preparations in all the harbours of Spain, and the prohibition of the sale of prizes in Spanish ports. When it is recollected that the total revenue of Spain does not exceed L.8,000,000, and that they had consented to give L.3,000,000, or not much less than a half of this sum, annually to France, these conditions cannot be deemed exorbitant. It is in vain to say that this enormous subsidy was subsequently acquiesced in. In all his notes to the Spanish Government on this subject, Mr. Frere accurately distinguishes between temporary connivance and permanent acquiescence; and reserved the right of making the subsidy the ground of hostility at some future period, even by itself: and much more, if any additional ground for complaint were given.

"Such was the state of affairs, when information was received from Admiral Cochrane that the condition on which alone the neutrality of Spain, under existing circumstances, had been connived at, had been violated by the Spanish Government. That Government were called upon to act upon that information, cannot be denied. The existence of formidable preparations in the ports of Ferrol, at the very time when a French squadron was lying blockaded there, and French troops were pouring in through the Spanish territory, and the packets were armed as in time of war, were such indications of approaching hostility as would have rendered the British Government to the last degree culpable if they had not instantly adopted measures of precaution. What would have been said, if, through their negligence in doing so, the Ferrol, in conjunction with the Cadiz and Carthagena squadron, had struck a blow at our interests, or co-operated with the French in any part of the great naval designs which they have in contemplation? The excuse that they were wanted to convey troops to quell an insurrection in Biscay is a

pretence so flimsy, as to be seen through the moment it is stated. If such was really the object, why not transport the troops in small craft, or in ships of war armed *en flûte?* and why, for such a domestic transaction, range her line-of-battle ships alongside of the French and Dutch in the harbour of Ferrol? Why arm the packets, if land operations in Biscay alone were in contemplation? The only question, in truth, is, not whether we have done too much, but whether we have done enough? It was clearly stated by us, long before hostilities commenced, that if the conditions of neutrality were violated by Spain, we would consider it as a declaration of war: they were so violated, and we acted upon them as such. We would, in such circumstances, have been clearly justified in preventing the junction of the French, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, and intercepting the treasures destined for the coffers, not of Spain, but of France; but we adopted the milder expedient of stopping and detaining them only; and if they have subsequently been rendered good prize, it is entirely owing to the conduct of Spain herself, in refusing to communicate any particulars in regard to the commutation convention, and following that up by a declaration of war against this country (1)."

Who is supported by Parliament. Feb. 12. 1805.

Upon a division, the conduct of Ministers in this affair was approved of by a majority 207 in the Lower House; there being 313 in their favour, and 106 on the other side. In the House of Lords a similar decision was given by a majority of 78; the number being 114 to 36 (2).

Reflections on the subject.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this question, so vital to the national honour and public character of England, was thus fiercely debated in Parliament and the nation: almost all the actors on the stage are dead, or have retired into the privacy of domestic life, and the rapid succession of other events has drawn public interest into a different direction, and enabled us now to look back upon it with the calm feelings of retrospective justice. Impartiality compels the admission that the conduct of England in this transaction cannot be reviewed without feelings of regret. Substantially, the proceedings of the English Cabinet were justifiable, and warranted by the circumstances in which they were placed: but formally, they were reprehensible, and forms enter into the essence of justice in the transactions of nations. It is true the treaty of St.-Ildefonso was a just ground for declaring war: the commutation treaty was a still juster; and even the armaments at Ferrol, if not explained, might have warranted the withdrawing of the ambassador at Madrid, and commencement of hostilities. Spain was in the most delicate of all situations in relation to Great Britain, after agreeing to the enormous war subsidy stipulated by that treaty; and this the French historians cannot dispute, since they represent the accepting of a subsidy of L.80,000 a year from England by the Convention of the 3d December of that very year (3), as an overt act of hostility on the part of Sweden against France. She was bound, therefore, in return for the forbearance which overlooked such excessive provocation, to have been studiously careful not to give offence in any other particular; and could not have complained if the crossing of the Bidassoa by one French company, or the arming of one frigate at Ferrol, had been followed by an immediate declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. But admitting all this, conceding that ample ground for declaring war existed, the question remains, could the existence of these grounds warrant the commencement of hostilities without such a declaration, while the

And particular in which England appears to have been wrong.

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 366, 386.
(2) Parl. iii. 354, 468.
(3) Bign. iv. 68.

British ambassador was still at Madrid, and negotiations for the explaining or removal of the grounds of complaint were still in dependence? That is the material question; and it is a question on which no defence can be maintained for the conduct of England. True, the declaration of war would, in such circumstances, have been a piece of form merely: true, it would not have averted one shot from the treasure frigates, and, on the contrary, led to their immediate capture instead of conditional detention: but it was a step which the usages of war imperatively required, and the want of which distinguishes legitimate hostility from unauthorized piracy. A line apparently as unsubstantial frequently separates the duellist from the assassin, or the legitimate acquirer of property from the highway robber: and they have much to answer for who, in the transactions of nations which acknowledge no superior, depart from one formality which usage has sanctioned, or one security against spoliation which a sense of justice has introduced. It is with painful feelings, therefore, that the British historian must recount the circumstances of this melancholy transaction: but it is a subject of congratulation, that this injustice was committed to a nation which was afterwards overwhelmed by such a load of obligation; that, like the Protestant martyr at the stake, England held her right hand in the flames till her offence was expiated by suffering; and that if Spain was the scene of the darkest blot on her character which the annals of the revolutionary war can exhibit, it was the theatre also of the most generous devotion, and the brightest glories which her history has to record.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR TO THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Necessity to which Napoléon was exposed of constant war—To disguise it, he proposes Peace to Great Britain—Answer of the British Government—Great influence of the French Press in his favour—Speech of Napoléon to the Senate—Commencement of indirect Taxation in France, and flattering state of the Finances—Public announcement of the Alliance with Russia in the King of England's opening Speech to Parliament—Important negotiations with the Russian Ambassador in London—Memorable State Paper, 11th January, 1805, the basis of the whole Anti-revolutionary Alliance—Continued jealousy of Austria on the part of Prussia—Supplies for 1805—Financial details of Great Britain for 1805—Other Parliamentary Measures—Charges against Lord Melville—His impeachment and acquittal—Commencement of the Debates on the Catholic Question—Argument of Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville for the Repeal of the Catholic Disabilities—Answer of Lords Hawkesbury, Sidmouth, and Eldon, for their continuance—The Bill is rejected by a large majority—Reflections on this subject—Total failure of Catholic Emancipation to pacify the Country—Causes of this apparent anomaly—The immense confiscation of land in former times—The vesting of the Forfeited Estates in Absentees—Total unfitness of the Irish at present for a Free Constitution—And peculiar character and dangers of the Catholic Religion—Measures of Napoléon at this period—Change of Government in Holland—And assumption of the Iron Crown of Lombardy by the French Emperor—His journey into Italy—Splendid pageant in the field of Marengo—He enters Milan—Is crowned with the Iron Crown of Charlemagne—Adulatory Addresses from Naples and Genoa—Napoléon's reply to the latter body—Incorporation of Genoa with France—His secret designs in that step—Popularity of Napoléon's Government in Italy, and great works which it undertook—His progress through the Italian Cities—Magnificent Fête at Genoa—Extinction of Lucca, and incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France—Increasing jealousy of Austria, and change of its Ministry—Treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and England—Objects of the Alliance—They disclaim all intention to control the French in the choice of their Government—At length the accession of Austria is obtained to the Alliance—Sweden also is included—Prussia in vain endeavours to mediate—Manifesto of France in the Moniteur—Prussia persists in her neutrality, from the hope of getting Hanover—And agrees explicitly to accept of that Electorate—Napoléon repairs to Boulogne to superintend the English Expedition—Immense force collected on the coasts of the Channel for that object—Its admirable organization and equipment—Nature of the Camps in which the Soldiers were lodged—Ample powers vested in the Marshals of Corps and Generals of Division—And vigilant watching to which they were subjected—Vast extent of his correspondence with his Generals—Organization of the Flotilla—His secret project for effecting the passage—Autograph note which he has himself left on the subject—Various actions with the British Cruizers off Boulogne—Operations of the combined Fleets of France and Spain to second the Enterprize—Measures of Defence by the British Government—The Toulon and Rochefort Squadrons put to sea—Alarm they excite in Great Britain—The combined Fleet steer for the West Indies—Uncertainty of Nelson—He at length follows to that quarter—Searches in vain for the enemy there—Simultaneous anxiety of Napoléon as to Nelson's destination—Combined Fleet had returned to Europe—Its secret orders—Entire success hitherto of Napoléon's design—But Nelson penetrates it, and warns the British Government of their danger—Energetic measures of the Admiralty when they receive his Despatches—The combined Fleet is outstripped by the British brig which brought them—Extraordinary penetration of Collingwood as to the enemies' design—Sir R. Calder's action with the combined Fleet—The two Fleets separate without decisive success—Vast importance of this action—Napoléon's conduct on receiving the intelligence—It totally defeats his well-laid projects—Cruel injustice to which Sir R. Calder was meanwhile subjected—Nelson returns to England—Napoléon orders the combined Fleet again to put to sea—But it makes for Cadiz instead of Brest—Gantheaume in vain leaves Brest to meet them—Napoléon's designs are in consequence entirely ruined—He sets off for Paris, September 1—Extraordinary dexterity to which the troops had arrived in embarking—Austria had been making hostile pre-

parations—Angry note of Talleyrand to the Cabinet of Vienna—Their reply—Both parties warmly assail the Court of Munich—It finally joins France—The Austrians cross the Inn—Forces on both sides—The Army of England marches from Boulogne for the Rhine—his Address to the Senate—Entire dislocation of the Armament at Boulogne—The combined Fleet is ordered nevertheless to sail from Cadiz—Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar—Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz—Enthusiastic reception of Nelson by the Fleet—His stratagem to induce the enemy to leave the harbour—They accordingly set sail—Disposition on both sides—Magnificent aspect of the Fleets as they approached each other—Order in which the English Fleet bore down upon the enemy—Battle of Trafalgar—Heroic conduct of Collingwood—Nelson next breaks the line—Details of the action in other quarters—Lasts moments and death of Nelson—Vast magnitude of this victory—Violent tempest, and disasters to the prizes after it terminated—Interchange of courteous deeds with the Spaniards at Cadiz—Mingled joy and grief in England on the occasion—Honours granted to the family of Nelson—Character of that naval hero—Victory of Sir R. Strachan—Reflections on the decisive nature of these successes—On the manœuvre of breaking the line—And on the introduction of Steam into naval warfare—What if Napoléon had succeeded in effecting a landing?—His designs, if he had succeeded in that object—Democratic changes which he would instantly have proclaimed—Their probable result.

"THE world," said Napoléon, "believe me the enemy of peace; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them whoever ceases to advance is lost (1)." Continual progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that the moment these failed, his authority would begin to decline. With him constant wars and evident advances towards universal dominion, therefore, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose inevitably from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation when heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or individuals, the principles of its own destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to the evil spirit of his times; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition, converted by his genius into that of military conquest; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him at last upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

Necessity to which Napoléon was exposed of constant war.

But although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, that he held the throne, no man knew better than Napoléon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled on every occasion to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made

But to disguise it he proposes peace to Great Britain.

(1) Dum xi. 81. De Staël, Dix Ans d'Exil, 15.

pacific overtures to the English Government. His letter on this subject, addressed, according to custom, to the King of England in person, was of the following tenour :—"Sir, my brother,—Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the Senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity : they may continue their strife for ages; but will their Governments in so doing fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people? And how will they answer to their conscience for so much blood innocently shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have sufficiently proved, I flatter myself, to the world that I fear none of the chances of war. It presents nothing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart; but war has never been adverse to my glory. I conjure your Majesty therefore not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate? Your Majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory : your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity : what can you expect from a war? To form a coalition of the Continental powers? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French empire. To renew our intestine divisions? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies? They are to her only a secondary consideration; and your Majesty has already enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion, that the war is maintained without an object; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting! The world is surely large enough for our two nations to live in it; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not awanting. I have now at least discharged a duty dear to my heart. May your Majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it (1)."

Jan. 2, 1805.

Answer of the British Government.

The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person; but Lord Mulgrave, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 14th January, addressed the following answer to M. Talleyrand :—"His Britannic Majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the Chief of the French Government. There is nothing which his Majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that that object cannot be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received, until he has had time to communicate with the Continental Powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has

Jan. 14, 1805.

(1) Dum. xi. 83, 84.

given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of sentiments with which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe (1)."

Great influence of the French press in his favour.

This reply, which in a manner disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoléon. It both revealed to the subjects of his empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the Emperor with the projects of ambition which were formed by the coalesced Sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular (2), had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war, the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland, were forgotten; and public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the Ruler of France, in the firm belief that in so doing they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence (3).

Dec. 25, 1804.

This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoléon addressed himself to the Legislative Body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804:—"Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens," said he, "we have all but one object in our several departments, the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier or First Consul, I have but one thought: Emperor, I have no other object,—the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe; but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our empire;* but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us, to other states." Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event will shew, for the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the ecclesiastical states and the whole Italian peninsula. No man ever knew so well as Napoléon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; and none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection and exclusive attention to present objects which have ever characterized that volatile people (4).

Speech of Napoléon to the Senate.

This session of the Legislative Body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect* taxation, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amidst all the declamations of the revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people.

It has been already mentioned (5), that the territorial burdens of France during the progress of the Revolution had become enormous; the land-

(1) Dum. xi. 86. Ann. Reg. 1805. State Papers, 237.
(2) De Staël, ii. 282. Sur la Rév. Franç.
(3) Dum. xi. 89.
(4) Bign. iv. 163, 164.
(5) Ante, iv, 357.

Commencement of indirect taxation in France, and flattering state of the finances.

tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, fifty, and even eighty per cent on their incomes (1). The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the Emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a particular class of society. Under his auspices, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organized under the name of *Droits réunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue. In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled the Government to diminish the territorial impost by 10,200,000 francs, or L.408,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the Emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year (2). On the 31st December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the empire was laid before the Chambers by M. Champagny, the Minister of the Interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Bavarian Republics, similar to that recently completed in the French empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoléon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time. "The first place was vacant: the most worthy was called to fill it: he has only dethroned anarchy (3)."

Dec. 1804.

Public announcement of the alliance with Russia in the King of England's opening speech to Parliament. Jan. 15, 1805.

Events of still more importance were announced to the British Parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the grounds then taken, Great Britain, through all the subsequent vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the speech from the throne, the King of England observed, "I have received pacific overtures from the Chief of the French Government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connection with a view to that im-

(1) Duc de Gaeta, i. 196, 197.

(2) Duc de Gaeta, i. 215. Bign. iv. 158, 159,

The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions higher than in 1803, and was as follows:—

	Francs.	
Direct Taxes, .	313,749,000, or	L. 12,500,000
Registers, . . .	198,584,000, or	7,800,000
Customs, . . .	41,485,000, or	1,700,000
Excise, first year,	3,895,000, or	138,000
Post-Office, . .	10,471,000, or	442,000
Lottery, . . .	16,658,000, or	640,000
Salt Tax, . . .	3,220,000, or	122,000
	588,062,000, or	L. 23,342,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 304.

(3) State Papers, 1804. Ann. Reg. 284. Bign, iv. 68.

portant object, and especially to the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe (1)."

Important negotiations with the Russian Ambassador at London.

It was not without foundation that Mr. Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connections which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success, the Cabinet of Vienna. Assured at length of the friendly disposition of the Austrian Government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situa-
Jan. 19, 1805. tion, they were compelled to adopt, Mr. Pitt, four days after the meeting of Parliament, presented a confidential communication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed,—1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as, while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future, and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia. 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont. 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. "The first of these objects," continues the note, "is certainly the one which the views of his Majesty and of the Emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document; for it goes on to state, "His Majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your Excellency has transmitted, that the views of the Court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even extended with advantage to the common cause (2). But it is worthy of especial notice, that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France, or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants; an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely under the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr. Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years afterwards, effected the deliverance of Europe; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his suc-

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 3.

(2) Schoel, Rec. de Pièces Officielles, vii. 59. Bign. iv. 192, 193.

cessors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and no severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of their enemy's elevation (1).

Memorable State Paper, Jan. 11, 1805, the basis of the whole Anti-revolutionary alliance.

(1) This state paper, the most remarkable in the whole revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the abridged narrative of the text:—

"From the Report of Prince Czartoriski, and the confidential communications received from the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg, his Majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the Emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The King, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the Emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability to take a part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependent.

"With this design the first point is, to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coalesced powers.

"It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the Emperor, with which those of the King are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads:— 1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution; and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandizement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

"The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the Emperor and King would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to unite to Great Britain and Russia the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

"The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish, as much as possible, their ancient rights, and to secure the well-being of their inhabitants: but in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that well-being is mainly dependent.

"It follows from this principle, that if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed, that they cannot be re-established; or because they are so situated, that their independence could only be nominal, and equally incompatible with their own security, or that of Europe in general. Happily the greater number stand in the first predicament. If the arms of the allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Placentia, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated, that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France, the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family; and the last measures of Genoa, and of some of the other Italian states, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyze the force, which as much as possible should be concentrated in the hands of the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the House of Austria: it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the States on the left bank of the Rhine: they have been detached from the empire, and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, no ways repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality, to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident, that after all the blood which has been shed, there exist no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause,

Jan. 14, 1805. About the same time a treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian Cabinet; and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St.-Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Winzingerode was in consequence despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian Cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but notwithstanding the leaning of Baron Hardenberg, its chief Minister, and the influence of the Queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit (1).

Continued jealousy of Austria on the part of Prussia.

Supplies for 1805. The supplies voted in the British Parliament for the service of the year, amounted to no less than L.44,559,521 for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, exclusive of L.4,554,000, as separate charges for England, besides L.28,032,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of L.77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of L.20,000,000, amounted to L.43,992,000 for England, and L.3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of L.32,381,000; in all L.79,873,000 (2). The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the

unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his Majesty is clearly of opinion, that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Prussia in a similar situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those the Ligurian Republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France, than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the European powers should mutually guarantee each others' possessions; such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as seems possible to repress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandizement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution." [Schoell, vii. 59. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 471, 478.]

In all these varied projects, there is not a syllable, either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation, which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes only a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable, and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interests of the people in the territories to be disposed of, and the general safety of Europe, required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

(1) Bign. iv. 194, 196, 197.

(2) INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary.

Financial details of Great Britain for 1805.

Malt and personal estate duties,	L. 2,750,000
War taxes,	8,300,000
New war do.	1,150,000
Property tax,	6,300,000
Surplus consolidated fund,	4,000,000
Lottery,	300,000
Surplus, 1804,	1,192,000
Loan, England,	20,000,000
Carried forward.	L.43,992,000

loan amounted to L.1,560,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations (1).

Other parliamentary measures.

The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both Houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a conviction which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilization requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants, and desolate its surface. In this session of Parliament also, the report of the select committee upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the management of Lord Melville; proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory (2).

May 27, 1805

Charges against Lord Melville.

The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st, That he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express Act of Parliament; and, 2d, That he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a

Brought forward,		L.43,992,000
Permanent.		
Customs,	L. 8,357,000	
Excise,	20,604,000	
Stamps,	3,354,000	
Land and assessed taxes,	5,309,000	
Post office,	924,000	
Pensions and salaries,	49,000	
Do.	61,000	
Smaller taxes,	32,000	
	L.38,690,000	
Deduct war customs and excise,	8,300,000	
		30,390,000
Total extraordinary and permanent income,		L.74,382,000

EXPENDITURE, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary Charges.		
Navy,	L.15,035,000	44,947,000
Army,	18,616,000	
Ordnance,	4,846,000	
Miscellanies,	6,450,000	
Permanent Charges.		
Interest of debt,	L.19,193,000	28,092,000
Sinking fund,	6,835,000	
Civil List, etc.	1,337,000	
Other payments,	727,000	
Total extraordinary and permanent charges, exclusive of Ireland,		L.73,039,000

[Parl. Deb. iii. 546, 550. V. App. 230. Ann. Reg. 1805, 592. App. to Chron.]

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 551, 546, and v. 23.
(2) Suttie's Reports. Parl. Deb. v. 1, 210. App. iii. 589.

time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses; in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. They were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr. Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterwards assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the House to the real import of what was established in evidence, viz. that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of the bankers; and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of patrimonial advantage from that irregularity (1). After an animated debate, Mr. Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting vote of the Speaker, the numbers being 216 on each side (2).

Has impeachment and acquittal.

This was too important a blow against the Administration of Mr. Pitt not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party. It led to various subsequent proceedings, and so vehement did the opinion of the public become in consequence of the incessant efforts made to keep it in a state of agitation, that on the 6th May, Mr. Pitt announced in Parliament, that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of Privy Counsellors; and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the Commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble Lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the house of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality; and in the interim, the nation, from whose services he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as first Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar (3).

May, 6.

June 12, 1806.

Commencement of the debates on the Catholic question.

This session of Parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the Legislature for five-and-twenty years. It was argued with the utmost ability in both Houses of Parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then considered, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age.

On the one hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Grattan, "That in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that

(1) "I never," said Mr. Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb.* iv. 611.

(2) Parl. Deb. iv. 255, 326. Ann. Reg, 1805, 67, 72.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1806, 86, 88, 127. Parl. Deb. iv. 602, 606.

Argument of Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville for the repeal of the Catholic disabilities.

they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three-fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions, of its inhabitants, It would indeed be a happy thing, if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions; but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for, and the question is, what is to be done under existing circumstances? That Parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain; but in justice to the memory of King William, it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with its measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent that the Roman Catholics were the irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant Establishment of Ireland, and the Protestant Government of England; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the next step was to exclude them from all share in the constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

"Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present Majesty: and under his Government the measures pursued have indeed been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of gradual amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system. You have given them full toleration, and the benefits of education; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunions of families; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, excepting the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, commerce, and general civilization: the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent Government, and at length, in 1792, they were admitted to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced; and here for a time a stand was made: not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any farther concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish Parliament. That Parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the precise object of making the legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three-fourths of the population. In these circumstances it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that legislature, founded as it would have been on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connection with this country. But that obstacle is now removed; the Irish members no longer form a separate assembly, but are merged in the general Parliament of the empire; and the same prudential considerations which forbad the admission of Catholics into the Irish Parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the British, where they can never exceed a small minority.

"It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes, that by the operation of the Union they would be relieved of their disabili-

ties. No authorized assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them that such a measure would result from that step: but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within doors and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic Emancipation would be more favourably considered than it had hitherto been; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand, that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the United Parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem: you are required not to concede Catholic Emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

"Every Government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects: but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities? We are not now to go back in the nineteenth century to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted: it lies upon the opponents of emancipation to make out their exception from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result, that you must undo all that you have done, recall every concession you have made, and begin a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected? And have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the Popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion: from the heartburnings consequent on the unhappy system of middlemen, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state: and the tranquil condition of three-fourths of the Catholic population for years past may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents can militate against them.

"The period has now arrived when one of two things must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics, by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force: too little to be won by affection. They have got every thing, excepting the right to seats in Parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions: to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heartburnings than serious patrimonial injuries. If they came into this House, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the Hierarchy of the country? What could five or six, or indeed fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object, in the midst of a Protestant Legislature tenfold more numerous? Similar arguments were urged against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility against

the English Establishment? and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr. Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment, under circumstances which left little, if any, hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted (1).

Answers of Lords Hawkesbury, Sidmouth, and Eldon.

On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British empire can boast; but their present claims do not relate to their condition as subjects, but their title to political power. No law, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must every where exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state, according as circumstances may render necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed, *non tangenda non movenda,* except on the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question, whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the Crown were the greater; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now, is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the Crown to persons of the Protestant faith, that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the Crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than in a Government, where the law is above the Crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the Ministers, the Chancellor, the Judges of the land, to be of the religion the most hostile to the establishment?

"What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the Constitution? There are many classes of Dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital point is that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is, in a peculiar manner, of importance to consider in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio,* only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis,

(1) Parl. Deb. iv. 651, 653, 670, 834, 1014, 1020.

which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood interfere in a great part of the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not whether Catholics may be loyal subjects —whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty, —for all that they already have,—but whether they are to obtain political power of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

"The practical effect of the extension of the elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of Parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants; and thus the influence of property would be operating on one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it must operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests.

"The present condition of the Continent renders it, in an especial manner, inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the present extension of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman see is substantially under the power of Napoléon. The Pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard of for ten centuries, to place a revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return to so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence in which he is placed to the French Government? and would it not be the height of madness in us, knowing his inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control?

"Mr. Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, 'that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation; neither did they care for parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.' It is evident, therefore, from their authority, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is unfortunately contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has been invariably found that yielding leads to disturbance and anarchy; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century, and that

since its relaxation it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and constantly been, more or less, the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands: kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay; but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our destruction, and recollect that it is only by a steady adherence to that system which we have received from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour (1)."

It is rejected by a large majority.

The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both houses: in the Peers by 178 to 49: in the Commons by 336 to 124 (2).

Reflections on this subject. Total failure of Catholic Emancipation to pacify the country.

In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquence alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has hitherto, at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried: but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realized many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change; and melancholy experience has taught us that Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland never has been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted: the total suspension of the constitution has in consequence been forced as a measure of absolute necessity upon Government: and without stilling the waves of discontent in the Emerald Isle, that long debated change has fixed the firebrand of discord in the British empire (3). Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of toleration: many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose: others have settled into the

(1) Parl. Deb. iv. 674, 691, 695, 700, 783. 803.

(2) Parl. Deb, iv. 843, 1059.

(3) The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed.

		Committed.	Convicted.
1828,	Catholic disabilities in force,	14,683	9,269
1829,	Relief Bill passed in March,	15,271	9,449
1830,		15,794	9,902
1831,	Reform agitation,	16,192	9,605
1832,	Ditto,	16,036	9,759
1833,	Tithe agitation begun,	17,819	11,444
1834,	Coercion act in force,	21,381	14,523

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a-half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or trial, it may safely be concluded, from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—See *Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

belief that, however well founded in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles; and that, in the attempt to draw a tainted beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.

Causes of this apparent anomaly.

In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote: and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution, of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction; it shows that nations who commit injustice cannot escape punishment: and in its present wretchedness may be discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, which constitute the great moral of the present times.

The immense confiscation of land in former times.

I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it in the whole British Empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without refering to historical details, it is sufficient to observe that at least three-fourths of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of injustice, because it extends to distant generations the punishment of one, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed: between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France, a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries Restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created: therefore, by both countries Retribution must be endured.

The vesting of the forfeited estates in absentees.

II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of middle-men and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland: and they soon found that, without middle-men interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realize any thing whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed in close and rapid succession the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a long tract of years, between the landlords and the peasantry; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining out of the produce of their labour such a multitude of

superiors; and the ruinous right of the landlord to distrain the effects of the sub-tenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal,—a privilege which, in its application to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existtence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realizing any rents out of their tenantry: a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of any thing like general freedom in their country; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with infatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of government and national representation for the two countries, has contributed still farther to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent peasantry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom, and an extensive distribution of property, alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement, or disregarding the passions consequent on a popular constitution. The state of civilization to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial: the passions consequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions (1). Could the wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is a wise and humane, but despotic Government, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every opening to employment, should, at the same time, close every avenue to democratic ambition, and extinguish every hope of revolutionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation be laid in the growth of an opulent middling class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

And total unfitness of the Irish at present for a free constitution.

IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr. Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who attribute to themselves

(1) The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a-year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act they were, over the whole country, reduced three-fifths; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from 1561 to 330 a-year. See *Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. "The disturbances of Ireland," said Marquis Wellesley, while Viceroy of that country in 1834, "have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solicitude that his Majesty's Government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connection, marked by the strongest characters in all these transactions, between the system of agitation and its inevitable consequence, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect; nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connexion." So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr. Littleton, the Irish Secretary under Earl Grey's administration, stated in Parliament, that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wish for its renewal."—*Mirror of Parliament*, 19th July, 1834.

any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority (1). The distinction which he draws between toleration to those who merely differ from Government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire to regain the lost possessions or ascendency of the Catholic Church, is in the highest degree important, and throws a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastic ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its mitre, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom. Unlimited toleration the Irish Papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted, on their shores, an armed and fortified settlement of Romans: or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoléon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number, at first, of such an organized band of aliens, any reason for despising its ultimate dangers: for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malecontents in its bosom, can almost always in the end attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

(1) Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows:—"Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is, when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be dethroned by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is, forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these *have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate*, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government, and possess themselves of the *estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects, and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?*

"Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it them on the pain of eternal fire."—*First Letter on Toleration, Works*, vi, 46, 47.

Measures of Napoléon at this period.

While the British Parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, and the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoléon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up in the tenth report of the Naval Commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated Republics his newly acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the first of these objects, and disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the last, he introduced a change into the government of all the states dependent upon France; placed on his head the Iron Crown of Lombardy, and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration: but during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel; and the minutest movements of the navy of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to cooperate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command, were regulated by his indefatigable activity, while to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress (1).

Change of Government in Holland.

Holland was the first of the dependent Republics which underwent the change consequent on the assumption of the Crown by Napoléon. The continuance of the Republican régime in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states subjected to his control: but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the Emperor. The whole powers of the constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new constitution, forged at Paris, the grand manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French Government, with the aid of M. Schemmelpennick, the Dutch ambassador at that capital, a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the Emperor, and was rewarded by the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this as they had done to all the preceding changes. The Democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a curb imposed on their revolutionary antagonists; and augured better things of this constitution than any which had before been forced upon their country.

March 22. April 30.

The new constitution, accepted on the 22d March by the Legislative Body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants (2).

And assumption of the iron crown of Lombardy by the French Emperor.

More important changes soon after ensued in the Italian states. The original design of Napoléon was to have erected the Italian Republic into a separate kingdom, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne; and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines: but that upright Prince declared he would not accept it, unless the Emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist, a tract of sea coast and a harbour in the Mediterranean, and relieve it from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (L.1,000,000) yearly paid to the French Government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoléon, and therefore he changed his design, and

(1) Norv. ii. 365, 367. Dum. xi. 140, 141.

(2) Bign. iv. 199, 200.

resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugène Beauharnais, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in quality of Viceroy (1).

This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation of the Italian Republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoléon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French Senate, called upon Napoléon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting
March 18, 1805. the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the Act of Settlement, by which Napoléon, Emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs. On the following day the Emperor appeared in great pomp in the Senate, and conferred on his sister Eliza the Principality of Piombino. The act of settlement of the Italian Crown was then read; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new Sovereign, and he declared, "That he accepted, and would defend, the Iron Crown; and that even during his lifetime he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the 31st of March,
March 31. when Eugène Beauharnais, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as Viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities. On the same day the new constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom; but in every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French empire (2).

His journey into Italy. The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bringing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces in the invasion of Great Britain, Napoléon resolved to proceed to Italy, and dazzle the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the Iron Crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose he set out
April 2. for Turin, by the route of Fontainebleau and Lyon, corresponding daily with the Minister of Marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from the Texel to Cadiz, and from Brest to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing gives so strong an impression of the vast ability and indefatigable activity of his mind as the study of the numerous minute and lucid orders

(1) Dum. xi. 133, 134. Bign. 199, 202.

(2) Bot iv. 154, 156. Dum. xi. 137, 138.

Napoléon on this occasion made the following speech in the Senate:—"Powerful and great is the French Empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany; but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain something, but we keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory, if we had united to them the Italian Republic; but we gave it independence at Lyon; and now we proceed a step farther, and solemnly recognize its ultimate separation from the Crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."—Botta, iv. 157.

which he addressed during every day of this journey to the Minister of Marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for by his all-seeing intellect (1). But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which to external appearance he was engaged. At Lyon he inspected the rising manufactures of that city, upon which the five pacific years of his government had already diffused an extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mount Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the Pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stupinigi, a country residence of the Kings of Sardinia, which had been splendidly fitted up for his reception. He there received accounts of the successful passage of the straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and its junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given. Overjoyed at this intelligence, he moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alexandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest fortresses in the world. A splendid pageant had for some time been in preparation at the field of Marengo. Thirty-four battalions and seven squadrons were assembled on that memorable plain, to imitate the manœuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the emperor and Empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes of which it had once been the theatre. The day was bright and clear; the soldiers, who from daybreak had been on their ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero; and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the Empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manœuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers, in an especial manner, distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialists in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the Emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amidst the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour. The splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the mind of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoléon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching (2).

Splendid pageant in the field of Marengo. May 5.

On the day following the Emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mezzona Costa amidst the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which

(1) This correspondence is to be found entire in General Matthieu Dumas's work, having been put into his hands by the Duchess Decres, widow of the Minister of Marine, to whom it was addressed.—See DUMAS, xi. 195.—*Pièces Just.* It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoléon's designs for the invasion of this country, and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented it from being carried into effect.

(2) Bot. iv. 157, 161. Dum. xi. 141, 147. Bign. iv. 217, 218.

May 8, 1805. He enters Milan.

the earned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amidst the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues, pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue of heaven : the chaste design of the arch of the Simplon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoléon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among whom were, in an especial manner, noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia, two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great contest which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the Emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent to him on the occasion by Frederick William (1).

Is crowned with the iron crown of Charlemagne. May 26.

After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the Iron Crown of Charlemagne was brought forth to encircle the brows of Napoléon. On the 26th May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted with the utmost magnificence, in the cathedral of Milan. The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, how splendid soever, at Paris. First came forth, from a side entrance, the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, and dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations; but the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the Emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the Pope on the occasion; Napoléon placed the Iron Crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the Historical words, *Dio me la diede : guai a chi la tocca* (2). He afterwards, as at Paris, himself crowned Joséphine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. The magnificence of the dresses, the matchless beauty of the women, the inimitable strains of the music, and the admirable decorations of the cathedral, in all of which the refined taste of the Italians shone forth in the most conspicuous manner, combined to form a scene surpassing even the far-famed coronation in the preceding year at Notre-Dame. Te Deum was afterwards sung according to the ancient custom of the Kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramontane authority ceased for ever (3).

Adulatory addresses from Naples and Genoa.

Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the Emperor, not the least remarkable was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms of flattery and adulation. At that very time, however, he had intercepted a secret corres-

(1) Bign. iv. 219, 220. Bot. iv. 160, 165. Personal observation.

(2) "God has given it me: beware of touching it."

(3) Bot. iv. 165, 167. Dum. xi. 149, 151. Bign. iv. 220.

pondence of Queen Caroline with the Imperial Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France, and he in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the Senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the Doge addressed the Emperor left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place, "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your Majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy: but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your Majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for an union with that France which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your Majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation (1)."

Napoléon's reply to the latter body.

Napoléon replied in words memorable, as containing the death warrant of one of the oldest and most distinguished republics of modern Europe. "Circumstances have frequently compelled me within the last ten years to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your Government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish by yourselves any thing worthy of your ancient renown. Every thing has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognize; the right which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which in effect is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary: all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation (2)." The secret motive of Napoléon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.

June 9, 1805. Incorporation of Genoa with France.

A few days afterwards a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian Republic with the French empire, and dividing its territory into three departments; those of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. Two days afterwards the ancient standard of the Republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. Thus was the French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of sea-coast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Apennines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan states; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sunk unheeded into the arms of death (3).

(1) Dum. xi. 151, 153. Bign. iv. 221, 222.
(2) Dum, xi, 154, 155. Bign. iv. 230.
(3) Dum. xi. 155, 156.
Napoléon's secret motive for this act of rapacity,

Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoléon presided at the opening of its Legislative Assembly, and laid the foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory empire of its author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000; the military establishment cost 30,000,000, the civil only six; and a very considerable portion of the public revenue was allotted to the departments, to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoléon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, notwithstanding the change of Government, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law: the order of the Iron Crown instituted, and the authority and powers of the Viceroy, Eugène Beauharnais, defined by an express statute. Napoléon, after having received as King the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as Viceroy, pronounced a discourse which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so desirous of giving to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to accomplish, by every means in my power, the happiness of the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy the place which they have already obtained in my mind; and they will never do so till they are persuaded that force in arms is the chief bulwark of nations. It is at length time that the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war (1)."

Popularity, of Napoléon's Government in Italy, and great work which he undertook.

Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the Government of Napoléon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration, and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence. Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the Vice-regal Court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoléon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more was owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugène's internal administration, and the admirable principles of Government which he received from the sagacity and

His secret designs in that step. Aug. 11, 1805.

like most of the actions of his life, was the unextinguishable desire with which he was animated of subverting the power of Great Britain. This distinctly appeared from his letter to the Arch Chancellor of that Republic, on the advantages to be derived from this acquisition. "I had no other reason for uniting Genoa to the empire but to obtain the command of its naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port contains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that in matters of state, *justice means force* as well as virtue? Do you think I am so sunk in decrepitude as to entertain any fears of the murmurs of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnishing sailors is expressed with sufficent force."—Bign. v. 78.

Sept. 16. 1805, from St.-Cloud, Oct. 1, from Strasbourg.

So tenacious was Napoléon on this subject, and so provident was that great conqueror of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly after to the same minister when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine: "To secure victories we must think only of defeats. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alexandria, nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenal, the magazines; be there in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strasbourg, on 1st October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least 300,000 quintals of wheat. My war projects are vast; but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly on all occasions that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the hosts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of the coalition when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany."—Bign. v. 79. 80.

(1) Dum. xi. 157, 159. Bign. iv. 223, 224.

experience of Napoléon. In the management of the kingdom of Italy he followed the maxims which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all were reserved for Italians: hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Every where great and useful undertakings were set on foot; splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields; if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of them was reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which a temporary revival, even of the military spirit, can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilization (1).

His progress through the Italian cities.

Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his Minister of Marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoléon visited the other towns of the north of Italy; Verona, Mantua, Parma, successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation from the Republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion of the oligarchy, under whose influence they had fallen; and to whom he promised a government, in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in northern Italy; veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of regard for the public welfare; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence either in the election of their Government or the administration of affairs. At length, on the 30th June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of the most unparalleled magnificence. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates, with the keys. "Genoa, named the superb from its situation," said they, "is now still more so from its destination: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero; jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory: and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amidst the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and vessels in the harbour; and then commenced the fêtes, which, in splendour and variety, exceeded any thing seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied; all that poetic genius has ascribed to fairy power, was realized on that memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city; its blue sea and cloudless skies; its streets of marble and gorgeous domes; its embattled shores and

Magnificent fête at Genoa.

(1) Bign. iv. 226. Dum. xi. 147, 149.

overhanging forts; its proud palaces, surmounting one another in gay theatric pride, and lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night; spreading from the Lantern on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amidst the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amidst the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination that this venerable republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism (1)!

Extinction of Lucca, and incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France.

The same period witnessed the extinction of the Republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoléon were accomplished. It was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Thus was fulfilled the saying of Napoléon nine years before, that the days were passed in which Republics could be swallowed up by Monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organization at this time of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendency in Italy was now complete: Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of King, and in Lucca and Tuscany by the ephemeral Governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria (2).

Increasing jealousy of Austria, and change in its Ministry.

These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but the temporizing policy of the Cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The rapid advances of Napoléon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the Cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the Cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of Government. The illustrious President of the Council, M. Cobentzell, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, resigned, and was succeeded by Count Baillet-Latour; and Prince Schwartzenberg received the situation of Vice-President of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive (3): the war party were now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.

June, 1805.

Treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and England, April 11, 1805.

Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th April a treaty was signed at St.-Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands speedy

(1) Bot. iv. 172, 176.
(2) Bot. iv. 176. Bign. iv. 236, 237.
(3) Dum. xi. 160, 164.

remedy, their Majesties have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French Government. They have agreed in consequence to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at 500,000 men; and the objects of the league are declared to be. 1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of Germany. 2. The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland. 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit. 4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces. 5. The establishment of an order of things in Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. To enable the different powers who may accede to the coalition to bring forward the forces respectively required of them, England engages to furnish a subsidy, in the proportion of L.1,250,000 sterling for every 100,000 of regular troops brought into the field (1)."

Objects of the alliance.

By separate articles, signed between England and Russia only, it was agreed that the objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as 400,000 men could be ready for active service; of which Austria was expected to furnish 250,000, Russia 115,000 and the remaining 35,000 by Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples. By another separate article, Russia engaged to march forthwith an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, and 80,000 to those *of Prussia*, "to be able to co-operate with the said courts in the proportions established by the treaty, and to support them respectively, in case they should be attacked by France;" and that, independently of the 115,000 men to be engaged in active operations, the Emperor of Russia should keep bodies of reserve and of observation upon his frontiers. The advantages of the treaty, so far as subsidies were concerned, were to be communicated to Austria and Sweden, if in the course of the year 1805 they brought their forces into action; the Emperor of Russia agreed, if necessary, to bring 180,000 men into the field, on the same condition as to supplies as the original 115,000; and the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against any power which should unite with France in the contest which was approaching. Finally, a separate article of great importance settled the ultimate objects of the coalition (2), and the intentions of the allies in regard to the states which they might rescue from the dominion of France, in a manner alike consistent with good faith, justice, and moderation (3).

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. App. p. 2 to 5.

(2) Parl. Deb. vi. App. 5 to 10. Separate articles.

They disclaim all intention to control the French in the choice of their Government.

(3) "The Emperor and King being disposed to form an energetic concert, with the sole view of ensuring to Europe a solid and lasting peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations, are aware of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time of those principles which they will evince as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. These principles are *in no degree to control the public opinion in France*, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on their operations, *with respect to the form of Government which it may be proper to adopt;* nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties; and to take possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the common enemy, in the name of country or state to which they of right belong; and in all other cases in the name of all the members of the league; and finally, to assemble at the termination of the war a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more determined basis than has been possible heretofore, and to ensure their observance by a federative system calculated upon the situation of the different states of Europe."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. *App.* 6, 7.

At length the accession of Austria is obtained to the alliance.

Notwithstanding the definite terms of this treaty, considerable difficulty existed, and delay was incurred, in arranging the terms of the Austrian co-operation. Not that the Cabinet of Vienna was backward in its disposition to forward the objects of the coalition, but that the deplorable state of their finances rendered it impossible for them to bring any considerable forces into the field till they had received large subsidies from Great Britain, and that it was highly inexpedient to commence hostilities till they had arrived, as the exposed situation of their territories rendered it certain that they would be the first objects of attack. At length, however, by the indefatigable efforts of Mr. Pitt, on the part of England and M. Novosiltzoff, on the part of Russia, these difficulties were overcome, and the cordial co-operation of Austria to the alliance was obtained. The Austrian Minister at St.-Petersburg, Count Stadion, forcibly represented the dilapidated state of the Imperial finances, and insisted on a subsidy of L.3,000,000, one-half to be immediately paid, in order to bring the troops into the field, and the other by monthly instalments after the campaign had commenced (1). These terms were at length agreed to by the British ambassador, it being stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should forthwith embody a force of not less than 320,000 men, and that the advance to be made by Great Britain, under the name of *Première mise en campagne,* or preliminary payment, should be made on this calculation (2). On the same day a treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria; and active negotiations ensued between the Aulic Council and the Russian war Minister relative to the measures to be pursued in the prosecution of their joint hostilities (3).

Sweden also is included.

Much less difficulty was experienced in arranging the terms of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Sweden, which had already, by the treaty of 3d December, 1804, evinced a desire to range itself under the banners of England. By a convention, concluded at Helsingborg on the 31st August, 1805, it was provided that England should pay monthly L. 1800 for every 1000 men who co-operated in the common cause; and as the garrison of Stralsund was taken at 4000 men, who were not included in the subsidy, this periodical payment amounted to L.7200. By a subsequent, signed at Bekcagsog, 3d October, 1805, the number of Swedish troops to be employed in Pomerania was fixed at 12,000 men, for whom England was to pay at the rate of L.12, 10s. per annum for each man, besides five months' subsidy in advance, as outfit for the campaign, and L.50,000 to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence (4). Thus, by the effects of the incessant advances of Napoléon towards universal dominion, and the genius and influence of Mr. Pitt, were the discordant elements of European strength again arrayed, notwithstanding the terror of former defeats, in a firm coalition against France, and a force assembled amply sufficient, as the event has proved, to have accomplished the deliverance of Europe, if ignorance or infatuation had not directed them when in the field. Diplomacy had done its part; war was now required to complete the undertaking. Mr. Pitt might then have said with Wallace, when he had assembled the Scottish Peers on the field of Falkirk, "Now, gallants, I have brought you to the ring; dance as you may."

Prussia in vain endeavours to mediate. July 10, 1805.

It was still, however, a great object, if possible, to engage Prussia in the alliance; and, for this purpose, M. Novosiltzoff was despatched to Berlin, and the successive annexations of Genoa, Parma, and Placentia to France gave him great advantages in the repre-

(1) Count Stadion's note, Aug. 9, 1805.
(2) Lord G. L. Gordon's answer, Aug. 9, 1805.
(3) Parl. Deb. vi. 11, 17.
(4) Parl. Deb. vi. App. 18, 24.

sentations which he made as to the necessity of opposing a barrier to its future progress. Fearful of the strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and for this purpose the Cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zostrow, aide-de-camp to the King, to St.-Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the Courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India; and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason, that recent events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers, a fact, of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence (1).

Prussia persists in her neutrality, from the hope of getting Hanover.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of England and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France in the Cabinet of Berlin, or its able director, Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize which her Ministers had long coveted in the electorate of Hanover. The Prussian Government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving her interposition for the decisive moment, she might without danger add that important acquisition to her dominions. In effect, Napoléon, well aware of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, 12,000 men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian Ministers
July 31. then dropped hints as to "the revival of the King's wishes as to Hanover," and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, "as the union of the Continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that
Aug. 9. it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acquisition, provided it can be done without compromising the character of his Majesty."

(1) Bign. iv, 258, 269. Dum. xii 92, 95.

Manifesto of France in the Moniteur.

The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the Moniteur at this period, than the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. "What have France and Russia to embroil each other? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a great influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the Cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland; it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you wish a General Congress in Europe? Let every power begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Mahratta states to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian states, the states of Holland and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Salza and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoléon in these able remarks.—*Moniteur*, 18th July, 1805, and DUMAS, xii. 96, 97.

There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power at the very moment when it was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe. The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The King at length put the question to his Ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests

Aug. 14. between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian Cabinet intimated to the French Minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French Government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions; and Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris by Napoléon to

Sept. 1. conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act of cupidity and infatuation; but in the mean while the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French Emperor. By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoléon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all its powers long abandoned, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress (1)!

Napoléon repairs to Boulogne, to superintend the English expedition.

Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoléon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; being well aware that if England was destroyed, the Continental Coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either

Aug. 3, 1805. in the basin of the Danube or the shores of the Vistula. For this purpose, shortly after his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets by

(1) Bign. iv. 268, 273.

And agrees explicitly to accept of that electorate.

The Prussian Ministers having demanded a frank statement of the intentions of Napoléon in the event of such an alliance, the following note was presented by the French Minister to Baron Hardenberg: — "The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say, that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the Emperor engages to support it with 80,000 men against the Russians; when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the Emperor engaging to obtain for the King the possession of Hanover, while his allies will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The Emperor offers Hanover, absolutely and without any condition; and the King may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian Minister replied: "It is with the most lively gratitude that the King has received the proposition made by the intervention of the French Minister. He experiences the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made *to exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy*, in order to avert a war on the Continent, and lead towards peace with England. His Majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland, and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. If on these subjects his Imperial Majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the King will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."— See Bignon, iv. 271, 272.

which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking it within a few days' march of London (1).

Immense force collected on the coasts of the Channel for that object.

The army which Napoléon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organization, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions. It amounted to 114,000 combatants, 482 pieces of cannon, and 14,654 horses, assembled in the camps at St.-Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 12,000 at the Texel and Helvoetsluys, and 10,000 on board the combined fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark on the squadron of Admiral Gantheaume; in all, 155,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the Emperor had in view. Each cannon had two hundred rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 14,000,000; the flints, 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5,000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected; the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2295 vessels, capable of transporting 160,000 men and 9000 horses, of which 1559 were armed with above 5000 pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited in the harbours of Boulogne, Etaples. Ambleteuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea (2).

Its admirable organization and equipment.

During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organized in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe. It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoléon, aided by all the experience of the revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organization, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution, the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to ensure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoléon adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which

(1) Bign. iv. 277.

(2) Dum. xii. 33, 37, and Tables opposite p. 304. Jom. ii. 66, 68.

The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: It is one of the most curious monuments of the age of Napoléon,—

Infantry,	76,798
Cavalry,	11,640
Cannoneers,	3,780
Waggoners,	3,780
Non-combatants,	17,476
Total,	113,474
Gun-boats,	1,339
Transport vessels,	954
Which could carry,	161,215 men
and horses.	9,059
Guns mounted on armed vessels,	3,500
Horses,	7,394
Fusils (spare),	32,837
Cartridges,	13,000,000
Flints,	1,268,400
Biscuits (rations),	1,434,800
Bottles brandy,	236,230
Tools,	30,375
Saddles,	10,560
Field-pieces,	432
Rounds of ammunition,	86,400
Loads of hay,	70,370
Do. oats,	70,370
Sheep,	4,924

—See DUMAS, xii; *Tables*, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

was intrusted to a marshal of the empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general. The organization of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only—that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the Emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying from five to seven thousand men, each commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only among the members of the same regiment, but those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care (1).

Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fights, or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting any thing defective in the discipline of the men; and the soldiers, from constant exercises and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced every thing that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick (2).

No man knew better than Napoléon, from his own experience, as well as the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had in-

(1) Dum. xii. 401, 411. Jom. ii. 58.

Nature of the camps in which the soldiers were lodged.

The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were distinguished by the same admirable system of organization. They were laid out, according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on an uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were formed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Vimireux, of sharp stakes cut in the forest of Guenis, supported by mason work. These field barracks were extremely healthy: the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits; neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle; when not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or levelling down eminences, draining marshes, or filling up hollows, to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations, and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions vied with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornament; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of Nature was sensibly improved.—See Dumas, xii. 25, 26.

(2) Dum. xii. 29, 32.

Ample powers intrusted to the Marshals of corps and Generals of divisions.

flicted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief especially, if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received general instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed; but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained; and although Napoléon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances; and a commander in his estimation would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom a certain discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted; a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of those officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoléon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état majeur*, or general staff, by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be abolished; an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and converted what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers (1).

And vigilant watching to which they were subjected.

But though Napoléon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active survey of every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders: nothing escaped his vigilance; continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted; and if any thing was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier instantly informed the person in fault that the attention of the Emperor had been attracted to his delinquence. Continual and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all, the attention of the Emperor was habitually turned to the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops; a branch of service which, from the prodigious extension of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the Emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had any thing of importance to perform imagined that the Imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself: while, in fact, it was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament. By this unexampled vigi-

(1) Jom. ii. 58, 60. Dum. xii. 408, 412.

lance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organization, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions (1).

Organization of the flotilla.

The organization of the flotilla was as extraordinary and perfect as that of the land forces. It was divided into as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery were already on board; so that nothing was awanting but the embarkation of the men. The French genius, able beyond that of any other people in Europe in the organization of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment and company had a section of the flotilla allotted to it; and the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array. Every man in the army, down to the lowest drummer, knew where he was to embark, on board what vessel, and where he was to station himself while on board; and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes (2).

His secret projects for effecting the passage.

The object of Napoléon, in this immense accumulation of gunboats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter from whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent, and no man knew better than Napoléon that to engage in such an enterprise while the English were masters of the sea was a vain attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English Government from adopting the means by which they might have been frustrated; and for this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing fifteen hundred warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil; the real covering force was assembled at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched

(1) Dum. xii. 411, 413.

Vast extent of his correspondence with his officers.

Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the Emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the appendixes to General Matthieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain on the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon contained in Napier's Account of the Peninsular war, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of a man who, amidst all the cares of empire, and all the distraction of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely printed volumes; and his letters to his generals during that time must have been at least twice as voluminous.

(2) Ney's Mem. ii. 256, 260. Dum. xii. 35, 37.

to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably conceived, was completely successful; not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design; the French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks sail in the rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne, in August, 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force (1).

Various actions with the British cruisers off Boulogne.

In the prosecution of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prosecution of this object many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast, which answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. Numerous actions in consequence took place with the English cruisers, whose vigour and boldness knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries with which the coast was guarded; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counter-balanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels, under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, and Captain Owen in the Immortalité frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their broadsides with great effect upon the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs by Marshal Davoust that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore

(1) Jom. ii. 70. Napoléon in Month. ii. 20, 21. Las Cases, ii. 277, 280.

Autograph note which he has himself left on the subject.

The following precious note, written by Napoléon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September, 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project:—

"What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne?

"I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have 150,000 men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment that the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering into the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.

"To succeed in this object, it was necessary to assemble 150,000 men at Boulogne; to have there four thousand transports, and immense *matériel*, to embark all that, and nevertheless to prevent the enemy from divining my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I have succeeded, it was by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gun-boats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand unarmed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage; but by constructing praams and gun-boats, I appeared to be opposing cannons to cannons; and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the *trajet* by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadrons, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the Councils of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin."—*See the original in* DUMAS, xii. 315, 316, *and in Napoléon in* MONTHOLON, iii. *App.* 384.

and the English cruisers, and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France (1).

Aug. 1805. While the Emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in reviewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two countries. Early in the year, Napoléon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with Napoléon long before the capture of the treasure frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated a junction of the Spanish forces already calculated on by Napoléon for the execution of his great design. By this convention, it was stipulated that the Emperor should provide at the Texel an army of 30,000 men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, 120,000 men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, 21 ships of the line, with the frigates and smaller vessels capable of embarking 30,000 men; at Rochefort, 6 ships of the line and 4 frigates, with 4000 men; at Toulon, 11 ships of the line, and 8 frigates, having 9000 land troops on board: and Spain, in return, bound herself to have 30 ships of the line and 5000 men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena,—in all 38 French ships of the line and 30 Spanish, and 170,000 men, all to be employed in the invasion of England. But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided "that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his Majesty reserves the explanation for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect." When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoléon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right (2).

Jan. 4. 1805. Operations of the combined fleets of France and Spain to second the enterprise.

Measures of defence by the British Government.

The English Government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures for the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz; Carthagena also was watched; and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy's force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile squadron which might approach; and thus, if one squadron got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined fleets for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what, in effect, soon happened (3).

(1) Dum. xii. 42, 48. James, iii. 434, 440.
(2) Dum. xi. 97, 98.
(3) Ann. Reg. 1805, 219, 221.

Jan. 11. The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons put to sea.

Napoléon, anxious for the execution of his designs, sent orders for the Rochefort and Toulon squadrons to put to sea. On the 11th January the former of these fleets, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squadron put to sea about the same time, but having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon considerably shattered in four days after its departure (1). The Rochefort fleet was more fortunate; it arrived at Martinique on the 5th February, and after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the Admiral landed 4000 men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only 500 regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, having no leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St.-Kitt's and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any farther stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santa Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochefort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons (2).

Jan. 15.

Feb. 22, 1805.

Alarm they excite in Great Britain.

The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoléon, who had prescribed to Missiessy a much more extensive set of operations, viz: to throw succours into Martinique and Guadaloupe, take possession of Ste.-Lucie and Dominica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St.-Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St.-Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the Emperor from Strasburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St.-Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for Life (3)!

The combined fleet steer for the West Indies. March. 30.

More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th March, from Toulon. On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the gulf of Palma, and made straight for Carthagena, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour; but finding them not

(1) "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyon gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."—SOUTHEY's *Life of Nelson*, ii. 214.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1805, 219, 221. Jom. ii. 71. Dum. xi. 110, 113, 123.

(3) Dum, xiii, 205. Pièces Just.

ready for sea, the French fleet passed the straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish squadron in that harbour, and one French ship of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to the amount of eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail on the following day for the West Indies. About the same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Gantheaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line, put to sea, and remained three days off the isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen (1).

April 10.

April 4. Uncertainty of Nelson.

Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was bearing up from the gulf of Palma for his old position off Toulon, when on the 4th April he met the Phœbe brig with the long wished for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but feeling assured by the 11th, from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds, to Gibraltar; devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest before he could reach them the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion he could not reach the Straits till the 30th April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and was compelled to anchor in Mazari bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days (2).

He at length follows to the West Indies.

At length, on the 5th May, he received certain information that the combined fleet had made for the West Indies, and amounted to eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind, that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England as indispensable to its recovery. In these circumstances this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman a piece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then (3)."

The combined fleet had above thirty days the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact Villeneuve reached Marti-

(1) South. Nelson, ii. 217, 218. Dum. xi. 124, 128.

(2) South. ii. 216, 217. Ann. Reg. 1805, 225.

On this occasion Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta.—"My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill luck will go far to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel."—Southey, ii. 217.

(3) South. ii 219, 220.

Simultaneous anxiety of Napoléon as to Nelson's destination.

The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoléon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the great events now in progress, with the utmost disquietude. On the 9th June, 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the Minister of Marine: "We cannot discover what has become of Nelson; it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica: but I am of opinion that he is still in the European seas. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to revictual, and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—Dumas, xi. 169.

nique on the 14th May, while Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th June; but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing excepting the capture of the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant resistance by the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet had gone to attempt the reduction of that colony; and so far was he misled by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th June, hoping to render the mouths of the Orinoco on the following day as famous in history as those of the Nile: but when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Grasse five-and-twenty years before; but as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas (1).

Searches in vain for the enemy there.

June 7.

May 28. Combined fleet had returned to Europe. Its secret orders.

In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 28th May, and instantly made sail for the north: having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line of battle ships. This reinforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoléon, dated Pavia, 8th May, 1805, which were, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line and ten Spanish which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochefort, join the five ships of the line under Missiessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. With this great fleet, which would greatly overmatch any force the British Government could muster in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle unless it was unavoidable, and if so, to bring it on as near as possible to Brest, in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in it. "The grand object of the whole operation," said Napoléon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne—masters of the Channel for a few days, 150,000 men will embark in the 2000 vessels which are there assembled, and the expedition is concluded." Every contingency was provided for: the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen; and stores of provisions were provided both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours (2).

Entire success hitherto of Napoléon's design.

Hitherto every thing had not only fully answered, but even exceeded Napoléon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British Government: on the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French Admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent, while the English squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and

(1) South. ii. 222, 223. Dum. xii. 1, 6.

(2) See the orders in Dum. xi. 247, 254. Pièces Just.

Rochefort were totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours. Villeneuve had sailed on the 28th May from Martinique; and on the 13th June, Nelson, on arriving at Antigua for the first time, received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth in order to warn the British Government of the probable return of the whole fleets of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing his sailors a moment's rest, set sail the very same day for Europe, and on the 18th July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the Leeward Islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days (1); an instance of vigour and rapidity of naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world (2).

May 28.

June 12.

But Nelson penetrates the design, and warns the British Government.

June 13.

June 18.

Energetic measures of the Admiralty when they received his despatches.

Great was the despondency in the British islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found; and the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering every man and ship that could be got in readiness to sea, and despatched Admiral Collingwood with a squadron of five ships of the line to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoléon; and on the 21st July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoléon, at that time in the possession of Villeneuve (3).

The combined fleet is outstripped by the British brigs with the despatches.

Meanwhile, Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d June he had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoléon, who by this time had returned to St.-Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochefort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined

(1) From April 30th, to July 18th.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1805, 228, 229, South. ii. 224, 225, Dum. xii 6, 7.

On the day following, Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

(3) South. ii. 224, 225. Collingwood, i. 145.

Extraordinary penetration of Collingwood as to the enemy's design.

His words are—"July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined with twenty more. This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe Bonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French Government never aims at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."—Collingwood's *Memoirs*, i. 145, 146.—The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from the West Indies; the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The Curieux brig, sent on this important errand, arrived at London on the 9th July having made the passages from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the Admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochefort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest. These orders reached Admiral Stirling on the 13th July. On the 15th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station in search of the enemy (1).

July 9.

July 15.

The event soon shewed of what vital importance it was that the Curieux had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the Admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information communicated by Lord Nelson. Hardly had Sir Robert Calder reached the place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and Spain hove in sight, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty gun ship, and seven frigates (2). The weather was so hazy, that the two fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity; but as soon as the British Admiral descried the enemy he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy, which, combined with the foggy state of the weather, brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the St.-Raphael and Firme, were so much da-

Sir Robert Calder's action.

July 22.

(1) Dum. xii. 16, 19. Ann. Reg. 1805, 229. James, iv. 1, 2.

(2) Yet strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital importance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochefort and Ferrol. Mr. James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which at the time were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in seach of. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the squadron did not, like the Rochefort one, take advantage of this circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders. [James, iv. 2.] Is it not evident, that unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th July, 1805, he wrote in these terms to the Minister of Marine.—"The English squadron before Rochefort has disappeared on the 12th July. It was only on the 9th July that the brig Curieux arrived in England. The Admiralty could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before Rochefort in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised therefore by orders received before the arrival of the Curieux. On the 15th July that squadron effected its junction with that before Ferrol; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of Nelson, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet: and that it is these fourteen vessels before Ferrol which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look out, or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long hidden designs of the French Emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets before Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the Admiralty, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—*See* DUMAS, xii. 19—20.

maged that they were compelled to strike their colours, while the Windsor Castle, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the Dragon. Darkness separated the combatants; and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day. The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to 59 killed, and 159 wounded: that of the French and Spaniards to 476 (1); and no ship except the Windsor Castle was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet shewed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day: at noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and a-half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle, but Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as the British; that is, to decline the engagement for the present, as soon as he saw that the English fleet stood firm; and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons, the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or that of Lord Nelson; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d August (2).

The two fleets separate without decisive success.

Vast importance of this action. Napoléon's conduct on receiving the intelligence. Aug. 11. 1805.

Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action ever fought by the navy of England, no farther proof is required than is furnished by the conduct of Napoléon, narrated by the unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the Emperor into his Cabinet. The scene which followed must be given in his own words.—"Daru found him transported with rage; walking up and down the room with hurried steps, and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. 'What a navy—what sacrifices for nothing—what an admiral! All hope is gone. That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol! It is all over: he will be blockaded there——Daru, sit down and write.' The fact was, that on that morning the Emperor had received intelligence of the arrival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour; he at once saw that the English expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever! Then, in the transports of a fury which would have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and the west of France, their order of march, duration, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous; the surprises and hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers movements of the enemy, every thing was forseen: victory rendered secure on every supposition. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of departure two hundred leagues in extent, and lines of operations three hundred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this

(1) James, iv. 7, 9. Dum. xii. 51, 52.

(2) James iv. 17. Vict. et Cong. xiv. 143. Dum. xii. 53.

original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital, the periods only underwent a slight alteration, but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan as originally conceived carried into complete execution (1)."

It totally defeats his well-laid designs.

Nothing can portray the character of Napoléon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage. He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming; and that unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be felt on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria, on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals before he was assailed in his own. Finding this great project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line, adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first; and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

Cruel injustice to which Sir Robert Calder was meanwhile subjected.

While such immense consequences were resulting from the action of the 22d July, the gallant officer who, with a force so inferior, had achieved so decisive a success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation wound up to the very highest pitch by an expression in the Admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement every where made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place (2). When, therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met, that the British Admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an encounter, and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoléon, in the official accounts published in the Admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms (3). The consequence was, that after hav-

(1) Dupin Force Navale de l'Angleterre, i. 244. Dum. xii. 119, 120. Bign. iv. 296-7.

(2) The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was in a great degree owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the accounts published by the Admiralty. The passage published was in these words:—"The enemy are now in sight to windward: and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any farther opportunity that may offer to give you a farther account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this:—"At the same time, it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron." [James, iv. 17.]. Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British Admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of eighteen hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British Admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when its character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

(3) The accounts published by Napoléon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the action, were entirely fabricated by the Emperor himself. In his despatch to the Minister of Marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers, which claimed the victory, Napoléon said. "The arrival of Villeneuve at Corunna will overturn all

ing continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th December, "severely reprimanded him for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th July;" though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection (1). Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the Admiralty the statesman whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best arranged project ever conceived by Napoléon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fits, is public opinion! History would indeed be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees (2).

Nelson returns to England. July 24.

Meanwhile Nelson having taken in water and other necessary supplies at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th July; and having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St.-Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland; and finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Corn-
Aug. 15. wallis off Ushant on the 15th August. No news had been obtained of the enemy; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at
Aug. 17. length heard of the action of 22d July, and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England; the public having followed with intense anxiety his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements (3).

Napoléon orders the combined fleet again to put to sea, but it makes for Cadiz instead of Brest.

Napoléon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly he resumed his designs of invasion; on the 12th August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the Minister of Marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, were Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning (4); and in two days afterwards

their gasconades, and in the eyes of Europe will give us the victory; that is no small matter. Instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. Here is my idea of what it should be;" and then follows the fabricated account.—Dumas, xii. 348; *Pièces Just.*

(1) James, iv. 18. Ann. Reg. 1805, 230, 231.

(2) Let us hear what the French writers say of this proceeding:—"Admiral Calder," says Dupin, "with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour?"—Dupin's *Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 17.

(3) South. ii. 225, 230. Ann. Reg. 1805. 230.

(4) "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoléon, on the 12th August, to M. Decres, "a messenger to Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the Imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects—that the enemy's squadron has suffered much—and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th August—"With thirty vessels, my admirals should learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hopes of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces: had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of battle ships before him——I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—Dumas, xii. 59, 67.

he wrote a second letter, in still more pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet. Sir Robert Calder had at this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th August, however, he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off cape Finistère. On the 11th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a north-westerly direction; but having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder) was approaching, Villeneuve tacked about and made sail for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Collingwood, with four sail of the line, who lay before that port, was obliged to retire on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had they entered than he resumed his station, and with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled (1).

Aug. 21.

Aug. 21. Gantheaume in vain leaves Brest to meet them.

Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Gantheaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron, after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets; but the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed off without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of descrying the long-wished-for reinforcement—in vain Gantheaume counted the hours for the arrival of Villeneuve with thirty ships of the line, chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed; the action of the 22d July had saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour; the combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour (2).

Napoléon's designs are in consequence entirely ruined.

The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoléon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of 22d July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterwards steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest (3). But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be disguised, preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time when the Emperor was directing the contemplated movements across France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 23d August and 1st September the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in that difficult operation (4). The cavalry

He sets off for Paris, Sept. 1.

(1) James, iv. 23, 27. Dum. xii. 63, 71.
(2) Dum. xii. 69, 70.
(3) Dum. xii. 84.
(4) The following passage from Marshal Ney's

and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the Emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board; when suddenly, on the 1st September, the Emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to defile by different routes towards the Rhine (1).

The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution, were not merely the destruction of all the projects for the naval campaign by the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz: matters had also come to a crisis on the Continent of Europe; and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube (2).

Austria had been making hostile preparations.

From the moment that Napoléon put on his head the Iron Crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine Republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end: and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the Emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces, having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength of the empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists to commence ope-
Aug. 12, 1805. rations. General Chastelar, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered the Tyrol, and began to organize the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venetian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the Cabinet of the Tuileries and that of Vienna; and in several articles in the Moniteur, evidently flowing from the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible in the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence (3).

Extraordinary dexterity to which the troops had arrived in embarking.

Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject:—"The instructions of the Emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out specifically. To ascertain the time required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, caissons, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he divided that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company received the boats destined for its use; every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprised of the boat, and the place in the boat where he was to set himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery, were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field officers dismounted, and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers in perfect order hastened on board, each to his appointed place; in *ten minutes and a half* 25,000 men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds; they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The relanding was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in *thirteen minutes* from the time the soldiers were on board, they were drawn up in battle array on shore."—Ney, ii. 260, 264.

(1) Jom. ii. 101. Dam. xii. 127. Ney. ii. 249, 265.

(2) Bign. iv. 303.

(3) Bign. iv. 310, 319. Dum. xii. 101, 111.

"The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two Cabinets:—

Both parties warmly assail the court of Munich.

At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the Imperial dominions, left no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoléon were, unknown to Austria, converging from the Elbe to the Pyrenees towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would in all probability be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich accordingly was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest, and the Elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connections with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours, and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria—that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory, and there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the Elector had therefore every thing to hope from an alliance with Napoléon, and as much to fear from falling into the jaws of the Emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party, that all these advantages were merely elusory; that the alliance with France was a connection with a revolutionary state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society, and that when menaced by such a catastrophe the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would always be opposed to such innovations. It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the Elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoléon; the fate of

Angry note of Talleyrand to the Cabinet of Vienna.

"Let us come at once," said Talleyrand, "to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different question that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria united will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilization itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she is fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not experience the rudest strokes of fortune.

"What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The Emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it; and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great design, and to enter into no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two empires." [Note, Aug. 5, 1805. Talleyrand to Cobentzel.]

Their reply.

It was replied on the part of Austria on the 3d September, "That the Cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put a period to the dangers which threatened Europe, by a sincere and anxious mediation; but that to do that with any prospect of success it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Lunéville anxiously stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian Republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it; no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French Government which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its invasion. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the Courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect in the internal affairs of France; to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany; and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French empire." [Note by Austria, Sept. 3, 1805. Dum. xii. 109, 110.]

the Duke d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French Emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such opposite dangers, the Elector agreed to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France on the 24th August, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d September at Wurtzburg. Meanwhile the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the Elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the Elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the Emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Wurtzburg, and the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn (1).

He finally joins France.

Aug. 24.

Sept. 6.

The Austrians cross the Inn. Forces on both sides.

The preparations of Napoléon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the allies were preparing to deploy against him. Mr. Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability: every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened: Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained that if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in support of the freedom of Europe. In Italy and Germany no less than 350,000 men were preparing to act against France, among whom were 116,000 Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at least two months to come: and in the mean time the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, 80,000 strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoléon. 30,000 Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were already assembled in the Tyrol: and the Archduke Charles, at the head of 55,000 of the best troops of the empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains. It could not be concealed, that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior; and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. Every thing, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and celerity of movement; and in both these qualities Napoléon was unrivalled (2).

To meet this immense force, and destroy part, before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoléon, and in its prosecu-

(1) Bign. iv. 320, 323. Dum. xii. 210, 211.

(2) Dum. xii. 131, 138. Jom. ii 97.

The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn:—

In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand,	90,000
Reserve under Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna,	30,000
First Russian army crossing Poland,	56,000
Second Russian army, under Emperor Alexander,	60,000
Austrians in Tyrol,	30,000
Austrians in Italy, under Archduke Charles,	55,000
Russians and Swedes in Pomerania,	30,000
	351,000

—Dumas, xii. 138.

The army of England marches from Boulogne to the Rhine.

tion he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of so many marshals of the empire : their united numbers amounted to 190,000 men ; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if they could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to their support. The army of Italy was 35,000, besides 15,000 in the Neapolitan territories ; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to 24,000, so that France could open the campaign with 270,000 men (1).

Immense preparations of Napoleon.

But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but a part of the preparations of the Emperor. On the 23d September, he repaired to the Senate, and submitted two propositions to the Legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of 80,000 conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806 ; a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating the military resources of the empire ; the second, the re-organization of the national Guard, throughout its whole extent. But in thus reviving this Republican institution the Emperor was careful to organize it on a different footing from what it had been during the days of democratic equality. " It is important," said he " that the officers of the National Guard should be *named by the Emperor :* every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme authority : all our institutions should be in harmony ; and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens." Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this re-organization ; every man in good health was required to serve from the age of twenty-one to sixty ; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Lefebvre, Marshal Kellermann, and General d'Aboville. The Emperor adjourned the meeting of the Senate, by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent aspect in which he viewed public affairs, and left him no alternative but to conquer or die.—" The eternal objects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished ; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany ; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago, I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed : menaces and umbrages alike found me immovable ; but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn ; Munich is invaded ; the Elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital ; all my hopes have vanished. Senators, when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the Imperial Crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up

Sept. 23, 1805.

His address to the Senate.

(1) Dum. xii. 136.

The French forces were thus disposed :—

Grand Army, divided into seven corps under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and guard under Mortier,	196,471
Army of Italy,	34,674
—— of Naples,	15,000
Electoral troops,	23,815
	269,960

—DUMAS, xii. 136.

of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people : they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen! your emperor will do his duty; the soldiers will do theirs; you will do yours (1).

Entire dislocation of the armament at Boulogne.

Previous to setting out from Boulogne, Napoléon issued several decrees for the disarmament of the flotilla, and the laying up what was kept in ordinary for future and distant operations. The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion, and soon of all that vast assemblage of vessels hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport 30,000 men. A reserve of 20,000 men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, destined at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances, and the intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than any inadequacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view (2).

The combined fleet is ordered nevertheless to sail from Cadiz.

Determined, however, not to lose entirely the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoléon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosilly to the command of the combined fleet in lieu of Villeneuve, who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival, a measure which led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising expeditions, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St.-Helena! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death (3)!

Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar.

July 9, 1805.

An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilized life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian Calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France, a change prescribed by the Emperor in a decree shortly before setting out for Strasbourg (4).

Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz.

Meanwhile the British Government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independently of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis and

(1) Bign. iv. 330, 331. Dum. xii. 237, 238.
(2) Dum. xii. 127, 129, 142, 143. Jom. ii. 87, 89.
(3) Dum. xii. 145, 149.
(4) Ibid. xii. 151.

the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth, and Nelson, who had retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Ports-
Sept. 14. mouth, and hoisted his flag on board the Victory of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea, that they were destined to receive their death-blow from his hand. In these generous sentiments he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty (1). He was vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching, and before he left London called at the upholsterer's, where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the l'Orient, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, at it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which
Sept. 14. formed the leading features of his character (2). With difficulty he tore himself, on the beach at Portsmouth on the following morning, from the crowd who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land, which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes on his vessel till it vanished from their sight (3).

Enthusiastic reception of Nelson by the fleet.

Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England: the yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the yards when he was seen on the quarterdeck of the Victory shaking hands with his old captains, who in transports of joy hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name, that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, Villeneuve hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival: and in a council of war it was resolved not to venture out unless they were at least one-third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents; stationed his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St.-Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy, while, at the same

(1) When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety became so excessive, that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes—"Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons." —SOUTHEY, iii. 232.

(2) "Friday night, Sept. 13, half-past ten.—I drove from dear, dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country! and if it is his good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of his mercy. If it is his good providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that he will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—SOUTHEY, ii. 235.

(3) South. ii. 234, 237.

time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that erelong they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoléon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had made no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochefort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt. Still, however, the council of war which Villeneuve had summoned to his assistance declined to undertake the responsibility of an engagement, and Nelson, to overcome their irresolution, had recourse to a stratagem, which was crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly equipped and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Carthagena or Rochefort squadrons should join the enemy and increase their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own ninety-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately the promised reinforcements arrived, and in single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line (1).

His stratagem to induce the enemy to leave the harbour.

Oct. 19.

They accordingly set sail. Oct. 19.

Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy—aware that Napoléon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean, and apprehensive, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosilly might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the south-east. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in the same direction; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest upon seeing the number of his vessels they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at daybreak on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semicircle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles ahead; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet, made signal to bear down in two lines perpendicular upon the enemy. He had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates; they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, of which four were three-deckers; and 4000 marksmen were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed (2).

(1) South. ii. 237, 242. Ann. Reg. 1805, 233, 234. Dum. xiii. 174, 177.

(2) James, iv. 39. South. ii. 240, 246. Ann. Reg. 1805, 234, 235. Dum. xii. 175, 177.

Dispositions on both sides.

Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in double columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was likely that each ship would be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the English lay to windward, were to lie in close order and await the attack. The fleet was divided into two lines, so arranged, that at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line, the broadside of one in the second presented itself: a combination as well imagined as can be figured, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Collingwood, in the Royal Sovereign, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the Belleisle and Mars: Nelson himself, in the Victory, headed the second, immediately after whom came the Temeraire and the Neptune (1). When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer—"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to him that made me, and may his blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To him I resign myself and the just cause which is intrusted me to defend (2)." Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power!

Oct. 21, 1805.

Magnificent aspect of the fleets as they approached each other.

Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st October, a few leagues to the north-west of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvass, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the south-west. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amidst the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded. The British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other, "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarter-deck, wore his admiral's frock coat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested; the officers

In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote,—"I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll, have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "that knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action, would supply any deficiency of signals; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—SOUTHEY, ii. 243, 244

(1) Collingwood's Memoirs, i. 162. James, iv. 41, 49. South. ii. 246, 247. Dum. xiii. 183.

(2) South. ii. 247.

on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen: it was evident that he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory? That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day; and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting? and after musing awhile he fixed what it should be, and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the Victory, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the great Disposer of all events and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty (1)."

Order in which the English fleet bears down.

Nelson led thirteen ships of the line in the Victory; Collingwood fourteen in the Royal Sovereign: but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood in order to cut off the enemy's retreat from Cadiz, the other column was first engaged (2). Far a-head of all the rest of the fleet was the Royal Sovereign, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still more than two miles in the rear. "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action;" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed, "What would Nelson give to be here!" When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hostile fleet was bearing down upon his line, he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the Santa Anna, the Royal Sovereign gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down and killing and wounding four hundred of her men (3): then wheeling rapidly round, she lay beside her so close, that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other. The Spanish Admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of the Royal Sovereign to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the Royal Sovereign heel two streaks

Heroic conduct of Collingwood.

(1) James, iv. 45, 47. South, ii. 252, 253. Dum. xiii. 185, 186.

(2) Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their canvass, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly L.200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of its early success was owing.

(3) Collingwood's guns on this occasion were all double shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought his men to such perfection that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a-half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now gentlemen," said he, "let us do something to-day which the world may talk of hereafter."—COLLINGWOOD, ii. 168, 169.

Battle of Trafalgar.

out of the water. A furious combat now engaged between the two first-rates; but such was the rapidity and precision of the Royal Sovereign's fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. The disgrace, however, was prevented by the St.-Just, Indomptable, Fougueux, and S.-Leandro, which grouped round the Royal Sovereign when they saw their Admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring his broadsides into his first-rate antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other, though, with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character, the Admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet, and they watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length shewed the British flag, waving unconquered in the midst of the numerous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded (1).

Nelson next breaks the line.

Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger, and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the Victory's main-top-gallant-sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the Victory continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this awful moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the Victory advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands, stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment Nelson's Secretary, Mr. Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amidst the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the Santissima Trinidada, which he imagined bore the French Admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted: but as the Victory approached, the enemy closed up and presented so compact a front that it was impossible to find an entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the Téméraire and Bucentaure, and at one o'clock the Victory, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble-shotted, into the Bucentaure, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the Victory's port-holes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbled wood-works of the Bucentaure's stern. In advancing, the Victory received a dreadful broadside from the French

(1) James, iv. 49, 52. Collingwood, i. 172, 174. South. ii. 257. Dum. xiii. 201, 204.

Neptune, but passed on to the Redoutable, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while on the other side she engaged the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidada. Captain Harvey, in the Téméraire, fell on board the Redoutable on the other side, so that these four ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants on the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge lest the shot should pass through and injure the Téméraire (1); and as every shot from the Victory set the Redoutable on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

He is mortally wounded.

After the first discharge, the Redoutable closed her lower-deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. Seeing this, and thinking they had struck, Nelson twice ordered the firing into her to cease: but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops; and to this humanity he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's forecastle, each loaded with 500 muskets balls, soon cleared the Redoutable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and main-tops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarterdeck he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards distant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied, "my back-bone is shot through." He was immediately carried below, but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been shot away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should leave him, and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. As the action continued, however, several ships of the enemy began to strike; and as the crew of the Victory cheered as each successive flag was lowered, at every hurra a gleam of joy illuminated the countenance of the dying hero (2).

Details of the action in other quarters.

Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the Santa Anna struck to the Royal Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her vanquished opponent. During the latter part of the action Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarter-deck, he visited the men, enjoining them not to a fire a shot in waste; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commending particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite port-hole of the Santa Anna. Captain Harvey of the Temeraire, when engaged in close combat with the Redoutable, perceived the Fougueux of 74 guns preparing to board her on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within an hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance,

(1) Ann. Reg. 1805, 235, 236. James, iv. 54, 59. South. ii. 259, 262, Dum. xiii. 20, 406, 208.

(2) South. ii. 263, 264. Ann. Reg. 1805, 237. James, iv. 61, 63.

by boarding. The other British vessels, as they successively came into action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the columns had reduced the great odds against which the leading line-of-battle ships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent. Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. The fire on the poop of the Victory from the tops of the Redoutable was so tremendous, that for a time it was almost deserted, upon which the French made a vigorous attempt to board; but they were quickly repulsed by the crew of the English vessel rushing up from below and engaging them at the muzzles of the muskets: and shortly after, the Temeraire, having wafted nearer, poured in her whole broadside upon her crowded decks, with such effect, that two hundred men were swept a way by the discharge. By degrees, however, the marsksmen in the tops of the Redoutable were picked off by the Victory's marines, and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the Temeraire's bows, which, forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Never had a ship been more gallantly defended: out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, only five-and-thirty reached the English shores (1). Shortly after the Bucentaur, which had never recovered the first broadside of the Victory, struck her colours, with Villeneuve on board, and the masts of the Santissima Trinidada, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the Victory, Neptune, Leviathan, and Conqueror, fell with a tremendous crash, and she was taken possession of when wholly disabled by a boat from the Prince (2).

Last moments and death of Nelson.

While victory was thus every where declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed: he is surely dead." At length he came down: they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?"—"Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing."—"I hope," said Nelson, "none of our ships have struck?"—"There is no fear of that," replied Hardy.—"I am a dead man," then said Nelson; "I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon." Hardy then went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were taken. "That 's well," replied Nelson; "but I bargained for twenty;" and then, in a stronger voice, added, "Anchor, Hardy, anchor. Do *you* make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy," said he. Hardy knelt down, and kissed his cheek. "Now I am satisfied," said Nelson, "thank God I have done my duty." His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, "Thank God I have done my duty," and

(1) The marksman who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after he fell, the storm of balls was so severe that an old quartermaster, who had seen him fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the Victory's poop. The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock He received a ball in the mouth and instantly expired.—SOUTHEY, ii. 269, 270.

(2) James, iv. 75, 89 South. ii. 270, 271. Ann. Reg. 1805, 236, 237. Dum. xiii. 208, 209. Vict. et Conq. xvi, 170, 175. Collingwood, i. 174.

expired at half past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled, even in the glorious annals of the English navy (1).

Vast magnitude of the victory.

The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only floating wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides; and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. Twenty ships of the line had struck, with Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish Admirals, Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the Achille, of 74 guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the Santissima Trinidada, of 130 guns, and Santa Anna, of 112, were in the hands of the British, and lay in mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz; and Admiral Dumanoir, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides, as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours; a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, however, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour (2).

Violent tempest, and disasters to the forces after it terminated.

It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well for that great and good man had this advice been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead (3). As it was he deemed it an unnecessary precaution till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous (4). Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides, to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was, that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the Algesiraz rose upon the slender British guard which had her

Oct. 22.

in possession and escaped with them into Cadiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English who had her in possession to return on their parole to the English fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance,

Oct. 23.

Captain Kirgulien, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismasted hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly

(1) Beattie's Narrat. 46, 49. South ii. 267, 270.

(2) James, iv. 99, 102. South, ii. 273, 274. Oum. xiii. 228, 229. Vict. et Conq. xvi. 188, 192.

(3) A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes from attending to Nelson's dying instructions was afforded by the Defence. This vessel, with its prize the San Ildefonso, anchored, and rode out the gale in safety. The Swiftsure and Bahama prizes also anchored and were saved.—James, iv. 130.

(4) In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated that many high naval authorities are of opinion that if he had anchored immediately after the battle the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night many vessels, including the Victory itself, were incapable of obeying.—Collingwood, i. 191, 192, *Note*.

formed a line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the Santa Anna and Neptune, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many melancholy catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest the Indomitable was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the Bucentaur's crew, and above 1000 persons perished. Many of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Admirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides 20,000 prisoners, including the land forces on board; and the combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only 1690 men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Matthieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal (1), were compelled to strike their colours." It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which, two months before, had filled England with alarm (2).

Courteous intercourse with the Spaniards at Cadiz.

An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded and the numerous prizes in their hands. In return, the Marquis of Solana, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies; and it was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse (3).

Mingled joy and grief in Britain on the occasion.

No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoléon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these

(1) The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan.

(2) Dum. xiii. 230, 239. James, iv. 123, 137. Coll. i. 183, 184.

In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle the following general order was issued to the fleet:—"The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his Majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are nought."—COLLINGWOOD, i, 179.

(3) Collingwood, i. 185, 190. South, ii. 275, 276.

blessings were, they yet seemed inadequately purchased by the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

Honour granted to the family of Nelson.

Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of L.6000 a-year: L.10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and L.100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St.-Paul's Cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of L.2000 a-year, a grant which first raised that noble officer from that of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St.-Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of weeping spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr: the most awful, that of the martyred patriot: the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory: and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory (1).

Character of that naval hero.

Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the skilful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him always blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the licence of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and a manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted

(1) South. ii. 276, 280. Coll. i. 211.

his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius in the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds of Naples, his public character might be deemed perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness. (1).

Victory of Sir R. Strachan.

The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible, until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near, that Dumanoir was obliged to lie too and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours, when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships; but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of 750 killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the Bristish loss being only 24 killed and 114 wounded. (2).

Nov. 4.

Reflections on the decisive nature of these successes.

It is observed by Mr. Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land: a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II; but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalizing from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect farther, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea: that the battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion, that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world, that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan invasion in the south of Europe, and that of La Hogue checked, for nearly a century, the maritime efforts of the House of Bourbon. Equally important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the

(1) Dupin's Voyages, iv. 66. Bretton, iii. 463. (2) Dum. xiii. 238, 233. James, iv. 154, 163.

battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England and destroyed all Napoléon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months: even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost obliterated by the host which was marshalled round the Imperial eagles at Waterloo; but from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the the utmost efforts of Napoléon, no considerable fleet with the tricolor flag was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

It is stated by Napoléon, that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of 120,000 men at land (1). Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which destroyed fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where 90,000 men out of 120,000 were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoléon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above 40,000 men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased on the side of the British alone, was 9,999: on that of the allies, above 20,000: whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only 1690 men; a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain (2). This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea than land: and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of proportion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands (3);" while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoléon.

And on the manœuvre of breaking the line.

The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary success of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors is alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or if attempted succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and full a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot: and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained (4). So far from the French and Spanish fleets

(1) Napoléon, ii. 124.

(2) The loss at Talavera, out of 19,000 British, was 5 000: that at Albuera, 4,500 out of 7,500; and out of 16.000 who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4,000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress!

(3) Coll. i. 183. 184.

(4) "The total loss was 1690; of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns." —James, iv. 111.

being doubled up and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was doubled up; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior to their antagonists, they must have been taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but a superior enemy have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Anna and the Bucentaur, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, when three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support? In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force, before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if from accidental causes their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique—quite the reverse; they did perfectly right: but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skilful party, and never can prove successful but in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force before the centre or rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being made prisoner, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an antagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did with British troops; and accordingly Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoléon's system of bringing an overwhelming force to one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms, or retired, the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops, among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with 7000 men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him, that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

And on the introduction of steam into naval warfare.

It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the naval officers to whom Napoléon remitted to report on M. Fulton's pro-

posal for the navigation of the vessels by steam had given a different opinion, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. Th re appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end, to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so to outstrip the march of time as to give to one generation that general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle; the mighty engine would have yielded its powers equally to both sides, and their relative situation would have remained the same as before. If steamers would have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel, they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into their crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steam-ship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, brought flames and explosion into its forests of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not more decisive than that of Edward III at Sluys; the countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action, and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

What if Napoléon had succeeded in effecting a landing?

But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoléon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days, and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the confiscation of the property of the church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the Revolutionary party in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterwards, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy; and that if he could once have roused the multitude against their rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France (1). "I would not," said he, "have attempted to subject England

Democratic changes which he would have instantly proclaimed.

(1) "I would have hastened over my flotilla," said Napoléon, "with 200,000 men, (it was only 138 000,) landed as near Chatham as possible, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing. I would have proclaimed a Republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution of the property of such of the latter as opposed me among my partisans; liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, *but would have introduced a great reform.* I would have published a proclamation, declaring

to France: I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and *left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of Republicanism in their morale.* I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform (1)."

His designs if he had succeeded in that object

That the French Emperor would have been defeated in his attempt if England had remained true to herself, can be doubtful to no one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, without exception, from Vimiera to Waterloo, and that Napoléon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained a doubt till within these few years; but the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior stimulants since 1830, and the strong partiality to French alliance which has recently grown up with the spread of democratic principles, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoléon did not know us better than we knew ourselves, and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which had proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people. The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented animated the British people: but, strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people. No man can say how he would keep his senses under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant, as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth suddenly open beneath his feet; and even the warmest

Their probable result.

friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounces upon the stability of the English mind under the influence of the

that we came as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy; all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been joined by a formidable body; and I would at the same time have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have burned your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruins of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully amongst the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen every thing, which would have made a great impression on their minds. The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an obnoxious and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families with the blood of the people, together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and its division amongst the partisans of the Revolution, with a general equalisation of property, would have gained me the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and the disaffected in the kingdom." Thus far the Emperor Napoleon; to which it may be added, that, amidst the divisions and democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and smiled at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, farther than spoliating some of the higher orders, and if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the chapel of St.-Stephen.—*See* O'MEARA, i. 349, 352.

(1) O'Meara, i. 350, 469.

prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoléon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage indeed would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger; thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory; at Trafalgar, for existence.

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Austria, deceived by Napoléon's measures, crosses the Inn—Her forces advance across Bavaria to the Black Forest—Efforts of Napoléon to gain Prussia—Negotiations between the two Powers—Russians refused a passage across the Prussian Territories—March of French Troops from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine—Composition and direction of these forces—Violation of the Prussian Territory by Bernadotte's Corps—Great indignation excited by this at Berlin—Measures concerted between Russia, Sweden, and England in the North of Germany—Neutrality of Naples—Napoléon's arrival on the Rhine, and Proclamations to his Troops—Mutual Manifestoes by the belligerent Powers—Movements of the French Troops to surround the Austrians—Mack's defensive arrangements—Four thousand Imperial Grenadiers are cut to pieces by Murat—Recompenses bestowed by Napoléon on the Soldiers engaged in the Combat—Measures of Mack to extricate himself—Bloody Combat at Hasslach—Surrender of four thousand Austrians at Memmingen—Completion of the Investment of Ulm—Napoléon's address to his Soldiers at the Bridge of the Lech—Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm—Combat at Elchingen—Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand, with great loss—Surrender of Werneck with eight thousand men—The Heights around Ulm are carried by Napoléon—Negotiations for the surrender of Mack—He capitulates at first conditionally—and then unconditionally—The Army of Mack defiles before Napoléon—Napoléon's Message to the Senate at Paris—His Proclamation to his Soldiers—The blame of these Disasters is divided between Mack and the Aulic Council—Errors of the Cabinet of Vienna in the general plan of the Campaign—The Archduke Charles is kept on the defensive in Italy—The Bridge at Verona is forced by Masséna—The Archduke resolves to retreat, in order to cover Vienna—And falls back by the Tagliamento to Laybach in Carinthia—Advance of Napoléon's Army through Bavaria—Defensive Measures of the Austrian Government—Increasing Irritation of Prussia—Arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Berlin, and conclusion of a Secret Convention with the Prussian Government—Nocturnal Visit to the Tomb of the Great Frederick—Landing of the Allies in Hanover—Operations in the Tyrol—Surrender of Jellachich and the Prince de Rohan, and abandonment of that Province—Napoléon advances into Upper Austria Austrians' proposals of Peace, which come to nothing—Kutusoff withdraws to the left bank of the Danube—Continued advance of the French towards Vienna—Destruction of part of Mortier's Corps by Kutusoff—Desperate Action at Dierstein—Mortier recrosses the Danube—Napoléon advances rapidly to Vienna—Description of that City—Surprise of the Bridge over the Danube—Napoléon passes through the Capital, and establishes himself at Schoenbrunn—Subsequent Movements of the Armies—Finesse of Kutusoff in parrying the attempts of the French to circumvent him—Heroic action of Bagrathion, who at length makes good his retreat—Junction of the Russian Armies—Measures of Napoléon—Conduct of the French at Vienna—Forces on both sides—Napoléon reconnoitres the Field of Austerlitz—Dangers of his situation—Simulate Negotiations on both sides to gain time—Haugwitz arrives from Berlin—The Allies advance to Wischaw—Preparatory Movements on both sides—Allied Order of Battle—Description of the Field of Battle—Dispositions of the French Troops—Nocturnal Illumination of the French Lines—Movements on both sides in the morning—Battle of Austerlitz—Its results—Dangers of Napoléon's situation, notwithstanding his success—The Austrians sue for an Armistice—Interview of the Emperor Francis with Napoléon—Armistice concluded with Russia—And with Austria—Dissimulation of Prussia, and accommodation with that Power—Treaty of Alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin, which gains Hanover—Affairs of Naples—And of the North of Germany—Peace of Presburg—Dethronement of the King of Naples—Reflections on this step—Napoléon returns to Vienna—Munich, the Rhine, and Paris—Reflections on the Campaign—Importance of the Valley of the Danube as the theatre of contest between France and Austria—Vast growth of the Military Power of France since the last Peace—A similar increase during Peace characterized all the reign of Napoléon—Great Abilities displayed by Napoléon in the arrangements for this Campaign—Errors of the Allies—Ruinous effects of

the Indecision of Prussia—Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the formation of the Confederacy —His last Illness and Death—His Character and mighty Achievements—Principles of his Domestic Administration—Progressive and steady growth of his Fame—Erroneous Views of Foreign Writers on his Designs—His Errors—Opinion of the Democratic Party in England on him—Funeral Honours paid to his Memory.

Austria, deceived by Napoléon's measures, crosses the Inn.

In proportion as the time approached when his great projects against Austria were to be carried into execution, Napoléon redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that Admiral to Cadiz, had been received, completely produced the desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of the Emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment come when she could safely commence hostilities, even before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn, and invading the Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard, and appear before their arrival, with the whole forces of the empire, on the banks of the Rhine. But she grievously miscalculated in so doing the activity and resources of the French Emperor, and soon found to her cost that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played his game as effectually as if she had intentionally prostrated before his ambition the resources of the monarchy (1).

Sept. 9.

The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were 80,000 men; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the Elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite side of the scale. The army of the Imperialists was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience. What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standard of Napoléon (2)? In vain the British Government transmitted to the Cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement, obtained from the Imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march, and asked whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act. With infatuated self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied

They advance through Bavaria to the Black Forest.

(1) Dum. xiii. 1, 11. Jom. ii. 99, 100.

(2) Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility, in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign: and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr. Pitt, that he wrote to the Cabinet of Vienna, recommending that officer to the command of the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr. Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations, and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoléon.—*See* Napoléon *in Month.* ii. 432.

with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine (1).

Efforts of Napoleon to gain Prussia.

From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoléon was indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his Envoy at Berlin, were to represent to the Prussian Government, "that there was not a moment to lose: that it was indispensable that an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that during the negotiations for a conclusion of the treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an open declaration against Austria, or at least a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the Emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might have their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the Emperor offered them the aid of 80,000, amply provided with every thing necessary for a campaign (2)." The answer of the Prussian Cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable. They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone provide against the rest of the Continent such a barrier as would ensure the maintenance of general tranquillity." The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended, immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian Government, their temporizing policy reappeared; they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amidst all their anxiety for the acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoléon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his account, and that the empire of France and kingdom of Italy shall receive no acquisition (3)." But the terrors of the Prussian Cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities.

Negotiations between the two powers.

Sept 21. Russians denied a passage through the Prussian territories.

Matters were in this doubtful state when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor of Russia, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian Majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for his troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederick William instantly took fire; and he replied by a positive negative against the passage of the Moscovites through any part of his dominions; but expressed his willingness to meet his august neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war: a proposition to which Napoléon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit (4)."

While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French troops were in full march from the shores of

(1) Dum. xiii. 12.

(2) Instructions to Duroc, 24th August, 1805.—BIGNON, iv. 334.—These instructions, written the very day on which Napoléon received accounts of the entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol, and when he dictated to Daru the march of the grand army from Boulogne across Germany, (*ante*, v. 159,) are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

(3) Bign. iv. 338, 341.

(4) Bign. iv. 343, 346.

March of the French troops towards Bavaria.

the Channel to the banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoléon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combination of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment, were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck (1). The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope: the exercises and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years in their camps on the shores of the ocean having enabled them to overcome fatigues with ease which would have been deemed impossible at that period by any other soldiers of Europe (2).

Composition and direction of these forces.

The army which Napoléon thus directed against the Imperialists was the most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. Divided into eight corps under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the empire, it consisted of 180,000 men; and had been brought by long exercise, both in camps and in the field, to an unrivalled pitch of discipline and splendour (3). The plan of Napoléon was to direct the corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guards and the cavalry under Murat, to Donaworth and Dettingen: Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neubourg; and Bernadotte joined to the Bavarians upon Ingolstadt; while Augereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest, received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to shew that these movements were calculated to envelope altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm: for while the bulk of the French, under Napoléon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donaworth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Augereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible,

(1) See the orders, addressed by Napoléon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in Dumas, xiii. 302, 340 *Pièces Just.*—Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven, at night, or midnight: but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

(2) Dum. xiii. 13, 14. Bign iv. 360, Jom. ii. 103, 104. Bonr. vii 10.

The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

(3) The composition of this army was as follows:

1, corps commanded by Bernadotte.
2, ... by Marmont.
3, ... by Davoust.
4, ... by Soult.
5, ... by Lannes.
6, ... by Ney.
7, ... by Augereau.
8, ... by Murat (cavalry).
9, ... Guards by Mortier and Bessières.
10, ... Bavarians, by Wrede.

—See Jom. ii. 104; Dum. xii.

be concealed: and the despotic power of the French Emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately laid on in all parts of the empire; the post was every-where stopped; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the Cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne (1).

Violation of the Prussian territory by Bernadotte's corps.

The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march: but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoléon was not a man to be restrained by such an obstacle; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. "You will traverse its territories," said he, "avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions were punctually obeyed: and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory, and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced guard on the Danube, between Neubourg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The master stroke was delivered: the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm (2).

Oct. 8.

Great indignation excited by this at Berlin.

Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage to their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian Cabinet; that the alliance with France neither was based on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage; that it had been contracted only for purposes of ambition by Napoléon; that he neither respected nor feared their power, and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning the independence of their own. The weight of these considerations was much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation whom, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in their power; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories, had been sufficient to avert the march of the Russian troops, although the Cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance to the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian Cabinet; while the more generous and warlike part of the capital, at the head of which were the Queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation, and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circumstance which had at length opened the eyes of Government to the ruinous consequences of the temporizing policy which they had so long

(1) Jom. ii, 105, 106. Dum. xiii. 13. 15.

(2) Dum. xiii. 27, 28. Bign. iv. 345, 346.

Oct. 14. pursued. All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian Monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoléon; the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded; and three powerful armies of observation formed, one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower Saxony, of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick, and one in Westphalia, of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse (1). This impolitic step of Napoléon is linked with many important consequences. It produced that burst of angry feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806. It is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which, in their ultimate results, produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French empire.

Measures concerted between Prussia, Sweden, and England, in the north of Germany.

While the precipitance of Napoléon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of 12,000 men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of double the amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be farther reinforced by the German Legion in the service of England; an addition which would raise it to nearly forty thousand men; an army it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in an united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders (2). Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities would have been spared to itself and to Europe!

Sept. 12. Neutrality of Naples.

More fortunate in the south than the north of Europe, Napoléon at this period concluded a convention with the Court of Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona; but the Pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession; and both parties protracted the discussions, with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations (3).

These negotiations at either extremity of the line of military operations might have been attended with important effects upon the final issue of the war, if affairs had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoléon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combinations formed by the English and Russian Cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.

Sept. 27. Napoleon's proclamations to his troops.

The Emperor arrived at Strasburg on the 27th September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military

(1) Bign. iv. 346, 347. Dum. xiii. 28, 31. Hard. viii. 476, 480.

(2) Dum. xiii. 31, 33.

(3) Bign. iv. 356, 357. Bot. iv. 287.

genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced, Austria has passed the Inn, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced guard of the great people: you may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure; but whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself—"Bavarian Soldiers! I come to put myself at your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The House of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour: and feel assured that after the first battle I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people, you are worthy to combat in the ranks of the grand army (1)."

Movement of the French troops to surround the Austrians

The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually in a defensive position, around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in the former war. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoléon in turning his flank with his left wing, and interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by a whole French corps, diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Ba-
Oct. 6. and 7. varians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed that river at Donaworth, Neubourg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the communications
Oct 12. of the Austrian army with Vienna, and by the middle of October, Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsbourg, directly on the road from the Imperial headquarters to the Hereditary States; while Napoléon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon them from the westward both on the right and left banks of the Danube (2).

Mack's defensive arrangements.

Struck, as by a thunderbolt, by this formidable apparition in his rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian General had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, hastily threw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and grouping his masses

(1) Bign. iv. 362. Norv. ii, 386.

(2) Dum. xiii. 35, 38. Jom. ii. 108, 109. Norv. ii, 388.

round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffemberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Innspruck, to join him by forced marches, and as soon as he arrived despatched him to support the corps of Reinmayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donaworth (1).

Four thousand Imperialists are cut to pieces by Murat.

The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Vertingen, four leagues from Donaworth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffemberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly awaited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the Imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mont Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate: in vain Nansouty with the heavy dragoons charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down rank after rank of the assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square; the Austrians worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffemberg succeeded in forming a smaller square which effected its retreat into some marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse; but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery remained in the hands of the enemy (2).

Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion appeared to the reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French, as it was depressing to the Imperial soldiers. Napoléon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action, he repaired in person to Zurmurhausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand he distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving, and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Excelmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer, who at the head only of two dragoons had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists

Oct. 9. Recompenses bestowed by Napoléon on the soldiers engaged.

(1) Dum. xiii. 41, 42. Jom. ii. 103, 109.

(2) Dum. xiii. 43, 45. Jom. ii. 109. Bign. iv. 364.

the night after the action, as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the Imperial Guard. Never did sovereign in modern times understand so completely the art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers, by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in whatever rank of the army; and it was as much owing to this circumstance, as the greatness of his military genius, that the superior successes of the grand army, which he commanded in person, to those at a distance, under the orders of his lieutenants, was owing (1).

While the powerful advanced guards of the grand army, viz. the corps of Ney on the left bank of the Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus engaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg: the Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the same place: Davoust, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived at Aicha, all directly in the rear of the Imperialists, while the corps of Kienmayer, almost enveloped in such immense masses, deemed itself fortunate in being able to effect its retreat by the bridge of Neubourg into Baravia, and the city of Munich. Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital, while the corps of Marmont and Davoust were moved in the same direction, in the view of forming a powerful army of observation, which might repel any attempt on the part of the Russians or Imperial reserves from the Hereditary States to disengage the army of Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces. But information soon arrived that the Russians were at such a distance, as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and, therefore, Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced guards on the right bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him, and regain Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army (2).

8th and 9th October.

Mack, instead of falling back to the Tyrol, which was the only retreat which now really remained to him, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the north-east, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsbourg, while the defence of Ulm was intrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants in the vicinity, at strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed; it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Gunzbourg. The latter post

Measures of Mack to extricate himself.

(1) Bign. iv. 365, 366. Dum. xiii. 45, 46.

Generosity as well as excellence of military conduct attracted the notice of the Emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer at the point of perishing in the waves of the river. Forgetting his injury, the brave man plunged in and saved him. The Emperor caused him to be brought into his presence, and after publicly eulogizing his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of honour.—BIGNON, iv. 365, 366.

(2) Dum xiii. 49, 52. Jom. ii. 110, 111.

being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They were there attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces, and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of the town, with the loss of above two thousand men. Disconcerted by this check, and despairing, from the vast accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm, and Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle on the north and east, which enveloped the Austrians in that city (1).

October 9.

October 10.

Bloody combat at Hasslach October 11.

In their advance towards Ulm, the vanguard of Ney encountered a body of Austrians, 20,000 strong, posted in an admirable situation at Hasslach, and supported by a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far advanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy, which was more than double their own, that retreat was impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these circumstances, their commander, General Dupont, took the most audacious, often in such situations the most prudent course,—he vigorously assailed the enemy, and in the evening, the arrival of successive reinforcements in some degree restored the equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and retaken six times during the course of the day: but although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired, leaving, indeed, a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him as a set off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners taken, during the terrible strife in the village, from the Imperial infantry (2).

The honour of the Austrian arms was in some degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmengin. On the 11th October, Soult was detached by Napoléon, with his whole corps, from Augsbourg against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combat which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons, and then began that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large bodies, which, during this campaign, more even than their numerous disasters, tarnished the lustre of the Imperial annals. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper Swabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while the fourth took post on the south-east before the ramparts of Ulm, where they were shortly after joined by the corps of Marmont and Lannes. On the same day, Napoléon, with the Imperial Guard, advanced

October 13. Capitulation of four thousand Austrians in Memmengin.

Completion of the investment of Ulm.

(1) Dum. xiii. 53, 56. Norv. ii. 389, 390.

(2) Jom. ii. 114. Dum. xiii. 57, 62. Bign. iv. 376.

from Augsburg to Burgau, and established his headquarters there for the night, while Ney, on the north, completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed—a hundred thousand French were grouped round the ramparts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep dejection, were accumulated together (1).

Napoléon's address to his soldiers at the Bridge of the Lech.

In advancing towards Ulm on the following morning, at the head of his guards, Napoléon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful; the snow already fell in heavy flakes; the cold was intense; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furrowed its surface. Insensible to the severity of the elements, Napoléon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight, as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory, if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which resemble as much the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions, as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the peculiar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention; but no sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides, and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them (2).

October 13. Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm.

While the formidable legions of Napoléon were thus closing round the Imperial array, the most stormy debates took place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which yet remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only chance of safety which was left was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage either towards Bohemia or the Tyrol; on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted; but the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the Imperial House, overpowered every other consideration, and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the Archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains (3).

(1) Jom. ii. 115, 116. Dum. xiii. 67, 68. Bign. iv. 368.

(2) Dum. xiii. 68, 69. Bign. iv. 369, 370.

(3) Jom. ii. 112. Norv. ii. 392, 393.

At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoléon was preparing for a general attack on the following day on the position which they occupied. His army formed a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were every where in presence of each other.

October 4. Combat at Elchingen.

Early on the following morning Napoléon himself ascended to the chateau of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who at the head of 16,000 men, was commencing an attack on the Bridge and Abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, 15,000 strong, with forty pieces of cannon under Laudon, had there established themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a vast convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the retiring Austrians on the preceding day, but the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered; and they still had a strong advanced guard on the northern bank of the river. Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. Dressed in full uniform, he was every where to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the Imperial outposts on the north bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements, while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on their right, from whence they enfilated the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery made good their ground, and though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable. The French, now in full possession of the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over. Already their cavalry was sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of 1500 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners (1).

The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of them-

(1) Dum. xiii. 72, 74. Jom. ii. 118, 119. Norv, ii. 393, 394. Ney, ii.

It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen was taken. He exposed his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death: but fate reserved him for greater and more melancholy destinies.—Jom. ii. 118.

selves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the House of Hapsbourg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at Elchingen, the Archduke disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which he made a feint of advancing towards Biberach, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed on the road it was following, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach, and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously enjoyed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred of their wearied columns prisoners; but having been joined by the Archduke, who had now returned from his feint towards Biberach, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy. With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose existence depended on the celerity of its movements, with five huudred waggons, heavily laden. They were speedily charged by the French horse and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied. Despairing, after these disasters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the Archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donaworth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a-day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers the Archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmuhl, and by Reidenberg and Ratisbon gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers. But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety (1), were surrounded at Trochtelfingen by the cavalry of Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.

October 15.

Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand with great loss.

October 16.

Surrender of Werneck with 8000 men.

October 18.

The heights around Ulm are carried by Napoléon.

While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoléon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and les Tuileries, which on the other side of the Danube command it in every part (2). These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the

(1) Dum. xiii. 92, 97. Jom. ii. 124, 126. Norv. ii. 397, 398. Rapp. 39, 44.

(2) Personal Observation.

provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the capitulation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign: but the ramparts were incomplete; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the Emperor, who had established his
October 18. head quarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amidst torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack (1). Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of les Tuileries; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and consternation into every part of the city.

Negotiations for the surrender of Mack.

Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoléon beheld Ulm, crowded with troops, stretched out within half cannon-shot at his feet, while the positions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little more than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Werneck, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to surrender, and returning himself to his head-quarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by the Russians. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were at Dauchaw, within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, if you do not grant them eight days. I can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume, before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place."—"Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur, "Ah, Marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource." Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoléon's headquarters to give an account of his unsuccessful mission (2).

Oct. 19. Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoléon sent back Ségur, on the following day, with a written ultimatum, granting the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days, or, death!" replied the Austrian general, and, at the same time, he published a proclamation, in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who should mention the word "surrender (3)!" Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was

(1) Dum. xiii. 80, 84. Jom. ii. 120, 122.

(2) Bour. vii. 25, 27. Dum. xiii. 84, 86. Rapp. Memoirs, 28, 31.

(3) The proclamation was in these terms—"In the name of his Majesty I render responsible, on their honour and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word surrender,' or who should think of any thing but the most obstinate defence: a defence which cannot be required for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced guards of an Imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days: and as to trying an

They capitulate at first conditionally.

despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme, when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the Emperor and his brilliant staff. The Emperor began the conversation, by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the example of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would lead the Imperial army to the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not yet reached the Bavarian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen (1). The Prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack falling suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender, and on the following day the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up, and the whole army lay down its arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian armies (2).

And then unconditionally.

These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms; but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation: Napoléon, to whom every hour was precious, and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters at Elchingen, and there so completely bewildered him by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians, or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops employed in the blockade, amounting to nearly 70,000 men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations (3).

October 20.

In consequence of this new article in the capitulation, a spectacle took place on the following day unparalleled in modern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, 30,000 strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoléon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence, forming part of the heights on the north of the city; for five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay,

The army of Mack defiles before Napoléon.

assault, it could only be done by little detachments: our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; nothing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time"—DUM, xiii. 87.

(1) "You expect the Russians?" said Napoléon: "Do you really, then, not know that they have not reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not fully informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers at least will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have so often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war; after the conduct of your Government, I have no measures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me: I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand was here, I could trust him; but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube, but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your General, I will grant him no other; the officers alone can be allowed to return into Austria: the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer he delays, the worse will be his ultimate fate."—BOUR. vii. 31, 33

(2) Rapp, 35, 36. Jom. ii. 124 Dum. xiii. 87, 88. Bour. vii. 35, See the capitulation in Dum. xiii. 396.

(3) Jom. ii. 127. Dum. xiii. 97, 98. Rapp. 36.

Gottesheim, Lichtenstein, were there—names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones which followed. Napoléon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: "Gentlemen," said he, "war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother the Emperor of Germany,—let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember, *that there are limits to all empires, however powerful.* The idea that the House of Lorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is *ships, colonies, and commerce, which I desire;* and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me." Thus spoke Napoléon on the 20th October, 1805: on the day following, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France on the field of Leipsic (1).

Little anticipating these calamities, the Emperor enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him. The Imperial soldiers, amidst all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been overcome: as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero, who filled the world with his renown; but when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them, and without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen: never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never the devotion to the Emperor so unbounded; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets (2)."

Napoléon's message to the Senate.

Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital,

(1) Bign. iv. 374, 375. Dum. xiii, 99, 100.

As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoléon said to the Austrian Generals,—"It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane Cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war: but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Such an alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed." At this moment, a general officer recounted aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. "You must have little respect for yourself," said Napoléon, with an air of marked displeasure, "to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune."—Savary, i. 101, 102.

(2 Dum. xiii. 101. Rapp, 37.

During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the Emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he had hardly ever off his clothes, incessantly on horseback; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsbourg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception: he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants.—Bign. iv. 376.

Napoléon sent to the Conservative Senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he said, "Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the grand army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without farther effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the Emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say, 'the people have done theirs.'" Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Wirtemberg, and 25,000 muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies (1).

The blame of these disasters divided between Mack and the Aulic Council.

The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian Government, on General Mack; he was subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years in consequence, upon the conclusion of the war. Napoléon interceded for him, but in vain. Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoléon, and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful abridgment of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the Imperial Government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the army; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the Imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed (2). It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoléon's legions were closing

(1) Jom. ii. 130. Dum. xiii, 103, 104.

His proclamation to his soldiers.

"Soldiers of the grand army! in fifteen days we have concluded a campaign. We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. That army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and his subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of 100,000 men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; from that whole army, not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers, I announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained these great advantages without incurring any risk; and what is unexampled in the history of nations, this great result has not weakened us by the loss of 1500 men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your Emperor—to your patience in undergoing fatigues—to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little an effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amidst his customary exaggeration there was much truth in this proclamation,—RAPP. 47, 48.

(2) Rapp. 36. Jom. ii. 130.

around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in afterwards capitulating without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian Government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoléon; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared with an assembly of officers; and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the discreditable custom of laying down their arms on the first reverse in large bodies.

Errors of the Cabinet of Vienna in the general plan of the campaign.

While these stupendous events were paralyzing the Imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and already fiercely contested on the Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two great armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men, with no enemy whatever to combat, on the Tyrol, which might at different times have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and the south of its mountains. While Mack with 80,000 men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the grand army, of double its own strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above 90,000, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige, in presence of Masséna, who had only 50,000 (1); and 20,000 men were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front that the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.

Archduke Charles kept on the defensive in Italy.

No sooner was the Cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoléon's troops across Germany, and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Swabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince accordingly restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions on the Adige; retained his forces on the left bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Masséna in his front; to depress the spirits of his soldiers by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes; and all this for no good purpose, as, before his reinforcements could emerge from the gorges of Tyrol, the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had defiled as captives before the French Emperor (2).

Oct 15.

Forcing of the bridge of Verona by Masséna.

The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself: the town properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs on the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river; and the Archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Swabia to a

(1) Jom. ii. 139. Dum. xiii. 108, 109.

(2) Jom. ii. 139. Dum. ii. 109. Bign. iv. 380, 381.

melancholy defensive, was strengthening with field works the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt in former campaigns, when Masséna, stimulated by the orders of the Emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations. He denounced, accordingly, the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th October, and in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire com-
Oct. 18. mand of the river at that point. At midnight, on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, they attached a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists; but this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers; some threw themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced; and under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street, and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *tête-de-pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution on the part of the French general: it cost the Austrians 2000 men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number (1).

Bloody but indecisive actions at Caldiero.

Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the Archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts, intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy an attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoléon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the farther advance of the French troops. Masséna remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th October, but having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoléon in the plains of Swabia, he resolved to resume the offensive; but how to assail 70,000 men, strongly intrenched, with a force not 50,000, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless he resolved upon making
October 28. the attempt. The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he made his dispositions, for an attack.
October 29. To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived, that by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it. Masséna himself, with two divisions, was to

(1) Bign. iv. 382, 383. Dum. ii. 112, 119. Jom. ii. 140.

engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn his left, and Molitor, with the left wing, was to gain the mountains, and threaten his right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Masséna, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona, while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige. On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre, issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the Imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all his endeavours were unsuccessful; and though his active efforts and threatening aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the Lower Adige, the contest fell exclusively on the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the Imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery; while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Masséna and the Archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit, but they were instantly there cut to pieces by the point blank discharge of the Imperial cannon rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage; for if the French had broken several columns of Imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners, they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists (1).

On the following morning, Masséna renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river; but at daybreak they were reinforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dykes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Soon a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chiavecco del Christo, which in this quarter formed the key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General

(1) Dum. xiii. 119, 143. Jom. ii. 141, 142.

Nordman, who commanded the Austrians, saw all his cannoneers killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterwards one of the most distinguished of the Imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the Archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige (1).

The Archduke resolves to retreat to cover Vienna.

But notwithstanding this success, the Archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the disasters in Germany, which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the empire was laid open, and it was necessary to fly to the protection of the menaced capital. The better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward in the mountains towards the French left, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the
Nov. 2. lake of Guarda. Alarmed at this movement, Masséna stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the Archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to defile towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments which had been so obstinately contested, they found them, stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rear-guard. Masséna's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rear-guard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of his troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, he resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bachiglione, whose stream was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rear-guard in battle array the whole of the 3d November, and on
Nov. 3. the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rear-guard, with heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Masséna, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river, having afforded by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march on the other troops, and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in presence of a victorious enemy, commanded by such an officer as Masséna,

(1) Dum. xiii. 143, 149. Jom. ii. 144, 145. Austrian Official Report.

We have the best possible evidence, that of Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated upon the whole to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had gained considerable advantages over Masséna at Caldiero; in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The Archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches.—*See Napoléon in* MONTH. ii. 108, and 116, and HARD. viii. 499.

secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth (1).

Archduke continues his retreat to Laybach in Carinthia. Nov. 12.

From Vicenza the Archduke retired, by forced marches, through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave, towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Saltzbourg, or proceed by the direct route through Laybach to Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skilfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen torrents of that stream as well as the Piave and the Isonzo could afford, he conducted his march with such ability, that though it lay through narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor the spirits of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams which make their way to the great basin of the Danube (2).

Advance of Napoléon's army through Bavaria. October 24.

Meanwhile Napoléon, whose genius never appeared more strongly than in the vigour with which, by separate columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian troops. On the 24th of October he arrived at Munich, where he was received with every imaginable demonstration of joy, and a general illumination gave vent to the universal transports. Augsbourg was made the grand depôt of the army, while the leading corps, under Bernadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in ceaseless march towards the Hereditary States. Speedily the Iser was passed: the French eagles were borne in exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Brannau. At the same time Marshal Ney, who had remained at Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th October, received orders to move with his whole corps upon the Tyrol, in order to clear the vast fortress which its mountains composed, of the enemy's forces, while Augereau's corps, which, having broken up from Brest, had latest come into the scene of action (3), and had recently crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was moved forward by forced marches to menace the western frontier of that romantic province.

Defensive measures of the Austrians.

While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides upon the Austrian monarchy, the Cabinet of Vienna did their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacuate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower

(1) Dum. xiii. 150, 161. Jom. ii. 143.
(2) Jom. ii. 143, 144. Dum. xiii. 165, 171.
(3) Dum. xiii. 241, 248. Savary, i. 103. 2d Part. Jom. ii. 144.

Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the Emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna (1), set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at his head-quarters at Wells, the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Kienmayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such inconsiderable forces, to withstand Napoléon at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across their line of march (2), so as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching, under Bennigsen and the Archduke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.

Increasing irritation of Prussia.

But while every thing seemed thus to smile upon Napoléon in the south of Germany, a storm was arising in the north which menaced him with destruction. The Cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of a French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation; it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that by keeping aloof she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Germany; and hitherto success had in a surprising manner attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already

(1) "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a Conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to unite in his own hands all the ties upon which depends the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace, which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new constitution which Germany received after the peace of Luneville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our councils. But the Sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, whilst his secret ally, the Elector Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the King of Prussia at the very moment that he had given the most solemn promises to respect it: and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy arose from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undecayed. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare every thing to save what must be saved,—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From this spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, every thing that is great and good; but above all things unanimity, and a quick, firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered, to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe and the security of thrones and of nations." —*Ann. Reg.* 1805, 713.

(2) Dum. xiii, 248, 250. Jom. ii. 144.

been discreditable. So far from having increased the respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the great Frederick, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers; they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submissions; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the Cabinet was violently shaken; the King openly inclined to hostile measures, but the indignation of the nation knew no bounds; Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehement and generous character, could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the Queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the author of the temporizing system, rapidly sunk and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs (1).

Oct. 25. Arrival of Alexander at Berlin, and conclusion of a treaty with Russia.

Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the King to embrace a more manly and courageous policy. Under the influence of so many concurring causes, the French influence rapidly declined; Duroc left the capital on the 2d November, without having been able to obtain an audience for some days previously, either from the King or Emperor; and on the day following, a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier against the ambition of the French Emperor. By this convention it was stipulated, that the treaty of Lunéville was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all the acquisitions which France had since made were to be wrested from it: Switzerland and Holland were to be restored to their independence, and without overturning the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely stipulated that they were never to centre in the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted with the notification of this convention to Napoléon, with authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation, but in case of refusal, to declare war, with an intimation, that hostilities would commence on the 15th December (2).

Nov. 3.

Nocturnal visit to the tomb of the Great Frederick.

The conclusion of this convention was followed by a scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was ultimately attended by consequences of the highest importance upon the destinies of Europe. When they signed it, both were fully aware of the perilous nature of the enterprise on which they were adventuring; as the Archduke Antony had arrived two days before with detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats around Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the Queen conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a bond more likely to be durable, than the mere alliances of Cabinets with each other. This was to

Nov. 4.

(1) Hard. viii. 479, 481. Dum. xiii. 250, 251. Nap. in Las Cas. iv. 229.

(2) Hard. viii. 481, 482. Martens, vii. Dum. xiii. 253, 254.

bring them together at the tomb of the great Frederick, where it was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The Emperor, who was desirous of visiting the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torch-light to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the Emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were engaged. A few hours after Alexander departed for Gallicia to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune, and deeply checkered with disaster, was yet destined to be brought to so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe (1).

It would have been well for the common cause if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her Cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But after the departure of the Emperor, the old habit of temporizing returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to

Nov 14. elapse without any operation being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from Potsdam till the 14th; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoléon was permitted to continue without interruption his advance to Vienna, while 80,000 disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank, amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr. Pitt, could not prevail on the Government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently the Cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities; forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken; that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the Emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoléon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction (2).

Landing of the allies in Hanover.

But though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoléon was not without very serious subject of anxiety in the north of Germany. A com-

(1) Hard. viii. 482. Dum. xiii. 254, 255.

(2) Dum. xiii. 255, 256. Hard. viii. 488, 489. Savary, i. 104.

There were not awanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from any longer adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tempelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are in presence of each other," said he; "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoléon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the allies, and that a strong body should threaten their communications with the Rhine, in order to compel them to divide their forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Ruchel, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council without having come to any determination. —HARD. viii, 489.

bined force of English, Russians, and Swedes, 30,000 strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover; and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance; a sure proof of a secret understanding between the Cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the English Government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the House of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoléon contrived to paralyze the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the Moniteur of the formation of a powerful army of the north, of which Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the Emperor himself (1).

Operations in the Tyrol. On his right flank Marshal Ney was more successful, in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him from all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterwards the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered (2). The imperious necessity to which the Austrian Government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from Tyrol for the protection of the capital, prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the Imperial troops, Napoléon ordered Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn, right upon Innspruck, while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzbourg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenhall to the same capital, and menaced Kuffstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Deroy, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzbourg from that of Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amidst a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kuffstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the Imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolese levies were shut up under the cannon of Kuffstein, which was soon blockaded. Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia,* a celebrated mountain intrenchment which commands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innspruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could to all appearance be assailed. An attack in front, though

(1) Jom. ii. 145. Dum. xiii. 249.

(2) See post Chap L.

supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was repulsed with very heavy loss: success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions, he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in making himself master of the fort of Leitasch, in the rear of the intrenchments: from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful: securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders: in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once: as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable; a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which they had no defence, rendered it impossible either to man the works or stand to the guns (1). A panic seized the garrison; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides a mountain barrier, hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of 1500 prisoners (2).

Surrender of Jellachich and the Prince de Rohan.

The immediate trophy of this victory was the capture of Innspruck, with sixteen thousand stand of arms. The whole northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned; General Jellachich, who commanded in the western part of the Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch, while the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the valley of the Inn and took post upon the Brenner, in the hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the Hereditary States. It was too late, however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with 5000 men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumphs of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Clagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince of Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with 6000 men near Nauders and Finstermung, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surrounded, and joining the garrison left in Venice. Surprising success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he sur-

Nov. 15.

(1) Bign iv. 390, 391. Jom. ii. 167, 168. Dum. xiii. 280, 288.

(2) An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had in the campaign of 1799 lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal at Innspruck one of its officers beheld them among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolese. Instantly the intelligence spread that their lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans hastening in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the companions of their former glory.—BIGNON, iv. 391.

prised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared; Bassado was passed; and the wearied troops were joyfully winding their way across the level fields to the shores of the Lagunæ, when they were met by St.-Cyr, who commanded the force stationed in observation of that town, and completely defeated at Castel Franco. Di-
Nov. 24. spirited by such a succession of disasters, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still 5000 strong, was obliged to lay down
Nov 18. its arms. At the same time the fortress of Kuffstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to march back to the Hereditary States, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, though garrisoned by 25,000 regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than the half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzbourg to co-operate with Masséna, who was approaching the same quarter against the Archduke Charles, while Augereau withdrew to Ulm (1), to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.

Napoléon advances into Upper Austria.

It was not inability to defend the Tyrol which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the House of Austria had long been conspicuous; it was the pressing danger of the heart of the empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoléon's progress down the valley of the Danube was every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up: forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line
October 31. against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Muhldorf, the ramparts of Brannau, armed as they were with artillery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn crossed by innumerable battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable that the French Emperor gave immediate order for its conversion into the grand
Nov. 3. depôt of the army. Meanwhile, Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the advanced guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the
Nov. 4. enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach; a more stubborn resis-
Nov. 6. tance near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the new enemy with whom they had now to contend, barely retarded the march of the invaders an hour; the determined opposition of the Austrians near the foot of the mountains (2), at the bridge of Steyer over the Ens, only delayed Marshal Davoust with the right wing of the army a day; and at length the Imperial headquarters were established at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.

The Emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops occasioned, to give a new organization to his army, with a view to the

(1) Dum. xiii. 280, 293. Jom. ii. 168, 170.

(2) Sav. ii. 102, 103. Dum. xiii. 264, 277. Jom. ii. 133, 134.

surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Lannes, which moved next to them on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube; and such directions given to the numerous corps on its right bank as were best calculated to ensure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that the Emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the north, under the command of his brother Louis, composed of six divisions; a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany; while at the same time a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times (1), the Marquis LA ROMANA, which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow in the same direction.

Nov. 8.

Austrian proposals of peace, which come to nothing.

At Lintz the Emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice with a view to a general peace. The ruined condition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, and the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian Cabinet over their long continued jealousy of France. Napoléon received the envoy courteously, but after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that propositions should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the Emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions. If these terms were not agreed to, he declared he would continue, without an hour's intermission, his march towards Vienna (2).

Kutusoff withdraws to the left bank of the Danube.

These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of their reserves, while a strong rearguard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rearguard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat; in which, although the allies were ultimately forced to retreat from the increasing multitude of the enemy (3), they long stood their

(1) Dum. xiii. 294, 298. Jom. ii. 145. Sav. ii. 103.

(2) Sav. ii. 104. Dum. xiii. 298, 300. Jom. ii. 146.

(3) A remarkable instance of courage occurred

ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St.-Polten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed, through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right, while the Emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the Imperial guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to withstand such formidable forces; either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality.

Nov. 9. Continued advance of the French towards Vienna.

Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Lintz and Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded for some days at least in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St.-Polten the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced: no force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry eagerly pushing

Nov. 10.

forward, on the following day reached Burkendorf, within four leagues of the capital. About the same time, Davoust, while toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and wooded Alpine ridges which formed the romantic southern barrier of the valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rearguard of Meerfelt, which, unsuspicious of evil, was pursuing its course in a southern direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of

Nov. 8.

Marmont. Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through the centre and thrown into such confusion, that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring woods and mountains, leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces of cannon in the hands of the enemy (1).

Destruction of part of Mortier's corps by Kutusoff.

But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoléon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befel them on the left.

here on the part of a French cannoneer. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high-road, had seized a battery of horse artillery which was firing grape at them within half musket shot, and sabred most of the gunners. One of them, however, though wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and putting the match to the touch-hole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen with such decisive effect that the whole squadron turned and fled.—Dumas, xiii. 303, 304.

(1) Dum. xiii. 307, 309. Jom. ii. 148, 149.

When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chasseurs, which he commonly wore, Napoléon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped, and inquired into the cause of her lamentations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the Emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged, and my gardener killed, by his soldiers."—"Your name?" replied he.—"De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marbœuf, formerly governor of Corsica."—"I am charmed," rejoined Napoléon. "to have the means of serving you. I am the Emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chasseurs of the guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with.—Rapp, 54, 55.

Murat, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French Emperor; who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger would attend those on the left bank, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which he had received to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind the columns on the right bank, and intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia, was eagerly emerging from the defiles of Diernstein, beneath the Danube and the rocky hills beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur de Lion was once immured, when he came upon the Russian rearguard under Milaradovitch, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery. He instantly commenced the attack at break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm: fresh troops arrived on both sides: the grenadiers fought man to man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff, ably conducted by the Austrian General Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had by a circuitous march through the hills reached his rear, and already occupied Diernstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal had the bulk of Kutusoff's force on his hands in front, his retreat was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army (1).

Nov. 11.

Desperate action at Diernstein.

Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten their march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant cannonade from the farther extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. In truth it was the division of Dupont, which, fully aware of the imminent danger of their general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them. This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants, in the

(1) Sav. ii. 105. Dum. xiv. 1, 13. Jom. ii. 150, 151.

dark or by the light of the moon, continued the strife: the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of fire-arms; while the ancient Gothic towers which once held in chains the crusading hero were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upwards of two-thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded his sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to step on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave Marshal refused to leave his comrades (1). This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with heroic courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, but who now in his turn found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grape-shot, at the moment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's division. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amidst the cries of "France! France! you have saved us," the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades (2).

Mortier recrosses the Danube.

This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoléon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men, which in so mighty a host was of little consequence,—that of the allies had amounted to two-thirds of that number,—and it could easily be repaired, it was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source of annoyance. Mortier on the day after the battle esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutusoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been clearly demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated but out-generalled; and the Moscovites, in their first serious engagement of the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle of Marengo. He paused therefore a day at St.-Polten; and abandoning all thoughts of harassing any farther the retreat of Kutusoff, turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would render totally impossible the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces (3).

Nov. 11.

Napoléon advances rapidly on Vienna.

Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition upon Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges

(1) "No," said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to command such brave soldiers should esteem himself too happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grape-shot; we are almost at Diernstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—Dumas, xiv. 14.

(2) Bign. iv. 402, 403. Dum. xiv. 9, 15. Jom. ii. 151, 152. Sav. ii. 105.

(3) Jom. ii. 153. Dum. xiv. 17, 18. Sav. ii. 105.

over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not (1). Meanwhile the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it at this eventful crisis to Count Wurbna, the grand chamberlain, who executed with great fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when they found themselves deserted by Government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts; but it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoléon's headquarters to treat of a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to the terms on which an armistice could be granted; but the French Emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded, and the Tyrol, with the Duchy of Venice, be immediately ceded to France (2).

Description of that city.

Built in the superb basin formed on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. Anciently the frontier station of the Roman empire against the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the frontier of civilization has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century; but the inhabitants hardly regarded as conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to an innumerable army of Turks in 1688 gave time for Sobiesky to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe from barbarian yoke. The old city is surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions; but it contains only 100,000 souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glacis, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments; but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decoration, though the church of St.-Stephens, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, possesses the greatest interest; and the Imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. But in a military point of view its capture was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only bridge below Lintz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon, and above a hundred thousand stand of arms (3).

(1) "As soon as ten o'clock on the 12th has arrived you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Giulay, before ten o'clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but, notwithstanding, use all your efforts to secure the passage of the river."—*Orders to Murat, 12th November*, 1805, *in* DUMAS, xiv. 20.

(2) Jom. ii. 153, 154. Dum. xiv. 17, 25. Sav. ii. 105.

(3) Personal observation. Jom. ii. 155, 156. Dum. xiv. 23, 25.

Seizure of the bridge of Vienna.

The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he stimulated the armament of the Hungarian insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the farther prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, the French forces in great strength approached Vienna; and Napoléon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge which led across the river to the northern provinces of the empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the outposts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfelt, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridges over the Danube to Prince Auersberg, who, with a strong rearguard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the Imperial

Nov. 13.

dominions. At daybreak on the 13th November, General Sébastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely followed by Murat, Lannes, and General Bertrand, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Léopold on its opposite side, and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thabor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced guard of the Austrians. Every thing was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge was wrapt in flames, and all communication with the left bank was cut off. The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops; every thing bore a friendly appearance; the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers as in time of profound peace: so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances: General Belliard advanced, with Lannes and Murat, with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter: they called out to the Imperial officers "not to fire, as the armistice was concluded;" and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French Generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge: for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French grenadiers were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible: the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grape shot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying, with a loud voice, "What are you about? do you not see?" At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward: the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that the armistice was signed: while the column advanced with a rapid step along the bridge, covering by its mass a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillery-men on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forbore to fire: the critical moment was passed; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge,

and suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoneers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by a stratagem, conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would be worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can either palliate or excuse (1).

Napoléon passes through Vienna, and establishes headquarters at Schoenbrunn.

This surprise of the bridge of Vienna gave the highest satisfaction to Napoléon, and it was in truth one of the most important events of the campaign. It was now in his power, from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force either against the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased; the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. Impatient to profit by such extraodinary good fortune, the Emperor, at daybreak the following morning, crossed the bridge and established his headquarters at Schoenbrunn, from which the young Archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to regain his communications with the allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna; the hospital train were established there; the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been ordered up from Metz and Strasbourg; while one-half of the army, passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kuffstein in Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles (2).

Subsequent movements of the armies.

The unexpected surprise of the bridge of Vienna contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his masterly movement across the Danube were now lost; the river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoléon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit in different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Noslitz, on the 15th November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rearguard of the Imperialists was soon overtaken, encumbered as it was with great loads of artillery and stores, which had been taken from the arsenal of Vienna: one hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, and equipments to an immense amount, fell almost without a combat into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of

(1) Bour. vii. 49, 50. Rapp, 56, 60. Sav. ii. 105, 106. Dum. xiv. 27, 31. Jom. ii. 157, 159.

(2) Sav. ii. 107, 108. Dum. xiv. 31, 33. Bour. vii. 50, 51.

the whole cavalry and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaim before the enemy, which, if done, would have prevented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. Meanwhile, Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian General, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable (1).

Finesse of Kutusoff in parrying the attempts of the French to circumvent him.

Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaim, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of an armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns; but he soon found that he had a very different antagonist to deal with in such an attempt from the unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shewn themselves superior in address to all the diplomatists of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia; while, in the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied (2). Murat fell into the snare: Bagration, who was in presence of the French videttes with 8000 men, indeed remained stationary: but meanwhile, the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaim, which opened up their communication with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves which were approaching. The Emperor Napoléon was highly indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but before his answer could be received, twenty hours had been gained, Znaim was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagration and his division in presence of the enemy (3).

Heroic action of Bagration, who at length makes good his retreat.

At noon on the 16th despatches arrived from Napoléon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagration to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army: nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to the last man to their country. He was soon assailed at once in front and both flanks, by Lannes, Oudinot, and Murat, to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian

(1) Jom. ii. 159, 160. Dum. xiv. 33, 36, 45. Sav. ii. 108.

(2) "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in my view nothing but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The Adjutant-General, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that of the French Emperor, and meanwhile caused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagration to almost certain ruin: but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps." —Dumas, xiv. 48.

(3) Jom. ii. 160, 161. Dum. xiv. 44, 51. Bign. iv. 432, 434.

position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Muscovites made good their ground: in vain column after column bravely advanced to the attack: the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however, the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed: the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved by a constant feeling towards the centre; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle: man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of fire-arms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night; and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife 5000 Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagration effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly 5000, unbroken from amidst 40,000 enemies: a glorious achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino (1).

Junction of the Russian armies. Measures of Napoléon.

Nothing now could prevent the junction of the allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau in Moravia, without farther molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoléon. It was no longer a dispirited band of 40,000 men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own, but a vast army, 75,000 strong, animated by the presence of the Emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoléon was in consequence daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army: the Archduke Charles, with 70,000 tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south: the Hungarian insurrection was organizing in the east: 75,000 Russians were in his front: while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with 80,000 men on his communications. The measures of Napoléon were calculated with his wonted ability to ward off so many concurring dangers. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies with whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expand forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained and a moral impression produced, and concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to disseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria: Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria to observe the Archduke Charles: Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians: Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, were removed towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with the 10,000 men who had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the upper Danube; while Mortier with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The corps of Soult

(1) Dum. xiv. 50, 55. Sav. ii. 108, 109. Jom. ii. 160, 161. Bign. iv. 434, 435.

and Lannes, with the imperial guard and the cavalry under Murat, advanced on the road to Brunn to make head against the now united Russian armies (1).

Conduct of the French at Vienna.

Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the gates were open, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in the occupation of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government was organized throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and then next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and even considerable payments made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments, —admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendant of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under authority of Napoléon himself, and the coercion of private plunder had not been all turned to the account of the great Imperial robber (2). At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the war were, as usual, ascribed to the English and the corrupting influence of their gold, while, with a rudeness unworthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne, the character and influence of the Empress herself (3).

Forces on the two sides.

Meanwhile the allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau; 104 battalions, including 20 Austrian, and 159 squadrons, of which 50 were of same nation, presented a total of 75,000 effective men. A division of the Imperial guard, under the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly 90,000. The forces which the French Emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great array were much less considerable, and hardly amounted at that moment to 70,000 combatants; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmutz before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their Sovereign, whose presence amongst them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers; but in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but

(1) Dum. xiv. 55, 58. Jom. ii 162, 163. Bign. iv. 435.

(2) The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000 sterling, a sum fully equivalent to L.8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest at Vienna, were immense; 2000 pieces of artillery, of which 500 were heavy for siege: 100,000 muskets; 600,000 quintals of powder; 600,000 balls; and 160,000 bombs. 15,000 muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—See Bignon, iv. 412.

(3) Bign. iv. 412, 417. Jom. ii. 157. Dum. xiv. 37, 40.

the indomitable firmness of northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground against them (1).

Nov. 20. Napoléon reconnoitres the fields of Austerlitz

The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoléon advanced his headquarters to Brunn, a fortified place, containing considerable magazines recently abandoned by the allies, and which afforded him the immense advantage of a secure depôt for his stores, sick, and wounded, in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, when out on horseback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a stratagetical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. The two chief roads of that part of Moravia, that from Nikolsbourg to Olmutz, and from Brunn towards Hungary by Holitsch, cross at that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here: within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this intersection of the roads led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced guard of the French, in presence of Napoléon himself, and the rear guard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the enemy compelled the allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced guard of Masséna had entered into communication with Marmont's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the grand army, so that Napoléon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany (2).

Nov. 25.

Dangers of his situation.

But all this notwithstanding, the French Emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Masséna and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archdukes Charles and John, nearly 90,000 strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their arms. The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Archduke Constantine at headquarters had already raised their efficient force to 80,000 men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmutz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by 20,000 of the soldiers of the Great Frederick (3). Every thing depended upon striking a decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties.

Nov. 25. Simulate negotiations on both sides to gain time.

The more to inspire the allies with the false confidence which might lead to such a result, Napoléon despatched Savary with a letter to the Emperor Alexander to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his arrival with his army, and propose terms of accommodation (4). About the same time Counts Giulay and Stadion arrived at the

(1) Dum. xiv. 61, 63. Jom. ii. 165, 166. Bign. iv. 435.

(2) Bign. iv. 436. Dum. xiv. 104, 105, 118.

(3) Dum. xiv. 120, 121. Bign. iv. 438, 439. Jom. ii. 171, 172.

Nov. 25. (1) "Sire," said Napoléon, "I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty, to offer you my compliments on your arrival at the head-quarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your Majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your Majesty will receive him with that condescension for which you are so eminently distinguished,

headquarters of the French Emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoléon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgoruecki, whom Napoléon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoléon, when the aide-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Emperor Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease betwixt us." The Russian represented that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his Cabinet, and that the Emperor had only taken up arms to succour Austria, and obtain for the Continent a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter or animosity against France, which he desired to see powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast that its extension was no object of ambition; and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects. Napoléon replied, that the allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgoroucki denied; and he denied also that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia;

and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you. I pray God to keep your Imperial Majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmutz, on the 27th, in these terms;—"I have received, sir, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments: I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you: receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declaiming against the ambition of the French Government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The Emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him; it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The Emperor said, when I put the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. It is long since he has been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only Grand Duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters and met with nothing but obloquy from the other Cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian Cabinet to take the lead, to induce the other powers of Europe, to recognize the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence. I have been called on by them to concur with them in establishing an order of things which may tranquillize all parties; and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted; but I will never desert an ally in distress, or separate my cause from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but not beyond the reach of remedy. I command brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandisement? Since the peace of Lunéville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposition.'

"'Genoa has been acquired by us,' answered Savary, 'in spite of ourselves. Its political power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has regained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with Republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The Emperor, in sending me to your Majesty, was far from doubting that the war took its origin in these questions; if so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility," It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission; but effectually gained its real design in making the French Emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the allied headquarters.—Savary, ii. 112, 128.

but admitted that they insisted on the independence of Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. "Let the Emperor of Russia imitate my conduct," said Napoléon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation."—"He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgorucki.—"Then we must fight," rejoined Napoléon. "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But though it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the allies as to the real state of affairs. The Emperor met him at the advanced posts, as if solicitous, to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward, field works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army, and Dolgorucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French Emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed (1).

Nov. 28.

Haugwitz arrives from Berlin.

On the same day, Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in the treaty of November 3. Since that time the measures of the Cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover; a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade; and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia, and all the former authorities reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia; while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia to bring immediate succour to the allied army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian Müller had wrought up the public mind to a perfect frenzy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoléon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He therefore resolved to temporize, and if possible dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. He therefore refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amidst the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily obeyed his directions (2).

The allies advance to Wischau.

When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the north and south, it was the obvious policy of the allies to remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmutz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had descended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The Russian troops, miserably provided at that period with com-

(1) Sav. ii. 115, 128. Bign. iv. 437, 442.

When Dolgorucki had retired, Napoléon said to the officers around him, "The allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre, before they make such propositions;" a remarkable expression, which subsequent events rendered prophetic.—Bour. vii. 67.

(2) Hard. viii. 497, 498. Bign. iv. 437, 438. Jom. ii. 171.

missaries, and totally destitute of magazines in that part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions; while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply supplied with provisions of all sorts. The allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brunn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in echelon in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the left flank of the French army, cut them off from their communication with Vienna and the reserve under Masséna, and at the same time establish their own connection with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. The movement commenced on the 27th at day-
Nov. 27. break, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy. The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an assailant; a detachment
Nov. 28. was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Rausnitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagration. Encouraged by this success of its advanced guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischau, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz (1).

Preparatory movements on both sides.

This sudden irruption produced an immediate concentration of the French army. Murat, Lannes, and Soult received orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brunn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians alone at Iglau, and advance by forced marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsbourg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brunn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. In this way Napoléon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than 50,000 strong, would be raised in a few days to 90,000 men; but before these distant succours could arrive, great successes might be obtained, and the Emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were reassembled. Fortunately for him, their movements were
Nov. 29. slow and vacillating. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force towards the French left: but on the day
Nov. 30. following they retraced their footsteps, and, advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hoqueditz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching across their position towards the right of the army. Napoléon spent the whole of both days on horseback, at the advanced posts, watching their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right towards Brunn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design, the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy (2). Austerlitz was evacuated, and

(1) Dum. xiv. 150, 152. Hard. viii. 505, 506. Jom. ii. 172.

(2) Norv. ii. 407, 408. Jom. ii. 174, 175. Dum. xiv. 133, 134. Bign. iv. 439, 440.

the French army concentrated round Brunn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries.

At length, on the morning of the 1st December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifested. Napoléon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched, with intense anxiety, their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops who had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Hohenlinden had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous operations in war—a flank march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that too when that enemy was Napoléon at the head of 75,000 men (1).

Allied order of battle.

Meanwhile the allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut them off from Vienna, and throw them back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which it was hoped would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. Their first column under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Aujezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Pratzen, directly before their right wing; the third, under Prybyszeweki, crowned the eminences immediately behind that elevated point; the fourth and fifth, under Milaradowitch and Lichtenstein, followed in order, shewing their flank to the enemy, and stretching along the whole front of his position: while the reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz. In all, 114 battalions and 172 squadrons, amounting to full eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition (2).

Description of the field of battle.

The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position, in advance of the fortress of Brunn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. The Emperor's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brunn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues and a-half from the former place, a little in front of Bollowitz, between the two streams which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Punlowitz (3). From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fish-ponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the lake Moenitz, formed by the confluence, in that undulated country, of the two rivulets above mentioned; their left on the Bosenitzberg—an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain

(1) Hard. viii. 506, 507. Dum. xiv. 133, 135. Norv. ii. 408. Jom ii. 175, 176. Sav. ii. 130.

(2) Dum. xiv. 134, 135. Nap. ii. 176.

(3) These names will convey no idea to readers in this country; but they will be of value to the traveller who explores in that distant region the theatre of this memorable conflict.

which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the March, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which on either side bordered the streams, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brunn to Olmutz, and by various country roads, from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence. Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, lay the line of waving heights, gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge, sought, to conceal the general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoléon (1).

Disposition of the French troops.

By great exertions, the French Emperor had succeeded in assembling an immense force for the decisive battle which was approaching. The left wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advance guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Bosenitzberg. Next to these were placed the corps of Bernadotte, who by forced marches had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high-road, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the Imperial guard, under Bessières, in second line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, who by incredible efforts had come up from Hungary, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the abbey of Raygern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the lake Moenitz. Before the night of the 1st December, above ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues; all veterans inured to war, and burning with impatience to signalize themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow (2).

Nocturnal illumination of the French lines.

Napoléon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, speaking to the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a decisive blow;" and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs, animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which, so often on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won (3). Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires

(1) Personal observation. Dum. xiv. 136, 143. Jom. ii. 175, 176.

(2) Dum. xiv. 142, 147. Sav. ii. 131, 134. Jom. ii. 177.

(3) "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the fire if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first strokes, for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manœuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious; while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the

were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled with the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved Emperor, celebrated thus, by the spontaneous combustion of the wood of their huts and straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation (1).

Movements on both sides in the morning.

The night was cold but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly enabled the sentinels to discern each other at ten yard's distance. At four in the morning the Emperor mounted on horseback. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the south eastern parts of the horizon; and all the reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, their orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Tilnitz, the outermost village in their possession on that side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoléon hear the sound of distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced; every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared. Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the summit of the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day; and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun rose in unclouded brilliancy—that "Sun of Austerlitz" which he so often afterwards apostrophized as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life. As the mist sunk and the upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent: the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted; it was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Tilnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoléon saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour, and turning to Soult, said, "How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?"—"Less than twenty minutes," replied the Marshal; "for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs; the enemy cannot see them."—"In that case," said Napoléon, "let us wait twenty

clearest indication of the mutual confidence which long service together had established between them. —See DUMAS, xiv. 148, 149.

(1) Dum. xiv. 146, 149. Sav. ii. 132, 133. Jom. ii. 176, 177.

minutes; when the enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right, towards Tilnitz, and an aide-de-camp arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoléon; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time the Emperor mounted his horse, and riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers," said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder (1)."

Battle of Austerlitz.

The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the allies were toiling in a wide semi-circle round their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action; but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their superiority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Tilnitz, and Buxhowden was advancing through the defile which leads from thence to Sokelnitz, beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoléon ordered Davoust, who with his reserve was concealed behind the abbey of Raygern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up Sokelnitz also was carried, amidst loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokelnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of cannon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution (2).

Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth Russian column, under Kollowrath, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, which preceded it, when its outpost perceived the immense dark mass of French infantry emerging out in the mist of the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been committed, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was awanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Pratzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Milaradowitch rapidly wheeled into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult had ascended the heights: its attack was so impetuous, that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Pratzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' dura-

(1) Dum. xiv. 160, 161. Jom. ii. 179, 180. Sav. ii. 133, 134. Bign. iv. 444.

(2) Jom. ii. 183. Dum. xiv. 160, 165. Norv. ii. 410.

tion, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the allied army, surprised in their line of march, were pierced throug hthe centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army (1).

While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte and Lannes, were also warmly engaged with the enemy. They too surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoléon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. They advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in order of battle, the second in columns, with the artillery between them, and Murat in reserve with the cavalry behind the second line: a disposition every where attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, when moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunderstruck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist in the low grounds; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand Duke Constantine was one of the first to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, however, were speedily made; the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, were wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellermann were assailing even the imperial Russian guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Austrian cuirassiers, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoléon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain (2).

This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive success to either party: but it had long the desired effect of preventing any succours being sent from that quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult. At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make head against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: they joined the horse of Ouvaroff, and formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the allies. Meanwhile the Grand Duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were

(1) Dum. xiv. 170, 172. Jom. ii. 185, 186. Bign. iv. 445.

(2) Oum. xiv. 176, 181. Jom. ii. 186. Bign. iv. 445, 446.

The combat of Lannes and Bernadotte, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops, arranged in the order prescribed by Napoléon, baffled all the efforts of the allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array; the second in squares of battalions—the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arrayed in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares in the rear, from whose front and flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to bring them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition to baffle the most intrepid charges of the finest cavalry in the world.—See DUMAS, xiv. 183.

making on his own side, brought forward the Russian Imperial guard, and descending from the heights, advanced midway into the low grounds to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by the Russian cuirassiers of the guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the French column was broken: three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th regiment lost its eagle. Napoléon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder; and immediately ordered up Marshal Bessières with the cavalry of the guard to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and, preceded by four pieces of horse-artillery, set off at the gallop to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there; they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to re-form their squadrons after their glorious success when this fierce enemy was upon them: they were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, they returned to the charge: both imperial guards met in full career: the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. The infantry on both sides advanced to support their comrades; the resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, company to company, man to man, they fought with invincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewed with the dead and the dying. At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their guard gave way, and after losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz (1); while from a neighbouring eminence the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army (2).

This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing, between Aujezd and Sokelnitz to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoléon caused his reserves and imperial guard to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokelnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of 6000 men, who were retracing their steps, too late to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated and half of its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate: and the survivors from his divisions, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central column of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouche from Aujezd with a

(1) Rapp, 61, 62. Dum. xiv. 191, 195. Jom. ii. 187, 188. Sav. ii. 135, 136.

(2) It is the moment when Rapp returned with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive success, that Gerard has selected for the admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz. —Rapp, 62.

view to regain, by a road between the margin of the lakes in his rear and the high grounds which adjoin them to the south, the remains of the army at Austerlitz. But before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle, and separating Buxhowden with a few battalions in advance from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear, by the imperial guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance they were at length overwhelmed: 7000 were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, a frozen lake or morass which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shells from the French batteries bursting below the surface caused it to crack with a loud explosion: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above 2000 brave men were swallowed up in the waves (1).

While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight of their battalions on the heights which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes, Bernadotte, and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat continued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse; but at noon the allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Kruh, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagration, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass, and dislodging it from the road of Olmutz, where almost the whole of the baggage of the allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution Bagration succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army (2).

Results of the battle.

Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoléon; that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; and the stroke which at once reestablished his affairs and prostrated Europe was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners (3); a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards remained the trophies of the victor's triumph; and the disorganisation of the combined forces was complete. It is true these advantages had been dearly purchased; twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the allies were cut off from the road to Olmutz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank, while Napoléon's victorious legions thundered in their rear. Such was the

(1) Dum. xiv. 195, 203. Jom. ii. 189, 190. Sav. ii. 137.

(2) Jom. ii. 190, 191. Dum. xiv. 182, 189: Sav. ii. 136. Bign. iv. 449.

(3) The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a large proportion of them were wounded.

consternation produced by this disaster that, at a council held at midnight at the Emperors' lodgings, it was resolved by a great majority that the farther prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoléon to propose an armistice (1).

Dangers of Napoléon's situation notwithstanding his success.

There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoléon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war; and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses; but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Moscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of 80,000 men, in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent, Masséna, was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising *en masse* at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Iglau. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmutz; while Prussia, with 100,000 men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to advance farther into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat without commencing a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power (2)?

The Austrians sue for an armistice.

Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoléon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without farther danger, but the utmost possible eclat. As on the Carinthian mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were within his grasp. The better to increase the terror of his arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and, appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders in the mean time for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour (3).

Meanwhile the allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the

(1) Jom. ii. 190, 193. Dum. xiv. 207, 209. Sav. ii. 137. Bign. iv. 450, 451.

(2) Jom. ii. 191. Dum. xiv. 208, 210. Hard. ix. 2, 4. Sav. ii. 138.

(3) Bign. iv. 452. Jom. ii. 191, 192. Dum. xiv. 209, 210.

Dec. 4. Interview of Emperor Francis with Napoléon.

attacks made on its rearguard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the chateau of Hollitch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitch, in order to be ready for the conference which Napoléon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the road side near Sarutchitz, still shewn to travellers, where the fire of a bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoléon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months."—"You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two Emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoléon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the Allies. Every thing, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amidst universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilized world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissention on the Continent, and, secure from attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoléon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins (1).

Armistice with Russia.

The conference lasted two hours, after which the two Emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of mutual esteem. The conditions had been verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Presburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference, but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without farther molestation, to their own country (2). Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which was immediately agreed to; and, without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoléon immediately stopped the advance of his columns (3). In truth, after the secession of Austria, the

(1) See this admitted in Dum. xiv. 214, 216. Bign. iv. 453.

(2) Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it, in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Marche was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeld. Davoust had already commanded his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the Emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful, as, independent of the Austrians, 26.000 Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—See SAVARY, ii. 144, 145.

(3) Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's head-

war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate in being able to extricate his army without farther danger, from its perilous situation. Anxious to conciliate the good will of so powerful an adversary, Napoléon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, without exchange; and Alexander set out two days after by post, for St.-Petersburg (1).

Armistice of Austerlitz.

On the 6th December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated, that, until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was levelled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the Cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered on so untoward an occasion. Napoléon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the wounded and widows of those who had fallen in the battle (2). At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners, above sixteen thousand in number, in the most ostentatious manner through the streets of Vienna on their road to France (3), and returned himself to Schoenbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Presburg (4).

Dissimulation of Prussia, and accommodation with that power.

Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the great Frederick, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the toils of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand Duke Constantine and Prince Dolgoroucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposition of the Prussian Cabinet if they would vigorously prosecute the war; but the veteran diplomatist to whom

quarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed; and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manœuvres has never given me time to succour the menaced points: every where you were at least double the number of our forces."—"Sire," replied Savary, "your Majesty has been misinformed Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less than yours; and even of that the whole was not very warmly engaged: but we manœuvred much, and these same divisions combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the Emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your Majesty, by accepting the armistice, does not dispose it otherwise."—"What guarantee does your master require?" replied Alexander, "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?"—"He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust."—"I give it with pleasure," rejoined the Emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St.-Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—Savary, ii. 142, 143.

(1) Sav. ii. 140, 141. Dum. xiv. 216, 218. Bign. iv. 454.

(2) In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy, "Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory: peace cannot now be far removed. When every thing necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy: and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'There is a brave man.'" Liberal gratifications at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 3000 francs each; and the common soldiers a Napoléon each: the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or L.240; of the colonels, 2400, or L.96; of the common men, 200, or L.8 sterling yearly.—See Savary, ii. 148, and Bignon, iv. 460.

(3) Bign. iv. 460. Dum. xiv. 214, 222. Sav. ii. 148.

(4) On his road there, Napoléon met a large convoy of wounded Austrians on their rout for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the waggons passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune." So well did this great man know how to win the affections and command the admiration of the very soldiers who had lavished their best blood in combating his power.

the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Haugwitz as already mentioned, had come to Vienna to declare war against Napoléon, and the 15th December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French Emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing could be more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his view of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessary, it was now likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part. But not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a step farther. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to secure a part of the spoils of his former allies; and if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least wrest from England those
Dec. 7. continental possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery he changed the whole object of his mission; and when admitted into the presence of Napoléon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions until the conclusion of a peace between France and England (1).

Although Napoléon had not received full accounts of the treaty of 3d November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, 30,000 strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslaw. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into a vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet; informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations; and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole forces against them; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovisioned, were in no condition to make any defence; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their matchless perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best founded causes of animosity: on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England; but this could be only on one condition—that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into

Treaty of alliance with Prussia, who gains Hanover.

the French alliance. On these terms he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with their dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria. Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations: and it was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Bareuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as well as all the other continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neufchatels and Cleves to France; and accede to all

(1) Bign. v. 14, 17. Hard. ix. 14, 28. Sav, ii. 148, 149.

the conditions of the general peace of Presburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed by Haugwitz on December 15, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. Thus the Prussian Minister extricated himself, not only without loss, but with apparent advantage, from his perilous situation. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous: it excited a just indignation in the Governmen of Great Britain (1), without really propitiating that of France (2); and by inducing a false security in the Cabinet of Berlin; rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved (3).

Dec. 15.

To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Presburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the North of Germany, which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria.

Affairs of Naples.

The Court of Naples had entered somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France. Notwithstanding the treaty of 21st September, already mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated, a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three thousand English troops, cast anchor in the bay of Naples, and

(1) As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the Cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say that it was signed by Haugwitz, of his own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the Government at home: and that so far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the prejudice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that four days after the treaty was signed, a long and official note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English Ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Berlin as a declaration of war, and various arrangements were proposed for the farther continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterwards, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that Minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French Ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoléon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his habitual disregard of truth, some months afterwards, published, in the Moniteur, an article, in which he declared, that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the Cabinet; and that he had for "base bribes prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent." [See 34th bulletin, and Moniteur, No. 106.] This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoléon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled: "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the Treaty of 3d November Napoléon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair; but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach."—*See* Bignon, v. 240, and Hardenberg, ix. 30, 42.

Dec. 19.

Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were made known. The war party, in particular, with the Queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment a friendly and allied power. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the Cabinet: national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed that the treaty was ratified only under the following reservations:—That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only; a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction.—*See* Hardenberg, ix 50, 59; Bignon, v. 241, 242.

(2) "The conduct of Prussia," said Mr. Fox, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Parliament, "was a union of every thing that was contemptible in servility with every thing that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces; but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, that of being compelled to become the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master."—23*d April*, 1806, *Parl. Deb.* vi. 891.

(3) Hard. ix. 47, 49. Bign. v. 17, 19. Sav. ii. 149, 150

"You have come," said Napoléon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory; but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoléon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on; but he prudently determined in the mean time to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by embroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unaided, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—See Bignon, v. 14.

soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the allies, what in effect happened, that this armament would have the effect of embroiling the Court with the French Emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality and inability to resist the allied forces; and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France; but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The Queen did every thing in her power to engage the Cabinet in the war, and the French ambassador disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the Court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the Government, seeing a war inevitable, was taking measures for organizing a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, like a flash of lightning, to deliver them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor (1).

And of the north of Germany.

It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British Government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the King's German legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to 18,000 men, which arrived, in October, in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of 12,000 men, and a Russian force, under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of 10,000; and it was the intention of the Allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and after freeing the United States from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscarriage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the Allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order to accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was to dissolve this ill combined armament; the Russians retired to Mecklenberg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund (2).

Peace of Presburg, 27th Dec. 1805.

The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoléon, were not long of being brought to a close. By the peace of Presburg she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Inviertel;

(1) Bot. iv. 198, 199. Ann. Reg. 1805, 193. Jom. ii. 198, 199. Bign. v. 35, 37.

(2) Jom. ii. 196, 197. Ann. Reg. 1805, 187, 188.

to the kingdom of Italy, the whole continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognized. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were elevated to the throne of their respective dominions, with large accessions of territory to each : to the former, besides the Tyrol and Voralberg, the principality of Echstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzbourg and the possessions of the Teutonic order, which, from their dispersion in different states, were almost a nominal acquisition. But what was of still greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage "to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the Kings of Wirtemberg or Baden might think proper to adopt,"—a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic empire. The counter-stipulations were entirely illusory : Napoléon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic Confederacy, which he held in chains; and that of the Batavian Republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis (1).

Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided, that Austria was to pay a contribution of 40,000,000 francs, or L.1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered provinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for their behoof (2). But her Government judged wisely that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire; and therefore they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large portion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior

(1) Martens, iv. Sup. vi. 212, 220. Jom. ii. 195. Dum. xiv. 236, and 339, 351.

(2) The losses of Austria by this treaty were,—

	Population.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
	2,975,620	1,417	17,075,000
She received	271,000	86	2,900,000
Clear loss	2,704,620	1,331	14,175,000
Bavaria gained	631,000	526	3,490,000
Wirtemberg gained	132,400	53	691,000
Baden gained	143,620	54	508 000
Kingdom of Italy gained . . .	1,856,000	711	10,000,000

Besides this, the sums drawn from Austrian contributions and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or L.3,500,000.—Hardenberg, ix. 472, and Bignon, v. 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly elected states stood as follows :—

	Population.	Army.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
Bavaria, ...	3,250,000	60,000	1,760	21,000,000
Wirtemberg, ...	1,154,000	20,000	346	8,000,000
Baden, ...	569,000	10,000	260	6,000,000
But Austria retained, . .	24,900,000	230,000	10,936	110,000,000

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederick.—Hardenberg, ix. 472, 474, *App.* and 23, 24, and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens, par le Baron* Lichtenstein.

to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through a war of twenty years' duration, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people—a memorable example of the vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion (1).

Dethronement of the King of Naples.

This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in European history — the pronuouncing a sentence of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French Emperor. On the 26th December a menacing proclamation proceeded from Presburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evidently bore marks of Napoléon's composition, against the House of Naples. The conqueror announced, that Marshal St.-Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal Queen, and precipitate her from the throne. We have pardoned that infatuated King, who thrice has done every thing to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? shall we a fourth time trust a Court without faith, without honour, without reason?—No! *the dinasty of Naples has ceased to reign*—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown." St.-Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which Napoléon afterwards pronounced against the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own (2).

Dec. 27.

Reflections on this step.

This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only meditating hostilities against the French Emperor, had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and at the same time descriptive of that mixture of caution and prudence by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The Ambassador and Cabinet of Naples, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the Court, under the like menaces, on the 8th October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the Bay of Naples six weeks afterwards liberated them from their apprehensions, and the Cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude; but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity: How often,

(1) Hard. ix. 17, 19, 25. Dum. xiv. 426, 428.

It is evident, from the statistical details given in the preceding note, that Napoleon had no intention, by the peace of Presburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependent on France, between his empire and the Hereditary States, the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Wirtemberg to the north of those mountains. Talleyrand, improving upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danube, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a perpetual bone of contention between the Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg; but Napoléon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with whom he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty, with a view to turning his undivided force against England.—See BIGNON, v. 87.

(2) Bign. v. 34. Hard. ix. 20.

on this principle, has Napoléon himself deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry? And what excuse is to be made for the Revolutionary Government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and every where rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom! But this has in every age been the system of the Revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoléon had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated Republics, but of subsidiary Crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwarlike, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and Prussia: and without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

Napoléon's return to Vienna, Munich, the Rhine, and Paris.

The remaining career of Napoléon during this memorable year was a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers (1) and at the same time complimented the burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous: the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. At Munich he arrived on the 31st December, and on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the Elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Joséphine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugène Beauharnais, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stéphanie Beauharnais, adopted daughter of the French Emperor. On this occasion Napoléon, in de-

Jan. 1, 1806.

(1) "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have, in the last autumn, made two campaigns—you have seen your Emperor share your dangers and your fatigues—I wish also that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first people in the universe. You shall all be there—we shall celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns in the field of honour—the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, or resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies on the continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoléon was contemplating a Prussian war.—Bignon, v. 41.

fault of his own lawful issue, called Eugène Beauharnais to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the Senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise,* between all the states in alliance with the French empire, which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg, the Emperor recrossed the same river at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amidst applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th January. A hundred days! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumph of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar (1): but destined to be eclipsed by another hundred days, in future times, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which shall endure till time itself shall be no more (2).

Reflections on the campaign.

The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of August the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the coalesced powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in four months! In the first division of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against the Republic: in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and yielded only, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoléon, and the scientific combinations of Moreau: but in the third she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with France! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than its celerity; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoléon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Directory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var? Blunders undoubtedly were committed; misfortunes occurred; but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign; and in the long catalogue of Imperial fatuity parallels are not awanting to the advance to Ulm or the flank march of Austerlitz. What was it then which made those false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable, and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but the overthrow of empires, and the dissolution of confederacies?

This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French Emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the Hereditary States, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, but a great navi-

(1) Bign. v. 39, 53. Dum. xiv. 237, 239.

(2) The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoléon; but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the Senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, ii. 209.

Importance of the valley of the Danube as the theatre of contest between France and Austria.

gable river constantly furnished the means of transport and supplies to his army. In former wars, the contest lay in corners of the empire; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat: but in the present all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation, with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commanders, to the Italian plains, on which side the empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoléon in person, to an inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced commander. The ruinous effects of this error were perceived, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. Like a skilful player at chess, Napoléon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities : and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rhaetian Alps.

Dangers of Napoléon's position before the battle.

This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk; and it was evident even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the Allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated him from the most perilous situation in which he had stood since the commencement of his career. At Marengo Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was open by the St.-Gothard and the St.-Bernard : at Campo Formio the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau with a vast force was preparing to advance to his support through southern Germany; but before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived : the Archduke Charles, with 80,000 men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and already nearly equal to his own. Delay in such circumstances was ruin : advance with such force in his rear was impossible : retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe : great as the talents of Napoléon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous moral retribution.

Vast growth of the military power of France since the peace.

But though this rapid advance to the heart of the empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French Emperor, yet it was by no means the principal : and though perhaps his triumphs might not have been so rapid, the result would

probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoléon poured down the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Masséna held the Archduke Charles in check in Italy with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast never had before been brought into action at any period of the war : nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort: it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men (1) that France maintained the contest, and she was capable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period. It was at once evident, upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace, than nine years of previous warfare : and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them.

Similar growth during peace characterized all the reign of Napoleon.

This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandisement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoléon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Lunéville, moderation and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded; every interval of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces or the annexation of some minor state to his dominions; and he never appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances and been longest on terms of the most apparent cordiality. Five years of continental peace followed the treaty of Lunéville; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprung up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoléon on its termination : ten years of neutrality or alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Basle : but at one stroke he felled the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when she at last took up arms : for twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions : he proposed eternal friendship to

(1) Strength of the French army in August, 1805.

Troops of the line,	341,000 men.
Light infantry,	100,130
Light horse,	60,554
Heavy horse, or of the line,	16,944
Artillery,	46,489
Engineers,	900
Gendarmerie,	15,691
Imperial guard,	8,500
Besides Coast guard, 100,000 strong,	590,208

—*See* PEUCHET, 576—8.

Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterwards led to the Kremlin. It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms the true and unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British Cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first signalized England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing time in warfare, even on that element where his power was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities, —an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted, in 1800, that before five years had elapsed, Napoléon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit than if he had foretold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign. Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of turning to such account every interval of war: and the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views; for while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

Great abilities displayed by Napoléon in the arrangements for this campaign.

Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoléon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the Hereditary States, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army; the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coasts of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and the banks of the Elbe, were made to arrive each at the hour appointed around the ramparts of Ulm; the swift advance on Vienna; the subsequent fanlike dispersion of the army to overawe the Hereditary States; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross march of the Allied Sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French Emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organization which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which was the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Rivoli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the fierce tempest of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of the general: the previous preparations of the Emperor, the deeply matured combinations of the statesman, produced their natural results: he did not now take the field with a force which left any thing to chance; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate; and the fruit

of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few month's duration.

Errors of the allies.

Great, however, as were the abilities, unbounded the resources of the French Emperor in this memorable campaign, it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the Allied Cabinets, had their full share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field, and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, they exposed Mack, with an inferior force, to the shock of Napoléon in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralyzed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated, thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops and giving the invader time to envelope with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the preceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to and stopping the advance of the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horse-flesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy. When the rapid advance of Napoléon towards Vienna threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and every thing depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into his hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the Allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when every thing counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumulating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undiscouraged veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with a hundred thousand men, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his rear, the allies must inevitably have led him to destruction or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence impelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction (1).

(1) In a memoir presented to the British Government by the Cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Presburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed—1. To the failure, on the part of the Allied powers, to realize in the north of Germany those promised diversions which might have prevented him from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover on the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2. To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back upon the Inn, or see itself cut off from its base of operations. 3. To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutusoff in the Hereditary States, remained immoveable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, in consequence of the armaments of Prussia, which, until its intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5. To the negligence of Prince Auersberg in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at

Ruinous effects of the indecision of Prussia.

But most of all is Prussia answerable for the disasters of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: Mr Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror, that he contemned her menaces, despised her power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part—then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillations of ten years, and, by a cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that if she had done so such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for his army to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoléon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearence, have prevented to Europe are considered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporizing policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia more than any other power these misfortunes had been owing; so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them.

Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the formation of this confederacy.

In fact, the forces which Mr. Pitt had now arrayed for this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished: the continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armies fully adequate to the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom; the presence of a common danger had at that moment at least extinguished their jealousies. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and 500,000 veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense; and the powers who had suffered so much from

Vienna, which at once gave them the command of both banks, and exposed Kutusoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Buxhowden.—See Hard. viii. 511.

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the enormous calamities of the campaign. But without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted, that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillations of the former power from the first paralyzed both Russia and England: the former by detaining those forces long in Poland, which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoléon on the Danube. Hanover was the ill-gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophe of Jena and Tilsit. England must take her share also of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command, [Hard. viii. 512.] but also by abstaining from all continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her sea-girt citadel, had then 500,000 men in arms. Had she despatched 80,000 of this vast force early in the campaign to a decisive point: had her troops marched to the shores of Kent when the legions of Napoléon broke up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of the troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

French ambition were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor interfere in the internal frame of its government (1). Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggression in future, alone were to be insisted on. To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justice of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr. Pitt necessarily intrusted the execution of its details to the allied sovereigns or their generals; and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross-march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make, and he spared none, were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr. Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its construction; and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its calamitous result, as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoléon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his last conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz or striking down the Prussian Monarchy on the field of Jena.

His last illness and death.

The dissolution of this great confederacy, which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr. Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sunk at length under the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain he tried the waters of Bath; in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office: his constitution was worn out by the labours, the anxiety, and the excitement which have proved fatal to so many Parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with accumulating force. From the time the disastrous news were received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. A devouring fever seized his blood—delirium quenched the fire of his genius. In the intervals of rest his thoughts, however, still were riveted to the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century:" so little could the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce. At the close of a lingering illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house in London on the 23d January, 1806, exclaiming with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle (2).

Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still at the zenith of his in-

(1) See note, 11th January, 1805, Mr. Pitt to Russian Ambassador.—*Ante*, v. 124.

(2) Gifford's Pitt, iii. 347, 360. Ann. Reg. 1806, 13, 14.

His character and mighty achievements.

tellectual powers, William Pitt. Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely, of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom and modern democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved; if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he rose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sunk under the struggle. If the calamities which befel Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm he had seen not merely its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch, by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every period of his career; in the midst of a desperate strife in Europe he extended the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoléon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere, strike down the throne of Tippoo Saib in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide extent of the Indian Peninsula. Under his administration the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies and political strength quadrupled; and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

Principles of his domestic administration.

But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting benefits of Mr. Pitt's government. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness; there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom: early imbued with liberal principles, the strenuous supporter of a relaxation of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals or danger to the state, he was at the same time as fully alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on such vital subjects, or permitting democratic ambition, under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel the institutions of society. No sooner therefore did the French Revolution break out, and it had become evident that a social convulsion was designed, than he threw his weight into the opposite scale: and though the advocate for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the King had thrown down the gauntlet to every established government, when once fairly drawn into the contest he espoused it with the whole ardour and perseverance of his character, and became the soul of all the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life, were framed to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady friend of freedom, he was on that very account the resolute opponent of democracy: the deadly, because the unsuspected enemy by whose triumphs in every age

its principles have been subverted, and its blessings destroyed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling under the shock, when the ardent and philanthropic were every where rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity, which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening, when Mr. Fox was pronouncing the Revolutionary Constitution of France "the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public virtue in any age or country," his superior sagacity, like that of Burke, beheld amidst the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the universe with darkness. Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses; and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood, and ravaging Europe with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions. With admirable foresight he there established a system of finances adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition (1); with indomitable perseverance he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, out of the discordant and selfish Cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Alone of all the statesmen of his age, he from the outset appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of democratic principles; and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles; for while liberty perished in a few months in France, amidst the fervour of revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished in the British empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to democratic ambition, were not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

Progressive and steady growth of his fame.

Chateaubriand has said, "that while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoléon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr. Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this magnificent eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoléon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the Barricades, and the military Government of Louis-Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete in foreign transactions; without the passing of the Reform Bill, and the subsequent ascendant of democratic ambition in Great Britain, his worth would never have been appreciated in domestic government. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady asserter of general freedom: his doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and the affluent: they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of

(1) See Chap. XLI. "On the British Finances."

historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warnings of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history; it is experience which brings conviction to the cold lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr. Pitt's memory: but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's Administration.

Erroneous views of foreign writers on his designs.

Foreign writers of every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent him as governed by an ardent desire to elevate his own country—the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation—and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr. Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by a commercial jealousy of that country, he had embraced the generous maxim of Mr. Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependent on the prosperity of those which surround it (1). Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792; but before the revolutionary levies were completed, have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its Government in the American war. It was not against France, but *Republican* France, that his hostility was directed, it was not French warfare, but French propagandism which he dreaded; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if these insidious principles had emanated from their states.

His errors.

If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr. Pitt's Government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion. Unequalled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies, and awakened the activity of Cabinets, he was by no means equally felicitous in

(1) In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr. Fox said, "France is the *natural enemy of Great Britain;* and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility, all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France; the true situation is the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr. Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours; on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependent on each other, and as a British subject, not less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably the enemy of another nation is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposing the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man." [Parl. Hist. xxvi. 392, 402.] Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate; they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure; and this statesman, whom the Continental writers represent as the eternal inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses any thing ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe." The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal; their brandy on paying a duty of 7s a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron work on a duty *ad valorem* of 10 per cent! So wide is the common opinion of the principles of this great statesman from the truth!—*See the treaty in Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 234-240.

the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoléon has observed, that he had no turn for military combinations (1), and a retrospect of the campaigns which he had a share in directing, must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the Continental armies put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt; whereas, by the vigorous application of a comparatively inconsiderable English force to the heart of the enemy's power at the outset, or when their resources were failing, before the arrival of Napoléon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and at the same time liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In warlike combinations, he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land, which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

Opinion of the democratic party in England of him.

"It is needless," say the Republicans, "to raise statues to Mr. Pitt's memory, he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people." If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoléon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as the salvage paid for the safety of the empire, and are no more chargeable on his memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore protracted system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different, and, ultimately, less burdensome form. And probably the warmest of his partisans will find it difficult to defend the frequent practice which he adopted, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced—a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

(1) Las. Cas iii. 274.

Funeral honours paid to his memory.

Mr. Pitt's eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of oratory, unequalled in modern times. Many of his speeches, delivered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with the most finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. In private life his conduct was irreproachable; concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune; and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote, Mr. Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred, but he resisted the motion for a monument at the public expense to his memory, upon the ground that, however splendid his abilities, or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of "an excellent statesman (1)." The monument which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of too many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British empire at the close of the contest, which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependent on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, "Si monumentum quaeris circumspice."

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. 42, 62, 71, 138.

"When I see a minister," said Mr. Fox, "who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integrity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr. Pitt as an 'excellent statesman.' Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not in such cases yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty." —*Parl. Deb.* vi. 61, 62.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR. PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of the subject—Astonishing Financial Efforts of England during the war—Historical Sketch—Public Income of the State before the Commonwealth—Great Increase of the Public Burdens during the usurpation—Permanent addition to them on the accession of William III—Reasons which led to the introduction of the National Debt—Corresponding Increase of the Expenditure of France on the accession of Louis-Philippe—Progressive growth of the Public Debt during the succeeding century—Table illustrating its increase—Alarming Financial Aspect of the country at Mr. Pitt's accession to power in 1784—Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing evils—His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in Parliament—And his simultaneous adoption of Measures for National Defence—Establishment of the Sinking Fund, and Mr. Pitt's speech introducing it—Mr. Fox gives the plan his cordial support—It is passed by the Legislature, and made applicable to all future loans—Modification introduced on the system in 1802—Immense results with which it was attended—Table showing the Progressive Growth of the Sinking Fund—Obloquy to which it began to be exposed—General diffusion of this delusion—Which is the more dangerous, as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error—Ultimate extinction of the Sinking Fund in 1832—Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction—Comparison of the Arguments for and against its continuance—He saw clearly the objections since urged against the System—Proof of the justice of Mr. Pitt's principles, which has been afforded by the result during the last twenty years—It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt—Durable and far-seeing system which he had established—Had it been adhered to the whole debt would have been discharged in 1843—Tables showing the progressive growth of a Sinking Fund kept up at fifteen or ten millions, from 1816 to 1836—Causes which have led to the decay of this system—Table showing the amount of indirect taxes repealed since 1816—Great error in not repealing at once all the Direct Taxes on the peace—Imprudent remission of Indirect Taxes since that time—Little good has been derived from their repeal—Immense burdens under which the nation prospered during the war—Argument on this subject—Temporary advantages which would have attended the keeping up the Sinking Fund—Ample Funds which existed for its maintenance, even when providing largely for the public relief—Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects—Lord Castlereagh's error in 1816 regarding the Income Tax—Advantages of the Funding System—Its dangers—Mr. Pitt's views on the subject—Modification which they received from the first Continental peace in 1797—He proposed to augment largely the Supplies raised within the year—Trebling of the Assessed Taxes, which were intended to be a war-burden only—First introduction of the Income Tax—Details of Mr. Pitt's plan on the subject—Objections urged against it—It is adopted by Parliament—Advantages of the new system—Mr. Pitt's permanent Taxes were all in the indirect form—Their advantage—Arguments in favour of indirect Taxation—Reply to the objections against them—Cases in which Indirect Taxes, being excessive, become direct burdens on production—General character of Mr. Pitt's Financial Measures: their grandeur and foresight—Their errors—Undue extent to which he carried the Funding System—Niggardly use of the military forces of England—Injudicious system of borrowing in the three per cents—Its effect in preventing the reduction of interest by Government on the return of peace—Temporary diminution of interest with which it was attended was no adequate compensation for these evils—In Mr. Pitt's view, however, the Sinking Fund was speedily to obviate all these ruinous consequences—Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department during the war—Vast effects of the Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797—Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state—Table showing the Paper and Coin issued, with the Exports, Imports, Shipping, and Revenue of every year during the war—Great temporary advantages also of the Funding System—Undue ascendancy of Popular Power was the real cause which undid Mr. Pitt's durable System for the Reduction of the Debt—And it must ultimately ruin the British Empire—But will still more impel the British race to the New World.

Importance of the subject.

IT would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French Revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the main spring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It

was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay, in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other nations; when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, on her citadel amidst the waves, the return of a right spirit in the surrounding nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain; and the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the contest they so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of Government, the means of permanently continuing it. Vain even would have been the re-action produced by suffering against the French Revolution: vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if England had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis, if she had been unable to aliment the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts, if the wealth of England had not at last arrayed them in dense and disciplined battalions, on the banks of the Rhine.

Astonishing financial efforts of England during the war.

How then did it happen, that this inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years; to keep on foot a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land forces of Napoléon, and equipped all the armies of the north for the liberation of Germany? The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe: but the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organized and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seemed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

Historical details. Public income before the Commonwealth.

The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth, it amounted only to L.400,000 a-year; and that of James I to L.450,000: and even including all the subsidies received from Parliament during his reign, L.480,000 a-year, sums certainly not equivalent to more than L.800,000, or L.1,000,000 of our money (1). That enjoyed by Charles I amounted on an average to L.895,000 annually; a sum perhaps equal to L.1,500,000 in these times (2).

Great increase of the public burdens during the Usurpation.

It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people of England; affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when relieved from all control on the part of the other powers in the state. The sums levied in Eng-

(1) Hume, v. 412, vi. 112.

(2) Ibid. vii. 341. Pebrer, 45.

land during the Commonwealth, that is, from 3d November, 1640, to 5th November, 1659, amounted to the enormous, and if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of L.85,000,000, being at the rate of nearly L.5,000,000 a-year: or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had preceded it (1). The permanent revenue of Cromwell was raised from the three kingdoms to L.1,868,000: or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I (2). The total public income at the death of Charles II was L.1,800,000, of James II L.2,000,000; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was not then materially different from what it is at the present moment (3).

Permanent addition to them on the accession of William III.

These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of the House of Brunswick to the throne. The intimate connection of the princes of that family with continental politics, and the long wars in which in consequence the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled: being raised from L.2,000,000 a-year, to L.3,895,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and Government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity (4).

Reasons which led to the introduction of the national debt.

Various motives combined to induce the Government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-

(1) "It is seldom," says Hume, "that the people gain any thing by revolutions in government, because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old; but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money and the tyranny of the Star Chamber had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the Crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of administration." [Hume, vii. 115.]

The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of L. 83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth,—a striking proof of the despotic character of the executive during that period:—

Land-tax,	L. 32,000,000
Excise,	8,000,000
Tonnage and poundage,	7,600,000
Sale of church lands,	10,035,000
Sequestrations of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years,	3,528,000
Sequestration of private estates in England,	4,564,000
Fee-farm rents for five years,	2,963,000
Compositions with delinquents in Ireland,	1,000,000
Sales of estates in Ireland,	3,567,000
Other lesser,	10,074,000
Total,	L. 83,331,000

—PEBRER, 139, 140.

(2) Of this sum, there was drawn from England, L. 1,517,274
from Scotland, 143,652
from Ireland, 207,790
L. 1,868,716

—*Ibid.* 140.

(3) Pebrer, 139, 143.

The quarter of wheat, from 1636 to 1701, was on an average 51s. 11½d.

From 1700 to 1765. 40s. 6d.
From 1764 to 1794. 44s. 7d.

In 1835 the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 38s. 8d. and the average of the last five years was only 48s.—SMITH'S *Wealth of Nations*, i. 358. and *Corn Average*, 1835.

(4) Pebrer, 59, 60.

burnings and divisions had succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of Government over a nation thus divided: foreign wars were deemed requisite to maintain the ascendant of the Protestant principles, to which the King owed his accession to the throne; and the continental connections of the House of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles, by which the very existence of the commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same which led to the duplication of the public burdens of France by Louis-Philippe, after the Revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and engendered the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessments of future years (1). It was justly thought, that the present influence of Government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself; and that, by the distribution of the debt among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power of attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed; but, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages; and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.

Progressive growth of the public debt during the succeeding century.

It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain, were increased after this period. Suffice it to say, that both were largely augmented during the glorious war of the succession; that the long and pacific administration which followed, effected no sensible reduction in their amount; that the checkered contest of 1759, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' War, contributed equally to their increase;

Corresponding increase of the expenditure of France on the accession of Louis-Philippe.

(1) The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions as France and England were at the accession of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar:

		Francs.	
1824	. . . . .	951,000,000, or about	L. 38,100,000
1825	. . . . .	946,000,000, or . .	37,800,000
1826	. . . . .	942,000,000, or . .	37,600,000
1827	. . . . .	986,000,000, or . .	38,730,000
1828	. . . . .	939,000,000, or . .	37,300,000
1829	. . . . .	975,000,000, or . .	38,840,000
1830	Revol. in July. .	981,000,000, or . .	38,930,000
1831	Louis-Philippe. .	1,511,000,000, or . .	60,000,000
1832	Ditto.	1,100,000,000, or . .	44,000,000
1833	. . . . .	1,120,000,000, or . .	44,500,000

—See *Stat. de France*, published by Government.

and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1733, in the opinion both of Mr. Hume and Adam Smith, they must inevitably prove fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was L.12,000,000, and the debt L.240,000,000 (1), the interest of which absorbed no less than L.9,519,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during that last unfortunate contest having been no less than one hundred millions (2).

Alarming financial aspect of the country on Mr Pitt's accession to power in 1784.

It was at this period that Mr. Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr. Fox and the coalition Ministry. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inextricable, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the previous years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed

(1) Pebrer, 245.

Table illustrating its increase.

(2) The following table exhibits, in a clear and condescended form, the increase of the public revenue, and progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1668 to the present times.

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue
National debt at the Revolution,	L.664,263	39,865	2,001,885
Increase during the reign of William,	15,739,439	1,271,087	
Debt at the accession of Queen Anne,	16,394,702	1,310,952	3,895,205
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne,	37,750,661	2,040,416	
Debt at the accession of George I,	54,145,363	3,351,368	5,691,803
Decrease during the reign of George I,	2,053,128	133,807	
Debt at the accession of George II,	52,092,235	3,217,561	6,762,463
Decrease during the peace,	5,137,612	253,526	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1739,	46,954,623	2,964,035	6,874,000
Increase during the war,	31,338,689	1,096,979	
Debt at the end of the war, 1748.	78,293,312	4,061,014	6,923,000
Decrease during the peace,	3,721,472	664,287	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1756,	74,571,840	3,396,737	7,127,164
Increase during the war,	72,111,004	2,444,104	
Debt at the end of the war in 1763,	146,682 844	5,840,841	8,523,440
Decrease during the peace,	10,739,793	364,000	
Debt at the opening of the American war, 1776,	135,943,051	5,476,841	10,265,405
Increase during the war,	102,541,819	3,843,084	
Debt at the peace of 1783,	238,484 870	9,319,925	11,962,000
Decrease during the peace,	4,751,261	143,569	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1793,	233,733,609	9,176,356	16,658,814
Increase during the war,	295,105,668	10,252,152	
Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February, 1801,	528,839,277	19,428,508	34,113,146
Increase during the second war,	335,983,164	12,796,796	
Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st February, 1816,	864,822,441	32,225,304	72,210,512
Decrease since the peace,	82,155,207	3,883,841	
Debt on 5th January, 1832.	L.782,667,234	L.28,341,463	L.50,990,000

—MOREAU and PEBRER's *Tables*, 70, 89, 153, 245, and PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

now more than two-thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening at no distant period to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. It was easy to foresee, that, in the course of events, wars and changes would arise, which would render it indispensable for the Government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities; but how could any Administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralyzing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing evils.

These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr. Pitt; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his understanding with the greater vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of money at compound interest; and Dr. Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great (1). Mr. Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might, without difficulty, be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed in producing great effects, because they were directed to the *annual* discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation: they advanced therefore by addition, not multiplication, in an arithmetical, not a geometrical progression. Mr. Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy: he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in Parliament.

Mr. Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject, one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the constitution sunk into insignificance. From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted to the subject, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on the subject on 29th March, 1786, "the people of

(1) A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would, in the year 1775, have amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions on which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this House, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it —to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which on many accounts we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties of my situation, but the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity, that which we ourselves have felt the want of, an efficient sinking fund for the national debt. To accomplish this is the first wish of my heart; and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt (1).

Establishment of the sinking fund, and Mr. Pitt's speech introducing it.

In pursuance of these designs, Mr. Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of L.900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of L.100,000—should be granted to his Majesty, to be vested in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sumsthus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the farther purchase of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan was secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the people, but the dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested

(1) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1295, 1313, 1109.

And his simultaneous adoption of measures for national defence.

It is worthy of especial notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr. Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired, and on the contrary, at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," said he, "by the plausible and popular name of economy, he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy, to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the sinking fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies, without which the nation must be endangered." [Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1109] Every measure of this great man was directed to great and *lasting* national objects: he was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

in the public trustees. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the side of the creditor to that of the debtor—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would, to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction (1). "If this million," said Mr. Pitt, "to be so applied, is to be laid out, with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation; and this will diminish the debt of this country so much, as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the bane of this country; for if the original sinking fund had been properly preserved, it can easily be proved, that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome; but this, hitherto, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his conveniency, gotten hold of this sum, which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long and very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House, and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law—of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt; it must for ever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war. To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan (2).

(1) The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of 5 *per cent*, is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that L.20,000,000 is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for L.1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of L.200,000 to be annually applied in the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners, for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased, being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progressive growth in ten years will stand as follows:

First year's surplus, . .	L.200 000
Second, ...	210,000
Third, ...	220,500
Fourth, ...	231,250
Fifth, ...	242,562
Sixth, ...	253,078
Seventh, ...	265,654
Eighth, ...	278 286
Ninth, ...	292,114
Tenth, ...	306,661
	L.2,500,105

The wonderful rate at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1309, 1322.

The speech delivered by Mr. Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one of the most luminous of his whole Parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded, "That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was prepared. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up; but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine with him at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far extended speech, as Mr. Fox called it, without one omission or error." *See* No. V. William Pitt. *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxxvi. 852; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

Mr. Fox gives this plan his cordial support.

Nor was Mr. Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments; but he pointed out with too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amidst the necessities or weakness of future administrations. "No man," said he, "in existence was, or ever had been, a greater friend to the principle of a sinking fund than I have been, from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman, in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking fund, for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals, to whom the faith of Parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions, at stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when Parliament, stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking fund, or enabling Government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents (1)". Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in its composition, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and, on the 26th May, the King gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

May 26, 1786.

It is passed by the legislature, and made applicable to all future loans. 1792.

The sinking fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate period; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to Parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which followed, soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy of Mr. Pitt is to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never on any pretence whatever to be departed from, that when any additional loan was contracted for, provision should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr. Pitt, "not to confine our views to the

March 30, 1792.

(1) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1318.

sinking fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter; we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should of course be issued out of the consolidated fund (1), to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, an additional sum, sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking fund, after reaching its largest amount, will discharge what will then remain of the present debt. To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, L.100,000 should be raised in addition to the existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose that L.200,000 a-year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking fund." Mr. Fox stated, "that he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt (2), and that as strongly when on the Ministerial as the Opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr. Pitt, but he wished it as warmly." In pursuance of the united opinion of these great men, it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "that whenever in future any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one *per cent* on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be placed to the account of the commissioners (3)." Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty in little more than forty years be expected.

Modification introduced upon the system in 1802.

Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking fund was managed till 1802; and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not indeed by Mr. Pitt, but by Mr. Addington, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now L.488,000,000; its interest, including the charges of the sinking fund, L.23,000,000: it is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other, without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking fund should be removed; and that both that original fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to: it being enacted, "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking fund of L.1,000,000, with the L.200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent

April 14, 1802.

(1) The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which were amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated during war among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxix. 1050, 1058.

(3) 32 Geo. III. c. 69.

on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund, to be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years(1)."

Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr. Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr. Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking fund which he established down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

Immense results of the sinking fund.

From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the sinking fund of a million which Mr. Pitt established in 1786, had increased, by accumulation at compound interest, and the vast additions drawn from the one per cent on all subsequent loans, to the enormous sum of *fifteen millions and a-half yearly* in 1813, while the debts which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than L.238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years; whereas Mr. Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years; the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of five per cent. The subsequent L.200,000 a-year granted certainly accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the vast accumulation which the one per cent on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the table compiled below, showing the sums paid off by the sinking fund in every year from 1786 to 1813 the loans contracted during that period—the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking fund rose, with the immense sums borrowed at different periods during the war: and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were L.585,000,000, it will not appear surprising, that even the small sum of one per cent on each, regularly issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked for accumulation (2).

Obloquy to which it became exposed.

It is this subsequent addition of one per cent on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking fund which has been at once the cause of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr. Pitt's financial statements, and, delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply of loans, or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely during war, for its permanent character, loudly proclaimed that it was founded entirely on a delusion: that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans: that, at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed, had been annually borrowed since the commencement of the war: that it was impossible that a nation, any

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 890, 892.

(2) Table showing the sums paid to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in every year, from 1786 to 1816; the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those Commis-

more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations, and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income (1).

General diffusion of this delusion.

These doctrines soon spread among a considerable part of the thinking portion of the nation; but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into different channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoléon; and democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal; attacks on the sinking fund were rapidly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr. Pitt's system—the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth; the meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days; and a system on which the greatest and best of men in the last age had been united, in commendation of which Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke, was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

Had these doctrines been confined to the declamation of the hustings, or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent,

sioners in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time.—Moreau's *Tables;* Pebrer's *Tables,* 153, 154, 246; *Parl. Pap.* 1822, etc. 145; Porter's *Parl. Tables,* i. 1; Colquhoun, 292, 294; Porter's *Progress of the Nation,* ii. 296.

(Table showing the progressive growth of the sinking fund.)

Years.	Sinking Fund.	Stock Redeemed by Sinking Fund.	Loans contracted.	Proportion of Loan paid to Sinking Fund.	Expenditure, including Interest of Debt, Funded and Unfunded, and Sinking Fund.	Total charge of Debt, including Sinking Fund.	Revenue.
	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1792	1,458,504	1,507,100			16,179,347	9,437,862	16,382,435
1793	1,534,970	1,962,650	4,500,000		17,434,767	9,890,904	17,674,395
1794	1,630,615	2,174,405	12,907,451	1,630,615	22,754,366	10,715,941	17,440,809
1795	1,672,000	2,804,945	42,090,646	1,872,200	29,305,477	11,081,159	17,374,890
1796	2,143,596	3,083,455	42,736,199	2,143,595	39,751,091	12,345,987	18,243,876
1797	2,639,724	4,390,670	14,620,000	2,639,724	40,791,533	13,683,129	18,668,925
1798	3,369,218	6,716,153	18,000,000	3,361,752	50,739,857	16,405,402	20,518,780
1799	4,294,325	7,858 109	12,500 000	3,984,252	51,241,798	20,108,885	23,607,945
1800	4,649,871	7,221,338	18,500,000	4,288,208	59,296,081	21 572,867	29,604,008
1801	4,767,992	7,315,002	34,410,000	4,620,479	61,617,988	21,661 029	28,085,829
1802	5,310,511	8,091,454	23,000 000	5,117,723	73,072,468	23,808,895	28,221,183
1803	5,922,979	7,733,421	10,000,000	5,685,542	62,373,480	25,436,894	38,401,738
1804	6,287,940	10,527,243	10,000,000	6,018,179	54,912,890	25,066,212	49,335,978
1805	6,851,200	11,395,692	21,526,699	6,521,394	67,619,475	26,669,646	49,652,471
1806	7,615,167	12,234,064	18,000,000	7,181,482	76,056,796	28,963,702	53,698,124
1807	8,323,329	12,807,070	12,500,000	7,829,588	75,154,548	30,336,859	58,902,291
1808	9,479,165	14,171,407	12,000,000	8,908,673	78,369,689	32,052,537	61,524,113
1809	10,188,607	13,965,824	19,532,000	9,555,853	76,566,013	32,781,592	63,042,746
1810	10 904,451	14,352,771	16,311,000	10,170,104	76,865,548	33,986, 23	66,029,349
1811	11,660,601	15,659,194	24,000,000	10,813,016	83,735,223	35,248,933	64,427,371
1812	12,502,860	18,147,245	27,871,325	11,543,881	88,757,324	36,388 790	63,327,432
1813	13,483,160	21,108,442	58,763,100	12,439 631	105,943,727	38,443,147	63,211,422
1814	15,379,262	24,120,867	18,500,000	14,181,006	106,832,260	41,755,235	70,926,215
1815	14 120,963	19,149,684	45,135,589	12,748,231	92,280,180	42,902,430	72,131,214
1816	13,452,696	20,280,098	3,000,000	11,902,051	65,169,771	43,902,999	62,264,546

(1) Hamilton on the sinking fund, and others.

Which is the more dangerous as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error.

and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed as an engine for the purposes of faction or ambition. But unhappily the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion: the prevailing ideas spread to the legislature, and the statesmen who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens, without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking fund till it was totally extinguished during the great convulsion of 1832; and the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The principle acted upon since that time has been to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the present democratic system, can never be expected to be considerable, Mr. Pitt's sinking fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed (1).

Ultimate extinction of the sinking fund.

In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form the important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history.

(1) The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the Sinking Fund from the time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken upon by Mr. Vansittart in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1832.

(Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction.)

Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.	Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.
	L.	L.	L.		L.	L.	L.
1786	662,000	500,000	239,693,900	1812	24,246,059	14,078,577	635,583,448
1787	1,503,000	1,000,000	239,200,719	1813		16,064,057	661,409,958
1788	1,506,000	1,000,000	237,697,665	1814	27,552,230	14,830,957	740,023,535
1789	1,558,000	1,155,000	236,191,315	1815	22,599,653	14,241,397	752,857,236
1790	1,587,500	1,230,000	234,632,465	1816	24,001,083	13,945,117	816,311,940
1791	1,507,100	1,371,000	233,044,965	1817	23,117,541	14,514,457	796,200,192
1792	1,962,650	1,458,504	231,537,865	1818	19,460,982	15,339,483	776,742,403
1793	2,174,405	1,634,972	209,614,446	1819	19,648,469	16,305,590	791,867,314
1794	2,804,945	1,872,957	234,034,718	1820	31,191,702	17,499,773	794,980,480
1795	3,083,455	2,143,697	247,877,237	1821	24,518,885	17,219,957	801,565,310
1796	4,390,670	2,639,956	301,861,306	1822	23,605,931	18,889,319	795,312,767
1797	6,790,023	3,393,214	355,323,774	1823	17,966,680	7,482,325	796,530,144
1798	8,102,875	4,093,164	381,525,836	1824	4,828,530	10,652,059	791,701,612
1799	9,550,094	4,528,568	414,936,334	1825	10,583,732	6,093,475	781,123,222
1800	10,713,168	4,908,379	423,367,547	1826	3,313,834	5,621,231	778,128,265
1801	10,491,325	5,528,315	447,147,164	1827	2,886,528	5,704,706	783,801,739
1802	9,436,389	6,114,033	497,043,489	1828	7,281,414	4,667,965	777,476,890
1803	13,181,667	6,494,694	522,231,786	1829	6,035,414	4,569,485	772,322,540
1804	12,860,629	7,436,929	528,260,642	1830	6,425,465	4,545,465	771,251,932
1805	13,759,607	9,402,658	545,803,318	1831	3,304,729	1,663,093	757,486,997
1806	15,341,799	10,625,419	573,529,932	1832	9,079	5,696	
1807	16,064,962	10,185,579	593,694,287	1833	1,321,749	1,023,784	
1808	16,181,689	10,584,672	601,733,073	1834	2,461,927	1,776,378	
1809	16,656,643	11,359,579	604,287,474	1835	1,846,791	1,270,050	
1810	17,884,234	12,095,691	614,789,091	1836	2,169,700	1,590,727	
1811	20,733,354	13,075,977	624,301,936				

—PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, i. and ii. 6, 8; PEBRER's *Tables*, 247; MOREAU's *Tables*; PORTER's *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 260.

N. B.—This table exhibits the progress of the Sinking Fund and Stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table applicable to Great Britain alone.

But it is only by attending to the dissolution of Mr. Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned which, so far as human wisdom could, had guarded against the evils which must, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British empire.

Comparison of the arguments for and against the sinking fund.

It is perfectly true, as Mr. Hamilton and the opponents of the sinking fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial operations, by borrowing with one hand, while you pay off with another; and unquestionably Mr. Pitt never imagined that if the nation was paying off ten millions a-year, and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking fund; because, as long as larger sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no *present* benefit to the state; nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But all that notwithstanding Mr. Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt, was not only founded on consummate wisdom, but a thorough knowledge of human nature. He never looked to the sinking fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year (1); he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt in time of peace. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance; indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr. Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation of mankind in general, and the especial desire always felt, that when the excitement of war ceased, its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to get the popular representatives at the conclusion of a war to lay on new taxes, and provide for a sinking fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so

He clearly saw the objections since urged against the system.

(1) Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget, in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking fund during war; but always looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased by the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy—we shall have to go far *before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the war.* Yet there are means by which I am confident it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise and not less practicable to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year; and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. *I cannot indeed take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation;* but if the means I have pointed out are adopted and resolutely adhered to, it will leave us at least stationary.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxiii. 1053, 1054.

that it might be at once brought forward into full and efficient operation, upon the conclusion of hostilities, without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

Proof of these principles afforded by the result during the last twenty years.

The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt: amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In sixteen years, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of five per cent granted to the holders of the five per cents, who were reduced to four: that it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions (1). It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt.

Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr. Pitt's unbending self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has to all practical purposes swallowed it entirely up. The sinking fund, when thus broken upon, has proved, like the chastity of a woman, when once lost, the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the conclusion of hostilities with a view to effect a diminution of its public debt; and how completely dependent therefore the sinking fund was for its very existence upon Mr. Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view without any application to the legislature, by the mere cessation of borrowing on the return of peace (2).

(1) Funded debt on January 5, 1816,		L.816,311,940
Unfunded ditto,		48,510,501
Total,		L.864,822,441
Total debt on 5th January, 1833. viz Funded,	L.754,100,549	
Unfunded,	27,752,650	
		781,853,199
Paid off in sixteen years,		L.82,969,242

—*Annual Finance Statement*, 1833, and PEBREB, 246, and PORTER's *Parliamentary Tables*, ii. 6.

Durable and far-seeing system which he had established.

(2) In Mr. Pitt's Financial Resolutions, in the year 1799, which embrace a vast variety of important financial details, there is the clearest indication of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was—"That, supposing the price of 3 per cent stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, L.90 in time of peace, and L.75 in time

Had it been adhered to the whole debt would have been discharged in 1843.

Not a shadow of a doubt can now remain that Mr. Pitt's and Mr. Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1843. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected, had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the Commissioners the whole sinking fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its Government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836, would, at five per cent, have been nearly six hundred millions, and the sinking fund would now have been paying off above forty millions a-year. Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent, which, on an average, is probably not far from the truth, the fund applicable to the reduction of debt would now have been above twenty millions annually, and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of funded property would not probably have been consistent either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury (1).

of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about L.85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about 40 years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793, will be redeemed in about 47 years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable) taxes would be set free in each year of peace, to the amount of L.133,000, and of war to that of L.168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would in the course of the same period gradually rise from L.5,000,000 to L.10,400,000; and that, on the suppositions before stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of L.10,500,000, and about 1846, farther taxes to the amount of L.4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793: making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of L.19,000,000 yearly." [Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1155] Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and experience has now proved, that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repealed, these anticipations would have been more than realized, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.

(1) Table I. showing what the Sinking Fund, accumulating at five per cent, if maintained at L.15,000,000 a-year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

(Tables showing the progressive growth of a sinking fund of fifteen or ten millions, since 1816 to 1836.)

1816.	L.15,000,000	Brought forward,	L.212,660,625
1817.	15,750,000	1827.	25,530,240
1818.	16,537,500	1828.	26,839,360
1819.	17,363,870	1829,	28,181,423
1820.	18,231,973	1830.	29,590,464
1821.	19,143,566	1831.	31,579,590
1822.	20,100,774	1832.	33,158,577
1823.	21,005,038	1833.	34,816,000
1824.	22,055,284	1834.	35 524 625
1825,	23,157,018	1835.	37,238,312
1826.	24,315,572	1836.	39,099,214
Carry forward.	L.212,660,625	Total in 20 years,	L.534,127,430

Table II. showing what the Sinking Fund, if maintained from the taxes at L.10,000,000 sterling, and if accumulating at four per cent only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

1816.	L.10,000,000	Brought forward,	L.31,216,000
1817.	10,400,000	1819.	11,264,000
1818.	10,816,090	1320.	11,715,560
Carry forward,	L.31,216,000	Carry forward,	L.54,195,560

Every thing, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr. Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but an accurate knowledge of human nature, and a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind, that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the war with the French Revolution might have been discharged in nearly the same time that it was contracted.

Causes which have led to the decay of this system.

What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to under the severest trials, with unshaken fidelity? The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen; in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the advent of times, when Government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain. When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "for," said he, "if you had spoken wisely these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest disasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual amongst them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage; the learned fiercely assailed the sinking fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile imposture, unfit to stand the test of reason or experience; the Opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the Government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; tax after tax was repealed, amidst the general applause of the nation (1); the

Brought forward,	L.54,195,560	Brought forward,	L.170,950,160
1821.	12,671,544	1829.	17,340,832
1822.	13,178,404	1830.	18,034,464
1823.	13,705,540	1831.	18,754,840
1824.	14,253,760	1832.	19,505,032
1825.	14,822,948	1833.	20,285,232
1826.	15,415,944	1834.	21,096,640
1827.	16,032,580	1835.	21,930,504
1828.	16,673,880	1836.	23,107,724
Carry forward,	L.170,950,160	Total in 20 years,	L.331,005,428

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the L.534,027,464 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or L 587,000,000 of the stock. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at an average at 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the L.342 000,000 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or L.385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment.

(1) Taxes repealed since the peace of 1814:

general concurrence in the work of destruction for a time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amidst mutual compliments from the Opposition to the Ministerial benches, the deep foundations of British greatness were loosened, the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue to the amount of forty-two millions a-year surrendered without any equivalent, and the nation, when it wakened from its trance, found itself saddled for ever with eight-and-twenty millions as the interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and a democratic constitution, which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

Great error in not repealing at once all the direct taxes on the peace.

The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxation upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when its excitement and expenditure was over. The income tax could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid any thing to Government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr. Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to Government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitements and understood necessities of war can render it bearable. His system was therefore to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of Government, those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple object was gained: the nation during the continuance of war was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties, while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to Government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in

(Table showing the amount of direct taxes repealed since 1816.)

1814,	War duties on goods, etc.	L. 932,000	L. 948,861
1815,	Ditto, ...	222,000	222,749
1816,	Property tax and war malt, ...	17,547,000	17,886,666
1817,	Sweet wines, ...	37,000	37,812
1818,	Vinegar, etc.	9,500	9,524
1819,	Plate glass, etc.	269,900	273,573
1820,	Beer in Scotland, ...	4,000	4,000
1821,	Wool, ...	471,000	490,113
1822,	Annual malt and hides.	2,139,000	2,164,037
1823,	Salt and assessed taxes, ...	4,185,000	4,286,389
1824,	Thrown silk and salt, ...	1,801,000	1,805,467
1825,	Wine, salt, etc.	3,676,000	3,771,019
1826,	Rum and British spirits, ...	1,967,000	1,973,915
1827,	Stamps, ...	84,000	84,038
1828,	Rice, etc.	51,000	52,227
1829.	Silk, etc.	126,000	126,406
1830,	Beer, hides, and sugars, ...	4,070,000	4,264,425
1831,	Printed cottons and coals, ...	1,588,000	3,189,312
1832,	Candles, almonds, raisins, etc. . . .	747,000	754,996
1833,	Soap, tiles, etc.	1,000,000	1,100,000
1834,	House duty, ...	1,200,000	1,400 000
		L.42,125,000	L.44,845,529
	Laid on in the same time, ...	5,813,000	
	Net taxation reduced, ...	L.36,312,500	
	Of which was direct, ...	L.18,690,000	
	Indirect, ...	17,490,000	
		L.36,180,000	

See *Parl. Paper*, 14th June, 1833, and *Budget*, 1834, *Parl. Deb.*

those direct duties which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of, from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr. Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state, in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amidst the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

Imprudent remission of indirect taxes since 1816.

Following out these principles, the income tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt tax, and in general all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated: but on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking fund, and none of them repealed till, from the growth of a surplus, after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population, and the constant efforts of general industry, would progressively had enabled Government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the salt tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since the peace amount to L.42,000,000 and consequently after the repeal of the income tax, assessed taxes, and these oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking fund, even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a-year, would have remained (1). Thus Mr. Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.

If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable; and therefore that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be

(Ample funds which existed for its maintenance, even when providing largely for the public relief.)

(1) Total taxes repealed since the peace,		L.42,115,000
Might have been repealed, viz.		
Property tax and war malt,	L.17,547,000	
War duties on goods,	1,154,000	
Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000	
Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000	
Candles,	600,000	
Soap tax,	800,000	
House tax,	1,200,000	
	L 27,625,000	
Leaving to support the sinking-fund,	14,490,000	
		L.42,115,000

Beside, L.5,813,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period,

Little good has been derived from this repeal of indirect taxes.

reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But unfortunately this is by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as future prospects, from the change.

Immense burdens under which the nation prospered during the war.

In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect, that during the war the nation not only existed, but throve under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than *half* of what they have since become. During the four last years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five millions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty; although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from twenty-five to thirty; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five; and in the last year had swelled to the enormous amount of one hundred and five millions for the former, and sixty for the latter (1). Without doubt, the prosperity of the latter years of the war was in a great degree fictitious—most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear, that if this had gone on for some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation; it is like making a man who has for years drank two bottles of port a-day suddenly take to toast and water. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but unquestionably the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

Argument on this subject.

It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step farther, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no

	Raised by taxes.	Official value. Exports, Great Britain and Ireland.	Official value. Imports, Great Britain and Ireland.
(1) 1813,	L.63,211,000	L.38,226,283	L.25,163,411
1814,	70,926,000	Records destroyed by fire.	
1815,	72,210,000	52,573,034	33,755,264
1816,	62,264,000	58,624,600	32,987,396
1830,	L.55,824,802	L 69,691,302	L.46,245,241
1831,	54,810,190	71,429,004	49,713,889
1832,	50,990,315	76,071,572	44,586,241
1836,	L.48,591,180	L.97,621,549	L.57,230,968
1837,	47,030,000	85,781,669	54,737,301
1838,	47,978,753	105,170,549	61,268,320

—Pebrer's *Tables*, 159, 341; Porter's *Tables*, i. 48, and ii. 49; Finance Accounts, 27th March, 1839; Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking fund? That was the ruinous measure! The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a-year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would to all appearance have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long run diminishing the national burdens, would at the same time have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the effects of which, for eighteen years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to labour.

Temporary advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking fund.

No one branch of the Government expenditure would have gone farther to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a-year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty or thirty millions, annually applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum, during the war, in loans occasioned. The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that since 1820 they would have been constantly kept from 90 to 100. The effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the Government expenditure in other departments, must have been very great. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in size, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking fund must have operated like a great forcing pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work must have been drawn from the nation, or the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry; but experience has abundantly proved that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income to such a productive investment, is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if from an undue regard to popular clamour it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner, not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilizing of his fields and the draining of his morasses. Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and growing purchases of the commissioners would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but would have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out, in order to realize the great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt would have altogether

counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going farther than either reason or experience will justify; but this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively a tolerable burden—that the nation would to all appearance have been much more prosperous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two-thirds of the national debt. This prosperity, doubtless, would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital; but whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only for its discharge—and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects.

Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking fund and Mr. Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that if the demands of Government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, their demands on Government must instantly undergo a similar diminution: that if the Exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a-year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it was not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers; whereas, in truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real, as, though a diminution of those burdens was effected, it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when it could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace, was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes and consequent abandonment of the sinking fund necessarily occasioned; and which the maintenance of its machinery, till it had fulfilled its destined purpose, would, to a very great degree, have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr. Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious expedience for its recommendation; but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

Lord Castlereagh's error regarding the income tax.

Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr. Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain that heavy impost as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities; and its weight was so excessive, that it

was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit Government to a contest with the people on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above five-and-twenty millions a year, when they were not complained of, and the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr. Pitt's principles. The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result. It is not unlikely, that from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the Government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and posterity will not acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous, popular weakness; and if they could not prevail on the House of Commons to adhere to Mr. Pitt's financial system, at least laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment.

It was impossible to explain Mr. Pitt's system for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's apology for the anachronism; and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

Advantages of the funding system.

It is evident that, in some cases, the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, the interest of which is alone laid as burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and if possible would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contests, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so it is always advisable to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income, so that, at the conclusion of hostilities, no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure: nor is it reasonable in such cases to lay upon those who for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalization of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amidst all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation; or to resist the conclusion deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application at

the close of the war, that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed (1).

Its dangers. But this system, like every thing good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity and conducted with prudence; unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing is to nations, not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leave the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause which has drowned almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages: the existence of the means of relieving present difficulties, by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by Government, that by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

Mr. Pitt's views on the subject. Mr. Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and ultimate dangers of the funding system. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue, which present appearances appeared to afford. During its earlier years, when the continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish Revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war supplies of the year were raised by that means; provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and the sinking fund for its extinction, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged (2). It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of L.116,000,000 was contracted before the continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the con-

(1) Loans contracted by the British Government in the latter years of the war.

1812,	L.24,000.000	1814,	L.58,763,000
1813,	27,871,000	1815,	18,500.000

Of these great loans upwards of L.12,000,000 was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to foreign powers; in consequence of which, the whole armies of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 60,000 men, was maintained on the southern frontier of France. —Moreau's *Tables*; Perrer, 246.

(2)

1793,	Loan contracted,	L. 4,500,000
1794,	. . . . .	12,907,451
1795,	. . . . .	42,090,646
1796,	. . . . .	42 736.196
1797,	. . . . .	14,620,000
		L.116 854,293

Moreau's *Tables*.

test, it might speedily be brought to a successful issue. That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, threw away the means of triumph when within their grasp. The financial measures of the British Minister, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent: the real error consisted in the misapplication or undue husbanding of its land forces, for which it is not so easy to find an apology.

Modification which they received from the first continental peace in 1797.

But after the peace of Campo Formio the system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle. Her Continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle; and the utmost that she could now expect was to continue a defensive warfare, till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798:—"Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth, and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the embarrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, on such a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever, is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause and to the supply of our own exigencies, by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick

redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

He proposes to augment the supplies raised within the year.

"To guard against the undue accumulation of the public debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed any thing which has been raised at any former period at one time; but I trust that whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle, by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations; and that while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view; if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert, great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance.

"The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the manners, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the portion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into excution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardship in every individual instance; but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting the large deficiency, which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year (1).

Trebling of the assessed taxes.

In pursuance of these admirable principles, Mr. Pitt proposed to treble the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages; and that the house and window tax, which in a great measure are borne by the middling ranks, should only be doubled; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the Committee of the House of Commons; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of Government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never cleared four millions and a half; a deficiency which rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year (2).

Were to be a temporary war burden only.

The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr. Pitt's plan, to be continued only for a limited time, and kept up only as a war burden. "I propose," said he, "that the increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest, of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1042, 1045.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1076.

millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exoneration of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope, that by stopping short of this effort, you will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability; the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware, it will be said it would be fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated: but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sums by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it: but if, on the other hand you fund its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest, which, in forty years, will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language fit for men legislating for a country, that from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow circumscribed sphere of shortsighted selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity, a sum of between forty and fifty millions sterling?' And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve every thing dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity (1)." Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge the whole principal sums themselves. An admirable plan, and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance, that of making the supplies raised within the year equal or nearly equal to the expenditure: but which was soon departed from amidst the necessities or profusion of future years; and which from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and from its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it added to the public, was necessarily attended both with greatly more suffering, and far less counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

First introduction of the income tax.

The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr. Pitt's administration. But in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1054. 1055.

circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a niggardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort, it appeared possible to obtain, during the absence of Napoléon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr. Pitt proposed the income tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and if considered as a war impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive and expedient that could be adopted. The grounds on which this great addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr. Pitt: "The principles of finance which the House adopted last year, were, first to reduce the total amount to be at present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount, and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded, shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion: but I trust that all who value the national safety will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts (1).

Feb. 1799.

Details of Mr. Pitt's plan on that subject.

In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under L.60 a-year should pay any thing: that, from that up to L.200 a-year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for L.200 a-year and upwards, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to disclose to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was, if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as any other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three-fourths of the rackrent of their lands. The total taxable income of Great Britain he estimated at L.102,000,000 a-year; and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to L.9,500,000, for which the income tax was to be mortgaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged (2).

Objections urged against it.

In opposition to this bill, it was urged by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downwards, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window tax was a burden on luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but income: that is, of imposing a burden which, by no possibility, can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the Government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 5, 6.

(2) Ibid. xxxiv. 6, 18, 22.

or even a half: that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution. The great danger of this tax, therefore, is that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middling orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middling class, and do it soon: it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great source of general prosperity, and then we should have only two classes in the community, and a miserable community it would be, of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means, is doubtless just: but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary—it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income might spend what portion of it he chose, without injury to his heirs: but income resulting from personal industry, or from profession, stood in a very different situation; for it was necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed: and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who, in all probability, will be the more extravagant; and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the farspread injustice should be inflicted, which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration (1)."

It is adopted by Parliament.

The income tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799; the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, L.18,500,000 besides L.3,000,000 of exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary, if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr. Pitt that no less than L.120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account; a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and providing them in great part by the funding system (2).

The regulation of Mr. Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy; and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required beyond one or two years; and in consequence it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it came to violate the principle that these direct taxes, being a painful impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1798 to 1801 the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 134, 147.

(2) Ibid. xxxiv. 1153.

war taxes was no less than fifty-six millions. The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr. Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking fund required for their redemption; and in 1802, when Mr. Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this L.56,000,000, as well as L.40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war; and for the whole of this immense sum of L.96,000,000, he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr. Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but the sinking fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt that this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle, which is, that the whole sums required for the interest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and direct burdens reserved only for the extraordinary efforts intended during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure (1).

Advantages of the new system.

The changes which have now been mentioned embraced all the leading principles of Mr. Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of Chancellor of the Exchequer: —"In the year 1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, "the proportions of the sinking fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being L.5,835,000, and the latter L.480,572,000. But in the year ending 1st February, 1806, the sinking fund amounted to L.7,566,000; and the unredeemed debt was then L.517,280,000, making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking fund, or to detain the House with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the House to cling to it as their sheet anchor for the future, they were pledged to support it, having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact, that during the first ten years of the war the increase of the debt was L.255,000,000, being at the rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a-year (2); whereas during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downwards, the total sum borrowed has been L.36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a-year only."

Mr. Pitt's permanent taxes were all in the indirect form. Their advantages.

With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr. Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans an-

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 573, 576.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 70. Parl. Deb. vi. 567, 570.

nually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and for the immediate redemption of the principles of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr. Hume:—"The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed; and being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting an universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenue of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans (1)." It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr. Pitt's financial measures, that he not only provided in permanent imposts, for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially set apart for those years only when the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

Arguments for indirect taxation.

In addition to these forcible reasons for ever, except in cases of obvious necessity, and when its resources are exhausted, preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish Pachas or the Indian Rajahs have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason is obvious: it consists in the difference upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below after it has fertilized innumerable plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, before it is withdrawn, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the Government may be the same in both cases:—but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the tax collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all

(1) Hume's Essays, i. 365, 366.

the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax, a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form, that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future existence.

Reply to the objections against them.

Nor is there any foundation for the obvious reply to this argument, based on the observation, that if the productions of industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralyzed as if the impost were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind has everywhere rejected its authority. No complaint was made during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain; but so burdensome was the income tax, producing only fourteen millions a year, felt to be, that all the efforts of Government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals opened by the Reform Bill, upon the legislature, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a-half extracted directly by the assessed taxes, which was made the subject of such loud complaint that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are most oppressive upon them at the moment. Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse soever it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not in reality fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery of its production, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguishes the burden. The proof of this is decisive: the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war; many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during its continuance, were sold at half the price at its termination which they were at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr. Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the *permanent* expenses of the nation in the indirect taxes; of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention of direct, and the lavish relinquishment of indirect taxes (1).

(1) It results from these principles, that when an indirect tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material,

General character of Mr. Pitt's financial measures. Their grandeur and foresight.

Such were the general features of Mr. Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately succeeded; stigmatized by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amidst the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the Governments by whom he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing, the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages: inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understanding, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements, it required for its successful development, patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of

Cases in which indirect taxes, by being excessive, become direct burdens on production.

or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption; it becomes a direct burden on production, and if unduly heavy may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in regard to the heavy impost duties on sugar. The burden formerly of 30s. then 27s. and now of 24s. the hundred weight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead, (from L.6 to L.6, 10s. the cwt.;) but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to L.12 or L.15 the hogshead, (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt.) including duty, it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent on the rude material; the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production; the cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery; and the stoppage of the slave trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties, and defray the interest of their mortgages, by raising more extensive crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive; the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per cwt. was, in Great Britain, 23s. 8d. excluding duty; while in America it was 36s. per cwt. in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to 100 per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which has fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.—See *Common's Report*, 1832, *on West Indies*, p. 7.

In all fiscal measures on this subject, there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than any thing else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilized states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, it is always much greater of producing agricultural produce. Great Britain can undersell the world in manufactures, but her farmers would be ruined without a corn law; a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.—See Bernard's *Theory of the Constitution*, 336, 358; a work which, amidst much exaggeration and declamation, contains many just and profound observations on the changes the country has undergone during the last half century, and is deserving of much more attention than it has received.

England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the revolutionary war, we feel that we are conversing with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and calculated for eternal duration to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs, who dwell amidst their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

Their errors. While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, it is indispensable not to draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray.

Undue extent of the funding system. I. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Mr. Pitt, is having carried too far, and continued too long the funding system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterwards so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broke through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugène, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was passed; after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Pichegru; after Spain had retired from the struggle, and the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napoléon, the career of conquest in Italy, it had become evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one half. Those loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time, on account of the loans of those years, would have been above L.120,000,000! So prodigious is the difference in the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the energetic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more accéptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

Niggardly use of the military forces of England. II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale and in a way calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the immense burdens thus imposed on posterity; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the history of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear

that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly accepted a temporary respite from the victorious arms of Clairfait: after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura with the terrible armies of Suwarrow and the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at that period at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been subverted by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies! Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr. Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote, that while the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most niggardly exertion of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish dissipation of its present funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportional efforts in the field had at the same time been made; and it was evident that nothing had been omitted which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war: but our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only 208,000 men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a sea-girt and inaccessible citadel, never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, and that only in the two first years of the war, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand. Mr. Pitt's plans for military operations were all based on the action of continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking up pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence, in a great measure, the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

Injudicious system of borrowing in the 3 per cents.

III. But the greatest of all Mr. Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which he carried the ruinous system, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, inscribing the public creditor for L.100 in the books of the bank of England, in consideration of only sixty advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true, but what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable; the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions has been contracted in the three per cents; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to

pay in all two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking fund at 80, on an average, which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr. Pitt's estimate in 1799, the surplus to be paid above what was received, would still be two hundred millions.

Its effect in preventing the reduction of interest on peace.

Nor have the evils of this most improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the 5 per cents; that is, if a bond for L.100 had been given for each L.100 only paid into the treasury. But as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with funds so contracted, of lowering the interest in time of peace? It is impossible to lower the interest of the 3 per cents till interest generally falls below 3 per cent; because if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and Government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, 4 per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the 5 per cents, it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the 5 per cents, and which, on L.157,000,000 only of the debt; the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time L.1,700,000 a-year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to $3\frac{1}{2}$; which, after taking into view the dissentients, has saved the nation, *for ever*, L.2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the L.600,000,000 in the 3 per cents (L.360,000,000 sterling) at L.18,000,000 a-year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent, would have been L.3,600,000, and by the second of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, L.1,800,000 more; in all, L.5,400,000 for ever. The sum already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years in future the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions a-year!

Temporary diminution of interest was no adequate compensation for these evils.

The temperary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses with which the system was ultimately attended. It appears, from the curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the 3 per cents and the 5 per cents was seldom above half a per cent, generally not more than a quarter (1). What is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled Government to have effected on the return of peace? Even supposing the difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent, what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest *for ever* to four or three and a half per cent? This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument; and if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an

(1) Take, for example, the following loans contracted in the 3 and 5 per cents, at different periods during the war :—

additional loan every year while the disability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, disabled posterity for ever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts. So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that by a solemn resolution in 1824, Parliament pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the 5 per cents; a resolution worthy of the British legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget, but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praiseworthy determinations, amidst the warlike profusion or demoeratic pressure of subsequent times (1).

	Sums borrowed, actually paid into Treasury.	Interest.	Rate per cent.
	L.	L.	
1794. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	1,907,451	96,326	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	10,806,000	502,791	4 3/4 per cent.
1795. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	1,490,646	80,494	5 1/8 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	17,777,163	841,374	4 3/4 per cent.
1796. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	2,034,889	101,744	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	8,500,000	493,145	5 1/2 per cent.
1797. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	17,815,918	1,006,242	5 1/2 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	13,000,000	825,500	5 3/4 per cent.
1801. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	2,227,012	111,380	5 1/8 per cent.
1806. Loan in 3 per cents, ...	27,519,544	1,344,487	5 1/8 per cent.
1807. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	1,293,200	64,660	5 1/8 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	10,800,000	512,400	4 1/2 per cent. but L. 140 stock created for each. L. 60 paid.
1809. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	7,932,100	408,878	5 1/8 per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,600,000	538,433	4 2/3 per cent.
1811. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	4,909,350	258,315	5 1/8 per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,925,243	569,500	4 3/4 per cent.
1814. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	5,549,400	277,470	5 1/7 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, ...	12,345,076	574,362	4 3/4 per cent.
1815. Loan in 5 per cents, ...	10,313,000	603,310	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	27,000,000	1,517,400	5 1/2 per cent.

—*See* PEBRER's *Tables*, 246, *from* MOREAU.

It clearly appears, from this most instructive table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the 3 and the 5 per cents, from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears; for the public creditors were frequently, in the three per cents, inscribed for much more than L.100 in consideration of L.60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than L.140 of stock for each L.60 paid.

(1) The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents, but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject in a company consisting of the most eminent and intelligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended, that if Mr. Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a *little loan* to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that the money could not have been obtained on other terms; and the "little loan" became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr. Anderson of Moredun, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes and Co. of Edinburgh, he will recur perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

In Mr. Pitt's view the sinking fund was to remedy all these evils.

It is true, as Mr. Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking fund, and had provided means which, if steadily adhered to, would unquestionably have produced that result even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the 3 per cents could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated, was the purchase of stock by the sinking fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they do by no means exculpate Mr. Pitt in these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 85 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr. Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking fund which he himself had established, and that the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effects of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements (1).

Vast effects of suspension of cash payments in 1797.

To Mr. Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are even yet far from being exhausted. The Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century, and, when taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the Spanish mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, opened the way to a series of changes in prices, and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico, and to which the future historian will perhaps point as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate fall of the British empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its development, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency from the

(1) It is a common opinion that the great expenses of Mr. Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during

rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is at the same time made the subject of discussion.

At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed to Mr. Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor like subsequent changes in this country, of theoretical or abstract opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national bankruptcy stared him in the face if the momentous step were any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at a subsequent period, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all its resources.

the whole war only amounted to L.52,528,470; of which no less than L.33,000,000 were advanced during the three last years. At Mr. Pitt's death the sum was only L.6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war were as follow. —(MOREAU,) (PORTER,)

(Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department, during the war.)

	Subsidies to Foreign Powers.	ARMY. Ordinary.	ARMY. Extraordinary.	Civil List	Ordnance.	Navy Total.	Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded.	Total Expenditure.
	L.	L.		L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1793	2,198,200	4,167,312		1,021,536	843,603	2,464,307	10,715,941	22,754,366
1794	4,000	9,209,236		1,027,761	1,500,767	4,219,156	11,081,159	29,305,477
1795	810,500	14,562,737		1,025 842	1,968,008	8,135,140	12,345,987	39,751,091
1796	99,500	13,738,350		1,125,053	2,590,000	7,780,868	13,683,129	40,761,583
1797	—	16 208,690		1,081,046	2,121,552	11,984 031	16,405,402	50,739,857
1798	120,012	7,986,297	3,165,854	1,111,376	1,715,355	12,591,728	20,108,885	51,241,798
1799	325,000	9 898 716	4,241,433	1,208,067	2,221,516	13,036,490	21,572,867	59,296,081
1800	2,613,178	9 971,889	3,906,000	1,247,420	1,918 967	14,809,488	21,661,029	61,617,988
1801	200,114	8,838,208	5,347,174	1,290,136	2,165,909	17,303,370	23,808,895	73,072,468
1802	—	6,95.,193	2,635 063	1,338,766	1,500 733	11,704,400	25,436 894	62,373,480
1803	—	8,134 315	3,165 092	1,425,545	1,827,150	7,979,878	25,066,212	54,912,890
1804	—	12,183,891	3,560,804	1,417,517	3,550,142	11,759,352	26,669,646	67,619,475
1805	—	10,758,343	6,261,387	1,914,104	4,782,289	14,466,998	28,963,702	76,056,796
1806	—	9,282,492	5 829,000	1,676,323	5,511,064	16,084,028	30,236,859	75,154,548
1807	—	9,956,684	5,431,867	1,680,061	4,190,748	16,775 762	32,052,537	78,369,689
1808	1,400,000	11,353,390	5,847,762	1,724,147	5 108,960	17,467,891	32,781,592	76,566,013
1809	2,050 000	12,591,041	5,872,054	1,696,994	4,374 184	19,236,037	33,986,223	76,865,548
1810	2,660,103	11,357,6.3	7,178,677	1,651,297	4,652,333	20,054,412	35,248,933	83,735,225
1811	2,977,747	13,753,163	10,116,196	1,582,097	4,557,509	19,540,679	36,388,790	88,757,324
1812	5,315,828	15,382,050	9,605,313	1,748,349	4,252,416	20,500 339	38,443,147	105,943,727
1813	11,294,416	18,500,985	10,968,535	1,708,526	3,404,582	21,996,624	41,755,235	106,832,260
1814	10,024,624	16,532,945	17,662,610	1,675,152	4,480,729	21,961,567	42,912,440	92,280,180
1815	11,035,248	23,172,137		1,682,021	2,963,892	16,373,870	43,902,989	65,169,771
Totals.	53,128,470	384,787,438		32,936,1257	1,082,262	328,236,415	619,830,178	1,539,176,633

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of seventeen hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirty-third, the latter hardly a fifteenth of the total expenditure. The vast sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted; for it gave England the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to almost a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; coinciding thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the niggardly use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficacy, which was the real reproach to Mr. Pitt's administration.

Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state.

No doubt, however, can remain that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place, that the perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amidst this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependents. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every additional demand, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the alterations on the currency, as productive of present strength as they were conducive to future weakness. No financial embarrassments of any moment were experienced subsequent to 1797; in vain Napoléon waited for the blowing up of the funding system, and the stoppage of England's financial resources; year after year the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained, and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle. No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an annual creation of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that one great cause is to be found of the neverfailing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, whose quickened and extended circulation spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports, and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if not sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency (1).

Great temporary advantages of the funding system.

It is evident also that the funding system, with all its dangers and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassment with which it was to be attended, but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management. The contracting and immediately spending loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a-year, in addition to a revenue raised by taxation of equal amount, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would

(1) Table showing the amount of Bank notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the Commercial

have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was indeed withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry: but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence in that respect was still more powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals; it was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter; but still that circumstance, how fatal soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression: exports and imports doubled, the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were to a certain extent delusive; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state

paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the Gold and Silver annually coined at the Bank, with the Exports, Imports, and Revenue for the same period.

(Table showing the paper and coin issued, with the exports, and revenue of every year during the war.)

Years.	£5 Notes in Circulation	Under £5.	Commercial Paper rendered at Bank.	Bullion coined.	Total of Notes.	Official Value Imports from Great Britain.	Official Value Exports from Great Britain.	Revenue.	British Vessels Tonnage.
1792	11,307,380	—	—	1,171,863	11,307,380	19,650,358	24,904,850	17,864,464	1,540,14
1793	11,388,910	—	—	2,747,430	11,388,910	19,659,357	20,390,179	17,707,983	—
1794	10,744,020	—	—	2,558,895	10,744,020	22,294,893	26,748,082	17,899,294	—
1795	14,017,510	—	2,946,500	493,416	14,017 510	23,736,889	27,123,338	18,456,298	—
1796	10,729,520	—	3,505,000	464,680	16,729,520	23,187,319	30,518,913	18,548,628	—
1797	9,674,780	867,585	5,350,000	2,600,297	11,114,120	21,013,956	28,917,010	19,852,646	—
1798	11,647,610	1,448,220	4,490,600	2,967,565	13,095,830	25,122,203	27,317,087	30,492,995	—
1799	11,494,150	1,465,650	5,403,900	449,962	12,959,610	24,066,700	29,556,657	35,311,018	—
1800	15 372,980	1,471,540	6,401,900	189,937	16,854,800	28,257,781	33,381,617	34 069,457	1,905,43
1801	13,578,520	2,634,760	7,905,100	450,242	16,203,280	30,435,268	34,838,564	35,516,351	1,725,94
1802	12,574,860	2,612 020	7,523,300	437,019	15,186,880	28,308,373	37,873,324	37,111,620	2,147,62
1803	12,359,970	2,968,960	10,747,600	596,445	15,849,980	25,104,541	28,075,239	38,203,937	2,167,86
1804	12,546,560	4,531,270	9,982,400	718,397	17,077,830	26,454,281	31,071,108	45,515,152	2,268,57
1805	13,011,010	4,860,160	11,365,500	54,668	17,871,170	27,344,720	30,540,491	50,555,190	2,283,44
1806	13,271,529	4,458,600	12,380,100	405,106	17,730,120	25,504,478	32,984,101	54,071,908	2,263,71
1807	12,840,790	4,109,890	13,484,600	None	16,950,680	23,326,845	30,588,084	59,406,731	2,281,62
1808	14,093,690	4,695,170	12,950,100	371,714	14,183,860	25,660,953	29,956,624	62,147,601	2,324,81
1809	14,241,360	4,301,500	15,475,700	298,946	18,542,860	30,170 292	45 667,216	63,879,802	2,368,46
1810	15,159,180	5,860,420	20,070,600	316,936	21,019,600	37,613,294	42,656,84	67,825,597	2,426,04
1811	16,246,130	7,114,090	14,355,400	312,263	23,360,220	25,240,704	72,837,252	65,309,100	2,474,77
1812	15,951,290	7,457,030	14,291,600	None	23,408,320	24,923,922	37,982,977	65,752,125	2,478,79
1813	15,407,320	7,713,610	12,330,200	519,722	23,210,930	Records destroyed by fire.		68,302,860	—
1814	16,455,540	8,345,540	13,285,800	None	24,801,080	32,622,771	51,358,398	70,240,313	2,616,96
1815	18,226,400	9,035,250	14,917,000	None	27,261,650	31,822,053	57,420,437	72,203,142	2,681,27
1816	18,021,220	9,001,400	11,416,400	None	27,013,620	26,374,921	48,216,186	62,640,711	2,648,59

Parl. Deb. vii. xiv xv *App. Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563, COLQUHOUN, 99.—MOREAU'S *Tables*, and PEBBER, 279.—MARSHALL'S *Digest*, pp 99, 147, 236.

Thus, in the twenty-four years, from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled: the revenue tripled, and the exports more than doubled; the imports increased a-half. The increase of commercial paper from 1792 to 1810 was *sevenfold*: indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emergencies; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow this feverish and unnatural tract of excitement, is indeed certain: but still the effect at the moment was the same, and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created, were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state in future times, it might have been, to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict: and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept for ever from the book of existence.

Undue ascendency of popular power led to the undoing of Mr. Pitt's durable system for reduction of debt.

Had Mr. Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience: and there can be no question that, if it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1840; that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation, a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals: the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent Governments. Without exculpating the members of the administration who did not manfully resist, and if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may safely be affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for its redemption, they have to blame not Mr. Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind democratic spirit which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge.

And it must ultimately ruin the British empire.

"All nations," says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American Democracy, "which have made a great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable

of durable achievements (1)." The abandonment of a system, fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the constitution had become overloaded in reality before it was so in form on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an ignorant impatience of taxation was to bring about that disregard of every thing but present objects, which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. With the prevalence of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired amidst the general influence of the unthinking multitude; and at length, upon its subversion by the great change of 1832, it finally, to all practical purposes, was destroyed. Irretrievable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state: for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected.

But will still more impel the British race to the New World.

But if the sun of British greatness is setting in the Old, it is from the same cause rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the democratic spirit, both in the British isles and on the shores of the Atlantic: the energy it developes, the insatiable desires it creates, the national burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the west, and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilization into the primeval recesses of the forest. In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown: but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality; but in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing operation of those principles at once of corruption and resurrection which are combined in humanity, and which, universal in communities as in single men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

(1) Tocqueville, ii. 287.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

ARGUMENT.

Immense results of the Campaign of Austerlitz—The office of Premier is offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined—General opinion on the necessity of a Coalition of Parties—Mr. Fox is sent for—State of Parties in the Country—Composition of the new Cabinet—Their first Measures—The Budget—Return of Napoléon to Paris—Financial crisis there—Its ostensible causes—Immediate origin of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war—Measures of Napoléon to remedy the evil—Real causes of the catastrophe—Financial changes in consequence introduced in France—And imposition of its Armies as a burden on Foreign States—French Budget for 1805, and Exposition of the Minister of the Interior—Erection of the Column in the Place Vendôme—Advance of the French against Naples—Successful Invasion of Calabria—Joseph Bonaparte created King of the Two Sicilies—Naples threatened by Sir Sidney Smith—General Stuart lands in the Bay of St.-Euphemia—Regnier resolves to attack him—Battle of Maida—Great moral effect of this victory—But its immediate results are less considerable—Surrender of Gaeta—Retreat of the English, and Suppression of the Insurrection—Domestic Reforms of Joseph in Naples—Louis Bonaparte is created King of Holland—Creation of Military Fiefs in the kingdom of Italy—Napoléon's secret views in these measures—Audience given to the Turkish Ambassador—Naval operations—Sailing of a Division of the Brest Fleet—Defeat of the first squadron at St.-Domingo—Disasters of the second division under Villaumez—Capture of Linois, and lesser Naval Operations—Reflections on these last Naval Disasters of France—Greatness of the French Navy under Louis XVI—Napoléon's change of system in regard to Naval War—Reflections on the growth of the English Maritime Power—Its probable influence on the future destinies of the world—Reduction of the Cape of Good Hope—Sir Home Popham resolves to attack Buenos Ayres—Which falls—Embarrassment of Government at this success—It is retaken by the South Americans—Differences with America in regard to Neutral Rights—Violent measures of Congress—The Commissioners appointed on both sides adjust the differences—Continental Affairs—Growing Coldness between France and Prussia—Jealousy of the two Cabinets—The Prussian Cabinet seizes on Hanover—Measures of Retaliation adopted by Great Britain—Mr. Fox's speech on the subject—Napoléon's opinion of Prussia in this transaction—His farther measures of aggression on Germany—Universal indignation which they excite in the North of Germany—Gentz's Pamphlet on the subject—Formation on the Confederacy of the Rhine—Powers admitted to the Confederation—The Emperor Francis renounces the Crown of Germany—Addresses of Napoléon and the Emperor Francis to the German States—Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin—Warlike preparations of Prussia—Renewed causes of irritation between France and Russia—Difference about the mouths of the Cattaro, which is occupied by the Russians—The French in return seize Ragusa—Actions in its neighbourhood—D'Oubril concludes a Treaty between France and Russia—Which is disavowed by the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg—Opening of the Negotiations between France and England—Latter power insists on Russia being a party to the negotiation—Basis of Uti-possidetis—Which France departs from—Continuance of the Negotiation, and gradual estrangement of the parties—Its farther progress—The demands of France become more extravagant, and the Negotiation is broken off—Real views of the Parties in this proceeding—State of Affairs at Berlin—Prussian ultimatum, and preparations for War on both sides—Murder of Palm—Great sensation which it occasioned—Proceedings of the Military Commission by which he was condemned—Influence which it had in producing the Rupture of the Negotiation—Last instructions of Mr. Fox to Lord Lauderdale—His eyes were at length opened to the real nature of the War—His Illness and Death—And Character—Extraordinary Talents in Debate—But his fame is on the decline as a just thinker—Reasons of this change.

Immense results of the campaign of Austerlitz.

The peace of Presburg appeared to have finally subjected the continent to the empire of France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes

was dissolved; the military strength of Austria had received to all appearance an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern Autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his triumph. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they too had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was silent; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the continental armies, and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible object; while the death of the great statesman who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolution, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of Government might be anticipated in his successors.

Premiership offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined.

The hopes entertained by Napoléon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon to all appearance likely to be realized. The death of Mr. Pitt dissolved the Administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none—friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from Government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unreserved confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his Cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sunk into the grave, the Ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The King, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the middle of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India bill introduced by the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the Government in the same hands, and immediately after Mr. Pitt's death commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new Administration on the same basis; but that experienced and cautious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his short-lived power was to accept the wardenship of the Cinq Ports, which had been held by Mr. Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift of the Crown—an appointment which gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussion in both Houses of Parliament under the succeeding Administration (1).

Public opinion on the necessity of a coalition of parties.

Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the Ministry after Mr. Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new Administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties, and an union of all the principal statesmen of

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 18, 21. Parl. Deb. iv. 67, 75.

the time to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its terrors might not be disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of Government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a very great degree; the Opposition journals had increased in number and vehemence of declamation; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of Government in that point where Mr. Pitt's Administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, are exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when these absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true friends to their country, on which ever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended Administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish accordingly was felt for the formation of a Government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction—a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England, and never can do so, except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy in the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened (1).

Mr. Fox is sent for.

Yielding at length, though unwillingly, and with sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the King, on the 26th January, sent a message to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr. Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham house, to confer with his Majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr. Fox as the person he should consult on the subject. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the King; and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men (2).

State of parties in the country.

The anxious wish expressed both by the Sovereign and the nation that the Government should be formed on the broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties, which, although it gave great apparent stability at the outset, was little calculated in the end to ensure the permanence of the administration. Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr. Pitt's Cabinet, then divided the legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to democratic principles, were represented by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of republican institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the test acts, the abolition of slavery, peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 17, 25.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 21.

in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had receded with Mr. Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr. Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in Parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr. Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold of the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stauncher brethren. In hostility to France and fierce opposition to revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr. Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the popular side, and might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more democratic portion of the Government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of these great parties, the adherents of Mr. Addington's administration, who had remained in Opposition ever since they were displaced from power were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr. Addington) was the leader of his portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalesce, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists, and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the Cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.

Composition of the Cabinet.

The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new Cabinet: but the preponderance of Mr. Fox's adherents was so great as to render the Ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig Administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most inconsiderable, under Government. Mr. Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the Crown, contented himself with the important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was likely to be experienced, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made First Lord of the Treasury; Mr. Erskine, Lord Chancellor; Lord Howick (formerly Mr. Grey) First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Windham, Secretary at War; Earl Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) The Cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked forward to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But amidst the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent Government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily excluded the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs, while the admission of the Lord Chief Justice into the Cabinet was

(1) The Cabinet was composed of the following members:—

Lord Erskine—Lord Chancellor.
Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council.
Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.
Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.
Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl Moira—Master-General of the Ordnance.
Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
Mr. Fox—Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Windham—Secretary at War.
Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Lord Ellenborough—Chief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet.
—*Ann. Reg*, 1806, 26.

justly regarded by all as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties (1), which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.

First measure of the new Ministry. The budget.

Notwithstanding the essential and total change which the Ministry had undergone, and the accession of a party to power who had so long denounced the measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the measures of Government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterized the war as unjust and impolitic preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors,—a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr. Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of Mr. Pitt, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late Government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, if was proposed to carry the war taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions and a half,—an increase which was effected by raising the income tax from six and a half to ten per cent, and an addition of 3s. a hundred weight on sugar (2). The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still L.18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and a sinking fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing L.500,000 a-year, and an additional duty laid on pig iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount in all of L.1,136,000 (3).

The great addition to the income tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden and total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by Ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue; and there can be no doubt that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesman like part.

Return of Napoléon to Paris. Financial crisis there.

The return of Napoléon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, was very necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to involve the Government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from poli-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 26, 28.
(2) Parl. Deb. vi. 566, 574. Ann. Reg. 1806, 71.
(3) The budget of this year stood as follows :—

	Charges, Great Britain.
Navy,	L.15,281,000
Army,	18,500,000
Ordnance,	4,718,000
Miscellaneous,	2,170,000
Arrears of Subsidies,	1,000,000
Vote of Credit,	2 000,000
	L.43,669,000

		Supplies, Great Britain.
Malt and Personal Estate Duties,		L. 2,750,000
Grants from Captured Ships,		1,000,000
Lotteries,		380,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,		3,500,000
War Taxes,	19,500,000	18,000,000
Deduct as outstanding at end of year,	1,500,000	
Loan,		18,000,000
		L.43,630,000

Exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being L,23,000,000, and the total sum raised by taxes and other sources of revenue, L.55,796,000, while the total expenditure was L.72,750,000.—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 566, 569.—Porter's *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

tical, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the Emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the Council of Finance was assembled: it sat nine hours: and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed Minister of Finances, and M. de Marbois, the former Minister, dismissed (1).

Its ostensible causes.

This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, and might, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the empire, and urged on by the constant demand for discounts on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, from the expenditure of Government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progressively enlarging its discounts: before the Emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoléon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amidst all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the Minister of Finances on the subject, and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in extensive transactions or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the Royal privilege of coining money (2). The immense discounts which occasioned the peril, were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who being obliged to make good their payments to Government by a certain day, and embarrassed by this remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were frequently driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and whose credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration. A few rich companies also had shared in the liberality of the Bank, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to the Bank, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these, was that of which M. Ouvrard was the leading partner; and its engagements with the Bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the

(1) Bign. v. 96. Bour. vii. 111.

From Boulogne, Sept. 24, 1805.

(2) His words are, in a letter to the Minister of Finances, "The evil originates in the Bank having transgressed the law. What has the law done? It has given the privilege of coining money in the form of paper to a particular company; but what did it intend by so doing? Assuredly that the circulation thus created should be based on solid credit. The Bank appears to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which is to discount to individuals, not in proportion to their real capital, but the number of shares of its capital stock which they possess. That, however, is no real test of solvency. How many persons may be possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them a single farthing? The paper of the Bank is thus issued in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on real credit but a delusive supposition of wealth. In one word, in disenunting after this manner the Bank *is coining false money*. So clearly do I see the dangers of such a course that, if necessary, I would stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in it. I am distressed beyond measure at the necessities of my situation, which, by compelling me to live in camps and engaging me in distant expeditions, withdraw my attention from what would otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first wish of my heart, a good and solid organization of all which concerns the interest of banks, manufactures, and commerce." What admirable wisdom in this great man, conceived at the camp of Boulogne, in the midst of the boundless arrangements which the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced, must have required, and of which his correspondence furnishes such ample proof!—*See* BIGNON, v. 85, 86.

Spanish fleet, and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service: and before the middle of 1805, nearly seventy millions (L.2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the Government, occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market: but so implicated was Government in these transactions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course, and thus increase the depreciation, which had already become sufficiently alarming. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sunk so much in value that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100: an universal disquietude prevailed (1), and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.

Immediate cause of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war.

Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states, both on the part of Government and individuals. Napoléon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (L.2,000,000) from the Bank of France. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the Minister of Finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanderbergh, and Seguin, who advanced 102,000,000 (L.4,080,000) to the Public Treasury, and received, in return, long dated bills for 150,000,000. To meet this advance Ouvrard hastened to Madrid, to obtain a supply of piastres from the Spanish Government, and such was the ascendency which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an *exclusive* right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company: the treasures of the whole world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining, before a year expired, from America 272,000,000 francs (L.11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of Europe, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Desprez and several of the greatest capitalists in Paris failed: this immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the Bank and the Treasury; paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanderbergh, one of the greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing, solely by an advance to a great amount from the Public Treasury. The consequences would have been fatal to the empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany, for the Government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service; but the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg operated as a charm in dispelling the panic: with the cessation of continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased; and the crisis was in fact over when the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public con-

(1) Bign. v. 85, 93. Bour. vii. 92, 100.

fidence. But the danger had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it: and by merely protracting the contest in Moravia for a few months, the allies would infallibly have brought the French Government to a national bankruptcy (1).

Measures of Napoléon in consequence.

Napoléon was highly indignant at these embarrassments, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate victory of Austerlitz (2). Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders; the imprudent facility of the Minister of Finances became the general object of reprobation and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration (3). The emperor minutely scrutinized the embarrassments of the Bank and the Treasury: it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the Government amounted to 141,000,000 francs (L.5,600,000) of which Ouvrard and Vanderbergh owed nearly two-thirds, and measures of severity were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, who were thrown into prison without distinction. The gigantic company of M. Ouvrard and his partners was in consequence reduced to bankruptcy: but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned: but a few years after the Government was under the necessity of resuming it: and Napoléon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by appointing him President of the Chamber of Accounts (4).

Real cause of the catastrophe.

In fact, though it suited the interests of the Emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the Minister of Finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the Bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper, and the crisis was, in fact, occasioned by the vicious system to which the extravagant expenditure of the Imperial Government had driven the Finance Ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoléon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the labouring condition of the finances. The actual receipts of the Treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions below the annual expenses (5). In addition to this, the payments of the Finance Minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year; while the period of its receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Thence there arose an indispensable necessity for a recourse to money-lenders, who instantly advanced cash to the Treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realized. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure, as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the Chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted by the Treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it. Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances: and this system

(1) Bign. v. 89, 94. Bour. vii. 100, 111. Sav. ii. 157, 162.

(2) "Beaten," says Savary, "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii. 161.

(3) The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Stael, "He!" said she, "he is nothing but a willow wand painted to look like bronze."—BOUR. vii. 111.

(4) Bour. vii. 111. Bign. v. 95, 97.

(5) Bign. v. 193.

succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804; but the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the Austrian war, rendered their resources totally unavailing; and it became necessary to apply to greater capitalists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by Government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, which was already the contractor for the supplies to almost all the forces, both by land and sea; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on Exchequer bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of Government; and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone Government derived the fund requisite for its immense engagement. The monetary embarrassments of 1805, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure: but they arose not on the part of individuals but of Government; the crisis was not commercial but political. Thence the singular and instructive fact that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoléon so loudly complained, were made not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service: the root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the Emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of Government. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest: it indicated the arrival of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the Convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution (1).

Financial changes in consequence introduced in France.

Napoléon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. M. Marbois had, long before, represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoléon was so sensible of this, that he had long before expressed his resolution, in military fashion, of having M. Ouvrard arrested, and made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence (2). The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he, "be-

(1) Bign. v. 87, 88.

(2) "Bourrienne," said he, in 1800, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested."—"General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?"—"Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? at the public expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the Government.—Bour. vii. 94, 95.

tween the Bank and the Treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign an arrêt for the emancipation of the Treasury." The difficulty was, that the Treasury had to pay every twelve months an hundred and twenty millions (L.5,000,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the Exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (L.2,500,000) was funded in the five per cents; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit banks, under the name of "caisses de service," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as ever they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly (1).

And imposition of the French armies as a burden on foreign states.

But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by Government greatly beyond its income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz solved the difficulty. From the moment that the grand army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany (2). On the 18th November, an edict of the Emperor directed the transmission of all funds to the army of the north to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the army of Italy. Thus the three principal armies of the empire ceased to be any longer a charge to its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoléon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were, in consequence, as the Duke de Gaeta, their principal author, himself confesses, no true statement of the Imperial expenses (3). They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; but, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the conquered states, totally fallacious (4).

Nov. 18.

French Budget for 1805, and exposition by the Minister of the Interior

The budget of France for 1805, presented to the Chambers in February, 1806, accordingly exhibited no true picture of the national finances; but even as it was, it shewed an expenditure of 700,000,000 (L.28,000,000), and an income of only 588,000,000 (L.23,600,000), the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states (5). But although Napoléon knew as well as any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the Government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a splendid exposition of the state of the empire. The

(1) Bign. v. 89, 189, and 195.

(2) From the castle of Louisberg in Wirtemberg, Napoléon wrote, so early as 4th October, 1805, to the Minister of Finances at Paris—"The army maintains the most exact discipline: the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: I have no need of money from you." These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French Government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—BIGNON, v. 100.

(3) The income was exhibited as follows:—

(4) Gaeta, i. 272, 434.

(5) Bign. v. 99, 100.

report drawn up by Champagny, Minister of the Interior, contained a picture of the state of the empire, which, from the magnitude of the victories which it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings which it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Saône as essentially improved; Alexandria surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Apennines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mont-Cenis, the Comiché, and the Mont-Genèvre opening to loaded chariots a path amidst heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Saône and the Rhône; harbours and wet docks in a rapid state of construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; the works of Antwerp and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England. The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence. "The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the Republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The House of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions: Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded: the Italian Peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great empire: the Emperor has guaranteed, as chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects for exultation, Napoléon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers:—"The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion by an hour. I shall always

Receipts.	Francs.		
Direct taxes,	311,649,196		
Registration and stamps,	172,763,591		
Customs,	52,725,918		
Lottery,	13,860,000		
Post Office,	10,000,000		
Excise,	25,000,000		
Salt,	3,000,000		
Total from France	588,998,705	francs, or	L.23,600,000
— from Italy.	30,000,000	or	1,200,000
— from Germany and Holland,	100,000,000	or	4,000,000
Total,	718,998,705	francs, or	L.28,820,000

Expenditure.		
Army,	271,500,000 francs	
Navy,	140,000 000	
Church,	35,000,000	
Interest of debt,	69,140,000	
Civil list.	27,000,000	
Minister of Finance,	43,349,800	
— of Justice,	21,200,000	
— of Interior,	29,500,000	
— of Treasury,	8,000 000	
— of Police,	700,000	
Miscellaneous,	20,765,339	
	666,155,139 francs,	or L.26,600,000

—See Duc de Gaeta, 304, Bignon, v. 102, Peuchet, 560.

be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality, a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak and temporize till the proper time arrived with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoléon's policy (1).

Erection of the Column in the Place Vendôme.

The return of Napoléon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the Emperor and the grand army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of the Emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect; five hundred imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to the summit of the structure, 120 feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoléon, since carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St.-Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis-Philippe it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his gray riding coat, which has become canonized in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. Magnificent fêtes were projected by the Emperor to signalize the return of the grand army to the capital; but they were adjourned, first on account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign (2).

Advance of the French against Naples.

The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Masséna was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month 50,000 men, under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, had crossed the Pontifical states and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible; the small Russian and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily; the Court, thunderstruck by the menacing proclamation of 27th December, speedily followed their example; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hastened to appease the conqueror by submission; a vain attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St.-Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops; in vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage; she was seconded by none; Capua opened its gates; Gaeta was invested; the Campagna filled with the invaders; she, vanquished but not subdued, was compelled to yield to necessity, and followed her timid consort to Sicily; and, on the 15th February, Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Bonaparte, enter its walls (3).

Successful invasion of Calabria.

But although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the sea-girt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The

(1) Bign. v. 104, 110. Hard. ix. 91.
(2) Bign. v. 112, 113.
(3) Dum. xv. 95, 99. Bign. v. 114, 116. Hard. ix. 56, 58.

Prince of Hesse-Philipsthal had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own gallant resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied, that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity; and the long résistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian Cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion, the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their Government and its allies, submitted to the enemy; and General Regnier, with a considerable corps, at first experienced little resistance in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Masséna with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to depair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position; but they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campo-Tenese their tumultuary levies, though 15,000 strong, were entirely dispersed. The victorious Regnier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoléon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily (1).

Joseph Bonaparte created King of the Two Sicilies. March 30.

When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in person to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district. He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Scigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoléon created him King of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time the Venetian states were definitively annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand Duke of Berg, with a considerable territory; and the Emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army (2). Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the military

April 14.

(1) Bot. iv. Hard. ix. 88, 90. Dum. xv. 107, 116.

(2) Bign. v. 131. Hard. ix. 93, 94. Colletta, ii. 14, 15.

"The interests of our crown," said Napoléon, "and the tranquillity of the continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and *forming part of the great empire*—we therefore declare our well-beloved brother Joseph King of the Two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier was created Prince of Neufchatel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the Pontifical States; Bernadotte became Prince of Ponteorvo; Cambacérès and Le Brun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the Crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories; a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues to be distributed among the French soldiers.—Hard. ix. 94, 95; Bign. v. 131.

hero of the Revolution already gave indications of his secret design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, to overturn its principles.

Naples is threatened by Sir Sidney Smith. General Stuart lands in the bay of St.-Euphemia.

Events, however, soon occurred which shewed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects on his elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the Bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment, and nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sidney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment, amidst the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions, attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffections which prevailed in Calabria, the English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the capital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than 5000 men, which landed in the Gulf of St. Euphemia: and the commander, Sir John Stuart, issued a proclamation calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none, however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received; and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Régnier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at MAIDA, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces accordingly in quest of the enemy. On the 5th july the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning, the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive that it would be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers (1).

July 1.

Regnier resolves to attack them.

When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Regnier, consisting of 5000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet towards the sea, while the British, bivouacking in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential gales of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Régnier, inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the errors of General Menou, and encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to 7,500 men (2), resolved to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, and march

(1) Bot. iv. 210, 211. Colletta, ii. 19. Ann. Reg. 1806, 142. Dum. xv. 142, 145.

(2) Bot. iv. 211.

at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy (1).

Battle of Maida, July 6.

Surprised, but nothing dismayed at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current fell into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled with light troops which kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached; but notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge; the 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward; and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity; their battalions broke and fled; but were instantly overtaken amidst deafening shouts, with such slaughter, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a thousand, including General Compere, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Regnier made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the left: a rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left, and this movement might have yet retrieved the day, when the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, were assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 28th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew their shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers (2).

Great moral effect of this victory.

The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation amidst the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, never was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling: but of what avail was all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had fallen in the conflict. At last the rival states had come into collision on terms approaching to equality, and without the paralyzing effect of lukewarm or dubious allies, and the result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoléon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable

(1) Ibid. iv. 211. Dum. xv. 144. Ann. Reg. 1806, 142.

(2) Sir J. Stuart's Despatch, Ann. Reg. 1806, 591, 593. Bot. iv. 211, 212. Colletta, ii. 20. Dum. xv. 146, 148.

The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded The Duchess of Abrantes states the loss of the French at 5,000 men.—D'Abrantès, ix. 136; and Sir J. Stuart's *Despatch, Ann. Reg.* 1806, 594.

was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or ascribed to their true cause, general inexperience in the military art: confidence, the surest presage of victory when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service; and reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy, and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy (1): the people no longer hesitated to speak of Crécy and Azincourt. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war (2). Napoléon was well aware of its importance: he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal. "Sive tanta, sive minor victoria fuit, ingens eo dic res, ac nescio, an maxima illo bello, gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibal, vincentibus, tunc difficilius fuit, quam postea vincere (3)."

Its immediate results are less considerable.

But though productive in the end of the most important consequences from the moral feelings which it inspired, the victory of Maida was not attended at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily, were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wildfire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after the town of Crotona, containing 1000 men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. Their detachments were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilized warfare. So general was the disaster, that Régnier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the intrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of 8000 men, at length to make head against the enemy (4).

Surrender of Gaeta.

These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Masséna, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on

July 18.

(1) In particular, Captain Pasley's able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England; a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

(2) D'Abr. ix. 136.

(3) Liv. xxiii. 16.

(4) Dum. xv. 148, 155. Ann. Reg. 1806, 595. Bot. iv. 213. Jom. ii 238. Bign. v. 126.

board an English vessel to Sicily. His successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit; proposals of capitulation were made; and Masséna, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions. The garrison, still seven thousand strong, marched out with the honours of war; and on the 18th July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements (1).

Retreat of the English. Suppression of the insurrection.

The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Masséna, eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible. Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving, of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain too often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Masséna, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents kept their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria, but were at length turned by the Monte Galdo and defeated with

Aug. 5.

great slaughter. A guerilla warfare ensued, attended with savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the

Nov. 10.

slain. But after several months of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English; and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost by sickness and the sword little short of 15,000 men (2).

Domestic reforms of Joseph in Naples.

No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the administration of the finances, the general police of the country, stood equally in need of amendment. Hence the remarkable fact, that the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education, while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses consequent in its train, were to be found among the rabble of cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Bonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found

(1) Bign. v. 127, 128. Dum. xv. 155, 170. Bot. iv. 214.

The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened on the 10th July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent. Gaeta, named after the nurse of Æneas (1), underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marshal Dam. Thirty years afterwards, it was besieged and taken when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—*See* Dumas, xv. 155, 170.

(2) Dum. xv. 171, 179. Jom. ii. 239, 246. Bot. iv. 214, 217. Ann. Reg. 1806, 143, 148.

(1) Tu quoque litoribus nostris, Æneia nutrix,
Eternam moriens famam, Caieta, dedisti.

Virg. *lib.* vii.

ample room for, and soon effected the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restrained; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the public debt; part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national institute, and various other useful institutions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals were undertaken or projected, and a general spirit of activity diffused by the energy of the Government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits produced by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution (1).

Louis Bonaparte created King of Holland.

The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the Two Sicilies by the brother of Napoléon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Presburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious Emperor; while the republic of Venice, incorporated by the decree of 30th March with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the Grand Pensionary in 1805, had almost rendered it a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were to all appearance indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a halfway house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepôt of the commercial riches of Holland, in the Eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean, and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotic rule of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others was equalled only by their base adulation of the foreign rulers of the commonwealth. The people, desperate of relief, and worn out by obscure tyrants, in the election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things. Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoléon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that in the existing state of Europe a hereditary government could alone guarantee the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious of the state," declared Louis the King of Holland. A few days after, the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the Emperor; but the elusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which

May 26.

June 6.

(1) Colletta, ii. 1, 15. Bign. v. 135, 139.

Napoléon made to his brother on the occasion. "Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of constable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge *towards me,* and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states (1)."

Creation of military fiefs in the kingdom of Italy.

At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy afforded the Emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne, Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoléon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers; while a fifteenth of the revenue which they yielded to the treasury at Milan, was set apart to form appanages suitable to those dignities. A revenue of 1,200,000 francs (L.48,000) was at the same time destined, from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund, out of which he was to recompense his soldiers: and soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoléon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree (2).

Napoléon's secret views in these measures.

The system upon which Napoléon now openly entered of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of dependent dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere ebullition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances, both which had elevated him to the throne, and surrounded him when there. He clearly perceived that it was revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both dreaded, from dear bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship—his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him; and this being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance on which he could depend was that which united him to his own family, and cemented with his own the interests of inferior royalties, dependent on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own relations? could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoléon, and that, *situated as he was,* they were founded on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite in the highest degree the jealousy and hostility of the other continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is indeed equally certain: but these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They shew only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played; and afford another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal

(1) Hard. ix. 99, 100. Bign. v. 141, 142.

(2) Bign. v. 139, 140.

truth, that those who owe their elevation to revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by, than those who resist its fury (1).

Audience given to the Turkish ambassador.

On the same day on which a king was given by the French Emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the Grand Signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the Imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoléon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his subsequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Every thing," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect, that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from me: united to my throne, he need fear nothing from his enemies." Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoléon signed on the Niemur, a treaty with Russia, for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe (2).

Naval operations.

But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoléon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations, and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies.

Sailing and division of the Brest fleet.

The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievements of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which, under Villeneuve, had issued from Cadiz: but the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoléon had so fondly calculated, still existed; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their resources. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations with smaller squadrons, against their remote colonies or merchant
Dec. 13, 1805. vessels. Half the Brest fleet, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, were victualled for six months; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons: the first, under Admiral Leisseigues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, were destined to carry out succours to St.-Domingo; while the second, under Villaumez, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward bound merchant fleets. But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which annihilated the enemy's remaining naval forces, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war (3).

Defeat of the first squadron at St.-Domingo.

Admiral Leisseigues arrived without any accident at St.-Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated

(1) Bign. v. 132, 241. Las Cas. vii. 127.
"The truth is," said Napoléon, "that I was never master of my own movements—I was never altogether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—LAS CAS. vii. 124, 125.

(2) Bign. v. 145

(3) Dum, xv. 84, 86. Ann, Reg. 1806, 229.

that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the Imperial, a splendid vessel of 130 guns, which bore the Admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action: a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb Imperial, driven ashore and burnt. The frigates stood to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all the ships stood to their guns; on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760; while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed and 294 wounded. The Imperial, before it ran ashore, had seen 500 of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels (1).

Disasters of Villaumez's division.

Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a disaster, the cruise of Admiral Villaumez, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in with the homeward bound Jamaica fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th July Sir John Borlase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the 4th June: Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance with a second fleet in the same latitude; while a third, under admiral Louis, put to sea in the end of August to intercept their return. As it was now evident that the attention of the English Government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St.-Domingo: and under the influence of these feelings the Veteran, of 74 guns, commanded by Jerome Bonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders stood away in the night of the 30th July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Villaumez saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet: the Foudroyant, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havannah, pursued by the English frigate Anson under the very guns of the Moro Castle; the Impetueux was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burnt, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the Cassant alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Bonaparte, in the Veteran, made

June 4.
July 8.
July 15.
August 28.

July 30.

(1) Dum, xv. 86, 89. Ann. Reg. 1806, 229. Bign. v. 156.

a rich prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by some English vessels when he reached the Bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where the hulk was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety (1).

Capture of Linois, and other naval operations. Sept. 18, 1805.

The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmolested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given, made an attack on the Centurion, 74 guns, and a few English merchantmen in the Bay of Vesigabatam; but though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove another on shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that March 13, 1806 the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois at length bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell in the night into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and after a short action was taken, with the Marengo of 80 and the March 14. Belle Poule of 40 guns. Next day five large frigates, with troops on board, bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were made prisoners. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the Rochefort squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made 800 prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British Government, Lallemand's was called by the Eng- Dec. 15, 1805. lish sailors the invisible squadron. He had the luck to meet and capture the Calcutta of 56 guns, which, unsuspecting danger, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French (2), who in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.

Reflections on these last naval disasters of France.

These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish navies were TOTALLY DESTROYED, and the English fleet, by general consent, had attained to UNIVERSAL DOMINION. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary ascendency acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire. Napoléon afterwards acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the impotent rage of Denmark, were put at his disposal: but he never again adventured on naval enterprises; and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the Brest fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, convoying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours; all apprehensions of invasion disappeared, and England, relieved from all danger

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806. 230, 231. Bign. v. 157, 158. (2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 229. Bign. v. 153, 154. Dum. xv. 90, 94.

of domestic warfare or colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and lanch forth her invincible legions in that career of glory which has immortalized the name of Wellington.

Greatness of the French navy under Louis XVI.

It was not thus at the commencement of the strug le, nor had it been thus in the preceding war. The mild and pacific Louis XVI had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of power. The French and Spanish fleets had rode triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been revictualled in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the Convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St.-Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can hardly produce a naval power. The transports of Brissot and the society of Les Amis des Noirs cut off the right arm of their maritime strength by the destruction of St.-Domingo; the confiscations of the Convention utterly ruined their commercial wealth: the blockade of their harbours deprived them of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only their own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralyzed that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily insulted him in his harbours.

Napoléon's changes of system in regard to the naval war.

This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoléon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivalling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe. Abandoning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, every where set on foot for the formation of a navy, were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the Continental System, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the continental powers, which could every where be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its Governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for if any considerable state was left out, the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to the separate interests of England, but the commencement of that important change in the system of continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoléon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illus-

Reflections on the growth of the English maritime power.

trious men who, during a series of ages, reared up this astonishing power. It was not, like the empires of Napoléon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime; nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France: 30,000 of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the victory of Sluys equalled in magnitude and importance, though from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs it has not attained equal celebrity with, that of Cressy or Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake—the fire of Essex—the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric; it grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow: the power of Louis XIV—the genius of Napoléon, were alike shattered against its strength: the victories of La Hogue and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the revolutionary war: dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the northern ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen serenity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amidst the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amidst the solitude of the waves, the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced. But amidst all our admiration for the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities perhaps still more worthy of admiration. Theirs was the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoléon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs; but had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that as self-confidence is its soul, so despondence is its ruin; and that in reality the admirals who encountered not only danger but disgrace in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land forces to certain victory at Jena or Austerlitz.

As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal domi-

Its probable future influence on the world.

nion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion, that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert, that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created, is already conspicuous. The Roman legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind the still more glorious inheritance of Transatlantic greatness. A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilization follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will arise to greatness in the east of Europe: the Cross is inscribed on its banners: wo to the Crescent is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoléon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, alike irresistible by sea and land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

Reduction of the Cape of Good Hope. Jan. 8.

The destruction of the French naval squadrons were not the only maritime operations of this year. Before Mr. Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, consisting of 5000 men; the naval armament being under the direction of Sir Home Popham. On the 4th January, 1806, the expedition reached Table Bay, but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking in that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th, they came up with the Dutch forces, 5000 strong, chiefly cavalry, in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders withstood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet, than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle; while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; General Jansens, who had retired with three thousand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for his safe return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the English dominions (1).

Sir Home Popham resolves to attack Buenos Ayres.

This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth: but the facility with which it was conducted, inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr. Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda against South America, and had even been appointed in December, 1804, to the Diadem of 64 guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the continent of South America favourable

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 233, 234. Dum. xv. 69, 73.

to the trade of this country (1)." But this intention had been afterwards abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces; and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope: and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the Governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay; taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops. With these, and two companies which he had the address to procure from St.-Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio della Plata (2).

Which falls 28th June.

The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th June, and was immediately disembarked. General Beresford, who commanded the land forces, immediately proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Monte Video, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders; and a capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property—a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat in the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to Government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors (3).

Embarrassments of Government on this success.

Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked for success reached the British islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpedience aad unhappy tendency of the enterprise; for on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing; which unhappily arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people perhaps of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though fortunately not very lasting fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports: boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered; and those fabled regions which formed the Eldorado of Sir Walter Raleigh, appeared about to pour their inexhaustible treasures into the British islands. Under the influence of these extravagant feelings every principle of reason, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience was swept away: speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained (4): and Government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.

(1) Lord Melville's evidence in Sir H. Popham's trial, March 9, 1807.
(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 234, 235. Dum. xv. 73, 75.
(3) Ann. Reg. 1806, 235, 236. Dum, xv. 73, 75.
(4) Ann. Reg. 1806, 237. 238.

It is retaken by the South Americans, Aug. 4.

But long before the Cabinet of St. James were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the boundless consignments which were in preparation could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the Government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unwonted occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders. An insurrection was secretly organized in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward: the militia of the surrounding districts were assembled: Colonel Linières, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Monte Video at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection in the interior of the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible: a des-
Aug. 12. perate conflict ensued in the town; and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal conflict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender were afterwards violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till reinforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended in the end with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American Governments, set sail from New York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after undergoing many hardships and landing on the Spanish Main, was obliged to re-embark and make the best of his way back to Trinidad (1).

Differences with America in regard to neutral rights.

Differences at this period arose which threatened to involve the British Government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service. The next the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a necessary consequence from the right of search which the American Government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had recognized, and which constituted the basis of the whole mari-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 240, 241.

time laws of Europe. It was impossible to expect that when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to their service, they should not reclaim them for their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether (1). The second arose from the decisions of the English Admiralty Courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country (2), contrary to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo (3). The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that to bring the neutral within the exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done; but, on the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unlading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognize such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state; but it was equally natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity, and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognizing as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then, after extensive capital had, on the faith of that

(1) On the part of the Americans it was contended, "that the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that, while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British born subjects; and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such intolerable abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to abstract right, or the practice of other states; the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their than it could be in any other case. The American Government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships; but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which he owed to the Government of his nativity; and that provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them: that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its merchant vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if in the course of that search her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time vindicate its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary from the right of search; it is in truth the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment: if the Americans can shew that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released: but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which as never yet been done."— *See Ann. Reg.* 1806, 244, 245.

(2) The Essex, May, 1805, per Sir W. Scott.

(3) Case of Polly, July 5, 1800. Rob. ii. 368.

recognition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize (1).

Violent measures of Congress.

To these serious and lasting subjects of discord was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship Leander, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so violent a commotion, that Mr. Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, April 18. and, after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect the 15th November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights (2), and every thing announced the commencement of a fresh Transatlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.

The commissioners on both sides adjust the differences.

But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the vehement populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of Great Britain. The instructions of their respective Governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their important duties in a correspondent spirit. Under such auspices, the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever, could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such difficulties, that the American commissioners; in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to consent, in the meantime, to a pledge by the British Government, that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and to afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by them, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity; but on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade by the enemy to their colonies, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent on European and two per cent on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, to five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the northern coalition (3).

(1) Robinson's Reports, iii. 241, 249. Ann. Reg. 1806, 246, 248.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 247. 249.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1806, 248, 250. Art. 11 and 12, Treaty.

Continental affairs. Coldness between France and Prussia.

While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoléon was rapidly advancing in his career of universal terrestrial empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th December, whereby he substituted for the intended warlike defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral England. Great was the embarrassment of the Cabinet of Berlin when this unexpected intelligence arrived. On the one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be bounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls; on the other hand, some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoléon prevailed over the King's better principles, and it was determined not simply to ratify the treaty, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications; and as a colour to the transaction, and also perhaps as a salvo to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margraviates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the meantime be obtained;" while it was represented to the English Minister at Berlin that arrangements had been con-
Jan. 26, 1806. cluded with France for insuring the tranquillity of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Russian troops and to the administration of the King until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitively annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the meantime the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army disbanded, and a proclamation to the same effect issued by the King in taking possession of that territory (1).

Increasing jealousies between the two Cabinets. They seize on Hanover.

But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs of Napoléon to admit any modification, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St.-Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoléon the question was decided; all sincere friendship was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian Government, the Emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect; Prussia had not resolu-
Feb. 15. tion enough to resist; and on the 15th February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ra-
March 28. tified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. Count

(1) Hardenberg's Letter, Jan. 26, 1806, to Mr. Jackson. Ann. Reg. 1806, 158. Hard. ix. 52, 58 Bign. v. 223, 226.

Schulemberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian Monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation, closing its harbours against English vessels; and on the 1st April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoléon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France (1).

Measures of retaliation by Great Britain.

This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater potentates, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoléon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to manifest their resentment; but Prussia was egregiously

Feb. 3.

mistaken when she applied it to Great Britain. So early as the 3d February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more

March 17.

than take possession of it for a temporary purpose; and the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr. Fox at a subsequent period, when the intentions of the Cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to shew that perfidious Government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British Ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours declared in a state of blockade; an embargo laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours;

April 23.

while a message from the King to both houses of Parliament announced his resolution to assert the dignity of his crown, and his anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened

May 14.

policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power with whom his Majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts (2)." An order of council was soon after issued, authorizing the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was instantly swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.

Mr. Fox's speech on the subject.

In the speech which he made shortly after in the House of Commons, Mr. Fox drew in vivid colours, and depicted with all the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. "The Emperor of Russia," said he, "after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French Emperor. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 159. Bign. v. 232, 234. Hard. ix. 107.

(2) Hard. ix. 207, 210. Bign. v. 233. Ann. Reg. 1806, 159, 161. Parl. Deb. vi. 882, 886.

could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer; but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoléon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country—and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of a military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of every thing that is contemptible in servility, with every thing that is odious in rapacity. Other nations have yielded to the ascendant of military power: Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master (1)."

Napoléon's opinion of Prussia in this transaction.

In consenting to this infamous transaction, the Cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French Emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed, by that dreaded conqueror. "From the moment," says Bignon, "that the treaty of 15th February was signed, Napoléon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France (2): he would not permit the delay of a single day." Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoléon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian Cabinet before they were finally consummated (3).

His farther measures of aggression on Germany.

The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared, in a series of measures, which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic empire, and ultimately brought that power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French empire. On March 15, Murat, without any previous concert with the Cabinet of Berlin, was invested with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of 15th February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune the brother-in-law of Napoléon, in the very heart of his Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now awakened jealousy of Prussia; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Werden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. 890, 892. Ann. Reg. 1806, 161.
(2) Bign. v. 232.
(3) Hard. ix. 107.

of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of 4,000,000 florins (L.200,000) from the city of Frankfort; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburgh to a still larger amount; while, in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English was seized without distinction, and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (L.240,000) was the price at which the Imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound peace, to tender to the city of Hamburgh and the Hanse Towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian Government now began to fall; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies (1).

Universal indignation in the north of Germany.

No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation, which burst forth in all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they had made so many sacrifices; but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The Queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporizing policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall; one universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks: it was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat: the elder spoke of the glories of Frederick and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence, issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved, and that universal fervour ensued which is the invariable forerunner of great events for good or for evil. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters (2).

(1) Bign. v. 247, 370, 1806. Reg. Ann. 164. Hard. ix. 136, 224, 225. Bour vii. 137, 138.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 165. Hard. ix. 117, 119.

Gentz's pamphlet on the celebrated subject.

One of the most remarkable of these pamphlets was a pamplet published by the celebrated Gentz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard every thing as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But how is our salvation to be obtained? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, resuscitating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes, they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource; that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations, and peace to the world. You, then, who amidst the universal shipwreck have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts; who have hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down, but not destroyed; in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is *to Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved.* It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more: we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe." —Gentz, *Europe en* 1806; and Hard. ix. 122. 123. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time!—a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

Formation of the Confederacy of the Rhine.

Strong as were the patriotic feelings which the conquests and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate feelings of many of their people, Napoléon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the Emperor at Mayence; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states of Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which they had elevated their sovereigns. France on this occasion played off with fatal effect the policy so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution, that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoléon felt daily more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to convert their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance, under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on the allied states (1).

Powers admitted to the Confederacy.

Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty were not long of being brought to a termination. The plenipotentiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July; and on the 12th of that month, the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand Duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau Weilberg, Nassau Usingen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, and Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm, and Salm-Kerbourg, Isenberg-Birchstein Prince Lichtenstein d'Aremberg, and Count de la Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, acceded to the confederacy a short time afterwards. By the act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be *severed for ever from the Germanic empire;* rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, placed under the protection of the Emperor of the French; and any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole (2). Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories encircled in their dominions (3). Lastly, a separate ar-

July 12.

Sept. 30.

(1) Hard. ix. 153, 155. Bign. v. 300, 303. Lucches, i. 124, 131.

(2) Arts. 1, 7, 12, and 35.

(3) Arts. 24, 25.

ticle provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection; which were, for France, 200,000 (1), and for the German states, 58,000 men: but subsequent experience soon proved that Napoléon received military aid to double the amount of these numbers from them all (2).

The Emperor renounces the crown of Germany.

This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoléon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic empire had been pierced to the heart, her fairest provinces had been reft from the empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great: sixteen millions of men were by a single stroke transferred from the Cæsars to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the Emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened by what immediately followed.

Aug. 1.

On the 1st August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced Princes. The former deemed it unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the empire, the inconsistence between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amidst the weakness of their former chief, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess force adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish Princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterwards to expiate in tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Soult still held the battlements of Brannau: on one pretext or another the evacuation of the German States, which by the treaty of Presburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed: the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn, the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored, while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the Imperial Cabinet dissembled their feelings; and justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, renounced the throne of the Cæsars, and declared himself the first of a new series of the Emperors of Austria (3).

(1) See Treaty, Ann. Reg. 1806, 818. Marten's Traites, iv. 313, 329.

(2) The contingents were settled as follows:—

France,	200,000
Bavaria,	30,000
Wirtemberg,	12,000
Baden,	3,000
Berg,	5,000
Darmstadt,	4,000
Nassau, Hohenzoki, and others,	4,000
	258,000

—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 166.

(3) Jom. ii. 240, 243. Bign. v. 317, 319. Hard. ix. 157.

Addresses of Napoléon and the Emperor Francis to the German States.

Napoléon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon announcing the Confederation of the Rhine—"The Germanic constitution is no longer but a shadow; the Diet has ceased to have any will of its own, His Majesty the Emperor and King can, therefore, no longer recognize its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. In his pacific views he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his pro-

Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin.

Though in appearance levelled at the emperor Francis as chief of the empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded : all classes, from the Cabinet of the King to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet : they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. The increasing aggressions of Napoléon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. Murat advanced claims to the principality of Embden, and the three Abbacies which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the House of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the King, tributary to the vassal of Napoléon; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with
Sept. 27. the Court of Berlin, they were given to understand by the French Emperor that if they were desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to Prussia in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation. But they were informed shortly after, that the Hanse
October 3. Towns, which Napoléon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy : that Saxony could not be allowed to form part of it against its will; while the Elector of Hesse was invited to join the confederacy of the Rhine, and on his refusing to comply, struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions. But all these causes of complaint, serious as they were, sunk into insignificance compared to that which arose when it was discovered by M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign; that, while continually urging the Cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoléon had engaged to Russia, in the treaty signed with d'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions (1); and that while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederic William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand Duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the

mises." The confederated Princes declared—"The results of the three last wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the Princes of the West and South have deemed it expedient to renounce all connection with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory as well as those of his empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity"—With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the empire : "Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the imperial throne imposed upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the Princes Electors of the empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the Electors, Princes, and States, members of the Supreme Tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chief."—See HARD. ix. 159, 162.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 167. Bign. v. 369, 390. Hard. ix. 167, 176.

Aug. 9. Warlike preparations of Prussia.

King of Prussia put his armies on the war footing, despatched M. Krusemark to St.-Petersburg, and M. Lacobi to London, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers; opened the navigation of the Elbe; concluded his differences with Sweden; assembled his generals; and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible; the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne; Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederic, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able, single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amidst thunders of applause, at the theatres, and the Queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch, by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps (1).

While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of southern Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England.

Renewed causes of discord between France and Russia.

The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz, had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France. Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Presburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations toward his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still farther removed the possibility of a rupture, while the withdrawing of Austria from the continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. But notwithstanding all these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again threw them into collision, and the quarter where the difference arose indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.

Differences about the mouths of the Cattaro.

Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in its naval transactions. By the treaty of Presburg it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorized to take possession had not arrived, and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who are almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pur-

(1) Hard. ix. 176, 181. Bign. v. 409, 415. Ann. Reg. 1806, 167.

Which is occupied by the Russians.

suance of these instigations, the people, who are styled Montenegrins, and ardently desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict blockade, in which they were soon supported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived March 4. from Corfu. After a short blockade, he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately transferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force; but the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious, that the Austrian subaltern officers, in the fortress protested against its surrender, and the governor was afterwards brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Transylvanian fortress for life (1).

The French in return seize Ragusa. Actions in its neighbourhood.

Nothing that has since transpired authorizes the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoléon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than Napoléon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Brannau, on the Austrian frontier; and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German States. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrins from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him he was at liberty to look for an indemnity May 27. wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with whom they had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians, both by land and sea; but before any thing of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian Cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the July 9 exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. But, in consequence of that ambassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune ar- July 6. rival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrins; but these troops having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued (2).

M. d'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he appears,

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 149, 150. Bign. v. 258, 262. Hard. ix. 195, 196.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 150, 151. Bign. v. 258, 265. Hard. ix. 219, 221.

D'Oubril concludes a treaty at Paris between France and Russia.

when he arrived at Paris, to have misunderstood, in an unaccountable manner, his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with that power was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands of the Emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and Russia from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoléon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord, to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the Court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-Royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of King—the harbours of those islands being shut against the British flag during the continuance of the present war; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his Queen; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties—a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concurred in within a year afterwards at Tilsit. Thus did Napoléon and d'Oubril concur in spoliating the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands to his son; gift away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the Court of Palermo or the Cabinet of London; dispose of the Balearic Islands, without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden, at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover (1).

July 20.

Which is disavowed by the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg.

M. d'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions, for no sooner was it concluded, than he set off in person to render an account of it at St.-Petersburg, observing, at the same time—"I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my Imperial master." In effect before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A change of Ministry had ensued: Prince Adam Czartorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the Imperial Government, as "entirely in opposition to the instructions which d'Oubril had received," though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been com-

Aug. 25.

(1) Mart. Sup. iv. 305, 309. Hard. ix. 119, 120. Bign. v. 325, 329.

municated to the Cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian Government was saved the dishonour which must for ever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one Ministry, with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the Imperial Cabinet, not any deviation from instructions on the part of its ambassador; and all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states (1).

The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and England, which had been long in dependence at Paris; and the turn which it was now taking left little hope that hostilities in every quarter could be brought to a termination.

Opening of negotiations between France and England.

This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private audience with Mr. Fox in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoléon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English Minister, after having at first dismissed him from his presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply from that minister, in which after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a Cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr. Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated the passage, in the exposition of the state of the empire by the Minister of the Interior, wherein Napoléon declared that he would always be ready to renew conferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr. Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments; and thus commenced a negotiation under the most favourable of all auspices, mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it (2).

Feb. 10.

March 26.

The basis proposed by Mr. Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their respective allies.—"Our interests," said Talleyrand, "are easily

April 1.

(1) Bign. v. 330, 344. Hard. ix. 221, 222.

The powers conferred on M. d'Oubril here—"We authorize, by these presents, M. d'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorized on the part of the French Government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to adhibit to it our imperial ratification in the terms that shall be specified." On the other hand the act of disavowal here—"The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. d'Oubril has been submitted to a council specially summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions transmitted to him from Vienna before his departure from that town; and they found that M. d'Oubril, in signing that treaty, has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however, that of mere banishment to his estates, did not look like any very serious deviation from instructions.—See MARTEN's *Sup.* iv. 308, 312, and HARD. ix. 222.

(2) Bign. v. 266, 269. Hard. ix. 184, 187. Parl. Deb. viii. 92, 94.

England insists on Russia being a party to the negotiation.

reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kings of the earth put together. We are a great continental power; but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English Minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr. Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty (1), independent of that power? No." Finding the English Minister immoveable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation; and it was agreed that the intervention of the continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.

Despatch, April 20.

Basis of *uti-possidetis* fixed.

The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and honour of England and France themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoléon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoléon was brought to agree to, and the retention of Sicily by England or its allies (2); the recognition of the Emperor of France by England, and of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France (3). These terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti-possidetis,* and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr. Fox on the subject.

June 13.

Which France departs from. June 13.

At the time when the proposals were made by the French Government, no accommodation had been effected with Russia; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Oubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace on behalf of Russia, and Napoléon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British Government. When pressed, therefore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti-possidetis;* and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied, that though the sentiments of the Emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that *some changes had taken place,* the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and farther mentioned that the Emperor had received reports from his brother and the

June 16.

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 103, 108. Bign. v. 267, 274.

(2) "I inquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said. 'Vous l'avez,' he replied, '*nous ne vous la demandons pas;* si vous la possédiez, elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make farther questions. We ask nothing of you (nous ne vous demandons rien), amounting to an admission of *uti-possidetis,* as applicable to his Majesty's conquests. Talleyrand concluded with these words:—'Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changés; l'aigreur qui caractérisait le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus. Et ce que nous désirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande-Bretagne.'"—Lord Yarmouth's *Communication,* No. 12. *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

(3) Lord Yarmouth's Commun. Parl. Deb. viii. 110.

general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily,* and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown, the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the Cabinet of St. James's to enter into the negotiation; that if a confidential communication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the Emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the Emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication." Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr. Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti-possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was on the faith of this basis,
June 26. more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences alone were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct the negotiation; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine qua non,*
July 1. without which it was useless to continue the conferences. Talley-
July 9. rand upon this offered the *Hanse Towns* as an equivalent for the King of Naples; and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian Majesty: looking out thus, according to the usual system of Napoléon, in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions (1).

Continuation of the negotiations, and gradual estrangement of the parties.

This clear departure on the side of France from the basis of the negotiation originally laid down by its own minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be spoliated, in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents, augured but ill for its ultimate success; and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr. Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily should
July 9. be retained by the King, and enjoined Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this were not acceded to. The changes in Germany consequent on the Confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be concealed, if peace with Great Britain were concluded. Mr. Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ragusa, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the pro-
July 19. posed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoléon would by no means consent. Advices were received at Paris that an army of 50,000 men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in Paris belonging to corps
July 20. in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments, and the signature of a separate treaty between France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles taken from Spain was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British Plenipotentiary (2).

(1) Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, June 19, July 1, 5, and 12. Parl. Deb. viii. 110, 115.

(2) Mr. Fox's and Lord Yarmouth's Despatches, July 9, 18, 19, and 20. Parl. Deb. viii. 113, 125.

Progress of the negotiation. July 21.

The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the Cabinet of St. Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacification. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover: full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clarke, and specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoléon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia as a compensation for Hanover, or by his Sicilian Majesty; and held out the menace, that by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views in regard to the Spanish Peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as they had been in Holland and Naples. But regardless of these threats Mr. Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti-possidetis,* as the only one which could be admitted, and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British Government (1).

July 30.

The demands of France become more extravagant, and the negotiation is broken off.

Under the auspices of Lord Lauderdale the negotiation was protracted two months longer without leading to any satisfactory result. The English Minister continued incessantly to demand for a return to the principle of *uti-possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation; and the French Cabinet as uniformly eluded, or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain. Lord Lauderdale in consequence repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril. This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, farther than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia: but it considerably lowered those of France, and Talleyrand announced that France "would make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterwards explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain, the confirmation of its possession of Malta, the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire, and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity *from Spain,* in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English Cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoléon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia (2).

Sept. 3. Sept. 18. Sept. 26. October 6.

Real views of the parties in this negotiation.

Thus this negotiation, begun under such favourable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro.

(1) Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, July 28, August 3, 1806. Parl. Deb. viii. 125, 138.

(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 173, 203. Bign. v. 343, 359. Lord Lauderdale's Desp. 26th Sept. 1806.

Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the South and North of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but in reality the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view were more considerable in contending for these distant possessions than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the Crown of Naples that Napoléon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother; it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire; it was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the collossal empires of France and Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties; and the negotiation broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France, the empire of the seas and the dominion of continental Europe (1).

State of affairs at Berlin.

The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify d'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when shortly after it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible; a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the Queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin (2). The enthusiasm was universal, but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to frenzy: in proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even

Aug. 26.

the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital (3). Lucchesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his Government full of acrimonious complaints of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, which either by accident or design fell into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoléon. He in-

Sept. 3.

stantly demanded the recal of the obnoxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission

Sept. 7. Prussian ultimatum, and preparations for war on both sides.

was mainly to protract matters, that the Cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and if possible gain time for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoléon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly defiling from Brannau, the Inn, and the Neckar towards the banks of the Elbe, and 100,000 men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at

(1) Bign. v. 363, 365.

(2) Bign. v. 403.

(3) He repeated with emphasis the lines of the poet Gleims, in allusion to the warlike bards of Berlin.

"Sie singen, laut im hohen Chor,
Vom Tod, furs Vaterland uns vor,
Doch kommt ein einziger Husar,
So lauft die ganze Barden Schaar."

Sept. 26. their head on the night of the 26th September, conveyed the guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by Oct. 1. M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were: 1st, That the French troops should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the Emperor, and continue it without interruption. 2d, That Wesel should be detached from the French empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter league in the North of Germany. No stronger proof of the infatuation which had seized the Cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of Napoléon and the grand army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rosbach than the eve of the battle of Jena (1).

Murder of Palm. Great sensation which it occasioned.

The public mind was violently excited at this period in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder committed by orders of Napoléon on a citizen of one of the free cities of the empire, who had sold a work hostile to their interests. Palm, a tradesman in Nuremberg, had been instrumental with many other booksellers in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gentz, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others Aug. 12. were fortunate enough to make their escape: but Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers, assembled by the Emperor's orders at Brannau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, Aug. 25. without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence (2). This atrocious proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany: men compared the loud declama-

(1) Jom. ii. 274. Bign. v. 443. Hard. ix. 266.

Proceedings of the Military Commission by which he was condemned.

(2) The judgment of the Military Commission convicting Palm and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble:—"Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservatinn; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination, menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the prngress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of natinns and the *respect due to crowned heads;* injurious to the people committed to their Governments; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination, declares unanimously, That the authors, printers, publishers, and distributers of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty nf high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the frenzy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination or any private crime. If they had, they were published not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its Emperor, but in the free city of Nuremberg, in the heart of the German empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoléon, but the Germans, aliens to his authority and enemies of his Government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Presburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that *Russia*, a separate power at war with France, had, in the usual course of hostility, conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Even applying Napoléon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Swiss, to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British empire to throw nff the rule of their sovereign and parliament, establish annual parliaments and universal suffrage? —See Bign. v. 337, 338.

tions of the republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with this savage violation of it by their military chief; and concluded, that the only freedom which they really had at heart was licence for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendency, that of military force. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the senate of Frankfort, after recounting the enormous
Aug. 19. contributions which they had paid to the republican armies in 1796, 1799, 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Auge-
Aug. 27. reau replied to this proclamation by a stern requisition to have the authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the last magistrates of the state, but after they had been arrested, Napoléon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop farther proceedings (1).

Influence which it had on the rupture of the negotiation.

The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevenged, either upon Napoléon or the French people. It fell deep and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr. Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general freedom by the spread of republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoléon for the negotiations which ultimately led to its abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the rock of St.-Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly in every part of Europe, that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France: that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolor flag. Napoléon has frequently said, that if Mr. Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted: but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to deprive one of the brightest ornaments of his country of the honour of having at last been awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and possessed the magnanimity instantly to act upon the conviction. In the last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow out the path thus clearly chalked out (2).

(1) Hard. ix. 246, 250. Bign. v. 337, 339.

Last instructions of Mr. Fox to Lord Lauderdale.

(2) "In the instructions," says Mr. Fox in his last important official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French Government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his Lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded: in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct: the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to use them till the French Government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand upon this made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany; and stated; 'that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place.' That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, the German confederation treaties were

In several of the speeches which he had made after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration (1). Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic duty: the two lights of the age came finally to concur in the same policy: if Mr. Pitt struggled for fifteen years, amidst difficulty and disaster, to carry on the war, it was Mr. Fox who bequeathed the flood of glory in which it terminated to his successors; and after having spent the best part of his life in recommending less honourable and enlightened measures of concession to his country, in his last moments "nailed her colours to the mast (2)."

Mr. Fox's eyes are at last opened to the real nature of the war.

Death of Mr. Fox.

The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining; and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in Parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th September he sunk into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery (3).

Sept. 13.

His character.

Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings, and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his

both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French Government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr. Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoléon's assertion that if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. Its last stages, down to his death on 17th September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—See Mr. Fox's *Despatches, August 3d and 14th*, 1806, *Parl. Deb.* viii. 138, 164.

(1) In the debate on Mr. Windham's military system, on April 3, 1806, Mr. Fox said, with admirable candour: "Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that *I have been weaned from the opinions which I formerly held* with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying it on, we must be reduced to that state which I for one cannot contemplate without apprehension, —'toto divisos orbe Britannos,' and he left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or indeed under any system which we may act upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 715, 716.

(2) This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox, on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties. Ten years before, the two champions of the constitution and of revolution, Mr. Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the Vindiciæ Gallicæ, had in like manner come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm,' said Mackintosh, in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter: You are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitutions of my country," Burke answered from the bed of death: "You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shews how much your own sagacity, operating on your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the shew of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end." What words between such men!—*See* Mackintosh's *Memoirs*, i. 87, 88.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1806, 258.

character communicated confidence; the ardour of his eloquence roused enthusiasm: the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship."—"I admired," says Gibbon, "the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood." Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr. Fox's character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between them had ceased: "To be sure, he is a man made to be loved (1)."

A man of pleasure in every sense of the word; dissipated and irregular in private life; having ruined his private fortune at the gaming table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in Parliament, he yet never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments, and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration, not only of his partisans, but his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British Parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic every where turned as to those of the gifted spirit intrusted with their cause. To his support the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he triumphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gratuitous exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

Extraordinary talents in debate.

Mr. Fox was the greatest debater that the English Parliament ever produced. Without the admirable arrangement and lucid order which enabled Mr. Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under a hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate; but his habits were too desultory—his indolence too great—his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge (2). Respectable as an historian, the fragment on the annals of the Revolution which he composed is justly admired, from the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the Parliamentary orator. It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from studying the vehement declamation—the powerful and fervent reasoning by which his great speeches are here distinguished.

But all this notwithstanding, the fame of Mr. Fox is on the decline. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts

(1) Mackintosh's Mem. i. 324.

(2) No man more frequently quoted or referred to Adam Smith; but he had never read the Wealth of Nations.

His fame is on the decline as a just thinker.

—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected in legislation the freedom of the press, and stopped the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind; but in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of democratic power—in so far as he supported the wild prospects of the French revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same destructive doctrines, and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition,—he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

Reasons of this change.

The doctrines that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands—that the extension of political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil—that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction—and that the growth of democratic ascendency is the commencement of social regeneration,—are sometimes amiable, from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular, from the agreeable flattery they convey to the multitude. They are liable to only one objection—that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a democratic regime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, are kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated (1). It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional monarchy:

(1) "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes."—"In turbis atque seditionibus," says the Roman annalist, "pessimo cuique plurima vis; pax et quies bonis artibus aluntur."—"Enfin je vois," said the French demagogue, when going to the scaffold, "que dans les révolutions l'autorité toujours reste aux plus scélérats."—"A democratic republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few; with this difference, that the few who are thus elevated to power are the most profligate and worthless of the community."—"Democracy," says the author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and to control; and consequently the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which *places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large.*" What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr. Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—Thucydides, l. iii. c. 39; Sallust *de Bello Cat.*; Rioufe, 67; *Parl. Hist.* xxx. 902; Mackintosh's *Memoirs*, i. 92.

no hope remains of its outliving the spring flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when these antagonist forces are brought for any length of time to draw in the same direction. The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr. Pitt opposed to revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps for ever, under the triumph in which Mr. Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by this great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr. Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration; on the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr. Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr. Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave; and award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise rather of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, than either a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart—it will indulge the pleasing hope, that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many of his earlier delusions; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors, by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA—FALL OF PRUSSIA.

ARGUMENT.

Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England—And of Austria—But the Cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neutral—Instructions to Mr. Adair, at the Austrian capital, on the subject—Spain indicates a hostile disposition against France—The lesser German Powers incline to France—Preparations of Prussia—Forces on both sides—Her want of foresight, and neglect of Defensive Measures—Imprudent conduct of the Prussian Generals—Proclamation of Napoléon to his soldiers—Reply of Prussia—Reflections on these Proclamations—Preparatory Movements of the Prussians—Counter-movement of Napoléon—The Duke of Brunswick abandons the offensive—Commencement of Hostilities, and Defeat of Detached Bodies of the Prussians—Death of Prince Louis—Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French—Movements on both sides preparatory to a general action—Result of these Manœuvres—The Prussian Army is again divided—The King marches to Auerstadt—Napoléon's dispositions for the approaching Action—Positions of the Army on both sides—Battle of Jena—Defensive measures of the Prussians—The Prussians are defeated—Arrival of Ruchel on the Field, who is also overwhelmed—Preparatory movements which led to the Battle of the King's Army—Battle of Auerstadt—Desperate struggle which there ensued—Additional Forces come up on both sides—Dreadful Fight on the Sonnenberg, on the right—The Prussian Reserve advances and is overthrown—Disastrous Retreat of the Prussians from both fields of battle—Loss on both sides in these actions—Unparalleled disasters of the Retreat—Capture of Erfurth with thirteen thousand men—The King of Prussia confers the chief command on Prince Hohenlohe, and retires to Magdebourg—Measures of Napoléon to follow up his Victory—Soult defeats Kalkreuth—The Duke of Wirtemberg is overthrown by Bernadotte at Halle—Saxony is overrun by the French—Investment of Magdebourg, which is abandoned by Hohenlohe—Who is pursued, assailed, and made prisoner—March and escape of the Duke of Saxe Weimar—Disgraceful surrender of Stettin and Custrin—Blucher's corps is pursued to Lubeck—And is there defeated, after a desperate conflict—He retires to Rat-Kau, and is there made prisoner—Fall of Magdebourg—And of Hameln and Nieubourg on the Weser—Napoléon detaches Saxony from the Coalition—But refuses to treat with Prussia—Napoléon visits Potsdam and the Tomb of the Great Frederick—Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg are occupied by the French—Affair of Prince Hatzfeld, and his pardon by Napoléon—His Proclamation and Addresses to his Soldiers—And unpardonable severity to the Queen, the Duke of Brunswick, and Elector of Hesse Cassel—Cruel expressions regarding both in the Bulletins—Enormous Contributions levied on Prussia and the North of Germany—Napoléon's unworthy expressions on Gentz, and Sir James Mackintosh's opinion of him—Military organization of the country, from the Rhine to the Vistula, under Napoléon—Negotiation with Prussia—Armistice concluded, which the King refuses to ratify—Advance of Jerome Bonaparte into Silesia, and of the French troops to the Vistula—Siege and Surrender of Glogau—Treaty between France and Saxony—Berlin Decree against English Commerce—Occupation of Hamburgh—Immense results of the Campaign—General despondency which it occasioned in Europe—Talents and rashness displayed by Napoléon during its progress—Reflections on the sudden fall of Prussia—Blucher's opinion on its probable Resurrection.

Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England.

NOTWITHSTANDING the inconsiderate haste with which Prussia had taken up arms, the Cabinet of Berlin made some attempts to induce the other powers of Europe to share with them the dangers of the conflict. With England it was no difficult matter to effect a reconciliation. At the first authentic accounts of the change in the policy of Frederick William, an order in council was issued, raising the blockade of the Prussian harbours. M. Jacobi, the Prussian Minister in London, returned to that capital immediately after he had left it; and the British Ministry had the generosity to resume its amicable relations with the Cabinet of Berlin before an explanation had been given on the subject of Hanover.

Sept. 25.

Aug. 17. With Sweden an accommodation was also without difficulty effected, on the footing of the troops of that power taking possession of Lauenberg, which they did in the name of the King of Great Britain. It was not so easy a matter to convince the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg of this unlooked-for change in the Prussian councils; and, taught by the long vacillation of its policy, they were for some time unwilling to yield to the general joy which was diffused through the Russian capital on the intelligence that war was resolved Sept. 18. on. But no sooner was Alexander informed by confidential letters brought by General Krusemark from the King of Prussia, that he had embarked seriously in the contest, than he instantly wrote, promising an immediate succour of 70,000 men, and announcing his intention of himself marching at the head of a chosen army to aid in the support of his faithful ally (1).

And of Austria. Important as the announcement of the intentions of Russia were, the accession of Austria would have been of still more value to the common cause, from its closer proximity to the scene of action, and the strong positions which the Bohemian mountains afforded on the flank of the probable theatre of war. The Prussian ambassador accordingly was indefatigable in his endeavours to rouse the Cabinet of Vienna to a sense of the vital importance of joining heart and hand in the approaching conflict for the liberties of Europe. He represented to Count Stadion, then Prime Minister at Vienna, "that the losses inflicted on Austria by the treaty of Presburg were so immense, that the Emperor, of necessity, must at some future period look out for the means of repairing them. The loss of the Tyrol is of such irreparable importance to Austria that no doubt can be entertained that she will take advantage of the first opportunity to resume it from Bavaria, by rousing the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that important province to their ancient masters. Napoléon has justly conceived the most serious apprehensions for the faithful observance of that treaty which he himself has been the first to violate. Does he not, in defiance of his engagements, still hold the fortress of Brannau and the line of the Inn six months after he was bound by a solemn treaty to have evacuated Germany with all his forces? The recent establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and dissolution of the Germanic empire, too clearly demonstrate with what ulterior views the French Government is actuated in regard to the countries beyond the Rhine. Honour, necessity, the existence of its people, have forced the King of Prussia to take up arms alone; but a powerful Russian army, and the well-known generosity of England, diminish its perilous chances. Now, therefore, is the time for Austria and Prussia to lay aside their jealousies springing from the conquest of Silesia, and unite their forces against the common enemy, who is about to make the Confederation of the Rhine an outwork from whence to enslave all the other states of Germanic origin (2)."

But the Cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neuter. Forcible as these considerations were, and strongly as the Cabinet of Vienna felt their justice, there were yet many circumstances which forbad them to yield on this occasion to their inclinations. The conduct of Prussia for the last ten years had been so dubious and vacillating; her hostility to Austria, especially on the division of the indemnities, so evident; her partiality for the French alliance so conspicuous; her changes of policy during the last year so extraordinary, that no reliance could be placed on her maintaining a decided line of conduct for any length of time together, and, least of all, continuing steadfast in that sudden and perilous hostility in which she had now engaged, and the vehemence of which was

(1) Hard. ix. 272, 275. Bign. v. 413, 415. Dum. xv. 285, 287. (2) Hard. ix. 277, 281.

the worst possible guarantee for its endurance. Who could ensure that she would not desert this alliance as she had done the first coalition against France, or change her policy as suddenly as she had done her recent hostility against England, and leave to Austria, irrevocably embarked, the whole weight and dangers of the contest? The Archduke Charles, on being consulted as to the state of the army, reported that the infantry, which had not yet been rejoined by the prisoners taken during the campaign, was hardly a half of its full complement; the cavalry but recently remounted, and for the most part unskilled in military exercises; the artillery numerous, but the majority of the gunners without any experience. The treasury was empty; great part of the most valuable provinces of the monarchy had been torn away, and those which remained were exhausted by enormous war contributions, wrung from them by the enemy. Influenced by these considerations, the Cabinet of Vienna resolved to preserve a strict neutrality, and issued a proclamation to that effect; and however much the historian may lament that determination, from a knowledge of the boundless calamities which an opposite course might have saved to both monarchies, it is impossible to deny that, situated as Austria was at that time, it was the most prudent resolution which its Government could have adopted, and that if Prussia was left single-handed to maintain the cause of European independence, it was no more than what she was bound to expect from the selfish and temporizing policy which she had so long followed (1).

October 6.

Spain indicates hostile dispositions against France.

Hopes were not awanting to the Cabinet of Berlin of efficacious aid in another quarter where it was least expected, and of a kind to paralyze a considerable part of the French forces. Spain, bereft of her navy by the battle of Trafalgar, blockaded in her harbours, destitute of commerce, cut off from all intercourse with her colonies, had felt all the burdens of war without any of its glories. The public indignation was hourly accumulating against the Prince of Peace, whose ignoble birth, exorbitant power, and immense wealth, rendered him as much an object of jealousy to the Castilian noblesse, as the uniform disasters which had attended his administration made him detested by the people. Still, however, that ruling favourite persevered, against the almost unanimous wishes of the kingdom, in the French alliance, till his pride was offended at the haughty conduct of Napoléon, who excluded the Spanish ambassador from any share in the negotiations for a general peace at Paris, and it was revealed to him, that in those conferences he had seriously proposed to take the Balearic islands from the Spanish crown, and confer them as an indemnity for Sicily, together with a revenue drawn from Spain, on the King of Naples; while the assembling of a powerful army at Bayonne, ostensibly directed against Portugal, sufficiently indicated a design to overawe both states of the Peninsula. The light now suddenly flashed upon the Spanish rulers. They perceived, as Prussia had done during the same negotiation, that the French Emperor made use of the powers with whom he was in alliance as mere dependencies, excluding them from

(1) Hard. ix. 279, 281. Bign. v. 418, 419. Lucchesini, ii. 106, 112.

Instructions to Mr. Adair on the subject.

The instructions of Mr. Adair, the British Ambassador at Vienna at that period, were, not to stimulate the Austrian Government to hurry into a war, of which the consequences, if unsuccessful, might be fatal to that country, but to offer its Government, if they deemed the opportunity favourable for engaging in hostilities, or if the necessities of their situation compelled them to such a course, the whole pecuniary aid which Great Britain was capable of affording. Of the wisdom of this course of proceeding, no one who considers the precarious situation of Austria at that crisis can entertain a doubt; and it affords another proof of the clear insight which Mr. Fox at that period had obtained into the insatiable ambition of Napoléon, and of the magnanimity with which that upright statesman instantly acted upon his conviction. "A man," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "unjustly styled by Napoleon and his adherents, the last prop of the pacific dispositions of the Cabinet of St.-James's." *Vide* Lucchesini, ii. 96, 97, *note*; and Bign. v. 417.

any participation in treaties in which they were deeply interested, and disposing of their provinces to others without condescending even to ask their consent to the transfer. No sooner, therefore, did they receive intelligence of the rupture of the conferences between Great Britain and France at Paris, and the resolution of Prussia to take up arms, than they resolved to detach themselves from the French alliance, and join their forces to those of European independence. Despatches from the Prussian envoy at Paris to the Prince of Peace on this subject were secretly intercepted and deciphered by the French Government, which from that moment resolved on the overthrow of the Spanish branch of the House of Bourbon at the first convenient opportunity; while the Prince of Peace, deeming concealment of his designs no longer necessary, issued two proclamations, in the middle of October, in which he enjoined the immediate completion of the ranks of the army, and the formation of the national militia, under their constitutional leaders, in all the provinces of the monarchy. Thus was the ambition and reckless disregard of national rights by Napoléon again reviving, on a surer basis, because that of experience and common danger, the great original European coalition against France; and on the eve of the battle of Jena were the first sparkles of that terrible conflagration visible, which afterwards burnt with such fury in Russia, Germany, and the Spanish Peninsula (1).

Oct. 14 and 15.

The lesser German powers incline to France.

But although the greater and distant powers, with the exception of Austria, were thus arming in favour of the coalition, the lesser states nearer the scene of action were overawed by the influence and the authority of France. Napoléon was daily receiving accessions of strength from the states which bordered on the Confederation of the Rhine. The Archduke Ferdinand, though brother to the Emperor of Austria, gave the first example of defection by joining his states of Wurtzburg to that alliance; the Elector of Hesse, whom interest as well as family connections strongly inclined to the cause of Prussia, was nevertheless so overcome by his apprehensions, as to persist, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Cabinet of Berlin, in a forced neutrality; the Elector of Cassel, summoned to each of the hostile camps, and sorely perplexed between his inclinations and his apprehensions, put his troops on the war footing of twenty thousand men, and contrived to protract his ultimate decision till the battle of Jena rendered submission to France a matter of necessity. Saxony alone, conterminous along its northern frontier with Prussia, and capable from its strength of adopting a more generous resolution, openly joined the Cabinet of Berlin, but twenty thousand men were all that it brought to the standards of the Great Frederick (2).

Sept. 25.

Preparations of Prussia. Forces on both sides.

The whole weight of the contest, therefore, fell on Prussia; for although great and efficacious aid might be expected to be derived in time from Russia, and succours were hoped for from England, both in men and money, yet these auxiliaries were as yet far distant. The Moscovite battalions were still cantoned on the Niemen; those of England had not yet left the Thames; while Napoléon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops, was rapidly approaching the Thuringian Forest. Nothing daunted, however, by this formidable prospect, Frederick William gallantly took the field, and directed all the disposable troops of the monarchy towards Saxony and Erfurth. The total military strength of the kingdom was 240,000 men, of whom 120,000 were assembled on the frontier, and 12,000 in observation in Westphalia, for the approaching campaign; the re-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 221. Lucches. ii. 100, 101. (2) Bign. v. 435, 442. Dum. xv, 287, 288. Hard. ix. 285, 286.

mainder being dispersed in garrison depôts, or not yet put in a state for active operations. Such was the general enthusiasm, and so little did they anticipate the terrible reverse which awaited them, that the Prussian guards marched out of Berlin, singing triumphant airs, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, almost in a state of sedition from the tumultuous joy they experienced on at length being about to measure their strength with the enemy (1).

Her grievous want of foresight and defensive measures.

The memorable military operations of the year 1813, and the tenacious hold which Napoléon then kept of the fortresses on the Elbe, when assailed by the greatly superior forces of the coalition, have demonstrated that no position in Europe is more susceptible of defence than the course of that river; and that, supported by the ramparts of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, Dresden, and Torgau, an inferior force can there for a considerable time prolong its defence against an enemy possessing an overwhelming superiority in the field. Had these fortresses been properly armed and provisioned, and the Prussians been commanded by a general capable of turning to the best advantage the means of defence which they afforded, it is probable that as protracted a contest might have been maintained as Napoléon supported in 1796 on the Adige, or Kray in 1800 around the bastions of Ulm, and time gained for the arrival of the Russians before a decisive blow was struck in the centre of Germany. But not only had no preparations for such a defensive system been made, but the nation, as well as its rulers, were in such a state of exultation as to despise them. None of these important bulwarks were provisioned; hardly were guns mounted on their ramparts. The interior fortified towns on the Oder and in Silesia were for the most part in the most deplorable state. No depôts were formed; no provision for recruiting the army in case of disaster made. They had not even a rallying point assigned in the event of defeat, though the strong fortresses of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, and Torgau lay immediately in the rear of the theatre of war, and the Elbe spread its ample stream to arrest the victor. Careless of the future, chanting songs of victory, and enjoying its triumphant march through the villages, the army bent its steps towards Erfurth; strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, stronger still in the anticipation of the overthrow of Napoléon, and dreaming rather of the banks of the Rhine or the plains of Champagne, than of the shores of the Vistula or the fields of Poland (2).

But if the infatuation of the army was great, greater still was the delusion

(1) Lucches. ii. 117, 118. Dum. xv. 289. Jom. ii. 275, 276. Hard. ix. 299, 300.

Napoléon's army was divided into nine corps, and stationed as follows, on the 3d October, when he arrived at Wurtzburg—

First corps—Bernadotte—at Lichtenfelds.
Second do.—Marmont—Illyria.
Third do.—Davoust—Bamberg.
Fourth do.—Soult—between Amberg and Bamberg.
Fifth do.—Lefebvre, succeeded by Lannes—in front of Schweinfurth.
Sixth do.—Ney—Nuremberg.
Seventh do.—Augereau—Wurtzburg.
Cavalry do.—Murat—between Wurtzburg and Cronach.
Imperial Guard—Bessières and Lefebvre, after Lannes got the 5th corps—Wurtzburg.

The bulk of the army was grouped round Cobourg and Bamberg. The whole bearing on the Prussians, exclusive of Marmont in Illyria, was 150 000 men.

The Prussians, when the campaign opened, were divided into three armies: the right wing under General Ruchel, of 30 000 men, was stationed on the frontiers of the Hessian territories; the centre, 55,000 strong, commanded by the King in person, with his lieutenant-general, the Duke of Brunswick, under his orders, was behind the Elbe around Magdebourg, with its advanced guard on the Saale; the left wing, composed of 40,000 men, including the Saxons, was commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the King's brother, under him. It assembled in Saxony; its extreme left rested on the Bohemian mountains, and its advanced posts were pushed as far as Hof and the Kirchberg. A detached corps of 12,000 men, in Westphalia, was under the orders of a general destined for future celebrity—Blucher.—See Dumas, xv. 290, 514; and Jom. ii. 275, 276, and the *Official Report of the Russian strength to the Duke of Brunswick*, Hard. ix. 484, App. G.

(2) Hard. ix. 297, 300. Lucches. ii. 117, 120.

Imprudent conduct of the Prussian Generals.

of its commanders. The Duke of Brunswick, though an able man of the last century, and enjoying a great reputation, was altogether behind the age, and totally ignorant of the perilous chances of a war with the veteran legions and numerous columns of Napoleon. The disasters of the late campaigns were by him ascribed entirely to timidity or want of skill in the Austrians; the true way to combat the French, he constantly maintained, was to assume a vigorous offensive, and paralyse their military enthusiasm by compelling them to defend their own positions. That there was some truth in this opinion, no one acquainted with the character and history of the French army could deny: but unfortunately it required, for its successful application, both a general and an army very different from the Prussian at this period. The former did not possess the energy and rapidity, the latter the strength or experience requisite for so perilous a system. Bold even to rashness in the original conception of the campaign, the Duke of Brunswick was vacillating and irresolute when he came to carry it into execution; and while his opponent was counting hours and minutes in the march of his indefatigable legions, frequently lost whole days in deliberation or councils of war, and sometimes changed the destination of the forces when their movements were half completed. The troops indeed were numerous and perfectly disciplined: the artillery admirable; the cavalry magnificent; the staff skilful and highly educated, but in matters of theory and detail, rather than the practical disposal of large masses in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy. But what the whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer, were alike ignorant of, was the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoléon had introduced into modern war, by the union of consumate skill at headquarters with enormous masses and a vast application of physical force: combining thus the talent of Cæsar or Turenne with the fierce tempest of Scythian warfare. Applying then to the present the experience of the past age, the usual error of second-rate men, they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them; and advanced as against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in presence of Napoléon and 150,000 men (1).

Proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers, 7th Oct. 1806.

As usual in such cases, the contending parties prefaced the war of arms by mutual manifestoes calculated to rouse the spirit of their respective forces, or vindicate their hostility in the eyes of Europe. That of Napoléon, which bore intrinsic evidence of his composition, was, as usual, admirably calculated to dazzle and stimulate his followers. "Soldiers! the order for your return to France was already issued: you had already approached it by several marches: triumphal fêtes awaited you; preparations for your reception were already made in the capital: but whilst we were surrendering ourselves to a too confident security, new conspiracies were formed under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war have been heard from Berlin: for two months provocations have daily been offered to us; the same insane spirit which, taking the advantage of our dissentions fourteen years ago, conducted the Prussians into the plains of Champagne, still prevails in their councils. If it is no longer Paris which they propose to raze to its foundation, it is now their standards which they announce their intention of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony which they wish to compel to renounce, by a shameful transaction, its independence, and range itself by their side; it is your laurels which they wish to tear from your brows: they insist upon our evacuating Germany at the mere

(1) Hard. ix. 301, 303. Jom. ii. 279.

sight of their army! The fools! Let them learn that it is a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to wither the honours of a great people and its allies. Their projects were then confounded: they found in the plains of Champagne defeat, shame, and death: but the lessons of experience are forgotten; and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy are never extinguished. Soldiers! there is not one among you who would return to France by any other path but that of honour. We should never re-enter there but under arches of triumph. What then! shall we have braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts—vanquished Europe, repeatedly coalesced against us—extended our glory from the east to the west,—to return at last to our country like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French Eagle fled at the mere sight of the Prussian standards? But they have already arrived at our advanced posts. Let us then march, since moderation has not been able to awaken them from this astonishing trance: let the Prussian army experience the same fate which it did fourteen years ago: let them learn that if it is easy, by means of the friendship of a great people, to acquire power and dominions, its enmity, though capable of being roused only by an abandonment of every principle of wisdom and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean (1)."

Reply of Prussia.

Less fitted to rouse the military passions and warlike enthusiasm of its subjects than this masterpiece of Napoléon, the Prussian manifesto, drawn by Gentz, was yet a model of dignified reason, and concluded with a sentiment as to the ultimate issue of the contest, which subsequent events have rendered prophetic. "All our efforts, and those of our allies, to preserve peace have proved unsuccessful; and if we are not willing to abandon to the despotism of an implacable enemy, and to deliver over to his devouring armies the whole North of Germany, and perhaps of Europe, a war is inevitable. His majesty has resolved upon it, because the honour and security of the state are in danger: he would have deemed himself happy could he have attained the same end by pacific means; but it is with the firmest confidence that he takes the command of the army which is about to combat for its country and national honour, because the cause in which it is engaged is just. His majesty is well aware that for long the army desired war; and even when circumstances prevented him from yielding to its wishes, they commanded his respect because they took their origin in those feelings of honour and patriotism which have ever distinguished the Prussian forces. The nation, in a body, has manifested the warm interest which it takes in this war; and that strong expression of enthusiasm has confirmed his Majesty in the opinion that now it is not only unavoidable, but in unison with the wishes of every people. His Majesty is convinced that the desire to preserve the national honour unchanged, and the glory which the Great Frederick has shed over our arms, will suffice to excite the army to combat with its accustomed valour, and to support with constancy all its fatigues.

"But this war possesses even a more general interest. We have to deal with an enemy who all around us has beaten the most numerous armies, humbled their most powerful states, annihilated their most venerable constitutions; ravished from several nations their honour, from others their independence. A similar fate awaited the Prussian monarchy: numerous armies menaced your frontiers; they were daily augmenting; it had become your turn to fall into the gulf, to bow beneath a stranger yoke; and already his pride and rapacity coveted the spoils of the North of Germany. Thus we

(1) Dum. xiv. 4, 6.

combat for our independence, for our hearths, for all that is dear to us; and if God gives victory to the just side, to our arms, to the courage which burns in the heart of every Prussian, we shall be the liberators of oppressed millions. Every warrior who shall fall on the field of battle will have sacrificed his life in the cause of humanity: every one who survives will acquire, besides immortal glory, a just title to the gratitude, the triumph, the tears of joy of a liberated country. Who amongst us could endure the thoughts of becoming the prey of a stranger? While we combat for our own safety, to avert from us the deepest humiliation to which a nation can be subjected, we are the saviours of all our German brethren; the eyes of all nations are fixed on us as the last bulwark of liberty, security, or social order in Europe (1)."

Reflections on these proclamations.

The opposite style of these two eloquent proclamations is very remarkable. Both are addressed to some of the strongest passions of the human breast; both are masterpieces of manly oratory; but the language which they severally employ is strikingly characteristic of the different situations in which their authors respectively stood. Napoléon speaks to his soldiers only of an insult offered to their arms; of glory and triumphs, and victories to be won; Frederick William, equally firm, but less sanguine as to the result, disguises not the dangers and chances of the struggle, but reminds them of the duty they owed to themselves, their country, the cause of the human race. The former invokes the Eagles of France, and calls on the soldiers to follow their glorious career: the latter appeals to the God of battles, and anticipates from his aid a final triumph to the arms of freedom. The battle of Jena and chains of Tilsit, seemed for long to have announced an abandonment of this cause by the care of Providence: but let these words be borne in mind, and compared with the final issue of the contest (2).

Preparatory movements of the Prussians.

Animated by those heart-stirring addresses, the forces on both sides rapidly approached each other; and their advanced posts were in presence on the 8th October. Then began the terrible contest of the North with the South of Europe; never destined to be extinguished till the domes of the Kremlin were reddened with flames, and the towers of Notre-Dame were shaken by the discharge of the Russian batteries. The first plan discussed at Berlin was for the whole army to debouche in two columns by the two great roads, those of Saalfeld and Adorf, and Gotha and Eisenach, and commence the offensive towards the valley of the Maine, on the east and west of the Thuringian Forest, the intermediate passes of which were to be occupied by a central corps; but this plan was soon abandoned, as exposing the army to a perilous division of force in presence of so powerful and enter-

(1) Dam. xvi. 8, 10.

(2) Napoléon had no gallantry or chivalrous feeling in his breast. The Prussian Minister had, with the ultimatum of the Cabinet of Berlin, given a pressing request for an answer to the Prussian headquarters by the 8th October. "Marshal," said he to Berthier, "they have given us a rendezvous for the 8th: never did a Frenchman refuse such an appeal: we are told that a beautiful Queen is to be a spectator of the combat: let us then be courteous, and march without resting for Saxony." Francis I. might have used the same language; but what followed in the first bulletin of the campaign, dictated by Napoleon himself? The Emperor was right when he spoke thus: for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an Amazon, bearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters-a-day to spread the conflagration in all directions. We seem to behold Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace. After her follows Prince Louis of Prussia, a young prince full of bravery and courage, hurried on by the spirit of party, who flatters himself he shall find a great renown in the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of these illustrious persons, all the Court cries 'to arms;' but *when war shall have reached them with all its horrors, all will seek to exculpate themselves from having been instrumental in bringing its thunder to the peaceful plains of the North.* Such was the language in which Napoléon spoke of the most beautiful princess in Europe, rousing her subjects to patriotic resistance! How singularly prophetic is the concluding part of the sentence of what he himself experienced just six years afterwards in the frozen fields of Russia!—*First Bulletin of* 1806.—*Bull. Nap.* ii. 11, 12.

Sept. 27. prising an enemy. The design ultimately adopted was to advance with the right in front, which was pushed on to Eisenach: next in echelon followed the centre commanded by the King in person, which, united with the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, was to advance upon Saalfeld and JENA, while each wing was covered by a detached corps of observation, the right by Blucher, on the confines of Hesse, the left by Tauenzein, on the side of Bayreuth. The object of this movement was to determine the hesitations of the Electors of Hesse and Cassel, and effect the junction of their contingents to the Prussian army, and at the same time pierce the centre of the valley of the Maine, which was the base of the enemy's operations, and cut them off from their communication with France. Both objects were important, and the design well conceived, had the Duke of Brunswick possessed a force adequate to its execution; but it necessarily involved his army in great hazard in presence of a numerous and skilful enemy; and by leaving open to his advance the great roads to Dresden and Leipsic, exposed the Prussians, to the very hazard of being themselves turned and cut off from their communications and magazines when endeavouring to inflict that injury upon their opponents (1).

Counter movement of Napoléon.

Napoléon was not a man to let slip the opportunity which this hazardous attempt of the Prussians to pass his position afforded, of not merely defeating, but destroying their army. Confident in the numbers and experience of his troops, which rendered a situation comparatively safe to them which was to the last degree perilous to their opponents, he instantly resolved to retort upon the enemy the measure they were preparing to play off upon him; and by throwing forward his army with the right in front, turn the Prussian left, and cut them off from their Oct. 8. magazines on the Elbe, and the heart of the monarchy. On the 8th October, the French army was concentrated around Bamberg: at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Napoléon put himself in motion, and his columns marched towards Saxony on three great roads: on the right Soult and Ney with a Bavarian division moved from Bayreuth by Hof, on Plauen: in the centre, Murat with the cavalry, with Bernadotte and Davoust, marched from Bamberg by Cronach, on Saalbourg: on the left, Lannes and Augereau, breaking up from Schweinfurt (2), advanced by Cobourg and Graffenthal upon Saalfeld. The effect of these movements was to bring the centre and right of the French directly upon the Prussian magazines and reserves, while they were stretching forward on the left, to interpose between their antagonists and the Rhine.

Duke of Brunswick renounces the offensive.

The Prussians were in the midst of their perilous advance to the French left, when intelligence of this rapid accumulation of forces on their centre and left reached the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters. It was indispensable to renounce forthwith the hazardous enterprise; and orders were instantly despatched to countermand the advance, and direct the concentration of the army in the neighbourhood of Weimar: the principal column, commanded by the King, at Erfurth; Ruchel at Gotha; Hohenlohe at Hochdorf; the reserve, under the Duke of Wirtemberg, at Hall. Thus the Prussians, in presence of the greatest general and most powerful army of modern times, were thrown into a change of position, and a complicated series of cross movements, with their flank exposed to the enemy, the situation of all others the most perilous in war, and which, not a year before,

(1) Pruss. plan of operations. Dum. xvi. 19. Jam. ii. 279, 280.

(2) Jom. ii. 280, 281. Dum. xvi. 19, 26. Bign. v. 465, 466. Norv. ii. 456, 457.

had proved fatal to the combined army, when attempting a similar movement in front of Austerlitz. To complete their danger, the concentration, from the orders which they received, took place on the centre and right; whereas it was on the left, towards Hof, that it should have been made, to resist the rapid march of the invaders upon their magazines and resources (1).

Commencement of hostilities, and defeat of detached bodies of Prussians.

But before the junction of the Prussian forces, even in this false direction, could be effected, the formidable legions of Napoléon were already upon them. As might have been expected, when surprised in this manner in the middle of a lateral movement, they were attacked at the same time in different quarters, and in all by greatly superior columns of the enemy. The French masses, dense and strong, marching on the great chaussées, fell perpendicularly upon the flank of their opponents when endeavouring, by cross and often deplorable roads, to reach the points of rendezvous assigned to them. The consequences might easily have been anticipated; they were defeated in every quarter, and lost, in the very outset of the campaign, the moral influence of an advance. On the

October 9. 9th Tauenzein, who was at the moment in front of Schleitz with 6000 Prussians and 5000 Saxons, was attacked by Bernadotte, at the head of greatly superior forces, and, after a gallant resistance, dislodged from his

October 10. position with the loss of several hundred men. The day following, Murat marched on Gera, and on the road fell in with and captured a convoy of 500 carriages and a pontoon train,—an extraordinary proof of the advan-

October 11. tage the French had already gained, when, on the third day after hostilities had commenced, they had fallen in with and captured a large part of the baggage of the enemy! Nor was the French left, under Lannes and Augereau, less successful. On the 10th, the former of these generals arrived on the heights of Saalfeld, and animated his troops to the highest degree by reading to them the proclamation of Napoléon on the opening of hostilities; and on the same day, in continuing his advance, fell in with Prince Louis, who commanded the rear-guard of the Prussian right, and had been stationed at Rudolstadt and Blankenberg by Prince Hohenlohe to cover the cross march of his columns, who were then endeavouring to reach the points of rendezvous assigned them by their commander-in-chief. This gallant prince, in common with his immediate superior, Prince Hohenlohe, had long expressed the opinion, which they had in vain endeavoured to impress upon the Duke of Brunswick, that Napoléon meditated an attack on the Prussian left, and that a concentration of their troops in that direction should have been made some days before (2). Unable to prevent the disastrous resolution to assemble on the right, he now set himself with heroic bravery to mitigate its effects. The forces under his command were only eleven battalions and eighteen squadrons of hussars, with eighteen pieces of cannon; and with these he had

October 9. to withstand the shock of Lannes, with 25,000 men. Notwithstand-

(1) Jom. ii. 280. Dum. xvi. 26, 31. Bign. v. 466, 467. Hard. ix. 303.

(2) In the great council of war, held on the 5th October at Erfurth, when the Duke of Brunswick's project of continuing the march across the Thuringian Forest was discussed, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Louis, and Colonel Massenbach, his chief of the staff, strongly represented that by continuing the march in that direction, the army would be exposed to certain ruin: that they would soon arrive at a country where the ground was entirely favourable to the operations of the enemy, and adverse to their own method of fighting; and that if the French were inclined, as seemed more than probable, to turn either of the wings of the army, nothing could favour his design so much as the plunging the Prussian host by columns in the Forest. These sage observations made no sort of impression on the Duke of Brunswick; and all the modification of his plan which these generals could effect, was that the troops should halt for a day on the 8th October, and on the following morning throw out strong reconnoitring parties, and receive bread for eight days before engaging in the defiles of Thuringia. It may safely be affirmed that that council, by continuing this fatal advance, determined the result of the campaign.—See DUM. xvi. 25, 26, and *Saalfeld Allgemeine Geschichte*, iii. 299.

ing this fearful preponderance of force, he resolved to hold firm during the remainder of the day, to gain time for the evacuation of the considerable magazines which were collected close in his rear at Saalfeld. In this gallant but unhappy determination he was confirmed from an opinion that it was only by resuming the old Prussian system of a vigorous offensive, that the spirits of the soldiers, which had been much sunk by the general order to retreat on the preceding day, could be revived. The sensible increase of the enemy all around him on the following day—even the turning of his right flank by Suchet with a powerful body of light troops, which rendered his position no longer tenable, could not induce him to abandon his ground; and, when the attack commenced, the Prussians were surrounded on all sides. Notwithstanding this they made a gallant resistance, and enabled the artillery and chariots to leave Saalfeld in safety. Returning from the town to his gallant comrades, who still made good their ground in its front, Prince Louis found them dropping fast under the murderous fire of the French tirailleurs. Soon their retreat was converted into a route by the ravages of the hostile artillery; and the Prince himself, while combating bravely with the rearguard, and striving to restore order among the fugitives, was surrounded by the enemy's hussars—"Surrender, colonel," said their chief not knowing the rank of his opponent, "or you are a dead man." The Prince answered only by a blow with his sabre, which wounded without disabling his adversary, who replied with a mortal stroke, which laid the heroic Prince dead at his feet.

October 10. Death of Prince Louis.

In this disastrous encounter the Prussians lost twelve hundred prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded, and thirty pieces of cannon; but this was the least part of their misfortunes. The heroic Prince Louis was no more; he had fallen, it is true, while bravely combating on the field of honour; but his body had remained the trophy of the victors, and the continued advance of the enemy too surely indicated that defeat had attended the first serious exploit of the Prussian arms (1). Their army was now broken in upon in several points; its concentration interrupted; its magazines in part seized; its line of march intercepted; and the dejected columns, without any fixed rallying points, were wandering about in every direction, while the terrible French legions, in dense masses, were falling perpendicularly on their flank. These disasters rapidly communicated themselves to the minds of the soldiers. The death of Prince Louis, above all, equally dear to the officers and private men, diffused an universal gloom. So grievous a calamity in the outset of the campaign was taken as the worst augury of its future fortunes; and as is usual with great bodies in a violent state of excitement, the transition was immediate from the preceding exaltation to an extraordinary degree of depression (2).

Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French.

Meanwhile the movements preparatory to a decisive battle continued, though in a very different spirit, on both sides. In deep dejection, and with infinite difficulty, the Prussians at length concentrated their forces in two great masses under the King in the neighbourhood of Weimar, and under Hohenlohe near Jena. It was in

Preparatory movements on both sides to a general action.

(1) No sooner was the rank of the slain prisoner known than Marshal Lannes, with deserved courtesy, shewed it all the honours due to so illustrous a character. He was interred with military honours in the cemetery of the Princes of Cobourg, at Saalfeld: and Berthier wrote on the 12th to the chief of the Prussian staff, announcing that the Emperor had ordered it to be restored, if it was desired that he should rest in the tomb of his ancestors: an offer which the disasters immediately ensuing rendered it impossible for the royal family at that time to comply with.—Bignon, v. 469.

(2) Lucches. ii. 137, 140. Bign. v. 468, 470. Dum, xvi. 51, 58.

the highest exultation, on the other hand, and in the full anticipation of victory, that the French made a sweep which brought them completely round the Prussian army. The early triumphs with which the campaign had opened had given Napoléon hopes of rapid and decisive success. He no longer feared that he would be obliged to have recourse to the mattock (1). The confusion of the enemy's columns had dissipated the prestige of the
October 12. Great Frederick. Encouraged by these events, he now hesitated not to follow out the brilliant career which had opened to his arms. A complete conversion, turning on the pivot of the left, took place in the direction of his columns, who wheeled round so as to face the Northern Ocean.
October 13. Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat, marched upon Naumberg, where on the next day, they made themselves masters of considerable magazines. Soult was advancing on Jena, where Lannes was already established, while Ney and Augereau were at Roda and Kohla, in its immediate neighbourhood. Such was the confusion of the Prussian movements and the bad understanding which already prevailed between them and the Saxons, that when the French took up the ground which the allies had just quitted in the environs of Jena, they found the fields and roads covered with arms, cuirasses, and chariots, like the scene of a defeat. The Saxons had pillaged the Prussians, the Prussians the Saxons. Baggage and ammunition waggons had been abandoned by their drivers, and lay scattered in confusion, while some guns even had been spiked to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy (2).

Result of these manœuvres.

The result of these different marches was in the highest degree favourable to the Imperial arms. By the advance on Naumberg they had cut the enemy off from the line of their retreat to Leipsic, and thrown their left back in such a manner that the French on the banks of the Saale had their back to the Elbe, and faced the Rhine; while the Prussians had their back to the Rhine, and could only hope to regain their country by cutting their way through the enemy. Finding affairs in a situation so much more favourable than he could possibly have anticipated, Napoléon, to gain additional time to complete the encircling of his antago-
October 12. nists, despatched, on the 12th, an officer of his household with proposals of peace to Frederick William, taking care mean time not to suspend for one instant the march of his columns; but the letter did not reach that monarch till after the battle was over. In the evening of the 12th the army of Hohenlohe, which, with all the additions it had received from Ruchel, did not exceed forty thousand men, was grouped in dense masses on a ridge of heights to the north on the road from Jena to Weimar, between the Ilm and the Saale. Its advanced posts were on the Landgrafenberg, a steep hill between its position and the town of Jena, from the summit of which the whole lines of the Prussians could be descried, and over which the only road to the attack of their position in front lay. The army of the King of Prussia, under the immediate command of the Duke of Brunswick, on the other hand, sixty five thousand strong was concentrated at the distance of somewhat more than a league in the rear of Hohenlohe, near Weimar. Thus the whole Prussian army, consisting of above a hundred thousand men, of which eighteen thousand were superb cavalry, with three

(1) In setting out for the Prussian campaign, Napoleon expected to experience a more formidable resistance than he had yet met with in Europe. The exploits of the Seven Years' War had filled him with the highest idea of the troops trained in the school of its illustrious hero, and he frequently said to his assembled officers at Mayence, "We shall have earth to move in this war."—See JOMINI, ii. 282.

(2) Dum. xvi. 58, 64. Jom. ii. 282, 283. Lueches, ii. 140, 141.

hundred pieces of cannon, were at length concentrated in a field of battle, where their far-famed tactics had a fair theatre for development; and notwithstanding the early disasters of the campaign, an opportunity was afforded them of reinstating affairs at the sword's point. Each army had passed its opponent, and mutually intercepted the other's communications; but there was this extreme difference between the two, that the army of the Duke of Brunswick, cut off from all its magazines, had no resource but in victory; whereas that of Napoléon, though severed from the Rhine, had a clear line of retreat, in case of disaster, to the Maine and the Danube (1).

The Prussian army is again divided. The King marches to Auerstadt.

It would have been well for the Prussians had they continued and given battle in this concentrated position; but the intelligence of the advance of Davoust and Murat upon Naumberg, which arrived at headquarters on the night of the 12th, led to a renewed separation, attended in the end with the most frightful disasters. Conceiving that the French Emperor had no intention of immediate combat, and being anxious for the safety of that town where the principal magazines of the army were placed, the Duke of Brunswick came to the ruinous resolution of again dividing his forces; and while Hohenlohe was left in position near Jena, as a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the army, the principal body, with the King at its head, moved at daylight for Sulza, and at night

October 13.

arrived on the heights of AUERSTADT. Thus at the very moment when Napoléon with above a hundred thousand men, was making his dispositions for a general battle on the day following, and surmounting the difficulties of the approach to the enemy's position on the heights in his vicinity, the Prussian general dislocated the imposing mass of his soldiers, and diverging to the left with two-thirds of his forces, engaged in a hazardous flank march of ten leagues in presence of his antagonists, leaving a comparatively inconsiderable rear-guard to be crushed by more than double its force in its position in the rear. Such was the dearth of provisions which already prevailed in the allied camp from the capture of their magazines by the enemy, that no regular supply of bread was dealt out to the men after the long and fatiguing march; but great numbers lay down, wearied and supperless, to sleep on the ground which was to cover their grave on the morrow (2).

Napoléon's dispositions for the battle.

Meanwhile Napoléon, never suspecting this division of the enemy's force, and supposing they were to follow the principles of the Great Frederick, which were to combat in concentrated masses and on as confined a field of battle as possible, was endeavouring, with his wonted energy, to overcome the all but insurmountable difficulties of the passage of the Landgrafenberg, by which access was to be afforded to his columns for the attack of the Prussian position. No sooner had the French light troops dislodged the enemy's patroles from these important heights than the Emperor repaired to them in person, from whence he distinctly beheld the Prussian army still reposing at leisure on its formidable position on the opposite ridge. Not doubting that he would have to deal with their whole army on the following day, he pressed without intermission the march of his columns; and soon arranged the forces of Lannes, who first arrived with his infantry above by the steep and rugged ascent to its summit, in such formidable masses around its declivities on the other side, that the enemy, who were now sensible of their error in abandonning so important

(1) Dum. xiv. 72, 79. Jom. ii. 284, 285, Bign. v. 471, 478. Lucches. ii, 141, 151.

(2) Lucches. ii. 141, 144. Jom. ii, 284, 285. Bign. v. 472. Dum. xvi. 79, 83.

a point, and were making preparations to retake it, were obliged to desist from the attempt. This valuable height, therefore, from which the whole of the Prussian position and all the movements of their troops were distinctly visible, remained in the hands of the French; and its elevation not only gave them that advantage, but entirely concealed from their observation the rapid concentration of troops on the Jena side of the mountain, which would at once have revealed the intention of a decisive attack on the following day. Still the difficulty of surmounting the ascent was very great, and for artillery and waggons it was as yet totally impassable. Nothing, however, could long withstand the vigour of Napoléon and his followers. He stood on the spot till the most rugged parts of the ascent were widened by blasting the solid rock, or smoothed by pioneers, and when the men were exhausted, revived their spirits by himself working with the tools, and exhibiting his old experience as a gunner, in surmounting the difficulty of dragging the cannon up the pass. Animated by such an example, and the vigorous exertions of the successive multitudes who engaged in the task, the difficulties which the Prussian generals deemed altogether insurmountable were rapidly overcome; before eight in the evening the ascent was passable for cavalry and artillery; and at midnight the whole corps of Lannes, with all its guns and equipage, reposed in crowded array on the ridges and flanks of the mountain; the imperial guard, under Lefebvre, bivouacked on its summit; Augereau on its left; Soult and Ney received orders to march all night to the right, in order to turn the enemy after the combat was engaged by his left; Murat was in reserve at Jena; while Davoust and Bernadotte were directed, the first to fall back to Naumberg, in order to threaten the enemy's rear, the second to advance to Dornberg and cut off his retreat to the Prussian dominions. The two armies were now so near that their fires were within cannon shot, and the sentinels touched each other: the lights of the Prussians, dispersed over a space of six leagues, threw a prodigious glow over the whole heavens to the northwest: those of the French, concentrated in a small space illuminated the heights in the middle of their position. Surrounded by his faithful guards, the Emperor, after having despatched his last orders to his marshals, wrapped himself in his cloak, and shared the frigid bivouack of the soldiers on the summit of the Landgrafenberg (1).

Situation of the armies on both sides.

At four in the morning of the 14th he was already on horseback, and, surrounded by his generals, rode along the front of the line of Suchet and Gazan's divisions, which were first to be engaged, and were already under arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the Prussian army is turned, as the Austrian was a year ago at Ulm; it no longer combats but to find the means of retreat. The corps which should permit itself to be broken would be dishonoured. Fear not its renowned cavalry; oppose to their charges firm squares and the bayonet." Loud acclamations rent the air at these words, but the morning was still dark: the first streaks of dawn were only beginning to appear, and a thick cold fog obscured every object around. Burning with impatience, the soldiers awaited the signal of attack, but for two long hours they were kept shivering in their lines. At length at six, when the day, though still misty, was light, and the Emperor judged that his marching columns would be so far advanced on their respective routes as to justify the commencement of the action in front, he gave the signal for

(1) Jom. ii. 285, 286. Bign. v. 473, 474. Dum. xvi. 83, 94. Saalf. iii. 301, 305. Camp. de Saxe i. 260.

the attack. Meanwhile the Prussians, little suspecting the tempest which awaited them, were securely reposing in their position, and, anticipating a day of complete repose on the 14th, had made no provision either for marching or battle. This fatal security had been increased by the opinion generally received at Hohenlohe's head-quarters, that the flag of truce who had appeared at their advanced posts on the preceding day, and been forwarded with his despatches to the King, bore proposals of peace, and that nothing serious would be attempted till his answer was received. Their position was strong, and admirably chosen: secure from attack on either flank, and approachable in front only by narrow and steep defiles, in which, if the heads of the enemy's columns were vigorously resisted and hindered from deploying, horse, foot, and cannon would be jammed up together, and the disaster of Hohenlinden might have been repaid with interest to the French army. But the departure of the King with two-thirds of the army, and the total absence of any preparations for an attack on the part of those who remained, deprived them of this advantage, and relieved Napoléon from a risk in the outset of the campaign, greater perhaps than he underwent even during the perilous changes which signalized its later stages (1).

Battle of Jena, 14th October.

Great was the astonishment of the Prussian outposts, when, through the grey mist of the morning, they beheld the French battalions close upon them, and advancing swiftly in the finest order to the attack. They made a gallant resistance, and did their utmost to prevent the French from debouching from the defiles at the mouth of which they were stationed; but being altogether unprepared for the attack, and completely surprised, they were not long able to make good their post, and fell back, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, to the main body of the army. The ground thus gained by Suchet was of the utmost importance, for it enabled the heads of the French columns, after emerging from the defiles, to extend themselves to the right and left, and gain room for the successive corps as they came up to deploy. Roused by the first discharge of fire-arms in front, Prince Hohenlohe rode through the mist from his headquarters in the rear at Cappellendorf towards the front; but still confident that it would only prove a skirmish, said to General Muffling, "that his troops should remain quiet in their camp till the fog had risen; and that if circumstances demanded it, he would move forward the division of Grawert, as he did not wish the Saxons to combat at all that day." Soon, however, messengers arrived in breathless haste from the outposts with urgent demands for assistance, and Grawert was rapidly advanced towards Vierzehn-Heiligen to support Tauenzein, who there with difficulty kept his ground against the impetuous attacks of Suchet. Meanwhile the whole army of the Prussians, alarmed by the sharp and incessant fire of musketry in their front, stood to their arms, and reinforcements were sent to the points in advance which were menaced; but in spite of all their exertions the enemy gained ground, the villages of Closwitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which the lines of Hohenlohe were posted, were successively carried; and all the low grounds in front of his position were filled with troops. Still the mist was so thick as to be almost impenetrable; the contending bodies could not see each other till they were within a few yards' distance; and under cover of this veil, and in the midst of the confusion arising from an unexpected attack, the movements of the assailants were completed, the defiles past, and the precious moments, when the heads of his columns might have been driven back

(1) Lucches. ii. 154, 155. Saalf. iii. 305, 507.

into the gorges by a vigorous attack, as those of the Imperialists were at Hohenlinden, for ever lost (1).

Defensive measures of the Prussians.

At length, at nine o'clock, the increasing rays of the sun dispersed the fog, and his light shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. Then, and not till then, the Prussians perceived the full magnitude of the danger. On every side they were beset by assailants, no longer struggling through steep and narrow gorges, but deployed, with all their cavalry and artillery, on the open expanse to which they led. Directly in their front, the whole corps of Lannes, having made itself master of the villages at the foot of the Prussian position, was preparing to ascend the slope on which they stood : immediately to its right, Ney, and beyond him Soult, had already cleared the defiles, and were drawn up in line or column on the open ground; while Augereau on the left was pressing forward to turn their flank; and the imperial guard, with Murat's cavalry, were stationed in reserve on the slopes of the Landgrafenberg. Above ninety thousand men had outflanked on either side, and were preparing to crush forty thousand, in a strong position, indeed, but totally inadequate to so desperate an encounter. Surprised, but not panic-struck, the Prussians drew up their lines in admirable order in the form of an obtuse triangle, with the apex in front, to avoid the danger of being turned on their flanks, and instructions were despatched to Ruchel, who with the reserve, twenty thousand strong, was at a short distance on their right, to hasten his march to the scene of action. Before he could arrive, however, the battle had commenced : the preparatory movements were made on either side in the finest style, the French columns advancing, and the Prussian retiring to their chosen ground with all the precision of a field day. But though they stood their ground bravely, and received the assailants with a close and well-directed fire, the odds were too great to give any hopes of success. Ney, indeed, whose impetuous courage led him to begin the attack before his columns were properly supported, and who had, by a charge of cuirassiers, carried a battery of thirteen pieces on an eminence which severely galled his soldiers, was for a few minutes in imminent danger : the Prussian cavalry broke the French horse, and enveloped the infantry in such numbers as would inevitably have proved fatal to less experienced troops : but the brave Marshal instantly formed his men in square, threw himself into one of them, and there maintained the combat by a rolling fire on all sides, till Napoléon, who saw his danger, sent several regiments of horse, under Bertrand, who disengaged him from his perilous situation. But on all other points the French obtained early and decisive success. Ney, extricated from his difficulties, with an intrepid step ascended the hill, and after a sharp conflict carried the important village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, in the centre of the Prussian position : in vain Hohenlohe formed the flower of his troops to regain the post : in vain these brave men advanced in parade order and with unshrinking firmness, through a storm of musketry and grape; the troops of Lannes came up to his support, and the French established themselves in such strength in the village as to render all subsequent attempts for its recapture abortive. Imboldened by this success, Ney next attacked the right of the Prussian line towards Isserstaedt, which Augereau with the French left had already carried : a devouring fire ran along the whole right wing, and the French were for some time arrested by the intrepid resistance of their adversaries; but the odds were too great, and despite of all their efforts, the allies were compelled to give ground in that quarter.

(1) Lucches. ii. 154, 155. Jom. ii. 286, 287. Dum. xvi. 94, 97.

But on the left of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the Prussians had obtained some advantage: their numerous and magnificent cavalry had made several successful charges on the French infantry when advancing on the open ground beyond its enclosures; several cannon had been taken, and Hohenlohe for a short time flattered himself with the hope of obtaining decisive success (1).

The Prussians are defeated.

Matters were in this state when the approach of Ruchel with his corps, 20,000 strong, to the field of battle from the right, confirmed the Prussian General in these flattering anticipations; and he despatched a pressing request to him to direct the bulk of his forces to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, already the theatre of such desperate strife (2). Thither, accordingly, the brave Prussian directed his steps; but before he could arrive at the decisive point, matters had essentially changed for the worse, and he came up only in time to share and augment the general ruin. The lapse of time had now enabled the French to bring their immense superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at all points: Soult, by a heavy and well-directed fire, had driven the cavalry from the field on their left, while Lannes and Augereau, pressing them at once in front and flank on their right, had forced back their infantry above half-a-mile. Emerging from the villages which had been the theatre of such obstinate conflict, the French forces advanced with loud shouts and in irresistible strength towards the Prussians, who, weakened and dispirited, and in some places almost mown down by the terrible fire of their adversaries, were now yielding on all sides, though hitherto their retreat was conducted in the most orderly manner. Napoléon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and from his station on the heights in the rear, sent orders to Murat with the whole cavalry to advance and complete the victory. This terrible mass was irresistible. Twelve thousand horse, fresh, unwearied, in the finest array, animated by the shouts of triumph which they heard on all sides, bore down with loud cheers on the retiring lines of the Prussians. In an instant the change was visible; in vain their cavalry, so brilliant and effective in the early part of the day, strove to make head against the assailants, and cover the retreat of the infantry and cannon: their horses, wearied by eight hours of fighting or fatigue, were unable to withstand the fresh squadrons and ponderous cuirassiers of Murat, and by their overthrow contributed to the disorder of the foot soldiers. After a gallant resistance, the lines were broken: horse, foot, and cannon pressed tumultuously together to the rear, closely followed by the bloody sabres of Murat; in the general confusion all order was lost: the infantry and cavalry were blended together, the guns and caissons abandoned to the victors (3).

Arrival of Ruchel, who is overwhelmed.

In the midst of this appalling scene, the columns of Ruchel, still in battle array, emerged through the cloud of fugitives to stem the torrent (4). It was a movement extremely similar to the arrival of Desaix on the field of Marengo: but he had to meet Napoléon, not Melas. The fresh troops, though advancing in good order, and with an undaunted

(1) Dum. xvi. 97, 115. Jom. ii. 286, 287. Bign. v. 475, 476. Saalf. iii. 306. Lucches ii. 156.

(2) At this crisis, Hohenlohe wrote to Ruchel—"It is highly gratifying to me to hear at this moment that your Excellency has arrived to my support. Send all the force you can to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the chief point of attack. You are a brave man and sincere friend. At this moment we beat the enemy at all points; my cavalry has captured some of his cannon."—Dum. xvi. 114.

(3) Dum. xvi 97, 120. Bign. v. 476. Jom. ii. 287. Saalf. iii. 307, 308. Camp. de Saxe, i. 262, 263.

(4) The rapid change for the worse in the prospects of the Prussians since he first approached the field, may be discerned in the altered tone of the next letter despatched to him by Prince Hohenlohe. "Lose not a moment in advancing with your as yet unbroken troops. Arrange your columns so that through their openings there may pass the broken bands of the battle: be ready to receive the charges of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitives, and has driven into one confused mass the infantry, cavalry, and artillery."—Lucchesini, ii. 157.

countenance, were speedily assailed on all sides: an ephemeral advantage gained by their cavalry was speedily, in the disorder of success, turned into disaster; in front they were charged with the bayonet by the French grenadiers, in flank assailed by an endless succession of Murat's dragoons; the villages of Romstedt and Cappellendorf were strewed with their dead, and Ruchel himself, while bravely animating his men, was wounded in the breast by a musket ball, and carried off the field. After a terrible combat of an hour's duration, this powerful reserve, which in any other circumstances would have changed the fortune of the day, was broken, dispersed, and almost totally annihilated. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre. In frightful disorder the whole army rushed like an impetuous torrent from the field: but nearly the whole right wing was cut off by the rapidity of Soult's advance, and made prisoners. Almost all the artillery of the allies was taken, and the victors entered Weimar pell mell with the fugitives, at the distance of six leagues from the field of battle. Behind that town, on the road to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe, at six o'clock, collected twenty squadrons, whose firm countenance till nightfall gave some respite to the wearied foot soldiers, who were now dispersed through the fields in every direction; while Napoléon, according to his usual custom, rode over the bloody theatre of death, distributing prizes to those who had most distinguished themselves, and giving directions for the care and consolation of the wounded (1).

Preparatory movements which led to the battle of the King's army.

While this terrible disaster was befalling the united corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the King of Prussia was combating under very different circumstances, but with little better success, on the plateau of AUERSTADT. Little expecting any engagement on the morrow, this fine army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick in person, had bivouacked in close array around the village of that name: the Queen was only prevailed on by the most pressing entreaties late in the evening to retire with a slender guard to Weimar. Informed of the occupation of Naumberg by a considerable force, the Duke directed the division of Schmettau to occupy the heights of Koessen, and present themselves in battle array before the enemy, whom he supposed to be at the utmost a few thousands strong, while under their cover the remainder of the army leisurely continued its march towards the Elbe. These orders were obeyed, but Schmettau's division, contenting themselves with occupying the heights in the neighbourhood, neglected to send forward detachments to seize the defile of Koessen; an omission which was speedily taken advantage of by Davoust on the morning of the 14th, who falling back to Naumberg according to his directions, early seized upon the important pass. At six on that morning, the French marshal had received an order from Napoléon, dated three o'clock *a. m.* from his bivouac on the Landgrafenberg, in which he announced his intention to attack in a few hours the Prussian army, which he imagined to be concentrated in his front, and ordered Davoust to march without loss of time upon Apolda, in order to fall upon their rear, leaving him the choice of his route, provided he took a part in the action. The despatch added: "If the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned to him at Dornberg." Davoust instantly repaired to the headquarters of Bernadotte, who at that moment was in communication with his corps in the neighbourhood of Naumberg, and shewed him this order, proposing that they

Oct. 14.

(1) Dum. xvi. 120, 133. Bign. v. 475, 476. Lucches. i. 157, 158. Hard. ix. 305, 306. Saalf. iii. 307, 308.

should march together to Apolda; but that officer, relying on the ambiguous expression in the despatch, which indicated that the Emperor "hoped he would be in the position assigned to him at Dornberg," did not conceive himself entitled to deviate from his previous instructions, and set out with his whole corps in the direction of that town (1).

Battle of Auerstadt.

Left then to his own resources, Marshal Davoust, notwithstanding, set himself to march in the direction which Napoléon had assigned. His forces were considerable, amounting to twenty-six thousand infantry and four thousand horse; a body perfectly adequate to its destined task of falling on the rear of the allied army, when defeated in front by Napoléon, but little calculated to withstand the shock of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, whom the King was leading in person to the encounter. The Prussians, on their side, were as little prepared for an action, and deeming their flank march sufficiently secured by Schmettau's division on the heights of Koessen, were in open column and straggling, advancing on their march towards the Elbe, when suddenly, at eight o'clock, on the plateau, they were met by the vanguard of Davoust, which had emerged from the long and steep ascent so well known to travellers who visit that memorable field, and were already in battle array on either side of its summit. The thick mist which here, as at Jena, concealed the movements of the opposing armies, prevented the troops seeing each other till they were only a few yards distant; and both parties deeming their adversaries only an inconsiderable detachment, fell back to collect forces to clear their advance—the Prussians, to drive the enemy back again down the defile, and secure the flank of the army from insult; the French, to clear their front, and pursue their rout by the cross road they were on to Apolda. Speedily reinforced, both sides returned to the charge. Davoust supported the advanced guard by the whole division of Gudin, with instruction sto maintain themselves to the last extremity on the level space at the upper end of the defile, in order to gain time for the remainder of the corps to debouche; while the King of Prussia, impatient at the check given to the march of his army, ordered Blucher, with 2500 hussars, to ride over the Sonnenberg and clear the plateau of the enemy. Little anticipating the formidable resistance which awaited them, the Prussian cavalry were thrown into disorder by the close and steady fire of the French infantry, which speedily formed themselves into squares. Their cavalry were, indeed, overthrown by the overwhelming mass of the Prussian horse (2); but all the efforts of that gallant body, even when guided by the impetuosity of Blucher, were shattered against the compact mass of Gudin's infantry, and the terrible discharges of grape which issued from his artillery.

Desperate struggle which ensued.

Surprised at the obstinacy of the resistance, the King, adopting the opinion of Marshal Moellendorf, who insisted that it was only a detached column which occasioned the delay, and disregarding the advice of the Duke of Brunswick, who strongly counselled a general halt, and the formation of the army in order of battle till the mist cleared away and the enemy's force could be ascertained, continued the attack by means merely of successive divisions as they came up to the ground. The divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange were ordered to pass the defile of Auerstadt, where the road runs through a winding hollow skirted with copsewood or rough slopes, and advance to the support of the discomfited cavalry. The former, who first emerged from the defile, was directed to assail the flank of

(1) Dum. xvi. 137, 141. Bign. v. 480. Jom. ii. 290.

(2) Jom. ii. 290, 291. Dum. xvi. 139, 147. Bign. v. 480, 481. Saalf. iii. 306.

Gudin's division, which had advanced on the plateau beyond the village of Hassen-Haussen; at this moment the mist was dissipated, and the sun shone in full brilliancy on the splendid squadrons and regular lines of the Prussians. The Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of the infantry, and led them gallantly to the attack, while Schmettau and Blucher pressed them with their respective divisions of foot and horse on the other flank. But the brave troops of Gudin, forming themselves into squares, resisted all the charges with unconquerable resolution; and the nature of the ground, which permitted the successive divisions to come up to the support of either side only by degrees, the one by the long and winding defile of Auerstadt, the other up the steep ascent of Koessen, rendered it impossible for the Prussians to bring all their overwhelming force to bear at once upon the enemy. The conflict, therefore, was most severe. The French troops, stationed behind the hedges, enclosures, and garden walls of Hassen-Haussen, kept up an uninterrupted and murderous fire upon the enemy. The Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded by a ball in the breast while leading on a charge. Schmettau experienced the same fate. Wartensleben had his horse shot under him; and the Prussians, discouraged by the loss of their leaders, wavered in the attack, which being made in line, and not in column, was not pressed with the requisite vigour. Still the terrible discharge of artillery and fire-arms continued. Gudin's division had lost nearly half their numbers, and it was evident they could not long maintain their ground against their redoubtable and hourly increasing adversaries (1).

Additional forces come up on both sides.

From this peril, however, they were at length relieved by the arrival of the other divisions of Davoust's army. Morand was the first who got up the defile; his troops, as they successively arrived on the summit, drew up on the left of Gudin, towards the Sonnenberg; and shortly after, Friant, with his division, debouched upon the right, and extended to the foot of the Speilberg. The combat was now equal, or rather the advantage was on the side of the French, for their three divisions were superior in strength to those of Schmettau, the Prince of Orange, and Wartensleben, to which they were opposed. Prince William of Prussia, at the head of a powerful body of cavalry, which had surmounted the Sonnenberg and arrived on the French left, furiously assailed Morand's division immediately after it formed, but those veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into squares, and with rapid discharges received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. In vain those gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds to the very muzzles of the French muskets. In vain they rode round and enveloped their squares; ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls; impenetrable the hedge of bayonets which the front rank, kneeling, presented to their advances. The heroic devotion of Prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge; still the fire continued, still the bayonets stood firm. At length, he himself was wounded, half his followers stretched on the field, and the remainder sought refuge in disorder, partly on the heights of the Sonnenberg, partly in the enclosures of Neuzalza (2).

Desperate struggle around the Sonnenberg on the right.

While this desperate conflict was going on on the left of Hassen-Haussen, the division of Friant had debouched from the defile, extended itself on the ground to its right, and chased the enemy who assailed it back to the village and heights of Speilberg, which were speedily

(1) Jom. ii. 292, 293. Dum. xvi. 139, 156. Bign. v. 482. Saalf. iii. 306. Personal observation.

(2) Jom. ii. 192, 193. Dum. xvi. 156, 161. Bign. v. 483. Saalf. iii. 306.

carried. The left of the Prussians was thus threatened; but it was not there that the principal danger lay. The progress of Morand on their right was much more alarming. On that side, not content with repulsing the furious attacks directed against them, the French had now assumed the offensive, and were rapidly pressing forward to the heights of Sonnenberg, from whence their guns would command the whole field of battle, and render untenable the position of the Prussian reserves, which had hitherto taken no part in the action. Sensible that the battle was lost without resource if these important heights fell into the hands of the enemy, the King put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and bravely led them to the charge. But if the attack was gallant, the defence was not less obstinate; Morand himself was to be seen at the head of his regiments, and for some minutes the balance quivered, but insensibly the French gained ground, and at length their artillery, dragged up to the summit of the heights, was placed in battery, and opened such a tremendous fire of grape upon the enemy's columns, as completed their discomfiture in that quarter, and with the bloodstained Sonnenberg and the village of Rehausen, the whole left of the field of battle fell into the hands of the invaders (1).

The Prussian reserve advances, and is overthrown.

The experienced eye of Marshal Davoust now told him that the moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived. The heights of Eckartsberg commanded the line of the enemy's retreat, as those of Sonnenberg did the field of battle: by moving forward his centre and seizing that important point, their defeat would be rendered complete, and all possibility of their rallying prevented. Thither accordingly Gudin's division advanced, driving before them the broken remains of Schmettau's and Wartensleben's divisions, which had lost nearly half their numbers during the sanguinary strife in which they had been engaged. But the Prussians made one effort more to regain the day. Their broken battalions, which had retired from the field, were rallied under cover of the powerful reserve commanded by Kalkreuth, who assumed the direction upon Moellendorf being wounded, consisting of two divisions which had hitherto taken no part in the action, and placed in front; while the whole cavalry, re-formed under Blucher's orders, was posted in a second line immediately behind the infantry to take advantage of any hesitation which might appear in the enemy's columns. Wearied by a morning's march and four hours' hard fighting, the French soldiers had now to withstand the shock of fifteen thousand fresh troops, to whom they had no corresponding reserve to oppose. Had the quality of the troops on the opposite side been equal, this powerful addition to the enemy's forces, at such a moment, must have proved decisive: but nevertheless they were totally defeated; and this last success put the keystone to the arch of Marshal Davoust's fame. Though strongly posted on an eminence, and protected by the fire of a powerful battery, they were charged with such intrepidity by Gudin's division, supported by a part of Friant's, that they were driven from their position with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. At the same time, Morand repulsed an attack against the troops which he had stationed on the heights of Sonnenberg: the artillery, from that commanding position, carried death through all the ranks of the enemy; and at length his gallant troops descended from the eminence, and carrying all before them, drove the reserves opposed to their advance through the defile of Auerstadt. Thither Blucher's cavalry followed the retreating columns: the guards still kept their ranks, and retired in good order in open square, and by their firm

(1) Dum. xvi. 161, 164. Bign. v. 483, 484. Jom. ii. 294. Lucches. ii. 146, 147.

countenance enabled the broken infantry to rally at a distance from the field of battle, where Davoust reposed amidst his heroic followers (1).

Disastrous retreat of the Prussians during the night from both fields of battle.

The King of Prussia, who, during this disastrous day, had manifested the most signal coolness and intrepidity, and, during the repeated charges which he made at the head of his troops, had lost two horses killed under him, gave directions for the army to retreat in the direction of Weimar, intending to fall back on the corps of Prince Hohenlohe, of whose disaster he was still ignorant. But as the troops were in extreme dejection, and with little order following the great road which leads to that place, they were suddenly startled in the twilight by the sight of an extensive line of bivouac fires on the heights of Apolda. These lights were made by the corps of Bernadotte, who, adhering to his original instructions to march to Dornberg, had arrived in this position, after passing that town, late in the evening, and, ignorant of the combats which had taken place, was preparing to fall on the rear of the Prussian army on the following day. His too strict adherence to the letter of the orders he had received, deprived him of the glory of sharing in either battle, endangered Davoust's corps, and had wellnigh cost him his own life, from the indignation of the Emperor; but, nevertheless, this sudden apparition of a fresh corps of unknown strength upon the flank of their line of retreat at that untimely hour, compelled the Prussians to change their direction and abandon the great road (2). About the same time, obscure rumours began to circulate through the ranks of a disaster experienced on the same day at Jena; and soon the appearance of fugitives from Hohenlohe and Ruchel's corps, flying in the utmost haste across the line which the troops retiring with the King were following, announced but too certainly the magnitude of the defeat sustained in that quarter. A general consternation now seized the men—despair took possession of the firmest hearts, as the cross tide of the battalions flying from Jena mingled in greater proportions with the wreck which had survived the fight of Auerstadt—the confusion became inextricable, the panic universal—infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and leaving their guns, horses, and ammunition waggons, fled in mingled disorder across the fields, without either direction, command, or rallying point. The King himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner during the tumult and horrors of the night; and it was not till five in the morning that, by a long circuit, he arrived at Sommerda, where he received the official news of the melancholy disaster at Jena, accompanied by the letter, offering an accommodation, so insidiously despatched by Napoléon the day before that great victory (3).

(1) Dum. xvi. 164, 171. Jom. ii 294. Lucches. ii. 146, 148. Bign. v 485, 486.

(2) Napoléon's anger at Bernadotte, on account of his not supporting Davoust, and taking a share in the battle of Auerstadt, knew no bounds. "If I should send him to a council of war," said he, "nothing could save him from being shot. I will not speak to him on the subject; but I will let him see what I think of his conduct. He has too much honour not to be aware himself that he has committed a disgraceful action." In truth, however, Napoléon had no sufficient grounds for this ebullition. If Bernadotte did not take a part in the action, it was because his own latest instructions expressed a hope that he should go to Dornberg rather than march toward Auerstadt with Davoust. Had he violated these instructions, and, in consequence, the Prussian army had escaped by Dornberg, its natural and most probable line of retreat, what defence could Bernadotte have offered for his conduct? "I was piqued," said that Marshal, "to be addressed in the language of authority by Davoust, but I did my duty. Let the Emperor accuse me if he pleases, I will answer him. I am a Gascon, but he is still more so."—BOURRIENNE, vii. 161, 162.

(3) Dum. xvi. 171, 178. Jom. ii. 295, 298. Bign. v. 486, 487. Hard. ix. 307. Lucches. ii. 148.

Napoléon's official account of the battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign, is characterized by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and unceasing jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible. Davoust was the real hero of the day, since, with thirty thousand men, he had defeated the King of Prussia in person, at the head of sixty thousand. His own achievement in overthrowing forty thousand, or, including Ruchel, sixty thousand, with ninety thousand veteran troops,

Loss on both sides in these actions.

Such were the astonishing battles of Jena and Auerstadt, which, in a single day, prostrated the strength of the Prussian monarchy; and did that in a few hours which all the might of Austria, Russia, and France, in the Seven Years' War, had been unable to effect. The subsequent disasters of the campaign were but the completion of this great calamity—the decisive strokes were given on the banks of the Saale. The loss of the Prussians was prodigious : in the two fields there fell nearly twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides nearly as many prisoners; and two hundred pieces of cannon, with twenty-five standards, were taken. Ten thousand of the killed and wounded fell at Auerstadt—an honourable proof, that if infatuation led them into field, valour inspired them when there. Nor was that victory bloodless to the conquerors : their total loss was fourteen thousand men; of whom seven thousand five hundred belonged to Davoust's corps—a striking indication of the dauntless intrepidity with which they had fought. (1) Napoléon, with his usual disregard of truth, called his whole loss in both battles 4000, little more than a fourth part of its real amount.

Unparalleled disasters of the retreat.

Great as were these results, however, they were but a part of the effects which ultimately flowed from these memorable battles. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians exceeded any thing hitherto recorded in modern history, equalled only by the still greater calamities which followed the flight from Waterloo. Nothing had been provided for such a contingency; no rallying point assigned; no line of march prescribed; no magazines collected. The extraordinary circumstance of four generals of the army—the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Moellendorf, General Schmettau, and General Ruchel—being killed or mortally wounded, left the confused mass of fugitives without a head : the unparalleled calamity of the survivors from two different defeats, experienced on the same day, crossing each other, and becoming intermingled during the horrors of a nocturnal retreat, rendered it impossible for them to know whose orders were to be obeyed. Thus, when morning dawned on the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenlohe, and the Duke of Brunswick, collected as chance threw them together, in disorderly groups, and inspired only with a common panic, fled in different directions, as accident or intelligence guided their steps. Vast numbers of stragglers wandered at large through the fields, or hurried, with so little knowledge of the country, from the scene of danger, that instead of avoiding, they fell headlong into the jaws

including the whole cavalry of Murat, is nothing in comparison. Nevertheless he represents the action as all fought in one field; speaks of the enemy, eighty thousand strong, as being commanded by the King and the Duke of Brunswick in person, and after dilating fully on his own achievements, dismisses the wonderful exploits of Davoust in the following words. "On our right, the corps of Marshal Davoust performed prodigies. Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues, with the bulk of the enemy's troops, who were seeking to debouche on the side of Koessen. That Marshal has displayed alike the distinguished bravery and firmness of character which are the first qualities of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Daultanne, chief of the staff, and by the rare intrepidity of his brave corps." Who could imagine that it was the glorious battle of Auerstadt which was here narrated? The injustice to Davoust is so manifest, that it is admitted even by the eulogists of Napoléon.—See Bign. v. 487, 488; *and Fourth Bulletin*, 1806, *in Camp de la Saxe*, i. 265.

(1) Dum. xvi 177. Camp de Saxe, i. 265. Dum. xvi. 180.

Davoust's loss at Auerstadt was 270 officers and 7200 privates, killed and wounded. Of these 134 officers and 3500 privates belonged to Gudin's division of 7000 men : in other words, more than a half of that band of heroes had fallen. This was the bravest action fought by the French troops during the whole contest : but the valour both of the corps and the division was inferior to that displayed by the English in more than one action of the Peninsular war, if the number of killed and wounded, a fair test with armies both of which have been victorious, is taken as the criterion. At Talavera, out of 19,500 English soldiers, 5000 were killed and wounded; nearly the same proportion as fell of the victors at Auerstadt : but at Albuera, out of 7000 English troops, only 1500 were unwounded at the close of the fight; and 9999 redcoats fell at Waterloo, out of a force of native English not exceeding 36,000 men.—See Dumas, xvi. 177; Napier's *Peninsular War*, iii. 451; and Wellington's *Official Account of the Battle of Waterloo, Ann. Reg.* 1815, *App. to Chron.*

of the enemy. It is in the extraordinary confusion arising from this disastrous retreat, and the terror which seized the minds of both officers and men at finding themselves thus huddled together with soldiers to whom they were perfect strangers, that the true cause of the unparalleled disasters which followed the battle of Jena is to be found (1).

Capture of Erfurth with 13,000 men, Oct. 15.

The effect of the general consternation which prevailed speedily appeared in the fate which befel the fragments of the mighty army. Six thousand fugitives, almost without leaders, had taken refuge the day after the battle in Erfurth, whose embattled walls and almost inaccessible citadels promised the means of at least a temporary defence. It contained also the grand park and reserve artillery stores of the army, with the greatest part of its camp equipage. Thither also the Prince of Orange, Marshal Moellendorf, and a great number of the wounded of distinction, besides seven thousand private soldiers, in the same mutilated state, had been conveyed. Such, however, was the terror of the governor at finding himself thus suddenly overwhelmed by a mass of wounded and stragglers, incapable of aiding in the defence, but who would speedily consume its slender stock of provisions, that he thought the best thing he could do was to negotiate a capitulation, on condition that the officers should retire on their parole into Prussia, and the private men remain prisoners of war. On these terms the place surrendered (2), and with it fourteen thousand men, including Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange; a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and immense military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Hohenlohe, who had retired, covering the retreat of the fugitives beyond Weimar with a considerable body of cavalry, in good order, at nightfall on the 14th found himself so completely overwhelmed by the crowd of stragglers who attached themselves during the night to his squadrons, that by degrees his array melted away; and it was only by making frequent circuits, and repeatedly crossing the fields, that he was enabled to reach Dernstedt at seven on the following morning, at the head of sixty horsemen. On the day following, the King, who had arrived at Sonders-Haussen, accompanied only by his aides-de-camp, conferred the command of all the troops which had combated at Jena and Auerstadt upon Prince Hohenlohe, with the exception of the two divisions under the orders of Kalkreuth, the reserve at the latter battle, which it was thought would still be in some sort of order; but in the general confusion this corps had dispersed like the rest, and there remained only eight battalions around his standard. Magdebourg was assigned as the rallying point to the army, within the almost impregnable walls of which fortress it was hoped the wreck of its mighty array could be re-organized, and a defensive struggle maintained till the arrival of the Russians from the Vistula, and the reinforcements which were collecting in the interior of the kingdom. Thither accordingly the King repaired, attended only by a few horsemen, to make preparations for the reception of the army; and there he was quitted by the British envoy, Lord Morpeth (3), who, seeing no chance of diplomatic concerns being attended to amidst the general confusion, returned to London to render an account to his bewildered Cabinet of the extraordinary events which he had witnessed in the outset of his mission.

October 16. The King of Prussia gives the command to Hohenlohe and retires to Magdebourg.

But if there was any one thing more than another in which the genius of

(1) Dum. xvi. 178, 182. Bign. vi. 3, 5. Jom. ii. 297. Hard. ix. 307.

(2) Dum. xvi. 200, 202. Jom. ii. 298. Lucches. ii. 159.

(3) Dum. xvi. 184, 192. Bign. vi. 7, 8. Hard. ix. 307.

Measures of Napoléon to follow up the victory.

Napoléon shone prominent, it was in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. The present was not an opportunity to be lost of displaying this essential quality of a great general. Without an instant's delay, therefore, he prepared to pursue the extraordinary advantages he had gained. From all parts of Germany his forces had been assembled to one point, in order to strike the decisive blow. That done, the next object was to disperse them like a fan over the conquered territory, to carry every where the impression of their victory, and the terrors of their arms. On the night after the battle, Napoléon, instead of retiring to rest, sat up dictating orders to all the corps of his army for the directions they were to follow in pursuing the enemy. On the extreme right, Bernadotte, whose numerous corps was still untouched, received orders to advance from Apolda to Neustadt, to cut off the line of retreat from Weimar to Naumberg, and so shut out the army from the great road to Magdebourg. Davoust was to return to Naumberg to hold that important post, and keep himself in readiness to debouch on the Elbe before the enemy could arrive there; Soult was to move on Buttelstadt, the point in rear of the fields of battle, where the greatest number of fugitives had assembled; Murat and Ney were to march direct upon Erfurth (1), and reduce that important place; while Lannes and Augereau were directed to take a position in advance of Weimar; and the imperial guard and Napoléon's headquarters were transferred to that town.

Soult defeats Kalkreuth.

Soult was the first who came up with the enemy. At Greussen his cavalry reached the retiring squadrons of Kalkreuth's division, which alone preserved any semblance of an army. That general proposed a suspension of arms, in order to gain time, declaring that he knew an armistice had been concluded, and for the purpose of arranging its conditions repaired to the advanced posts in order to a conference with the French General. The terms, as might be expected, could not be agreed on. The statement was made in perfect good faith, under the impression founded on the letter from Napoléon offering an accommodation, written the day before, but not received till the night after the battle; and it gave the Prussian com-
October 15. mander leisure to cause a considerable part of his forces to defile in safety to the rear. Enraged at finding himself thus overreached, Soult, the moment the conferences were broken off, attacked the Prussian rear-guard posted in front of Greussen; which, after a short resistance, was cut to pieces, and the victors entered that town pell-mell with the vanquished. Following up his success, the French Marshal, early the following morning, resumed
October 16. the pursuit, and again came up with the ememy at Nordhausen, where they were again defeated with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, and 3000 men. Unable, from want of provisions, to keep his men together, and having no other means of escape to any part of his forces, the Prussian general divided his troops into two bodies, with instructions to follow diffesent routes to Magdebourg. An almost total dispersion immediately followed this order. The stragglers came into that fortress by companies, squadrons, and groups of single men in hardly any array; and thus was the disorganiza-
October 21. tion of the only divisions of the army which still preserved their ranks rendered complete within three days after the battle. Collecting prisoners at every step, Soult continued rapidly to advance, and on the 21st his vanguard reached the Elbe, and planted their victorious standards around the walls of Magdebourg (2).

(1) See the orders in Dum. xvi. 192, 193.

(2) Dum. xvi. 191, 200. Jom. ii. 299. Norv. ii. 465, 466. Lucches. ii. 161.

The Duke of Wirtemberg is defeated by Bernadotte at Halle, October 17.

A more important action awaited the arms of Bernadotte. This able chief, whose too literal adherence to the letter of his instructions had deprived him of all the laurels of Auerstadt, was burning with anxiety to achieve some exploit worthy of the deeds of his comrades and his own renown, when fortune threw the wished-for opportunity in his way. The Duke of Wirtemberg, who commanded the Prussian reserve, 14,000 strong, stunned by the intelligence of the disasters of the army at Jena, was making the best of his way back to Magdebourg and the Elbe, when he was beset on all sides at Halle by the corps of Bernadotte. The Prussians, who were brought into action, had not shared in the preceding defeats: notwithstanding the great superiority of force on the part of the French, they made a brave resistance; and there might be seen what elements of success existed in their army had they been opposed by less, or guided by greater ability. Assailed with the utmost impetuosity by the vanguard of the French, under Dupont, at Passendorf, they were driven in haste back to the islands in the Saale, over which the road passes; but in that defile they stood firm, and supported by a cloud of light troops who lined the dykes on either hand along the margin of the stream, long withstood their assailants and debarred all access to the gates. After an obstinate resistance, however, a column of grenadiers, headed by Dupont himself, rushed across the bridges, carried the guns which enfiladed them; and rapidly pursuing their success, pushed on and made themselves masters of the town. The Prussians had now no alternative to gain time for the retreat of their main body to Magdebourg but to prevent as long as possible the French troops from debouching from the gates on its opposite side; and the gallant efforts of the Duke of Wirtemberg long delayed them at that important point; but at length the increasing numbers of the French, and the murderous fire of the artillery which they brought up and planted on the ramparts, drove the Prussians from their strongholds in the gardens and walls of the suburbs, and enabled the columns to issue from the gates. Charged while retreating in open square along the level plain, the Prussians, during a running fight of four leagues, sustained severe loss from the enemy, and lost nearly their whole artillery; but they combated with heroic resolution; and still kept their ranks, when the pursuit ceased on the approach of night. Then the combat terminated on the right bank of the river, but on the left bank a greater disaster awaited the allied arms. Three thousand Prussians had broken up from their quarters near Magdebourg, in order to join the main body of the reserve at Halle, and ignorant of the occupation of that town by the French, fell into the midst of such superior forces that they were almost all either killed or made prisoners. Honourable as this affair was to the Prussians, it augmented, in an alarming degree the dangers of the army by dissipating its last regular corps: four thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed twelve hundred men; while the broken remains of the vanquished crossed the Elbe in such haste that they were unable completely to burn the bridge behind them, which was speedily restored by the French, who established themselves in force on the right bank, and drew their posts round Magdebourg (1).

October 19.

Saxony is overcome by the French, October 18.

Meanwhile the other corps of the army continued their triumphant progress, with hardly any opposition, through Saxony. Four days after the battle of Auerstadt Marshal Davoust took possession of

(1) Jom. ii. 300, 301. Dum. xvi. 214, 223. Saalf. iii. 307, 308.

Leipsic: strange coincidence, that the French army should for the first time enter that city on the very day on which, seven years afterwards, they were there to experience so terrible an overthrow (1)! Napoléon gave testimony of the rigorous warfare which he was about to commence on English commerce, by there issuing an edict of extraordinary severity against British merchandise (2). Rapidly following up his success, Davoust, two days afterwards, reached Wittenberg, at the very time that the retiring Prussians were preparing to blow up its great bridge over the Elbe; the French grenadiers rushed so rapidly over the arches that the enemy had not time to set fire to
October 19. the train, and thus that important passage was secured. On the same day Lannes made himself master of the passage at Dessau. Thither Na-
October 23. poléon followed with his guards three days afterwards; and regarding the capture of Berlin as certain and a secondary object, he already began to give directions for the march of his troops from the Elbe to the Oder. Davoust's corps was pushed on towards that capital, Napoléon having permitted, as a reward for his transcendant heroism at Auerstadt, that his corps should be the first to enter the capital of the fallen monarch (3).

Investment of Magdebourg, which is abandoned by Hohenlohe, Oct. 22.

Such was the rapidity of the French advance, that they arrived around Magdebourg before a large portion of the broken Prussians had taken refuge within its walls. Napoléon saw clearly the importance of accumulating as large a number as possible of the enemy in a situation where he foresaw they would, ere long, become his prisoners, and therefore he gave orders to leave the entrance to the place open, and dispersed his cavalry in all directions to drive the stragglers into that devoted fortress (4). Murat's horsemen inundated the plain; and the garrison of the town, ill provided with subsistence, already began to feel the pangs of hunger from the multitude of useless soldiers who were driven to its shelter. Summoned to surrender by Marshal Soult, the Governor replied, that he hoped to gain the esteem of the besiegers by an honourable defence; but the confusion of the garrison, and the evident discouragement of the multitudes of insulated men who thronged around the gates, rendered it more than probable that his means of defence could not be prolonged for a very long period. Hohenlohe, despairing of preventing the investment of the place with so disorganized a wreck as was collected within its walls, and aware that the want of provisions would in the end compel its surrender, resolved to depart with all the forces which still maintained the appearance of

(1) On Oct. 18, 1813.

(2) "Your city," said Napoléon, "is known throughout Europe as the principal dépôt of English merchandise, and on that account the enemy most dangerous to France. The Emperor and King commands, 1. In the four-and-twenty hours immediately following this notification, every banker, merchant, or manufacturer having in his possession any funds *the produce of English manufactures*, whether they belong to a British subject *or the foreign consignee*, shall declare their amount in a register appointed for that special purpose. 2. As soon as these returns are authentically received, domiciliary visits shall be made to all, whether they have declared or not, to compare the registers with the stock in hand to ascertain its exactness, and punish by military execution any attempt at fraud or concealment." Well may the honest General Mathieu Dumas exclaim, "What a deplorable abuse of victory!"—Dumas, xvi, 225.

(3) Bign. vi. 8, 9. Jom. ii. 302. Dum. xvi. 223, 227. Lucches, ii. 162.

Bernadotte was unavoidably detained a day longer than he was ordered in marching to the Elbe, and in consequence did not cross that river till the 23d and 24th, instead of the 21st and 22d, before which time the corps of the Duke of Wirtemberg had defiled through Magdebourg, and was in full march for the Oder. This escape of a considerable part of the best organized corps of the Prussians excited to the highest degree the indignation of Napoléon, who took occasion bitterly to reproach him with this delay, as well as his conduct in not marching with Davoust to Auerstadt. Already were to be seen the germs of that mutual discontent which seven years afterwards, on those very plains, brought Bernadotte in arms against the French Emperor on the field of Leipsic.—Bignon, vi. 9; Dumas, xvi. 230.

(4) "Magdebourg," said Napoléon, "is a net where all the isolated men who have wandered about since the battle may be taken. We must, therefore, invert our manœuvres, and beat all the country for fifteen leagues around; we shall thus collect numbers of prisoners, and also gain accounts of the direction taken by the strong columns of the enemy, of whose route we have as yet no certain intelligence."—Dumas, xvi. 232.

order, and make for the great line of fortresses on the Oder; but such was the universal confusion which prevailed, that he could only collect fifty battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons in a state to keep the field. With those he departed on the day following, leaving fifty skeleton battalions, hardly amounting to twelve thousand combatants, within the walls (1).

Who is pursued, assailed, and made prisoner at Prentzlow, October 25.

Upon leaving Magdebourg, Hohenlohe, abandoning Berlin to its fate, made for Stettin, situated near the mouth of the Oder, by the route of Spandau. But when he drew near to that place, he received intelligence that on that very day it had capitulated to the first summons of the advanced posts of the cavalry, under Murat, and that Davoust on the same day was to make his entrance into the capital. Driven thus to a circuit to avoid the taken towns, he moved by Grandsee to Zeydenick, in order to reach, if possible, before the enemy, the defile of Lochnitz, near Stettin, which would have secured his retreat to that important fortress. Aware of the importance of anticipating the Prussian General in these movements, Napoléon sent Murat forward with the cavalry to get before him to the defile, while Lannes advanced as rapidly as possible in pursuit of his steps with his indefatigable infantry. By forced marches, Murat got the start even of the horsemen who formed the advanced guard of Hohenlohe's corps; and

October 26.

on leaving Zeydenick, they were assailed by that active officer himself, at the head of Lassalles' dragoons. Confounded at being thus anticipated in a quarter where they expected a leisurely retreat, the Prussian horse made but a feeble resistance: even the famous regiment of the Queen's dragoons was driven back after a gallant effort, surrounded and almost cut to pieces; and the Prussian cavalry were compelled to fall back on their infantry, with the loss of 500 slain, and renounce all hope of pursuing the direct road to Stettin. Driven thus from his line of retreat, and his right flank being exposed to the attack of Marshal Lannes, Hohenlohe, after waiting three hours in the vain hope of being joined by Blucher, who had retreated to the same quarter, changed his direction, and moved upon Boitzenberg, where he arrived on

October 27.

the 27th, hoping to reach Stettin by the circuitous route of Prentzlow: but in attempting to do so, the unhappy Prince found himself again beset by his indefatigable pursuers. No sooner was Murat informed of his change of direction, than he marched across the country all night, from the one road to the other, again got before him, and assailed the Prussian horse at once in front and flank with his terrible dragoons, on the following morning, as they were continuing their march two leagues beyond Prentzlow. To troops

October 28.

wearied by incessant marching for a fortnight together, and discouraged by such a succession of disasters, the shock of his victorious squadrons was irresistible, the Prussian cavalry were speedily broken, and fell back in disorder to the suburbs of Prentzlow, already encumbered with infantry and artillery. To complete their misfortunes, Marshal Lannes appeared at this critical moment on their right flank, having, with indefatigable perseverance, marched all night from Templin on the direct road. Murat now summoned Hohenlohe to surrender, which the latter refused, and brought up a powerful battery of cannon to answer the fire of the French artillery, which was severely galling his troops as they attempted to debouche from the town. This battery was immediately attacked and carried; a regiment of infantry and cavalry which advanced to support it broken and made prisoners. Prince Augustus of Prussia, at the head of his regiment, which was still two leagues in the rear of Prentzlow, was surrounded, and after

(1) Bign. vi. 10, 11. Dum. 223, 237. Jom. ii. 304, 308.

heroically resisting the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers, during a march in hollow square of four miles, was at length made prisoner, with almost all his men, while bravely resisting to the last. Overwhelmed by such a multitude of calamities, and seeing no chance of escape, while every hour increased the forces against him by permitting the formidable battalions of Lannes to arrive on his rear and flank, Prince Hohenlohe, after several un-
October 28. successful attempts to obtain a capitulation, was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition that the officers should be dismissed on their parole. With him were taken fourteen thousand men, including the flower of the Prussian army; the guards, six chosen regiments of cavalry, forty standards, and fifty pieces of field artillery. Notwithstanding their many defeats and disastrous circumstances, this grievous surrender did not take place without the most profound grief by the Prussian troops; the officers retired from the circle where it had been agreed to in stern silence, or shedding tears; many of them fiercely and indignantly accused their commanders of treachery, and invited their comrades to cut their way through the enemy, sword in hand; the private soldiers, by loud sobs and lamentations, gave vent to their grief, and flinging their muskets on the ground, slowly and mournfully pursued their way into the town; while a loud flourish of trumpets, the quick rattle of drums, and the triumphant shouts of the soldiers, announced the successive arrival of the French regiments at the scene of their triumph (1).

March and escape of the Duke of Saxe Weimar.

Of the army, late so splendid and numerous, there remained only in the field the corps of the Duke of Weimar and General Blucher. The former of these, which formed the advanced guard of the host which advanced to the Saale, and had been pushed on through the Thuringian Forest to Verra, in the view of threatening the rear of the French army, had become entirely detached by subsequent events from the principal body, and thus escaped the catastrophes of both defeats. Almost forgotten in the rapid succession of succeeding triumphs, the Duke was left to his own direction, and no sooner received accounts of the ruin of the main army, than he took steps for making the best of his way back to the Elbe. He had much difficulty in steering his way through the numerous corps of enemies which traversed the intervening country in every direction: but by great exertions he contrived to escape, and rallying to his standard a considerable detachment of Ruchel's corps, which had been separated from the remainder, reached the Elbe in safety at Stendal, with 14,000 men, by Seesen, Schladen,
October 26. and Lutter. He was there superseded in the command by the King of Prussia, and his corps passed into the hands of General Winning, who gave them a day's rest at Kigritz. As the approach of the French corps rendered those quarters dangerous, he broke up and retired towards the Oder, and by good fortune, and no small share of skill, he succeeded in reaching the banks of that river in safety in the first week of October, where he joined Blucher with the cavalry which had escaped from Auerstadt. Their united forces now amounted to 24,000 men (2).

Disgraceful surrender of Stettin and Custrin.

Meanwhile, the fortresses on the Oder fell in the most disgraceful manner. The day after the capitulation of Hohenlohe, a brigade which had escaped from the wreck of his corps presented itself at the gates of Stettin; the governor sternly refused them admittance, upon the pretence that his provisions were only adequate to the support of his own
October 28. garrison. Next day, however, he capitulated, on the first summons,

(1) Dum. xvi. 275, 299. Jom. ii. 308, 312. Bign. vi. 19, 21. Saalf. iii. 309, 310. Hard. ix. 313.

(2) Dum. xvi. 260, 272, 303, 306. Bign. vi. 23.

to the advanced guard of Marshal Lannes; and the French, without firing a shot, became masters of a fortress of the first order, armed with 150 pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by 6000 men. The brigade of Prussians, shut out
October 29. from its walls, was soon after surrounded at Anclam and made prisoners. Encouraged by these repeated successes, the French soldiers deemed nothing beyond the reach of their arms; and the advanced guard of Davoust's corps, which had traversed the district between the Elbe and the Oder without meeting with any enemies, presented itself before Custrin, and threatened the garrison with a severe bombardment if they did not instantly capitulate. This menacing outpost consisted merely of a regiment of foot, and had only two pieces of artillery at its command. On the other hand, the governor of the town had ninety pieces of cannon mounted on the ramparts, and four hundred in the arsenal; four thousand brave men for a garrison, and every requisite for a prolonged defence. Nevertheless, such was the terror produced by Napoléon's arms, and such the skill with which the French officer, General Gauthier, concealed the real amount and description of his force,
October 31. that the Prussians capitulated almost on the first summons; and one of the strongest places in the kingdom, amply garrisoned, situated in an island of the Oder, and invested only on one side, had the disgrace of surrendering to a regiment of foot with only two pieces of cannon. The besiegers could not approach it to take possession till the garrison furnished them with boats! These disgraceful capitulations, at which the brave troops involved in them were so much exasperated that it was with difficulty they could be induced to yield obedience to their officers in carrying them into execution, demonstrated that the Prussian generals were so overwhelmed by the magnitude of their misfortunes, that they deemed the monarchy irrevocably ruined, and that *sauve qui peut* had become the only remaining principle of their conduct. Astonished at his good fortune in effecting the reduction of such a
October 1. fortress without firing a shot, Marshal Davoust inspected the fortifications on the day following, which he found in the best condition, and
October 3. deeming his base on the Oder now sufficiently secured, pushed on his light troops to Posen, in Prussian Poland; while six thousand Bavarians formed the investment of Glogau, the only remaining stronghold on its banks which was still in the hands of the enemy; and Augereau established himself at Frankfort, the well-known emporium of eastern Prussia (1).

Blucher's corps is pursued to Lubeck.

The only corps of the Prussian army which had hitherto escaped destruction was that formed by the union of Blucher's cavalry with the Duke of Saxe Weimar's infantry, and commanded by the former of these generals (2). Though its resistance, however, was more honourable,

(1) Dum. xvii. 13, 20. Bign. vi. 23. Jom. ii. 314.

(2) Before this junction was effected, Blucher's cavalry had been hard pressed by a brigade of horse under the French General Klein, and escaped in consequence of his affirming that an armistice had been concluded on the propositions for an accommodation sent to Napoléon after the battle by the King of Prussia. Whether the Prussian General really believed the report to that effect, which unquestionably prevailed through the whole army at that time, [Hard ix. 320.] or whether he made use of this very questionable military stratagem as a device to extricate his troops from present danger, does not appear; and therefore neither praise nor blame can in this uncertainty be awarded on the subject. But this much is clear, that if he knowingly affirmed a falsehood, as they assert, no necessity, how pressing soever, no advantage, how great soever, can afford it any apology. But when the French historians inveigh with such severity against Blucher's conduct on this occasion, [See Bign. vi. 7. and Norv. ii. 466.] and affirm, "In the campaigns of the Revolution, the Austrian Generals have frequently had recourse to that strange ruse de guerre, *the French never*," they forget or wilfully conceal immediately preceding events, on which they bestow no sort of censure. What is to be said to General Lecourbe, who, in November, 1799, escaped destruction at the hands of the Austrian General Starray solely by falsely affirming that a negotiation for peace was commenced; [Ante, iv. 88.] to Lannes and Murat, in the campaign of Austerlitz, who won the bridge of Vienna, by the fallacious declaration that an armistice had been concluded, which they well knew was not the case; or to the latter of these Marshals, who a few days after tried a similar piece of deceit with Kutusoff, and was only foiled by the superior finesse of that astute commander. Both these French historians

its ultimate fate was not less calamitous. No sooner was he informed of the junction of these two corps in the north of Prussia, than Napoléon ordered their pursuit by forces so considerable, that escape became impossible. Bernadotte was instructed to follow closely on its footsteps; while Murat was despatched by a circuit to cut it off, on the right, from Stralsund and Rostock, under the cannon of which it might have found shelter; and Soult threw
October 28. himself on the left, to bar the communication with the lower Elbe. Blucher arrived at Boitzenberg the day after the ill-fated Hohenlohe had left that town; and having there learned the catastrophe which had befallen that brilliant portion of the army, he renounced all hope of retiring before the enemy, and retraced his steps in order to unite with General Winning and the Duke of Saxe Weimar's corps, which took place at Kratzemberg on the
October 29. day following; and finding himself now at the head of eighteen thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, he resolved to move to the right, recross the Elbe, raise the siege of Magdebourg, and, supported by that fortress and Hameln, maintain himself as long as possible in the rear of the Emperor's army. The project was boldly conceived and intrepidly executed; but the three corps now directed against him, numbering nearly sixty thousand combatants, rendered its execution im-
Nov. 1. possible. A sharp conflict took place with his rear-guard at Nossentin, in which five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the French; but the next day the junction of Bernadotte with Soult rendered it necessary for the gallant Prussian to be more circumspect. An opportunity, however, soon
Nov. 2. occurred of taking his revenge. Next day the French hussars were charged and put to the route by the Prussian light dragoons, at the entrance of a defile. Colonel Gerard and three hundred horsemen were made priso-
Nov. 3. ners; but the cavalry having fallen back on the support of their infantry, headed by Bernadotte in person, the Prussians were in their turn repulsed, with severe loss. Finding the enemy's forces so considerable, that all chance of making good his way to the lower Elbe was out of the question,
Nov. 4. Blucher resolved to fall back by Gadebush on Lubeck, where he hoped to find resources to recruit his wearied troops, and whose decayed bastions he flattered himself he would soon be able to put in a respectable
Nov. 5. state of defence. Before arriving at that city, he was summoned by Bernadotte to surrender, and informed that he was beset by forces triple his own. "I will never capitulate," was the brief and characteristic reply of the Prussian general; and continuing his march, he entered Lubeck on the evening of the 5th, closely followed by his indefatigable pursuers (1).

And is there defeated after a desperate conflict.

Unfortunately for Lubeck, it was still surrounded by a ruined wall and deep ditches filled with water; and this gave Blucher an excuse for representing it as a military post, and disregarding all the remonstrances of the magistrates, who loudly protested against this violation of their neutrality. Hastily planting the few heavy cannon which he still retained to defend the principal gates, Blucher caused the greater part of his

mention these unworthy stratagems, not only without censure, but with the highest admiration. [Rapp. 57, 58, 59. Bign. iv. 406. Ante, v. 217, 219.] It would be well, if, in making such random assertions, they would calculate less confidently on the want of information or recollection in their readers; and if, in the survey of the conduct of their own officers, they would display a little of that warm anxiety for the great principles of public morality, to which they so loudly appeal when any violation of it occurs to their disadvantage on the part of their enemies.

(1) Dum. xvi. 308, 321. Bign. vi. 23, 24. Jom. ii. 317. Saalf. iii. 311, 312.

In the course of the pursuit, a convoy of twelve hundred Swedes fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who treated them with unusual courtesy and kindness From the gratitude of the Swedes for this treatment arose the interchange of good deeds which terminated in his elevation to the throne of Gustavus Adolphus. At that period events, in appearance the most trivial, were big with the fate of nations.—See Saalfeld, iii. 313, and Bignon, vi. 24.

forces to defile through the town, and take post on the low marshy ground on
Oct. 6. the opposite side, on the confines of the Danish territory. At day break on the following morning the French columns were at the gates, and every preparation made for an instant assault. In spite of a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the old walls, the French advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the assault. The corps of Bernadotte advanced against the Burg-Thor, or gate which looked to the north; that of Soult approached the Huxter-Thor and Mahlen-Thor, or gates of Hanover. After sustaining a terrible discharge from the bastions, which were armed with the Prussian field-pieces, the French advanced guard, under Generals Merle and Frere, succeeded in breaking through with their hatches the exterior palisades of the Burg-Thor, and rapidly following the Prussian regiments which held that outwork, entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of the adjoining bastions. At the same moment Soult's divisions threatened the gates opposed to their attack; but so murderous was the fire which the Prussians kept up from the walls which flanked their approaches that the assailants were unable to make any progress till Bernadotte's divisions, having penetrated into the town, threatened to take the defenders in rear. Even then, however, the brave Prussians, at this gate, to the number of two thousand, faced both ways, and besieged in their turn, sustained the double attack within and without. Posted on the roofs of houses, and on the summits of the ramparts, they kept up an incessant fire till their cartridges were exhausted, when they were all either killed or made prisoners. So rapid was the advance of the French through the Burg-Thor that Blucher, who had retired to his lodgings, after having made his dispositions, to dictate orders, had barely time to mount his horse with his son and a single aid-de-camp and ride off; all the rest of his staff were made prisoners. Having joined the remaining troops in the town, that brave general, with his gallant followers, prolonged the defence. He himself repeatedly charged down the Koning-Strasse at the head of a body of cavalry, but was unable to clear it of the French soldiers, who had now broken into the houses near the gate, and from thence kept up a fire of such severity upon the street as rendered it impossible for the dragoons to advance to its farther extremity. Presently the besiegers brought up their field-pieces, the guns on the ramparts were turned upon the town, and repeated discharges of grape from both sides swept the pavement, and occasioned a terrific slaughter. With invincible resolution, however, the Prussians maintained the combat. From street to street, from church to church, from house to house, the conflict continued. Blood flowed on all sides. The incessant rattle of the musketry was almost drowned in some quarters by the cries of the wounded and the shrieks of the inhabitants, who in that day of wo underwent all the horrors consequent on a town carried by assault. By degrees, however, the superior numbers of the French, who were soon reinforced by part of Murat's corps, prevailed over the heroic resolution of the Prussians. With difficulty Blucher succeeded, towards evening, in collecting five thousand men, with whom he forced his way through by the gate of Holstein, and rejoined his cavalry, which lay at Schwertau on the opposite side of the town, near the Danish frontier (1); while the remainder of his corps, in the town, consisting of eight thousand men, were slain before nightfall in that terrific fight, or fell into the hands of the enemy (2).

(1) Dum. xvi. 322, 333. Jom. ii. 317, 318. Bign. vi. 24, 25. Saalf. iii. 313, Hard. ix. 322.

(2) The French writers make it a just reproach to the English army that its soldiers committed such disgraceful excesses at St.-Sebastian, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, when these fortresses fell by assault. It is the duty of the historian to condemn equally such outrages, by whomever committed;

He retires to Rat Kau, and is there made prisoner.

The situation of Blucher, with his cavalry and this slender body of infantry, was now altogether desperate. He was driven up to Rat Kau, in the extremity of Germany, on the very edge of the the Danish territory, where a powerful body of troops was collected to prevent his entrance. In the night he received intelligence that Travemunde, a fortified town on the sea-coast, to which he proposed to have retired, had been taken by Murat with a battalion which he had sent forward to garrison that important post, where he hoped to have embarked; and to complete his misfortunes, information arrived in the morning that the salt marshes between Schwertau and that town were not passable by the army. At the same time a flag of truce arrived from Murat, while his numerous squadrons had already driven the Prussian infantry out of Schwertau, and were closing in, in all directions, on his last position. Overcome by stern necessity, the hardy veteran, with tears in his eyes, agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which all his troops laid down their arms (1). On this occasion were taken ten battalions and fifty-three squadrons, amounting to four thousand foot soldiers, and three thousand seven hundred cavalry, with forty pieces of cannon, the remainder of his fine train of artillery having been left on the ramparts of Lubeck.

Fall of Magdebourg.

To complete the disasters of the Prussian monarchy nothing was wanting but the surrender of Magdebourg; and that important bulwark was not long of falling into the hands of Marshal Ney. Although its garrison was in great part composed of fugitives of all regiments, who had made their escape into that asylum from the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt, yet such was the strength of its works, and the ample store of provisions and magazines of all sorts which existed within its walls, that a prolonged defence might confidently have been anticipated. Nevertheless, if its fall was not quite so disgraceful as that of Stettin and Custrin, it was such as to affix a lasting stigma on the Prussian arms. After fifteen days of a blockade, Marshal Ney commenced operations in form; but before having recourse to the tedious method of regular approaches, he resolved to try the effect of a bombardment. Furnaces for this purpose were heated to throw four-and-twenty pound shot, red hot, into every part of the town, while a copious shower of bombs were ready to bring terror and conflagration upon the inhabitants. It was not necessary, however, to proceed to these extremities. The citizens of Magdebourg preserved a vivid traditional recollection of the horrors which their forefathers underwent after the memorable storm by Count Tilly in 1631, when the whole town was reduced to ashes. No sooner, therefore, did the first flaming projectiles begin to descend upon their houses than they besieged General Kleist, the governor, with entreaties for a capitulation. That officer, deeming the Prussian monarchy destroyed, and seeing no use in singly prolonging a contest now become hopeless, agreed to a capitulation on the same terms as Stettin, in virtue of which this important frontier town, the bulwark of the monarchy, with its redoubtable ramparts still untouched, and not even an outwork lost, containing sixteen thousand troops in arms, and four thousand in hospital, six hundred pieces of cannon, eight hundred thousand pounds of powder, a pontoon train complete, and immense magazines of all

Nov. 8.

and certainly in this work no veil shall be thrown over these atrocities when they come to be recounted. But it would be well if they would reserve a little of their humane indignation for the sufferers under their own soldiery on similar catastrophes. On this occasion, though they pass it lightly over, the cruelties and devastation committed by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps for two days after the town was taken, notwithstanding all the efforts of those marshals, were equal to the very worst deeds that ever stained the British arms.—See the frightful details, drawn with a graphic hand, in *Lettre de Villers à la Comtesse Fanny Beauharnais*, Amst. 1808.

(1) Dum. xvi. 333, 339. Jom. ii. 317, 319. Hard. ix. 321, 322. Saalf. iii. 313.

sorts, fell into the hands of the enemy, who hardly mustered a greater force without its walls (1).

Fall of Hameln and Nieubourg on the Weser.

After these stunning calamities, it was not to be expected that the fortresses on the Weser, which were now left far in the rear of the storm of war, should long continue to hold out. A host of fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt had taken refuge in those strongholds, particularly Hameln and Nieubourg; into the former of which General Lecoq, who had been separated in the confusion of the disastrous night which followed those battles, had thrown himself with four thousand men who still preserved a military array. There he speedily found himself blockaded by the forces of the King of Holland, who had advanced by Wurtzbourg and Paderborn to the banks of the Weser. The disastrous state of the monarchy gave him too plausible a ground for assailing the fidelity of the besieged. "You are insulated," said he, "without hope of succour. Abandoned, and more than a hundred leagues in the rear of the victorious invaders, what can your efforts do to avert the fall of the Prussian monarchy?" These arguments, supported by the official intelligence of the fall of Magdebourg and the surrender of almost all the fragments of the army, produced the desired impression, and it was speedily agreed that the fortress should be evacuated, the private soldiers made prisoners, and the officers return on their parole to Prussia. A mutiny
Nov. 20. broke out among the soldiers upon learning the terms of this disgraceful capitulation; but it was speedily suppressed by Savary's dragoons, the men disarmed, and the fortress, in admirable condition, delivered over, with five thousand prisoners, to the French. Nieubourg speedily followed the
Nov. 25. same example, and, with its untouched fortifications and garrison of three thousand men, capitulated to the victors; and with it all the elements of resistance expired between the Elbe and the Weser (2).

Napoléon detaches Saxony from the coalition.

While the arms of Napoléon, guided by his penetrating eye, were reaping in this astonishing series of successes the fruits of the victories of Jena and Auerstadt, the Emperor himself, occupied alike with military and diplomatic objects, was preparing the means of farther triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of the power which fortune and genius had thus combined to place at his disposal. His first care was to detach Saxony from the coalition; and after the defeat of its army in those disastrous days, and occupation of its territory by the conquerors, this was easily accomplished. The Saxons have a hereditary jealousy of the Prussians, by whom they have a presentiment they are one day to be swallowed up. Necessity, not inclination, had brought them into the field with their ambitious neighbours; and they gladly availed themselves of the first opportunity to range their forces on the side to which their secret inclinations had long pointed, and which seemed to be recommended alike by prudence and necessity. Early in the campaign, Napoléon had addressed them, in a proclamation, in which he called on them to assert their national independence, and throw off that withering alliance with Prussia from which nothing but ultimate ruin was to be anticipated (3). This address had already produced

(1) Dum. xvi. 343, 347. Jom. ii. 319. Bign. vi. 26. Saalf. iii. 313.

(2) Dum. xvi 347, 351. Bign. vi. 27.

(3) "Saxons! the Prussians have invaded your territory. I have come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops and incorporated them with their own ranks. You must forsooth shed your blood, not merely for interests foreign but adverse to those of your country! Saxons! your fate is now in your own hands. Will you float in uncertainty between those who impose and those who seek to liberate you from the yoke? My success will secure the independence of your country and your prince. The triumph of the Prussians would rivet on you eternal chains. To-morrow they will demand Lusatia; the day after, the right bank of the Elbe. But what do I say? Have they not already done so? Have they not long endeavoured to force your sovereign to recognize a feudal supremacy which would soon sweep

a great impression on the Saxon troops, when the victory of Jena seemed to dissolve at once the bonds which held the two nations together. Improving on these dispositions, Napoléon assembled the Saxon officers, three hundred in number, who had been made prisoners at Weimar, and strongly represented to them the impolicy of any longer uniting their arms to those of their
Oct. 17. natural enemies the Prussians; and offered, upon their subscribing the oath tendered to them of fidelity to its fortunes, to admit them into the Confederation of the Rhine. Gladly the officers, for themselves and the troops under their command, subscribed the conditions; and immediately they were all, with the private soldiers, six thousand in number, sent back to Dresden. The Elector shortly after recalled the remainder of his forces from the Prussian standard; he accepted first neutrality, then an alliance with the conqueror; and before the war in Poland was concluded, his troops were to be seen actively engaged under the French eagles. Such was the origin of that intimate union which, down to the close of the war, subsisted between Napoléon and the Saxon Government, and which, though in the end fraught with numberless calamities to that electorate, must ever command respect, from the fidelity with which its engagements were adhered to under adverse fortune (1).

Refuses to treat with Prussia.

It was shortly after having detached Saxony from the Prussian, and united it to his own alliance, that Napoléon received an answer from the King of Prussia to the elusory proposals of accommodation made by him before the battle of Jena, and which that unhappy monarch eagerly caught at after that disaster as the only light that seemed to break upon his sinking fortunes. The times, however, were not the same: there was no longer any need of dissembling; the Prussian army was routed, and he was not the man to let slip the opportunity of completing its destruction. He
Oct. 18. therefore coldly replied, that it was premature to speak of peace when the campaign could hardly be said to have commenced, and that, having resolved to try the fate of arms, the King must abide by its issue (2).

Napoléon visits Potsdam and the tomb of Frederick, Oct. 25.

Following the march of his victorious armies, Napoléon continued his progress, by Weimar, Naumberg, Wittenberg, and Potsdam, towards Berlin. On the march he passed the field of Rosbach, the well-known theatre of the Prussian victory over the French, and ordered the column erected in commemoration of that triumph, which had been thrown down by the soldiers of his army, to be preserved, and transported as a trophy to Paris. At Potsdam he visited, with eager haste, the palace of Sans Souci and the tomb of the Great Frederick. Every thing in the apartments of the illustrious monarch remained as when he breathed his last: the book which he read shortly before his death remained on the table; the furniture was untouched; the writing materials still there: their simplicity surprised the conqueror, who was accustomed to the magnificence of St.-Cloud. By a singular coincidence, but one of the many with which the
Oct. 25. history of Napoléon is full, he visited the sepulchre on the anniversary of the day on which Alexander, just a year before, on the same spot, had sworn fidelity to Frederick William. Such had been the confusion of the Prussian flight, that on the tomb there still remained the cordon of the black

you from the rank of independent nations? Your independence, your constitution, your liberty, would exist only in recollection, and the spirits of your ancestors, of the brave Saxons, would feel indignant at seeing you reduced, without resistance, by your rivals to a slavery long prepared by their councils, and your country reduced to the rank of a Prussian province." None could descant more fluently than Napoléon on the withering effect to inconsiderable states of an alliance with a greater power; for none put it in force so invariably towards his own tributary states.—Dumas, xvi. 205.

(1) Dum. xvi. 204, 207. Bign. vi. 3, 4.

(2) Dum. xvi. 236, 239. Jom. ii. 301.

eagle, the scarf and sword of the hero, which he had worn in the Seven Years' War, as well as the standards of his guard. With generous emotion Napoléon approached the awful monument; but even at that solemn moment unworthy feelings gained the ascendency. He himself seized the venerable relics, and sent them with indecent haste off to Paris. "I will make them a present," said he, "to the Hôtel-des-Invalides : the old veterans of that Hanoverian war will receive with religious respect all that once belonged to one of the greatest captains of whom history has made mention." Such an act could not injure the dead; his glory was enshrined in imperishable lustre in the page of history; but it lowered the living, and sullied the triumph of Jena by an unbecoming act of rapacity. Little did Napoléon at the moment anticipate the advent of times so soon approaching, when the Prussians, now so humbled, were to have the mastery of his proudest trophies, and nought was to remain but veneration for the remains of the dead to protect his own ashes in a foreign and far distant land from the rude hand of the spoiler (1)!

Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg occupied by the French. Oct. 25.

This interesting episode did not interrupt for a moment the military movements of the corps immediately around the person of the Emperor. The same weakness and infatuation appeared there as elsewhere to have seized the Prussian authorities. On the same day Marshal Davoust, agreeably to the promise of Napoléon, headed the splendid vanguard which, with all the pomp of war, entered Berlin. No words can describe the mingled feelings of rage, astonishment, and despair, which animated the inhabitants at this heart-rending spectacle, occurring in less than a fortnight after hostilities had commenced. With speechless grief they gazed on the proud array which defiled through their gates, and drank deep, in the agony of that dreadful moment, of the punishment for the political sins of their Government during the last ten years. On the same day the strong fortress of Spandau, with its impregnable citadel and a garrison of twelve hundred men, surrendered, without firing a shot, to Marshal Lannes (2); and Napoléon, after inspecting that stronghold on the day following, made his triumphal entry into the capital. He had not the same delicacy towards the feelings of its inhabitants which he had previously evinced towards those of Vienna: the palace of Charlottenberg would have answered his purpose of a residence as well as that of Schoenbrun had done; but he was anxious to lacerate the feelings of the Prussians as much as he had been to spare those of the Austrians, and punish ten years of subservience and ten days of warfare more than he had done the inveterate hostility of twelve years. Surrounded, therefore, by all the splendour of the

Oct. 26.
Oct. 27.

(1) Bign. vi. 11, 12. Jom. ii. 302, 303. Dum. xvi 249, 250.

How much more honourable as well as magnanimous was the conduct of the Russian officer who, instead of destroying the monument erected at Cologne to commemorate the battle of Austerlitz, simply engraved below the inscription the words, "Seen and approved by the Russian governor of Cologne, May 8th, 1814." It is for the interest of all nations to preserve the trophies of their enemy's victory and the remains of the dead from insult; for it is impossible to foresee how soon they may themselves suffer from an opposite system. Nor is such forbearance without its reward. It obliterates the disgrace of defeat in the magnanimity of subsequent victory. The Pillar of Austerlitz, in the Place Vendôme, is now a monument not less to German generosity than French valour. It would be well for the memory of Napoléon if more instances of moderation in victory and regard for the vanquished were mingled with his military triumphs.

(2) Napoleon spoke thus of this fortress : "The citadal of Spandau, situated on the Spree, fully victualled for two months, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of open trenches But such was the general confusion that the batteries were not even armed"—19th Bulletin. It is evident that treachery, or selfishness equivalent to treachery, occasioned the sudden fall of so many of the Prussian fortresses at this period; and Bignon tells us that he became convinced of that when, on being sent by the Emperor to superintend the capitulation of Spandau, he found the governor, Benckendorf, occupied with no other consideration but disputes with the French commander as to some wretched culinary articles which he alleged the capitulation authorized him to remove!—BIGNON, vi. 13.

empire, in the midst of a brilliant staff, and preceded by his dragoon guards, he made his triumphal entry under the arch erected to the honour of the Great Frederick, and surrounded by an innumerable crowd, in whom passion, admiration, and wonder were mingled in some cases with joy (1), he proceeded through the streets, and alighted at the gates of the old palace.

Affair of Prince Hatzfeld, and his pardon by Napoléon.

Prince Hatzfeld, one of the leaders of the war party, in the total absence of any authority flowing from the King, had been besought by the principal inhabitants to take an interim direction of affairs, and assume the command of the burgher guard. In doing so he had issued a proclamation, in which he said, "Nothing remains for us now but to assume a pacific attitude: our cares should not extend beyond what is within our own walls: that constitutes our sole interest, and as it is of the highest importance, we should bestow our exclusive attention upon it." This prince, as the chief of the pacific authorities, presented himself at the head of the magistrates before Napoléon at Potsdam, and was well received. He again waited on him when he arrived at the palace; but the conqueror received him with a severe air, and averting his head said, "Do not present yourself before me; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates." Shortly after the astonished nobleman withdrew he was ordered to be arrested by orders of Napoléon, who had commanded him to be seized *and executed* before six o'clock that evening. In fact he had transmitted to Prince Hohenlohe a letter, containing military details in regard to what he had seen at Potsdam when waiting on Napoléon, which had been intercepted by Davoust and brought to the Emperor. The imperious commands of the conqueror left his subordinate authorities no alternative but submission; although Berthier, shocked at the deed of violence which was in contemplation, did his utmost to avert the storm, and even refused to write out the warrant, which Rapp was called in to do. He could not, however, prevent Napoléon from ordering another murder as atrocious as that of the Duke d'Enghien, and the death-warrant was signed, and ordered to be sent by Rapp to Davoust for immediate execution. That brave and generous man, at his own imminent hazard, took upon himself to delay its transmission; and in the meantime the Princess of Hatzfeld, having arrived in the antechamber of the palace, was informed of the danger of her husband, and sunk in a swoon on the floor. Rapp advised her, after she recovered, to endeavour to throw herself in Napoléon's way at the hotel of Prince Ferdinand, where he was going in a short time; she did so, and fell at his feet in the extremity of despair. Her grief and beauty touched Napoléon, who, though subject to violent fits of passion, was not insensible to generous emotions. Rapp warmly seconded the return to feelings of humanity, and orders were despatched to Davoust to suspend the execution till farther directions. Meanwhile the Princess was enjoined to repair to the palace, whither Napoléon soon after returned. He ordered her to be brought into the room which he occupied. "Your husband," said he, with a benign air, "has brought himself into a distressing situation; according to our laws he has incurred the penalty of death. General Rapp, give me the letter: take it, read it, madam. Is it your husband's writing?" She did so, trembling. "I cannot deny his subscription," she replied, almost fainting with emotion. Napoléon then took it from her, tore it, and threw it into the fire. "I have no longer any proof; your husband is pardoned." He then desired Rapp to bring him back immediately from Davoust's headquarters: that officer ventured to admit that he had not even sent him there: the

(1) Dum. xvi. 250, 252. Bign. vi. 13. Hard. ix. 313.

Emperor manifested no displeasure (1), but on the contrary seemed gratified at the delay which had taken place in the execution of the order (2).

Napoléon's proclamation and addresses to his soldiers. Oct. 30.

Shortly after his arrival at Berlin, Napoléon paid a visit of condolence to Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great King of Prussia, and father of Prince Louis who fell at Saalfeld, and manifested the most delicate attentions to the widow of Prince Henry, as well as the Princess Electoral of Hesse Cassel. At the same time he addressed an animated proclamation to his troops, in which he recounted with just pride their astonishing exploits, and promised to lead them against the Russians, who, he foretold, would find another Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia (3). Next day he reviewed the corps of Marshal Davoust on the road to Frankfort, and assembling the officers in a circle, assured them of the admiration which he felt for their achievements, and the grief which he had experienced at the numerous losses which had thinned their ranks. "Sire," answered the Marshal, "the soldiers of the third corps will ever be to you what the tenth legion was to Cæsar." Already, in the emulation of the different corps, and the mutual knowledge and attachment of the officers and men, were to be found the happy effects of that permanent organization into separate armies and divisions which, first of the moderns, Napoléon had imitated from the ancient conquerors of the world (4).

(1) Rapp. 109, 110. Bign. vi. 14. Hard. ix. 315.

(2) It is always pleasing to record a generous action, and doubly so when it occurs in an enemy; but justice compels the admission, that by delaying the transmission of this order Rapp conferred a greater favour on Napoléon than on the intended victim of his passion; for the one he saved only from death, the other from the guilt of murder. Rapp informs us that the Prince of Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam on the 25th, and it was for the account transmitted to Hohenlohe on that day of what he there saw that he was about to be condemned. The 25th was the day on which Davoust entered Berlin. The information objected to was collected, and the letter written, therefore, before the Prince had come under the military government of the French Emperor. There is no law against a private citizen, or a civic authority of one nation, transmitting to its military officers details which have come to his knowledge regarding an enemy, when not yet subject to their authority—Napoléon himself called on the French prefects and magistrates to do so a hundred times. If the circumstance of Hatzfeld having collected and transmitted this information, while on a civil mission to the Emperor at Potsdam, exposed him to the penalty of death, what is to be said to Savary the year before, who, by orders of Napoléon, when conferring with the Emperor Alexander on the proposed terms of accommodation, obtained and brought to him military details of inestimable importance in regard to the temper and strength of the allied army on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz; [Sav ii. 112, 113. Ante, v.] or to Napoléon himself, who, in 1797, transmitted orders to his brother Joseph, when holding the sacred office of ambassador at Rome, to do all in his power to revolutionize the Eternal City, and overturn the Papal authority? [Ante, iii. 291, and Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon, iv. 199, 201.] What the Prince of Hatzfeld did was no more than all ambassadors do, and which Napoléon invariably required from all his diplomatic agents. The character of the intended transaction may be judged of by what Berthier, with generous warmth, said on the occasion—"Your majesty will surely not shoot a man connected with the first families of Berlin for so trifling a thing: the supposition is impossible—you will not do so;" and from his positive refusal to write out the order, as well as Rapp's delay in its transmission. Had the Prince been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm—an act of deliberate murder. History, therefore, cannot award to Napoléon the praise of having pardoned, on this occasion, a criminal who had forfeited his life, either by the laws of war of the principles of justice; but it must not refuse the meed due to a conqueror who returns to generous feelings, after having been led, in a moment of irritation, to the command of an atrocious deed; and joyfully seizes on this incident as illustrative of that ascendency which, in his cooler moments, humane feelings obtained over ruthless passion in the mind of this extraordinary man.—RAPP. 108.

(3) "Soldiers! you are worthy defenders of my crown, and of the great people. As long as you are animated with your present spirit nothing can resist you. Behold the result of your labours! One of the first powers in Europe, which recently had the audacity to propose to us a shameful capitulation, is annihilated. The forests and defiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers would not have traversed in seven years, we have surmounted in seven days, besides, during the same period, fighting four combats and a great battle. We have arrived at Potsdam and Berlin sooner than the renown of our victories! We have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, including those of the royal guard, six hundred pieces of cannon, three fortresses, twenty generals, while half the army regret their not having had an opportunity of firing a shot. All the Prussian provinces, from the Elbe to the Oder, are in our hands.

"Soldiers, the Russians boast that they are advancing to meet us; let us march to encounter them; we will spare them the half of their journey; they will find an Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. A nation which has so speedily forgot the generosity which we manifested towards it after the battle, when its Emperor, its Court, the wreck of its army, owed its safety entirely to the capitulation which we granted to it, is a nation that will never be able to contend with us."—DUMAS, xvi. 250, 260.

(4) Dum. xvi. 259, 261.

Unpardonable severity of Napoléon to the Queen, and the Duke of Brunswick, and Elector of Hesse Cassel.

While Napoléon and his followers were thus indulging in an excusable pride at the retrospect of their wonderful achievements, the Prussian officers who had traversed the country, or reached the capital in virtue of the several capitulations which had been granted, were exposed to the most grievous humiliation. The officers of the guard, especially, who had escaped from the wreck of Hohenlohe's corps, were ostentatiously marched by the Emperor through Berlin to Spandau. Words cannot describe the mortification of those high-spirited young men, at the unparalleled calamities in which their inconsiderate passions had involved their country; wherever they went crowds beset their steps, some lamenting their sufferings, others reproaching them as the authors of all the public misfortunes. Napoléon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoléon, after the battle of Jéna, recommending his states to his generosity, was in an especial manner the object of invective; his states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that this wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died (1). The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms, and a heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an excess of patriotic ardour, compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy (2). The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jéna, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his posses-

Cruel expressions regarding both in the bulletins.

(1) "If the Duke of Brunswick," said the Bulletin, "has richly deserved the animadversion of the French people, he has also incurred that of the Prussian army and people; of the latter, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war; of the former, who complain of his manœuvres and military conduct. The false calculations of the young may be pardoned, but the conduct of that old Prince, aged 72, is an excess of insanity, and his catastrophe can excite no regret. What can there be respectable in gray hairs, when to the faults of age it unites the inconsiderateness and folly of youth? For these extravagances he has justly incurred the forfeiture of all his dominions."—23 and 27 *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe,* ii. 216, 293.

Napoléon's unworthy expressions regarding Gentz.

(2) "All the world accuses the Queen as the author of all the calamities which have befallen the Prussian nation. The public indignation is at its height against the authors of the war, especially Gentz, a miserable scribbler who sells himself for money. After her ridiculous journey to Erfurth and Weimar, the Queen entered Berlin a fugitive and alone. Among the standards we have taken are those embroidered by the hands of this princess, whose beauty has been as fatal to her people as that of Helen was to the citizens of Troy.—27 and 23 *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe,* ii. 215. It is worthy of observation that M. Gentz, who is here stigmatized as a miserable hireling sold to England, was one of the most distinguished writers of the age, and with whom Sir James Mackintosh, the eloquent apologist of the French Revolution, maintained a constant and valued correspondence down to the time of his death. That distinguished author thus speaks of Gentz's pamphlet, to which Napoléon alluded in a letter to the author :—"I received by the mail your two precious fragments. I assent to all you say, sympathize with all you feel, and admire equally your reason and your eloquence throughout your masterly fragment. I have read your letter fifty times since I received it, with the same sentiment which a Roman in the extremity of Mauritania would have felt, if he had received an account of the ruin of his country after the battle of Pharsalia, written the morning after that calamity, with the unconquerable spirit of Cato, and the terrible energy of Tacitus. He would have exulted that there was something which Cæsar could not subdue, *and from which a deliverer and avenger might yet spring.*"—Mackintosh's *Memoirs,* i. 304. Certainly, of all the unaccountable peculiarities in the mind of Napoléon, the most extraordinary is his total insensibility to the ultimate ascendant of truth over falsehood, and the extent to which he calculated on palming off falsehood and defamation on the credulity or ignorance of mankind.

Sir James Mackintosh's opinion of him.

sions. Animosity to England was the secret motive for all those acts of robbery. So strongly was Napoléon influenced by these feelings that he made no attempt to disguise that it was the ruling principle which governed all his measures towards the vanquished (1). The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, in favour of whom the Prussian plenipotentiaries then at Berlin made the strongest representations, shared the same fate: while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs,—"I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their bread." When a conqueror, in the midst of his greatest triumphs, uses such insulting language to the vanquished, and makes such an atrocious use of his victory, it is impossible to sympathize with his fall, and Waterloo and St.-Helena are felt to be a just measure of moral retribution (2).

Enormous contributions levied on Prussia and the north of Germany.

Meanwhile the French armies, without any farther resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoléon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of 159,000,000 francs (L.6,200,000) on the countries at war with France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian states on the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector of Saxony, and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden, equivalent to at least 12,000,000 sterling, if the difference between the value of money in England and Germany is taken into account, was levied with unrelenting severity; and the rapacity and exactions of the French agents employed in its collection aggravated to a very great degree the weight and odious nature of the imposition. Saxony, in the scourging contributions with which she was overwhelmed, had soon abundant cause to regret the French alliance; while Berlin, as well as the Hanoverian and Prussian states which had been occupied, experienced, in the rapacity of General Clarke and his subordinate agents, all the bitterness as well as the humiliation of conquest. Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor (3),—an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation, while General Clarke, governor of Berlin, acting towards the magistrates as if they were already its subjects, barbarously shot a burgomaster of the town of Kiritz, whose only fault was that he had, when destitute of any armed force, been unable to resist the

(1) M. Bignon, who was present on the occasion, gives the following curious account of the conversation which led to the dethronement of the Elector of Hesse Cassel:—"Duroc and I said every thing we could during breakfast in favour of the Elector. He only petitioned to be allowed to resume possession of his estates; his fortresses were all to be ceded to the French arms; his troops, twelve thousand strong, were to be joined to their forces, and a heavy contribution paid. These offers appeared to make a considerable impression on the Emperor, especially the offer of so many troops; but after musing a while, he said abruptly 'Bah! Brunswick, Nassau, Cassel: all these princes are essentially English; they will never be our friends,'—and instantly set out for a review. Two days afterwards appeared the 27th bulletin, containing the announcement of their dethronement."—See BIGNON, vi. 35.

(2) Bign. vi. 15, 33, 34. 23 and 27 Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe, ii. 155, 295, 214.

(3) The oath was in these terms:—"I swear to exercise with fidelity the authority which is committed to me by the Emperor of the French, and to act only for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to concur with all my power in the execution of all the measures which may be ordered for the French army, and to maintain no correspondence with its enemies."—BIGN. vi. 51.

abstraction of the arms of the burgher guard and local militia by Colonel Schill, who commanded a flying detachment that still, in the open country, preserved its fidelity to the colours of the monarchy (1). Even the highest authorities gave way to the indiscriminate passion for pillage; "the name of General Clarke," says Bourrienne, "became justly odious from every species of exaction, and a servile execution of all the orders of Napoléon," while the great reputation of the conqueror of Auerstadt was disgraced by the pillage of the noble library at Tempelberg, the country seat of Baron Hardenberg (2), minister of state, which took place, by his authority, while he was in person occupying the edifice.

Military organization of the country from the Rhine to the Vistula.

These evils, great as they were, and disgraceful to the arms and generals of France, were, however, in the ordinary case, only transitory; but it soon appeared that in the case of Prussia and the adjoining states they were to be permanent, and that the iron grasp of the conqueror was to be not only laid but retained on the north of Germany. Early in November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organization and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments, those of Berlin, of Magdebourg, of Stettin, and Custrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders of provinces into which it was divided. Receivers-general were appointed in each province, charged with collecting its whole revenue and all the war contributions imposed on it, and their transmission to the French governors. Magistrates, police, gendarmes, all were nominated by the authorities of Napoléon; the whole civil and military government of the country was concentrated in his hands. Clarke was governor-general, aided in the details of government by Count Daru, whose great capacity soon appeared in the admirable order which he introduced into every branch of the administration, and which would have been worthy of the highest admiration if it had not been rendered instrumental to the most cruel and universal system of public extortion. The same system of government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenberg, and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburgh, which were speedily oppressed by grievous contributions, in exacting which the Dutch generals and troops were peculiarly conspicuous. The Emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. Careful, at the same time, to mingle with these important civil changes such deeds as might captivate the imaginations of his subjects, he paraded before the deputation which came to Berlin from the senate of Paris to congratulate him on his victories, three hundred and forty grenadiers of his imperial guard, each bearing a standard taken from the enemy in this short campaign,—the most splendid display of military trophies seen in Europe since the triumphs of the Roman generals (3).

Nov. 3.

Negotiations with Prussia, and armistice concluded.

Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed; the misfortunes of the King rendered it almost indispensable that a respite should be

(1) At a dinner given by Louis XVIII. in 1815, to the King of Prussia, this massacre became the subject of conversation. "Sire," said Clarke, then Duke of Feltra, "it was an unhappy error."—"Say, rather, an unworthy crime," replied the indignant monarch,—Hard. ix. 318.

(2) Hard. ix. 317. Bign. vi. 51, 53. Dum. xvii. 40. 49. Bour. vii. 219.

(3) Dum. xvii. 54, 61. Bign. vi. 72. Bour. vii. 217, 219.

obtained on any terms, while it was not less advantageous for Napoléon to reap at once the fruits of his triumphs without undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a winter campaign in the frozen plains of Poland. Plenipotentiaries accordingly were appointed on both sides: on that of France, Duroc; on that of Prussia, M. Luchesini and Rastrow. There was no need of lengthened conferences; the situation of the parties gave to the one the power of demanding whatever he pleased, to the other the power of withholding nothing which was required. Napoléon insisted that Prussia should renounce all the provinces she possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, pay a contribution of a hundred millions of francs for the expenses of the war, cease to take any concern in the affairs of Germany, and recognize in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine whatever titles the conqueror chose to confer upon them. Not daring to refuse these conditions, and yet unwilling to take upon themselves the responsibility of making so great a
Oct. 27. sacrifice, the Prussian envoys referred the matter to the King or his Cabinet. They returned an answer agreeing to all the exactions which were required; but in the interval matters had essentially changed for the worse, the wreck of the Prussian armies had been almost totally destroyed, and the demands of Napoléon rose in proportion. Perpetually haunted by the idea that it was the influence of England which he required to combat, and that the northern powers were brought into the field only to maintain her cause (1), he now insisted that the Prussian troops should retire entirely to Königsberg and the small portion of the monarchy which lies to the east of the Vistula; that Colberg, Dantzic, Graudentz, Thorn, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Nieuburg should be placed in the hands of the French; and that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter any part of the Prussian territory. In agreeing to terms so ruinous to the monarchy, the Prussian plenipotentiaries could hardly expect that the King would ratify them; but so desperate had its affairs now become, that it was of importance to obtain a delay even of a few days, in the departure of Napoléon for Posen, in order
Nov. 16. to gain time for the arrival of the Russian troops on the Vistula. They signed the convention at Charlottenberg acccordingly, stipulating only for its ratification by the King of Prussia. In fact, however, no hope remained to either side that it would lead to a permanent accommodation; for, a few days before the truce was concluded, Talleyrand openly announced to the Prussian plenipotentiaries that they must look for no restitution of his conquests by the Emperor Napoléon, and that the vast territory from the Rhine to the Vistula would be retained until a general peace, as a means of compelling England to surrender its maritime acquisitions, and Russia to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had recently been invaded by its arms. Thus the unhappy Prussian monarchy was made responsible for the ambition or successes of other powers over whose measures it had no sort of control; and the negotiations at Berlin, diverging from their original object, were degenerating into a mere manifesto of implacable hostility against the Cabinets of London and St.-Petersburg (2).

The severity of the terms demanded, as well as their express assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead to a separate accommo-

(1) "He was persuaded," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "that it was the intrigues of England which had arrayed the northern courts against France, which had brought about the refusal of the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of Paris, and pushed forward Prussia into the field of battle. It was England, therefore, which it had become necessary to strike in Prussia; and it was on the conduct of the Cabinet of London, in regard to the restitution of conquests, that the Emperor announced he would measure his own steps for the future fate of the Prussian monarchy"—LUCCHESINI, ii. 176, 177; BIGN. vi. 44.

(2) Dum. xvii. 66, 67. Bign. vi. 48, 49. Lucches. ii. 182, 185, 186. Martens, xi. 380.

Which the King of Prussia refuses to ratify.

dation, as Napoléon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, what was to be gained by the cession of three-fourths of its dominions, and its fortresses still unsubdued on the Vistula, to the French? Reft as he was of his kingdom and his army, the King still preserved his honour, and nobly resolved to continue faithful to his engagements. He declined, therefore, to ratify the armistice, which was presented to him at Osterode for signature, on the part of France, by Duroc, and at the same time published a melancholy but noble proclamation, in which, without attempting to disguise his hopes or conceal the deplorable state of his affairs, he rose superior to the storms of fortune, and declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia (1). This refusal was anticipated by Napoléon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

Nov. 28.

Famous Berlin decree against English commerce.

To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree of the 21st November, against the commerce of Great Britain. But that subject is too vast to be adequately touched on in the close of a chapter embracing such a variety of objects as the present; and it will be fully enlarged on in a subsequent one, which will include also the Milan decree which followed, in 1807, the continental system, and orders of council adopted as a measure of retaliation by the British Government.

Affairs of Poland. Napoléon's words to the Polish deputies.

Napoléon set out from Berlin for the Vistula soon after he had fulminated this anathema against English commerce, and at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hopes which his subsequent conduct never realized: "France," said he, "has never recognized the partitions of Poland; but, nevertheless, I cannot proclaim your independence until you are resolved to defend your rights as a nation at every sacrifice, even that of life itself. The world reproaches you with having in your continual civil dissensions lost sight of the true interests and safety of your country. Taught by your misfortunes, now unite, and prove to the world that the same spirit animates the whole Polish nation." Universal acclamations attended his arrival at Posen; all the population advanced to meet his carriage; four magnificent triumphal arches were erected to the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Count Palatine Radzerminski, at the head of the deputation from Great Poland, addressed him in terms of Eastern adulation, mingled with strange expressions which proved prophetic: "The universe knows your exploits and your triumphs; the West beheld the first development of your genius;

Nov. 29.

(1) Dum. xvii. 69, 71. Lucches. ii. 223, 225. Bign. vi. 48, 49.

Matters, said the proclamation, had arrived at that pass, that Prussia could no longer hope to obtain peace, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices. It was not in his power to make the Russian forces retrograde, since already their own frontiers were menaced. The Emperor of France has shown a determination, even when he acceded to the basis of a negotiation, not to suspend for one moment his military operations; and he has protracted the conferences till his successes enabled him to declare that the conquest of Prussia should afford him the means of dictating peace to England and Russia. Compelled thus to resume hostilities, the King is not without hopes of yet bringing them to successful issue. He hopes that the governors of the fortresses on the Vistula will not imitate the weakness of those on the Oder and Elbe, and all the disposable forces of the monarchy will hasten to unite their colours on the Vistula and the Warta to the brave Russian battalions. Such a proof of courage and constancy is not new to the Prussian nation. In the Seven Years' War the capital and provinces were also occupied by the enemy; but the firmness and intrepidity of the nation brought it safe through all its perils, and excited alike the admiration and astonishment of posterity. Then Prussia combated alone the greatest powers of Europe; now the powerful and magnanimous Alexander is about to take his place by her side with all the forces of his vast empire. Their cause is the same . they will stand or fall together.—Dum, vii, 70, 71.

the South was the recompense of your labours; the East became to you an object of admiration; *the North will be the term of your victories.* The Polish race, yet groaning under the yoke of the Germanic nations, humbly implores your august highness to raise up its remnant from the dust."—Napoléon replied, "That which has been destroyed by force cannot be restored but by force. I would with pleasure behold the independence of Poland restored, and a barrier formed by its strength against the unbounded ambition of Russia; but petitions and discourses will not achieve this work; and unless the whole nation, including nobles, priests, and burghers, does unite and embrace the firm resolution to conquer or die, success is hopeless. With such a determination it is certain; and you may always rely on my powerful protection (1)."

Advance of Jérome into Silesia, and of the French army to the Vistula.

While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoléon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the flanks of the invading force. To Jérome Bonaparte, who commanded the ninth corps, consisting of twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Wirtembergers, and who had Vandamme for his adviser, was intrusted the difficult task of reducing the six fortresses of Silesia, Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz, containing in all a force nearly equal to his own. Glogau, however, with its garrison of three thousand men, made but a show of resistance, and, early in December, fell into the hands of the French. The other bulwarks of the province exhibited more determination, and operations in form were commenced against them (2).

Surrounding of Glogau. Dec. 3.

Mortier occupies Hamburgh.

Mortier, on the extreme left, was intrusted with the subjugation of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, and the occupation of Hamburgh, which was accomplished with hardly any resistance. Having done this, he advanced to observe Stralsund and the Swedes, while a fresh reserve was collecting on the Elbe, under the command of Louis, King of Holland. Thus, though the grand army was advancing by rapid strides to the shores of the Vistula, its flanks on either side were protected by subordinate corps; and fresh forces, stationed in echelon in their rear, overawed the intermediate states, and kept up the communication with the Rhine. The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while a hundred thousand were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoléon were, such prodigious efforts over so great an extent of surface, rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The Senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor, eighty thousand were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. "In what more triumphant circumstances," said the Emperor, "can we call on the youth of France to flock to our standards? They will have to traverse, in joining their comrades, the capitals of their enemies, and fields of battle illustrated by immortal victories." It may easily be conceived with what transports this appeal was received by a nation so passionately attached to military glory as the French, and the Emperor resolved to turn it to the best account. Not content with this great addition to his prospective resources, he instituted corps of volunteers to receive the numerous and enthusiastic youth, whom even the conscription could not drain off in sufficient numbers; additional battalions were added to the imperial guard; the troops of Hesse taken

Dec. 5. Levy of a new conscription in France.

(1) Dum. xvii. 60, 64

(2) Jom. ii. 324, 325. Dum. xvii. 20.

in a body into French pay, and the most energetic measures adopted to augment as much as possible the military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine. Detailed instructions were at the same time transmitted to Marmont in Illyria, and the Viceroy Eugène Beauharnais, to have their forces disposed on the Austrian monarchy in the most advantageous position; the King of Bavaria was informed by the Emperor himself of all that he should do for the defence of his dominions, and the activity displayed in the fortresses on the Adige, the Isonzo, and the Inn, looked as if he was making preparations rather for a defensive struggle in the plains of Bavaria, or the fields of Italy, than for a stroke at the vitals of Russia on the shores of the Vistula (1).

Treaty between France and Saxony.

A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France was the natural result of these successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at twenty thousand men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign : a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation—while by a subsidiary treaty, signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the Confederacy (2).

Dec. 15.

Immense results of the campaign.

Such was the astonishing campaign of Jena, the most marvellous of all the achievements of Napoléon; that in which success the most unheard of attended his steps, and his force appeared most irresistible to the bewildered nations. Europe had hardly recovered the shock arising from the fall of Austria in three months, during the campaign of Austerlitz, when she beheld Prussia overthrown in as many weeks by the shock of Jena. Without halting one day before the forces of the enemy, without ever once pausing in the career of conquest, the French troops had marched from the Rhine to the Vistula; the fabric reared with so much care by the wisdom and valour of Frederick the Great, had fallen by a single blow; and one of the chief powers of Christendom had disappeared at once from the theatre of Europe. Three hundred and fifty standards, four thousand pieces of cannon, six first-rate fortresses, eighty thousand prisoners, had been taken in less than seven weeks; of a noble array of a hundred and twenty thousand men, who had so lately crowded on the banks of the Saale, not more than fifteen thousand now followed the standards of the King to the shores of the Vistula (3). Results so astonishing were altogether unprecedented in modern Europe : they recalled rather the classic exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, or the fierce inroads of Timour or Gengiskhan, than any thing yet experienced in Christendom; but they possessed this superiority above the achievements of antiquity or the sanguinary conquest of modern barbarism, that it was not over inexperienced tribes or enervated nations that the triumphs had been won, but the most warlike nation of the civilized world that had been overthrown, and the army which had recently withstood the banded strength of Europe which had been dissolved.

The talents displayed by Napoléon in this campaign, though of a very high order, were not equal to the transcendant abilities evinced at Ulm and Austerlitz. Doubtless the celerity with which the hazardous advance of the

(1) Bign. vi. 69, 71. Dum. xvii. 50, 55. See the orders in Dum. xvii. Pièces Just.

(2) Dum. xvii. 88, 89. Martens, Sup. iv. 384, 387.

(3) Jom ii. 325.

Talents and rashness displayed by Napoléon during the campaign.

Duke of Brunswick across the Thuringian Forest to turn the French left and interpose between the Rhine and their army, was turned to the best account, and the Prussians cut off from their magazines and communications at the very moment they were endeavouring to inflict that injury on the enemy, the vigour of the fight at Jena, and the incomparable energy with which the mighty host which there conquered was dispersed like a fan in pursuit of the broken remains of the enemy, and incessantly pressed on till they were totally destroyed, were worthy of the highest admiration. But in the very outset of the campaign he exposed himself to unnecessary hazard, and but for a change of position on the part of the bulk of the Prussian army, of which he was ignorant, might have been involved in as great a catastrophe as the route on the banks of the Inn had been to the Imperialists. To advance and attack the Prussian army, strongly posted at Jena, through the narrow and rugged defiles of the Landgrafenberg, was a greater error in military conduct than it was in the Archduke John to advance against Moreau through the pines of Hohenlinden. Napoléon has told us this himself,—"The first principle of the military art," says he, "is never to fight with a defile in your rear; for if defeated in such a station, total ruin is hardly avoidable (1)." Had the whole Prussian army, a hundred thousand strong, been posted at the opening of the defiles instead of a rear-guard of forty thousand only, the French would probably have never been able to debouche, and a disastrous retreat have been experienced. There was little of the usual calculation of means to end in this great commander, when he himself, with eighty thousand men, was opposed only to Hohenlohe with forty thousand, while Davoust, with thirty thousand, was left to struggle with the King in person, at the head of sixty thousand. No man knew better than Napoléon that such combinations were against the first principles, not merely of the military art, but of common sense applied to such subjects; but the truth is, that the campaign of Austerlitz had given him an undue confidence in his destiny; he deemed himself invincible, because he had always hitherto proved so; and already were to be seen the signs of that fatal rashness which was to lead him to the Moscow retreat and the disasters of Leipsic.

Reflections on the sudden fall of Prussia.

After making every allowance for the magnitude of the defeat sustained by the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, and the extraordinary circumstance of the fugitives from these two fields getting intermingled during their nocturnal flight, there is something extraordinary and almost unaccountable in the sudden prostration of the monarchy. Had the people been lukewarm or disaffected in the cause, it would have admitted of easy solution; but this was very far indeed from being the case; public spirit ran high, and unanimity unprecedented against Gallic aggression existed among all classes. Yet in the midst of this ardent and enthusiastic feeling, pusillanimity the most disgraceful was generally evinced, and fortresses all but impregnable surrendered at the first summons of a contemptible enemy! Where were the soldiers of the Great Frederick, where the constancy of the Seven Years War, when Magdebourg, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau lowered their colours without firing a shot, and the weakness of these garrisons permitted the army on the Vistula to be reinforced at the decisive moment by forty thousand men, who otherwise would have been chained round their walls? These unprecedented capitulations demonstrate that, however high was the spirit of part of the nation, the same feelings were not universal, and that the kingdom of Prussia, newly cemented by the genius of Frederick, had

(1) Nap. Mem. Book ix. 124, 125. on Waterloo.

not yet acquired that general patriotic spirit which can withstand the severer shocks of adversity, and constitutes the only secure basis of national independence. And the English historian who recollects how a similar catastrophe prostrated the energies of his own ancestors after the battle of Hastings, will probably feel charitably towards an infant nation placed in such trying circumstances; and feel a deeper thankfulness for that long career of national independence, that unbroken line of national glory, which has formed the indomitable public spirit of his own country, and constitutes the unseen chain which has so long held together the immense fabric of the British dominions.

General despondency which it occasions in Europe.

In proportion to the unbounded enthusiasm which these wondrous events excited in France, was the despondency which they diffused through the other states of Europe. Alarm now seized the most sanguine, despair took possession of the most resolute. The power which had risen up in Europe to vanquish and destroy seemed beyond the reach of attack. Every effort made against it, every coalition formed for its overthrow, had led only to fresh triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of its strength. The utmost efforts of Austria, supported by all the wealth of England and all the military strength of Russia, had sunk in the conflict; and now a few weeks had sufficed to dissipate that admirable army which the Great Frederick had bequeathed as the phalanx of independence to his country. The thoughtful and philanthropic, more even than the multitude, were penetrated with apprehensions at these portentous events. They looked back to ancient times, and read in the long degradation of Greece and the Byzantine empire, the consequences of their subjugation from the military force of Rome, and could anticipate no brighter prospect for futurity than the ultimate resurrection of Europe after many ages of slavery and decline (1). So little can the greatest intellects anticipate the future course of events in a society so perpetually influenced by new moving powers as that of modern Europe; and so necessary is it, in forming a judgment on the ultimate consequences of existing changes, not merely to look back to the lessons of history, but take into account also the hitherto inexperienced influence of fresh causes rising into action in the ever varying scene of human affairs.

Blucher's opinion of its probable resurrection.

That bright dawn, however, which philanthropy looked for in vain, and philosophy was unable to anticipate in the dark gloom of the political horizon, the ardent mind of a hero had already begun to descry; and what is very remarkable, he fixed on the precise circumstances in the temper of the times which were destined to make it ultimately expand to all the lustre of day. "I reckon much," said Blucher to Bourrienne at Hamburgh, whither he had retired on his parole from Lubeck, "on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral; but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honour and a passion for national glory. Be assured, when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination, they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a Landwehr such as the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. England will yield us its subsidies; we will renew our alliances with Russia and Austria. I know well the principles of the coalition. The sole object which the allied sovereigns have in

(1) See, in particular, Sir James Mackintosh's letter to Gentz on this subject, *Memoirs*, i. 384. It is curious, but not unnatural, to observe the earliest and warmest advocates of the French Revolution most gloomy in their anticipations of its ultimate effects. Ardour of imagination, the habit of looking before the multitude into the ultimate consequences of passing events, a sincere desire for the good of mankind, naturally in the same minds, in 1790 and 1806, produced these opposite results.

view is to put a limit to the system of aggression which Napoléon has adopted, and which he pursues with the most alarming rapidity. In our first wars against France, at the commencement of its Revolution, we fought for the rights of kings, in which, for my part, I felt very little interest; but now the case is totally changed, the population of Prussia makes common cause with its Government, the safety of our hearths is at stake; and reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation. I look forward without anxiety to the future, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your Emperor. The time may come when Europe in a body, humiliated by his exactions, exhausted by his depredations, will rise up in arms against him. The more he enchains different nations, the more terrible will be the explosion when they burst their fetters. Who can now dispute the insatiable passion for aggrandizement with which he is animated? No sooner is Austria subjugated than Prussia is destroyed; and though we have fallen, Russia remains to continue the strife. I cannot foresee the issue of this struggle; but supposing it to be favourable to France, it will come to an end. You will speedily see new wars arise, and if we hold firm, France, worn out with conquests, will at length succumb (1)."

Blucher was right in these anticipations. It is not in the suffering but the prosperity of nations that the seeds of ruin are in general to be found: the anguish and humiliation which are the consequences of weakness, disunion, or corruption, are often the severe school of ultimate improvement. If we would discern the true cause of the fall of Prussia, we must go back to the vacillation and selfishness which characterized its national councils during the ten prosperous years which succeeded the treaty of Basle in 1795: which caused it to temporize when the moment for action had arrived, and brought it in heedless security to the very edge of perdition; which lowered the national feeling by sacrificing the national honour, and paralyzed the arms of its natural allies by inspiring distrust in the good faith of its Government. In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations any more than individuals; it is the flow of unbroken prosperity which, by promoting the growth of the selfish passions, is the real source, in most cases, of irremediable ruin. Those twin curses of humanity, despotism and democracy, act in precisely the same way on the sources of public welfare, by poisoning the fountains of individual exertion, and inducing in the active members of society a slavish submission to the authority of the irresistible executive, or a selfish prosecution of their own interest, instead of a generous devotion to the public good. Till this last stage of national degradation has arrived, there is always a hope of revival to its fortunes; no misfortunes are irremediable as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken; no calamities irreparable but those which undermine their virtue.

(1) Bour. vii. 205, 206.

END OF VOLUME FIVE.